Author Archive

28/09/2014: Happy Sunday Junubeen

Posted: September 28, 2014 by PaanLuel Wël in History, PaanLuel Wël

Now it has taken us over 21 years to capture a geographical region called South Sudan. But I don’t know how long it may take us to capture the minds of Junubeen”Dr. John Garang, Rumbek, Lakes State, 27th July 2005. 
John Garang, Kerubino Kuanyin and William Nyuon

John Garang, Kerubino Kuanyin and William Nyuon, and Salva Kiir below

“On July 27th, 2005, when Dr. John Garang arrived in Rumbek from Khartoum, we had an impromptu meeting to welcome the chairman. After the meeting, few of us remained behind under the big tree to chat with the chairman. Mama Rebecca Nyandeeng had gone home to cook. Then the chairman turned to Comrade Salva Kiir and said: ‘Remember what I said in 1984 after we had formed the movement? By then we had thought that the war would be over within few years and we would come out of the bush to enjoy our freedom. Then I had a dream in which I dreamt that we had achieved our liberation but only two of us were remaining, out of the founders. When I narrated this dream to our comrades then, Kerubino had shouted me down, saying, yin ya apiedh. So I kept quiet. Now it has taken us over 21 years to capture a geographical region called South Sudan. But I don’t know how long it may take us to capture the minds of Junubeen.” ~~Recalled Comrade Aguil de Chut Deng, on the 27th of September 2014, Juba Grand Hotel, Juba, South Sudan.

Speech by Hon. Raila Amolo Odinga of Kenya

Posted: September 28, 2014 by PaanLuel Wël in Speeches

This is not about us; it is about future generations

The true size of Africa

The true size of Africa

No apologies to make: The test for our clamour for change is not the timing but rather the necessity.
Of course county governments are not perfect. But then, no one is.


Our constitution opens with five powerful words: “We, the People of Kenya…”

But I get the feeling not all of us appreciate the importance of these words.

These words identify who is responsible for promulgating and upholding the foundations of the Constitution.

Our intent in giving ourselves the constitution is laid out in the remainder of the preamble thus:

Acknowledging the supremacy of the Almighty God: Honouring those who heroically struggled to bring freedom and justice to our land: Recognising the aspirations of all Kenyans for a government based on the essential values of human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law: Exercising our sovereign and inalienable right to determine the form of governance of our country and having participated fully in the making of this Constitution… Adopt, enact and give this Constitution to ourselves and to our future generations.

In the past few months, we have gone around the country; we shall continue to go around the country, for the very reason we’ve gathered for here today: to push to change our Constitution in our capacity as the people of Kenya.

The Constitution allows for a referendum to amend it. The Constitution provides for a parliamentary route or a popular initiative. We, the people, have chosen the route of the popular initiative.

In providing for amendments, the Constitution does not label any such effort as an attempt to overthrow or to slow down the government or take over power through the back door.

We commit no crime; this is not a contest between Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga. It is not a test of might between Cord and Jubilee. Nor is it an attempt to revive or end political careers.

We are not in this because we love our government less. We are in this because we love Kenya more.

Do not be afraid, do not feel guilty, and do not be apologetic over this journey. We, the people, are acting in the best interest of our country.

We expect the government to facilitate, not frustrate our efforts. Many battles have been fought from this venue. At this very venue, Dr Crispin Odhiambo Mbai put the case like nobody ever did on why we need to devolve power and resources.

They vilified him. They trailed him. Eventually, they killed him. But devolution came to be.

And Kenya is a much better place today because of devolution. In Kenya, you know you are into something big and something good when the establishment fights you viciously.

We are out to strengthen devolution because we have seen what it can do what ails it. We have seen what county governments have done with so little money in such a short time.

I will give a few random examples. In Marsabit, the national government drilled only about 20 bore holes in the last 50 years.

The county government has drilled 20 bore holes in one year. Livestock is the mainstay of Marsabit but for 50 years the region never built a slaughter house.

Today, after one year of devolution, Marsabit is set to perform a ground breaking ceremony for a modern slaughter house.

In Siaya, there were only 3 tractors when the county government took over. The county government has bought 7 tractors and hired 30 others.

Siaya used to harvest 3,300 bags of maize. Within a year, the county government has put 5,000 hectares under mechanisation. This year they expect 880,000 bags.

Kisii Hospital has never had a dialysis unit since it was built in 1917. One year after devolution, a dialysis unit is being set up.

The mortuary capacity that never exceeded 20 is now expanding to accommodate 100.

Mombasa County mobilised 27 cars within months of taking office for police to ensure security. At no one time in 50 years did the county manage that number of vehicles.

The county is also set to unveil the first water desalination plant by 2016. In Wajir, they have built the first tarmac road — 25 kilometres — the first one since independence.


Of course these county governments are not perfect. But then, no one is.

For months, we have been asking the national government to account for the Sh15 billion that was stolen from OP. No one is talking.

When counties are strong, we have an economy firing from all cylinders. That means jobs and opportunities for youth and good living for all.

That is why we are demanding that 45 per cent of national revenue goes to the counties to enable them carry out functions that are commensurate with this allocation.

We want an end to the deliberate confusion around the Provincial Administration.

We want state departments and parastatals whose functions were fully or partially devolved to release to the counties all the funds they are holding in Nairobi.

Today, the national government is holding up to Sh120 billion for functions already devolved. Continuous withholding of these funds is a major source of several crises in counties.

We recognise that the country’s foreign policy is the role of the national government. However, counties are now major centres of investment, trade and other critical sectors of economy.

We feel their voices should be heard in determining the core foreign policy direction of the country.

Is it too early for a referendum to amend the constitution? No. The test is not the timing but the necessity.

In the USA, the Constitution came into operation on 4th March 1789 and the First Amendment was sent to the States for ratification on September 25, 1789, barely six months later. And in its seventeen years of existence, the South African Constitution has been amended seventeen times.

They will tell you Americans did not go to the referendum. That is true, but that was because the government opted for dialogue.

We, the People, must now roll our sleeves from here and reach every corner of our country, for the sake of our children and grandchildren.

Mr Odinga is Cord leader. This is an excerpt from a speech he read at the Okoa Kenya General Assembly at the Bomas of Kenya.

The peace talks between the South Sudanese warring factions have seen a slow but encouraging progress as president Salva Kiir’s government has agreed to installation of federal system of governance.

Observers at the peace talks told Sudan Tribune on Saturday that various committees formed were working on different documents in order to agree on issues of security, governance and economy of the young troubled nation.

“Government negotiators have agreed to the call for federalism in South Sudan. This is a significant step and good gesture to reach a political settlement,” an observer close to the process said.

The rebel faction SPLM-in-Opposition under the leadership of the former vice-president, Riek Machar have been calling to restructure the South Sudanese state on the basis of federalism which the government had previously rejected.

The recent change of heart by the government is seen as a good gesture towards reaching a political settlement to end the 9-month-long civil war in the country.

Sources indicated that government negotiators have also agreed that a prime minister, which would be a nominee by the rebel group in the proposed transitional leadership power-sharing arrangements, would also run for public office. The latest development is a reverse to the IGAD protocol which denied the prime minister the right to contest in elections, a position previously supported by the government.

Machar’s opposition faction also suggested a prime minister would be the head of government and its security organs while the president would be the head of state who would be ceremonial in roles.

While the rebels agreed and preferred to discuss a parliamentary system similar to the leadership arrangements in Ethiopia, the government leaned towards adopting a system similar to the Grand Coalition which Kenya used between the former president Mwai Kibaki and his rival Raila Odinga.

It is not clear whether the parties will beat the 45-day dateline imposed by IGAD within which to reach a final peace agreement.

Meanwhile the warring parties continue to trade accusations over the recent clashes in Upper Nile state which threatens to interrupt the oil production in the main oil fields of Paloich.

Tens of thousands of people have died and over 1.5 million displaced since the conflict within the ruling party turned violent in mid-December.

The IGAD-mediated peace process is seen as the only hope to peacefully end the conflict and avert the looming humanitarian crisis in the fragile region.


Now Machar’s men back UPDF stay in South Sudan, The East African News Paper.

By BARBARA AMONG, TEA Special Correspondent

Posted  Saturday, September 27  2014

The conflict in South Sudan saw significant developments last week with Dr Riek Machar’s rebels finally coming to terms with the UPDF presence in Juba and the rebel leader travelling to Beijing, where he was expected to commit further to a peaceful settlement of the nearly one-year-old conflict.

While opening their liaison office in Kampala, rebel representatives declared support for the continued stay of Ugandan soldiers in Juba while Uganda on the other hand officially welcomed the Principal Representative of the rebels to Kampala.

The official opening of a liaison office in Kampala, players say, now gives Uganda leverage over the rebels and it is also seen as a sign of improving relations between the rebel movement and the government of Uganda.

Machar’s Principal Representative to Kampala David Otim said the liaison office in Kampala will be used to promote the diplomatic relations between the rebel group and Kampala, and to co-ordinate the humanitarian, peace and reconciliation initiatives in Uganda with the aim of realising permanent solution to the war in South Sudan.

Consensus on UPDF’s role

“We in the SPLM/A (in opposition) are in the meantime in consensus that the UPDF in South Sudan should continue to play their positive role in protecting lives and property as we wait for full deployment of Igad’s protection force as per the Addis-Ababa Cessation of Hostility Protocol,” said Mr Otim.

This is a U-turn from the previous demand that Uganda should withdraw its troops from South Sudan as a prerequisite for the Addis Ababa peace negotiation and for a meeting between President Yoweri Museveni and Dr Machar to take place.

The change of heart on the side of Machar’s team follows a meeting in Kampala last month between Uganda’s security officials and Machar’s team.

The developments in Kampala come at a time when China, one of the major oil players in South Sudan, has summoned Dr Machar to Beijing to discuss the crisis.
Sources said China hopes to rein in Machar to commit to the peace talks and get a guarantee from him on protection of its interest in the oil fields. Dr Machar’s forces control the oil rich states of Unity and Upper Nile.

An advance team, led by Dr Dhieu Mathok Diing, arrived in Beijing last week. In the delegation is Comrade Hussein Mar Nyuot, chairperson for the humanitarian committee and Dr Richard K Mulla, the chairperson for the justice and human rights committee.

“Dr Machar will hold bilateral talks with officials of the Peoples Republic of China and try to forge mutual understanding,” said Machar’s spokesperson James Gatdet.

Prof Nathaneil Oyet, chairman for the rebel faction’s national committee for political mobilisation, told The EastAfrican in an interview that Dr Machar would discuss China’s role in the peace process and the recent report that China was supplying arms to the Juba government.

“We want to hold frank discussions on, for example, the question of human rights violations by government,” said Prof Oyet.

However, China’s worry, insiders say, is threats to its interests in South Sudan. The war, which broke out December last year, has affected oil production, reducing it from 300,000BPD to less than a half.

China is the largest foreign investor in South Sudan and Sudan oil industry. The China National Petroleum Corporation has 40 per cent stake in the oil fields, making it the largest.

Is Khartoum Colluding with the Rebels to Undermine Juba?

Posted: September 28, 2014 by PaanLuel Wël in History

What the Khartoum regime really thinks

(leaked minutes of critical August 2014 meeting of senior military and security official)

By Eric Reeves

I received on 22 September 2014, from a source within Sudan whom I trust implicitly, a truly extraordinary, indeed explosive document, containing the “Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College [Khartoum]“; the meeting referred to took place on August 31, 2014; the date of the minutes for the document is September 1, 2014 (Sunday).

What makes the document so extraordinary is the participation of the regime’s most senior military and security officials, expressing themselves freely, and in the process disclosing numerous highly consequential policy decisions, internal and external. We learn, for example, of Sudan’s continuing involvement with international terrorism and radical Islamic groups, including an ongoing “strategic” partnership with Iran. There is certainly evidence here that Khartoum has reneged on its putative commitment to provide the U.S. intelligence community with information relevant to counter-terrorism. More explicitly, the document reveals a determination to continue bombing agriculture and food supplies as a means of waging war against the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, with an explicit, declared goal of starvation. Regime officials also emphasize that there will be no lifting of the humanitarian embargo that prevents international relief efforts from reaching the desperate civilians in rebel-held territories of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

There is much in this document making clear that political machinations surrounding the so-called “national dialogue” are nothing but a sham in the eyes of the regime, merely a means of filling time uselessly before the 2015 elections—a constant topic of discussion. We see that Darfur has been largely written off as a military threat, or at least one that requires no more than an expansion of the re-invigorated and openly embraced Janjaweed militias, now known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In addition to encouraging the uncontrolled predations of the RSF, these senior officials speak openly about renewed efforts to empty the camps for Darfuri displaced persons.

We also learn much about the extent to which Khartoum is committed to supporting the rebel groups in South Sudan, promising heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and other “advanced weapons”—as well as re-supply and security in Khartoum. Riek Machar and his deputy Taban Deng Gai are reported to have expressed their regret at Southern secession.

And there is a great deal more.

[All quotes included here come from a lightly edited version of the English translation of the original Arabic document; edits are for punctuation errors (including apostrophes indicating possession, extra spaces, gratuitous end punctuation, and a great many unnecessary commas; some unidiomatic passages have been made slightly clearer. As they appear in this analysis, some excerpts have been somewhat more heavily edited, but still limited to matters of grammar and idiom. Brackets [ … ] are used where editorial intrusion has been greatest. All comments by me, including interpolations of explanation and identification, as well as extended critical remarks, are in italics.]


Inevitably there will be questions about the authenticity of this document, marked internally as “Secret,” “Confidential,” and “Restricted.” I should say first that I do not know what the full “chain of custody” for the document is (documents rather: for in addition to the English translation of the Arabic, there are photographs of every page of the original Arabic document, as well as of every page of the handwritten translation into English; there are 46 documents in all, most in .JPG format; typically, however, I will refer simply to “the document”).

A close linguistic analysis of the English text makes clear that while the prose is of very good quality, and written by someone with considerable intelligence, there are many small typographic and punctuation errors that are typical of even skilled native Arab speakers writing in English; a few idiomatic errors recur with telling familiarity. The person who produced this text is well-educated person, very proficient in English, whose native language is Arabic (I have taught English as a second language, and specifically to native Arabic speakers.)

That I am not able say to say how the document made its way to my source is hardly surprising: the transfer of such a document would have been extremely dangerous at all stages, given its explosive contents and the greatly enhanced intercept capabilities of Khartoum’s security services (something discussed and referred to in authoritative detail at various points in the document). Everyone involved in producing and transporting or transmitting the documents was (and is) at risk of arrest and execution for treason. Gratuitous explanatory communications of any kind explaining movement or transmission of the document would increase the risk of exposing all involved. I have concluded after much reading and reflection that the unknown nature of original transmission or physical transfer of the document is not in itself suspicious.

And there are a great many reasons to believe that the document is authentic. Some are small: the transliterative use of “Hisen” rather than “Hussein” (as in Abdel Rahmin Mohamed Hussein, Minister of Defense) seems odd, but transliteration may not be a familiar exercise for the person(s) who undertook the translation. On the other hand, a skilled fabrication would be unlikely to make such a peculiar choice in transliteration; and if this is indeed a fabrication, it is an astonishingly skilled one, even as it serves no obvious purpose for the regime and in several respects seems quite beyond the capacity of the rebel movements.

Most of the reasons for believing the document to be authentic, on my reading, have to do with the extremely close resemblance of much of what is said by officials in this meeting and what has been said and done publicly by the National Congress Party/National Islamic Front regime, but in the minutes with more detail, specificity, and nuance of expression. To be sure, not all of what is said in the confidence of this meeting would be uttered by regime officials so bluntly when communicating with the international community—within the various worlds in which Khartoum understands itself to be speaking. It uses many “dialects,” as these exchanges make clear: to the Saudis and Arab Emirates, to Iran, to the U.S., to the UN and its various representatives in Sudan, to the European Union, and to the African Union.

But why fabricate a document only to persuade an audience of the fact that the NCP/NIF speaks bluntly in private meetings? What could be the motive for the regime to fabricate a document that contains so much of what we know to be the case, if cast in brutally unvarnished and contemptuous fashion?

I believe the congruence between what is in the document and what has long been known, but little discussed publicly by the regime, is itself telling at various points. It has long been known, for example, that many within the regime opposed the Naivasha peace talks that yielded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan (January 2005)—that there were a number, especially in the military, who felt too much had been given away, and that this was humiliating to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), since they had not been defeated in many areas they were obliged to leave.

But there is still some shock in reading the current Defense Minister and former Minister of the Interior during the most violent years of the Darfur genocide, Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein, declare baldy: “If it were not for Naivasha, all the rebellion[s] should have finished” (page 22). Lt. General Bakri Hassan Saleh, current Vice President of the regime, speaks contemptuously of his interlocutors at the time of Naivasha in the context of current efforts to understand Khartoum’s multiple and highly secretive security services: “They are targeting the security organs, but they don’t know how these organs work. Even those who came during the days of Naivasha went [away] without knowing how we think or work” (page 19). Notably, of the fourteen participants listed in the documents, twelve have military titles—all generals of some rank, primarily Lt. General. Some wear two hats: Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh also has the specified rank of “First Lieutenant General.”

Further Observations on Authenticity

In compiling these documents, someone/some group took an extraordinary risk even in assembling the photographs and written translation records, as well as the final time-consuming translation, and then transmitting them, unless we make the unlikely assumption that the documents were created abroad, smuggled back into Sudan, and then passed on to my source. Certainly one thing we hear again and again in the minutes—nothing really new—is how effective the regime’s intercept capabilities are. Perhaps the documents were smuggled out of the country by “flash drive,” which might be very small and still contain all these data. But this, it must be emphasized, would entail extreme risk on departing Sudan. Indeed, mere possession of even fabricated minutes for such a meeting as is reported would be considered as treasonous as actually transcribing and translating the contents of a real meeting.

Moreover, the documents reveal considerable disagreement, especially about the strategic relationship with Iran, and how to finesse the problems this has created with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates. In closing the meeting Vice President Bakri declares that: “In this meeting it is not necessary that we agree on every point we discuss”—this to the most hardline elements within the current regime.

In his concluding remarks at the meeting, Vice President and First Lt. General Bakri Hassan Saleh also declares:

“A number of policy options and emphases are considered, not all compatible—what we would expect of a real meeting of the most powerful men in Khartoum, not a fabrication of such a meeting.” [The irony here is almost too rich—ER.]

Iran is always referred to as a “strategic issue,” a “strategic partner,” what again is widely known but not in the nuanced, often urgent terms of policy debate reflected in these documents. It is particularly difficult to imagine the fabrication of this extensive part of the discussion, including the highly detailed accounts of what leverage Khartoum has with neighboring countries, how the regime plans to deal with the issue of Shite proselytizing in Sudan, the extent of Iranian military assistance and help in providing military production capacity, and other very specific topics. Collectively, the details suggest a range of compelling knowledge that would in fact be available only to these men.

To the extent we know anything of the character of the men in this meeting, this knowledge seems to be consistent with what can be discerned of character in various passages—especially the thuggish and clumsy Hussein (who refers at once contemptuously and confusingly to his arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for multiple crimes against humanity). And there is a fearsome bluntness to the comments of Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh, who has long been known for his brutality and cruelty, his willingness to suppress political dissent by any means necessary, and his loyalty to President al-Bashir. This translates into ruthless political judgments and actions, partially captured in this passage (page 27):

“The negotiations, national dialogue, Paris Declaration and all their statements are needed to take us to the elections.” [In other word, Bakri is admitting that all this diplomatic activity is merely a useful distraction from the relentlessly pursued goal of retaining the presidency—ER]

“Those who are interested to join the Ingaz and co-exist with us are welcome. But we are not ready to respond or work under pressure. Nobody is paying us and we are not indebted to anybody.” [This seems a spectacularly bizarre view of the US$47 billion that Sudan owes many creditors around the world—ER]

“America deceived us in regards to the separation of the South. They did not lift our name from the list of the States sponsoring terrorism or relieve our debts. So the Envoy should not come.” [Nobody is better at the most cynical Realpolitik than Bakri, who might have added his view that American "reneging" justifies what is clearly reneging on the part of the regime in its commitment to provide the U.S. with counter-terrorism intelligence, especially about North Africa and the Gulf States—ER]

A great deal more could be said about what is revealed by a close, detailed examination of the contents and verbal habits of those who speak in this document. From the point of view of such analysis, I believe all evidence points to authenticity.

My source is regarded by all who know him as a man of the greatest integrity; one frequent and highly knowledgeable traveler to Sudan says of him, “he is the most honest, trustworthy and highly principled man” I have met in Sudan. My source is intelligent, highly resourceful, and extremely well-informed; he would not knowingly put my reputation for accuracy at risk gratuitously. I have never, in fifteen years of writing extensively about Sudan, been accused of relying on a fabricated document or source; my source on this occasion is well aware of this, and how destructive to my reputation it would be were the document a fabrication. At the same time, my source sees no point in speaking openly to me in Northampton, Massachusetts about the details of how he came to possess the document in Sudan. He would be particularly vulnerable to Khartoum’s enhanced intercept capacity.

The Burden of Proof

It would seem to me that the burden of proof is on those who would argue that the documents are fabrications, that there was no meeting such as described. Moreover, while the motives for fabrication by the regime are murky and implausible at best, there is certainly there is no difficulty at all in imagining the motives of someone who knew of the August 31, 2014 meeting and had access to these highly confidential and equally authoritative minutes. There are a great many Sudanese desperate to bring down the regime; and they know that it will require extraordinary and courageous actions, and that these are likely to be directed against exceptionally well-protected “targets.” But given those in attendance and the agenda items of the August 31 meeting, this would be the moment to take the ultimate risk.

The English translation is 30 pages in length (a length that again argues against fabrication, given the continual potency and specificity of the revelations); it will require several thematic analyses to present what stands as consensus within the regime on a range of topics, to parse sometimes partially opaque pronouncements (or translations), and to provide a clear overall view of the regime’s thinking at this crucial moment in the political history of Sudan. Additional portions of all documents will be released with these new analyses; eventually all will be released.

Some of the topics to be addressed individually:

[Again, all quotes included here come from a lightly edited version of the English translation of the original Arabic document; edits are for punctuation errors (including apostrophes indicating possession, extra spaces, gratuitous end punctuation, and a great many unnecessary commas; some unidiomatic passages have been made slightly clearer. In the context of this analysis, some excerpts have been somewhat more heavily edited, but still limited to matters of grammar and idiom. Brackets [ … ] are used where editorial intrusion has been greatest; these edits are occasionally the work of the translator, not mine; I’ve attempted to put all the former in different brackets . All comments by me, including interpolations of explanation and identification as well as extended critical remarks are in italics; all emphases have been added by me.]

§§§ Reneging on commitment to provide the United States with the intelligence acquired by the regime concerning terrorist groups, including in North Africa:

“The Gulf States have only very weak information about the terrorist groups that are based in Libya, Somali, Nigeria, Mali, North Africa Arab countries and Afghanistan because they have bad relations with these radical groups. They want us to cooperate with them in the war against terrorism because the radical groups constitute [a] direct threat to them. Their relation with ISIS, Nusra Front, Muslim Brothers, and Palestine Islamic Movement is even weaker. We will not sacrifice our relations with the Islamists and Iran for a relation with the Saudis and the Gulf States. What is possible is a relation that serves our economic interests in terms of investments, employment market, etc…,” Lt. General Yahya Mohammed Kher, State Minister of Defense (page 12). [Can any reasonable person imagine that Khartoum is sharing with the Obama administration the intelligence bragged about here? – ER]

“Currently, there are twenty thousand (20,000) Jihadists and fifteen (15) newly formed Jihadist Movements who are scattered all over from Morocco to Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, all Gulf States, [a w]ide presence in Africa and Europe and nobody else owns a data-base on that [such] as the one we have. We release only limited information to the Americans according to the request and the price is the armed movements file. The coming days carry a lot of surprises,” First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein (page 24). This clearly suggests reneging on any counter-terrorism effort promised to the U.S.—that if the U.S. doesn’t ask the right question, make the right “request,” they won’t get the information they most want. Moreover, the claim that the price the U.S. is willing to pay is to provide the regime with intelligence on Sudan’s rebel movements suggests an unscrupulous betrayal—ER]

[On Sudan’s future relationship with international terrorism—ER]:

“We can create them a problem with the Islamic radicals, but we are not going to use this card now,” First Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 17). [The clear implication is that "creating problems" with Islamic terrorists is one of the tools in the NCP/NIF bag of tools—one of their "cards" (a repeated, and telling, metaphor)—ER]

§§§ The strength of the commitment to Islamism and political Islam, too often played down in current characterizations of the regime:

[Throughout the document the centrality of Islamism and Islamic rule is clear, and the corresponding fear that opposition movements are bent on … “remov[ing] the Islamic movement from power” (page 3).

“[Iran is] our biggest ally [because of] our web-like relations with all the Islamic Movements, world-wide,” Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security” (page 9).

[The great rubric for all regime opponents is "supporters of the New Sudan Project," referring to the principle, most forcefully articulated by the late Southern leader John Garang, that neither race nor ethnicity nor religion should be the basis for citizenship in a truly multi-party, democratic Sudan—ER]

[The phrase "New Sudan Project" is used incessantly, a sign of what the regime most fears—ER]:

“In order to foil the New Sudan Project we are watching closely all political party activities. When we discover that a politician is going abroad to meet the rebels we usually prevent him not to travel,” Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, Popular Defense Forces General Coordinator (page 9).

“We can bring all the Islamic movements to fight [the rebels], just we tell them that these rebels are collaborators and agents of America,” First Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 17).

[Most notably, comments by the Vice President in his "recommendations" section—ER]:

“We consider the New Sudan Project as [the] top internal and regional challenge that endeavours to expand the foreign intervention and division of Sudan [understandably so—ER]. All the political, security, military, and diplomatic organs should change the approach in dealing with it” (page 28).

§§§ Support for Iran as a means of supporting Islamist movements worldwide and gaining important regional support:

“Are you sure Saudi Arabia can change its mind [concerning our relationship] after [the Saudis] classified the Muslim Brothers as terrorists? On the other hand you know that our relation with Iran is part and parcel of our relation with the Muslim Brotherhood International Islamic Organization. Accordingly, we must consult with Iran and our Islamist group, before taking any step in this regard. This is because the Kingdom cannot be trusted despite their knowledge that we are in a position to threaten their rule,” Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 6).

“We are the only state that will not be affected by the conflicts taking place between Sunni Islamic groups and the Shite’. This is, because we succeeded to manage good relations with all Islamic groups, through the cover of social organizations, and not through the state apparatus. The secret of the strength of the Ingaz (NCP) government lies in the smooth management of the alliance with Shite’ Iran on one side and the alliance with the Sunni Islamic groups on the other side,” question and statement from Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director General of M.I. [Military Intelligence] and Security (pages 10 – 11).

[Virtually every speaker invokes the "strategic relationship with Iran"; it is a constant in the discussion. In the past this "relationship" has dictated that Khartoum allow for the transfer of Iranian weapons destined for Hamas in Gaza to pass through Sudanese territory—ER]:

“The relation with Iran is one of the best relations in the history of the Sudan. The assistance we received from Iran is immeasurable. Accordingly, the management of this relation requires wisdom and knowledge with all its details. The commonalities between us are many,” 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 26).

“Our relation with Iran is strategic one and unchangeable. They who wants to assist us can do that without conditions.”

“Maintenance of relations with Iran [are] to be protected from any threats. Should be managed by military and security organs,” (1st Lt. General Bakri Hasan Salih, 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan (page 28).

“In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States, but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the M.I. [Military Intelligence] and security organs,” Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 4).

“There is no state other than Iran who has the courage to say no to the whole West. Iran is a real partner to the Ingaz revolution…. It was Iran who provided unlimited support to us…,” Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, PDF General Coordinator (page 7).

[Perhaps most tellingly]:

“[The Gulf States] also fear from our relation with Iran. Our relation with Iran is beneficial to us, because Iran is our biggest ally in the region, in terms of the cooperation in the areas of intelligence and military industrial production. This is due to our web-like relations with all the Islamic Movements World Wide. The importance of this relation comes from the fact that we constitute for Iran [access?] to all the Islamic groups, Lt. Gen. Siddiig Aamir, Director General of [Military Intelligence] and Security (page 9).

§§§ The willingness to destroy agriculture and food supplies as a means of attacking the rebel movements of South Kordofan and Blue Nile (the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North, SPLA/M-N); a concomitant commitment not to lift the humanitarian blockade put up around these regions and all civilians caught within them:

“This year the Sudan People’s Army (SPLA-N) managed to cultivate large areas in South Kordofan State. We must not allow them to harvest these crops. We should prevent them. Good harvest means supplies to the war effort. We must starve them, so that, commanders and civilians desert them and we recruit the deserters to use them in the war to defeat the rebels,” Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director of M.I. and Security (page 10).

[This savage, ruthless assessment neglects to point out that the vast majority of agricultural production is a civilian undertaking, and that it will be civilians—primarily children, women, and the elderly—who will suffer most from this destruction of food supplies—ER]

[Declaring that negotiations with the rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile are a "waste of time," a senior general, Chief of Joint Operations, indicates that the military option is the only one to be considered—ER]:

“We should attack them before the harvest and bombard their food stores and block them completely,” Lt. General Imadadiin Adaw, Chief of Joint Operations (page 14).

§§§ The determination to complete the destruction of African tribal groups in Darfur:

Vice President Bakri recommends that the regime: “Support the mechanism intended to disperse or empty the IDP camps. Create differences and security strike[s] in the IDP camps” (page 29).

“We must continue the military operations. We shall continue bombarding the rebel concentration areas [in Darfur, as well as South Kordofan and Blue Nile] by air force. In the coming dry season we need any fighter from any country that can fight under our command in addition to the sons of the war-affected areas to act as guides to the rebel defenses,” 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 22).

[Less is said about Darfur than one might expect; the general tenor of comments suggests that Khartoum believes Darfuri rebels by themselves are no longer a serious threat to the regime—only insofar as they assist the efforts of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (if the U.S. is indeed providing intelligence to Khartoum on the Darfuri rebel groups, this military weakness on their part becomes less surprising). Darfur is a strategic afterthought at this point, no matter how great the violence, displacement, and deprivation of Darfuri people—ER]

§§§ Plans for weakening South Sudan through support of the rebel forces (the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in Opposition):

[Vice President Bakri recommends that the regime]: “Recognize Dr. Riak [Machar] Liaison office and all organs are required to provide protection and security to them.”

“I met Riak [Machar], Dhieu and Taban [Deng Gai] and they are regretting the decision to separate the South and we decided to return his house to him. [Riek Machar lived in Khartoum for a number of years during the long civil war (1983 – 2005)—ER.] He [Riek Machar] requested us to assist him and that he, has shortage in the M.I. personnel, operations command and tank technicians. We must use the many cards we have against the South in order to give them unforgettable lesson. [Yet again the "card" metaphor—ER]

The operational military commanders have particularly strong views—ER]:

“[Juba is] still supporting the two divisions of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. Accordingly, we must provide Riak forces with big support in order to wage the war against Juba and clean the whole of Greater Upper Nile area. Riak and Taban during their visit to Khartoum disclosed to us everything about the logistical support from Juba to the rebels, the route of supply and who transport it to them” Lt. General (PSC) Imadadiin Adawi, Chief of Joint Operations (page 14). [The verb "clean" here has extremely ominous implications, given the history of the regime’s engaging in what many call "ethnic cleansing"—ER]

“We must change the balance of forces in South Sudan. Riak, Taban and Dhieu Mathok came and requested support in the areas of training in M.I. and especially in tanks and artillery. They requested armament also. They want to be given advanced weapons. Our reply was that we have no objection, provided that we agree on a common objective. Then we train and supply with the required weapons,” 1st Lt. General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 16).

§§§ The militarization of foreign policy:

[Vice President Bakri recommends that]: “Foreign policy management departments should work under the supervision of the military and security organs responsible for the national security affairs to cope with the new internal and external changes,” (page 28).

“We intensified the work to train and graduate Libyan M.I. [Military Intelligence] cadres. Currently, they are undergoing an advanced course in in Internet operation, de-ciphering of codes, interception of telephones and wire-less radios. Their leadership requested us to train and establish for them a strong M.I. apparatus,” Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director General of M.I. and Security (page 11).

“In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States, but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the M.I. [Military Intelligence] and security organs,” Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 4).

§§§ The determination to hold the 2015 national elections, including the all-important Presidential election, on time; this entails wholesale bribing of potential opposition parties and individuals, and threatening protestors:

“Demonstrations or uprising is a red line and will be confronted with fire and those who are interested in the New Sudan Project should go to the South,” Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, Popular Defense Forces General Coordinator (page 7). [Presumably "fire" means a reprise of the shooting of last September, which occurred under "shoot to kill" orders—ER]

“We still remember [the] September 2013 experience, and that after we fired at them [fired with "shoot to kill" orders, according to Amnesty International—ER] they stopped issuing any statement or movement or talk about the then on-going military operations. The coming demonstrations they are planning to conduct during the elections constitute a crime and we will deal with it firmly and timely [again, presumably on the basis of "shoot to kill" orders],” First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein (page 23).

[In preparation for the coming elections]:

“… this year we have already trained suicidal teams and strategic battalions to protect the elections and assist the police to suppress any such activities that may be carried out by the rebellion or the supporters of the New Sudan Project,” Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 7).

“Any journalist or politician who criticizes the RSF (Rapid Support Forces, the most recent incarnation of the Janjaweed militias that became notorious for their savagery and brutal destructiveness in the Darfur conflict—ER] must be arrested and charged with spying [i.e., treason—ER] and collaboration [with the enemy],” 1st Lt. General Mohammed Atta Al-Mowla, Director General N.I.S.S. (page 19).

“The elections must take place on time. Holding the elections constitutes a psychological war against the armed movements and may frustrate them and lead to the end of the project of the New Sudan Project,” Lt. Gen. Salah Al-Tayib, DDR [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration] Commissioner (page 6).

“There must be strict control over the freedom of the press, political statements of the party leaders, and the national security should remain a red line. Any political or press statement should not violate the rule of law…, 1st Lt. General Hashim Osman Al-Hisen, Director General of Police. (page 15). [Those crossing the regime’s various "red lines" risk imprisonment, torture, rape, and execution, as well as a dramatic loss of educational and employment opportunities—ER]

§§§ Skill with which the regime plays off regional actors against one another:

[This should be read in light of recently strained relations between Khartoum and Cairo—ER]:

“The Egyptians have no choice, but to establish especial relations with us, given the victory of the Islamists in the battle for Tripoli, despite Egyptian support to Gen. Haftar. They will not dare to open two fronts, one against Libya and the other against us. These are useful cards at hand and we should use them properly,” Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 6 – 7). [And yet again the "card" metaphor appears—the regime is making clear that it knows exactly how to deploy its various assets, and that it will do so in strategic fashion—ER]

“We managed to secure the borders with Ethiopia and have already signed an agreement to form a joint force covering the whole border between the two countries, exchange of information, prevention of any insurgency that can start from one country against the other, and our contribution or role in the protection of Nahda Dam (Renaissance Dam). This agreement is beneficiary to us because we can use it to cross into the Ethiopian side of the boarder in the name of visiting the refugees, which can allow us to recruit Ethiopian soldiers who can collect and supply us with the necessary information about SPLA-N camps in Yabus and other areas to be bombarded by air force,” Lt. General Imadadiin Adaw, Chief of Joint Operations (page 13).

§§§ Skill in co-opting and disrupting international and regional diplomatic efforts; UNAMID head Mohamed bin Chambas and AUHIP chair Thabo Mbeki seem the most fully corrupted by contact with the regime;

“No dialogue to take place abroad.” “Mbeke meeting with the armed forces in Addis Ababa is just a public relations exercise.” “The AUHIP representative Abdul Mohammed told me that the armed movements do not trust Mbeke on one side and that, Malik [Agar] and Yasir [Arman] complained against him to the Ethiopian Prime Minister and the American envoy,” Lt. General Salah Al-Tayib, DDR Commissioner (page 6).

“I [1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense] told him [Thabo] Mbeki, [chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel] that we trust [Mohamed] Bin [C]hambas [who recently resigned as head of UNAMID amid a growing scandal over the performance of the peacekeeping force in Darfur—ER], who will bring to you all the Darfur movements in Addis Ababa and the aim of the Addis meeting with them is for consultation only and not for negotiation.”

“In case one of them is interested in negotiation let him go to Doha [now regarded by all international actors of consequences as a "diplomatic dead letter—ER]. He is going to bring all of them to Addis and seek their opinion on the proposal; if [they] reject the [national] dialogue, then the position of Sudan will be correct, and we will be able to defend it in front of the international community. In that case Sudan would be seen to have done its best by the international community. Mbeke will participate in the dialogue from within as an observer. Also I met Ali Al-Zaatari (UN) and he is pro us. And met Salah Halima (Arab League) and he is also supporting us, and Hailey Menkariuos and he is also pro us. We did a big job for Mohammed Bin [C]hambas.” [This would seem a very considerable understatement, but it does much to explain the following—ER]:

“When I met him [bin Chambas], he said the UN is going to investigate into the reports of the UNAMID Mission and [bin Chambas] advised me to correct things on the ground to conform to their reports about our performance. He told me that Darfur has no case or problem and their remaining movements should join Doha agreement, and if they want to join the internal national initiative it is up to them and let them come,” 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 21).

[The attraction of Mbeki as a biased negotiator is unmistakable—ER]: “[The rebels’] plan is to see that the elections do not take place. Accordingly, we must support all the efforts carried by Mbeke,” Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP” (page 3).

[The final word, in all matters of consequence, clearly rests with the military leaders in the regime—ER]:

“SAF [the Sudan Armed Forces] is against any dialogue that is supervised by foreigners, because it will end up dismantling SAF. We support separate forums for negotiation with the rebels, no unification of forums or negotiation with them as a group… [Today the rebels say that the] SAF is not a national force, or SAF is using foreign militias and mounted their campaign against SAF. Permit SAF and the RSF [Rapid Support Forces—the reconfigured Janjaweed militias—ER] plus the sons of those areas to attack and clean these areas from the rebellion. We are ready for military operations,” 1st Lt. General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 15)

§§§ Cynical view of the much-touted “national dialogue”:

“The only option in front of us now is the [national] dialogue that is leading to the holding of elections on time. No postponement of the elections, whatsoever the case. I met with the EU ambassadors and all of the are supporting the dialogue initiative that [they believe] can lead to political reforms….” Lt. General Salah Al-Tayab, DDR Commissioner (page 5).

“Let us go and prepare a force to protect the elections. Secondly, if the peace talks are necessary let them take place after the elections, and the internal national dialogue can continue after we hold the elections. We will continue recruiting and splitting the field commanders, and win them to our side since we have all the information about the rebels. We have to sign more agreements and never sit with the rebels as a group or collectively,” 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Osman Al-Hisen, Director General of Police (page 15).

§§§ Sophistication of surveillance and intercept capabilities; the security services provide massive amounts of detailed intelligence on political enemies or potential enemies:

“We intercepted all the telephone calls coming from Saudi, Emirates and Egyptian intelligence, and some people from the political parties of the Sudan [in September 2013]. They were instructing people to go for demonstrations. They brought experts to administer the demonstrations. Since we were following the telephones we managed to arrest the real players and they confessed and disclosed all the details about the conspiracy and the name of officers assigned to supervise the demonstrations and the leadership in each country was receiving daily reports. That is why the Egyptians, Saudis and Emirates will fear when they discovered that, all the elements they sent were arrested by the security. On our side we did not disclose anything up to now, instead we want to use this file to blackmail them,” 1st Lt. General Mohammed Atta Al-Mowlem, Director General N.I.S.S. (page 17).

“All the Embassies and Chanceries in Khartoum are infiltrated and our elements report to us who visited the Embassy and who went out from the Embassy staff and to where,” Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 8).

“Regarding the rebels, I, can say that we have managed to infiltrate their rank and file. We are following all their movements, chats, private affairs with women, the type of alcohol preferred or taken by each one, the imaginary talks when they get drank. We have ladies who are always in contact with them. The ladies managed to send to us their e-mails, telephone numbers, skypes, “whats-up’s” and all their means of communications. By that, we are now able to infiltrate them electronically. We are following all their activities and contacts with people inside the country,” Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 8).

§§§ The skill of which they boast in their “divide and conquer” tactics of the past 25 years:

“We are working to cause differences and divisions within the SRF [Sudan Revolutionary Front—ER] to weaken and destroy it. The same policy of divide and weaken will be applied to all the political forces in the north, like DUP [Democratic Unionist Party], Eastern Sudan, Umma party after we see Sadik [el-Mahdi] comes back. We bring him back using his own sons Abdal-Rahman and Bushra to convince him. We collected all the information about the SPLM-N cadres and working now to launch a psychological warfare campaign on them to see that they got divided like the SPLM in the South,” Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 7).

§§§ Racist attitudes towards the West, Western humanitarian efforts, and democratic ideals:

Mustapha Osman Ismail speaks of the uprising of all 2013 as “a political crisis created by the racist and tribal project of the New Sudan” (page 3).

“Let [the rebel forces] come to the battlefield. They are dreaming to rule Sudan. It is just a fuss that will fade away. The White People will never give you enough support or fight along with them. The greatest liars are White People; they are concerned about their own interest only,” 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 22).

[This is a conspicuous echo of a comment by President Omar al-Bashir made a year ago—ER]:

“If a white man brings you relief, don’t take it and whip him on his back.” (Sudan Tribune, October 25, 2013).

§§§ And perhaps most tellingly, the failure to understand the economic disaster that these policies have created (see my recent analysis at the Enough Forum |

“We are currently facing an acute economic crisis that need to be addressed in order to alleviate the suffering of our people, and look for alternatives that can enable us to control the market forces,” Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 3).

While acknowledging the extent of the economic crisis, “Dr. Smile” hardly understands the difficulty of controlling market forces in a highly inflationary economy with no significant foreign exchange reserves (and thus very limited ability to import foods and other commodities), growing debt—already a staggering US$47 billion in external debt—and a rapidly depreciating currency. Even less comprehending, however, is the brutal and intellectually limited First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein—ER]:

“The economic situation can be addressed and will improve due to the fact that our country have all the requirements needed for industrialization, Agriculture, basic infrastructure, oil and there is no hungry person. This is temporary; just days and they will pass. The military industries will cover all our needs in the armed forces.” (page 23)

[Fantastically, Hussein claims there is not a single hungry person in Sudan despite reports from various UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations that Global Acute Malnutrition rates and Chronic Malnutrition rates are, especially for children under five, at crisis levels—ER]

One of the most remarkable features of the document is that these powerful men nowhere discuss in any detail the economic crisis that has already taken a terrible toll on Sudan’s people, and certainly make no proposals to deal with the inevitable consequences of ongoing crisis. Instead, there is a constant discussion of who has been paid off, which of the many small parties have received enough money to ensure their support in the elections, money for bribes, money for infiltrators, money for recruits into the armed forces—a constant patter of references to significant expenditures that are at once the political mainstay of the NCP/NIF regime, but also an enormous drain on national resources and one reason the fiscal budget gap cannot be closed. For of course none of these expenditures appear in the data the regime reports to the IMF—and the IMF asks no questions.

Looking forward

In-depth analyses of these various topics will for forthcoming, seriatim. The document is thirty pages and all the issues they raise deserve careful, detailed, analytic attention.

Below I have included the first two pages of the translation (one text is in exactly the format received, with no modification of any kind; the second has been slightly reformatted for clarity). I have also included .JPG files showing these first two pages of the Arabic original since they were photographed for purposes of confirmation (see below and All documents, in all formats, will be published in the coming days and weeks.


[Original formatting of translation:

In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Restricted and Confidential

Date: 01/09/2014 Republic of Sudan

National Intelligence & Security Service

Central Security Corporation

Management of Military Activities

To: Lt. Gen. Osman Tajasir

The Managing Director of Central Security Corporation

Peace be on you,

Find enclosed:

1/ Joint Military and Security Committee Meeting held in National Defense College on 31/08/2014.

2/ Support Hamas Meeting held in Sudan Scientific Corporation Premises on 31/08/2014.

Maj. Gen. (Security): Abdal-Wahab Al-Rashiid


In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College

Sunday 31/08/ 2014

# 1st. Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih welcomed the attendance.

# Reading and analysis of the SRF. Statement 20 – 25/08/2014.

# Study of Paris Declaration signed by the SRF and Sadik Al-Mahdi on 18/08/2014.

# Activities report covering Sadik Al-Mahdi visits and meetings in Cairo, Arab Emirates and Addis-Ababa.

# Reports on Rebel Leaders activities, contacts and meetings.

The Agenda of the meeting:

1- Paris Declaration and SRF statement impact.

2- Radical and moderate trends in regards to Shite Belief activities in Sudan.

3- President Mbeke role and Sudanese issues.

4- Elections, National Dialogue and Peace Negotiations- The Priority.

5- New Sudan Project and its impact on the national security and economic activity.


1- 1st. Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih – 1st. Vice President of the Republic of Sudan

2- 1st. Lt. Gen. Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen- Minister of Defence.

3- ,, ,, ,, . Mohammed Atta- Al- Mowla – Director General N.I.S.S.

4- ,, ,, ,, . Hashim Osman Al-Hisen- Director General of Police.

5- ,, ,, ,, . Hashim Abdalla Mohammed- Chief of Joint General Staff.

6- Lt. Gen. . Imadadiin Adawi – Chief of Joint Operations.

7- Professor. Ibrahim Ghandur – D/ Chairman of the N.C.P.

8- Lt. Gen. . Yahya Mohammed Kher – State Minister of Defense.

9- ,, ,, . Siddiig Aamir – Director General of M.I. and Security.

10- ,, ,, . Al-Rashiid Fagiri – Director of Popular Security.

11- ,, ,, . Abdalla Al-Jaili – PDF. General Co-ordinator.

12- ,, ,, . Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen- National Service Co-ordinator.

13- ,, ,, . Salah Al- Tayib – DDR. Commissioner.

14- Dr. . Mustafa Osman Ismail – Political Secretary- NCP.


[Text reformatted for clarity:

In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Restricted and Confidential

Date: 01/09/2014

Republic of Sudan

National Intelligence & Security Service

Central Security Corporation

Management of Military Activities

To: Lt. Gen. Osman Tajasir, Managing Director of Central Security Corporation

Peace be on you,

Find enclosed:

[1] Joint Military and Security Committee Meeting held in National Defense College on 31/08/2014.

[2] Support Hamas Meeting held in Sudan Scientific Corporation Premises on 31/08/2014 (This document did not accompany the first—ER]

Signed, Maj. Gen. (Security): Abdal-Wahab Al-Rashiid


In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College

Sunday 31/08/ 2014

• 1st Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih welcomed the attendance.

• Reading and analysis of the SRF Statement 20 – 25/08/2014 .

• Study of Paris Declaration signed by the SRF and Sadik Al-Mahdi on 18/08/2014.

• Activities report covering Sadik Al-Mahdi visits and meetings in Cairo, Arab Emirates and


• Reports on Rebel Leaders activities, contacts and meetings.

The Agenda of the meeting:

[1] Paris Declaration and SRF statement impact.

[2] Radical and moderate trends in regards to Shite Belief activities in Sudan.

[3] President Mbeke role and Sudanese issues.

[4] Elections, National Dialogue and Peace Negotiations- The Priority.

[5] New Sudan Project and its impact on the national security and economic activity.


[1] 1st Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih – 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan

[2] 1st Lt. Gen. Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen – Minister of Defence.

[3] 1st Lt. Gen. Mohammed Atta Al-Mowla – Director General N.I.S.S.

[4] 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Osman Al-Hisen – Director General of Police.

[5] 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed – Chief of Joint General Staff.

[6] Lt. Gen. Imadadiin Adaw – Chief of Joint Operations.

[7] Professor Ibrahim Ghandur – D/ Chairman of the N.C.P.

[8] Lt. Gen.Yahya Mohammed Kher – State Minister of Defense.

[9] Lt. Gen. Siddiig Aamir – Director General of M.I. and Security.

[10] Lt. Gen. Al-Rashiid Fagiri – Director of Popular Security.

[11] Lt. Gen. Abdalla Al-Jaili – PDF General Co-ordinator.

[12] Lt. Gen. Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen – National Service Co-ordinator.

[13] Lt. Gen. Salah Al- Tayib – DDR Commissioner.

[14] Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail – Political Secretary-NCP.

Eric Reeves’ book-length study of greater Sudan (Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 – 2012;; review commentary at:

President Kiir being received at the UN

President Kiir being received at the UN


Statement by H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan  on the occasion of The 69th Session of the United Nations’ General Assembly New York, USA, 27 September 2014 

·         Your Excellency, Mr Sam Kutesa, President of the United Nations General Assembly,

·         Your Excellency, Mr Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations,

·         Your Majesties,

·         Excellencies, Heads of State and Government,

·         Honourable Ministers,

·         Distinguished Delegates,

·         Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good Morning,

I congratulate you, Mr President, and your country, Uganda and the African continent on your election, as the President of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation and I pledge our full support to you in this important mission. I also wish to congratulate Ambassador John Ashe for having successfully completed his term.

Global Peace and Security

Mr President,

We are all bound by our moral duty and legal obligations to address the challenges confronting the world today. We need to act in solidarity to promote global peace and security for the good of our nations. In this context, I urge the UN and all of you, Heads of State and Government, to support the current peace initiatives in the world, especially those in the Middle East, Central Africa Republic, Somalia, Mali, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of South Sudan.  We need to find appropriate ways and means of ending these conflicts, and many others in the world and to pave the way for all the nations and the peoples of the world to live in peace and to enjoy their basic rights.

In addition, the United Nations Security Council needs to be strengthened to deal with new global challenges. Therefore, we support the call of the African leaders for a comprehensive review of the UN Security Council to ensure that Africa and other continents are well represented in this important international body, according to the African position as Stipulated by Azalwin Consensus and Sirte Declaration. This will create a more inclusive Security Council and empower all the continents to play a bigger and more effective role in promoting global peace and security for the benefit of the human race. More importantly, it will ensure that the Security Council continues to fulfill its purpose and be more able to achieve its mandate.

The Conflict in South Sudan

Mr President,

The journey of my people from conflict to peace, independence and freedom was costly. It was characterized by economic and political marginalization, a prolonged war, humanitarian disasters, loss of millions of lives, and untold human suffering. At independence, we acquired a country with a multitude of challenges ranging from weak national institutions, inadequate physical infrastructure, limited human capacity and weak security mechanisms. We are grateful the international community supported us and continue to do so with humanitarian and development assistance.

Mr President,

I have no doubt that the world has followed with shock and disbelief the violent conflict that erupted in South Sudan on Sunday 15 December 2013, which was plotted by my former Vice President who wanted to seize power by force.

He was too impatient in his thirst for power and did not want to wait for the general elections, which were scheduled to take place in 2015, and to seek the mandate from the people of South Sudan as required by The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. The failed coup and the rebellion that followed resulted in the loss of too many innocent lives, destruction of properties, and damage of community relationships. However, the coup was foiled and the Government is continuing to defend the country and the people against the ensuing rebellion.

The Government and the people of South Sudan take this opportunity to thank the United Nations, the African Union, and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the entire international community for their prompt action to restore peace and stability in my country.

My Government is unwaveringly committed to resolve the conflict peacefully and my negotiating team has been in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, since January 2014 talking peace with the rebels to close this dark chapter in the history of our young country; open a new page and pave the way for us to, once again, embark on the difficult mission of socio-economic development, which our people urgently need.

With the dedicated efforts of the mediators, we were able to sign the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 23 January 2014, and re-affirm our commitment to that Agreement on 9 May 2014. My Government has demonstrated its firm commitment to peace, has unreservedly honoured these Agreements, and is continuing to negotiate in good faith to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, the rebels have violated the Agreements too many times, and have refused to sign the Protocol Agreement, which is a crucially important document signed by the Heads of State and Government of IGAD, including myself as a party to the conflict. This important document forms the basis for resolving the crisis peacefully and inclusively. Therefore, I urge the international community to exert efforts on the rebels to sign the Protocol Agreement.

Mr President,

We appreciate that the international community is rightly concerned with humanitarian crisis and about human rights abuses that resulted from the failed coup and the rebellion. In this regard, my Government has ordered an investigation into these abuses and also has accepted to cooperate with the Commission of Enquiry formed by the African Union to carryout investigations into allegations of human rights violations. We are determined to hold those who will be found responsible accountable, as we do not condone impunity under any circumstances.

 My Government has recently signed into law the Media Laws to guarantee freedom of expression and has also ratified (3) UN core Conventions, namely:

a)     Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;

b)    International Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading or Treatment Punishment and its First optional Protocol; and

c)      Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional Protocol on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts and optional Protocol on Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. These are all positive measures put in place to address some of these concerns.

Mr President,

The conflict in South Sudan is purely a political struggle for power – not an ethnic conflict as reported. The citizens displaced by the conflict, especially in the three States of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, have sought refuge in the neighbouring States of Lakes, Warrap, Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria and in the neighbouring countries. These innocent victims of the conflict urgently need and deserve humanitarian assistance. We, therefore, thank the United Nations, the Government of Norway and the other stakeholders for organizing the Donor Conference in Oslo, Norway, in May 2014, to support our humanitarian needs. We also deeply appreciate and welcome the High-level Ministerial Meeting on South Sudan, which the UN organized in the margin of the 69th Session of UN-GA on 25 September 2014 during which a number of donors made fledges of support. My Government is fully committed to render humanitarian access and has taken the necessary measures to facilitate access for Humanitarian Agencies.

Mr President,

The conflicts within our two countries of South Sudan and Sudan tend to be interconnected. That is why we in the Republic of South Sudan will exert more efforts to strengthen our relations with the Republic of the Sudan. Our oil flows through the Sudan. In the spirit of cooperation, my Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation will soon commence more joint visits with his Sudanese counterpart to donor countries, to appeal and lobby for lifting and waiving Sudan’s foreign debt, as it was agreed in the Cooperation Agreements. There are outstanding issues associated with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), especially the final status of Abyei. The Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan are working through these issues as part of the African Union High Implementation Panel mediation and our other partners to find amicable peaceful solution with the Sudan. I am committed to addressing these outstanding issues and I am in direct communication with President Omar El Bashir of the Sudan to resolve these issues through dialogue.

Furthermore, my Government and the people of South Sudan, would like to express our appreciation and thanks to the countries that have expressed support for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in my country; especially USA, China, Egypt, South Africa, the Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Norway, Congo, Namibia and many others.

Mr President,

My Government is collaborating with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other stakeholders, such as community leaders, political parties, civil societies and faith based organizations to build trust with the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in UNMISS Camps so that they return to their homes and their pre-conflict areas, and start once again their normal livelihood.

Mr President,

With respect to our cooperation with UNMISS, my Government would like to raise its concern regarding the recent mandate of UNMISS which has very serious implications in service delivery to my people. I note in particular that the new mandate does not allow UNMISS to support requests from national, state and local partners for assistance in important activities connected with capacity building, peace-building, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reforms (SSR), recovery and development.

Notwithstanding the fact that the activities mentioned above are of paramount importance to South Sudan, we strongly believe the main objective of UNMISS was to support peace and reconciliation in the first place. We humbly request the United Nations Security Council to reconsider this decision when the renewal of UNMISS mandate comes up in November 2014. On the same note, we would further urge UNMISS to engage in reorientation of its activities related to its mandate to civilians protection, to shift from ‘protection-by-presence’ to ‘protection-by-action’ and to encourage those in UNMISS camps to return to their homes. UNMISS needs to protect the civilians in their neighbourhoods and not in camps in a huge country like ours, which is bigger than the size of France.

The Post-2015 Global Development Agenda

Mr President,

The theme of this 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly is “Delivering on and implementing a Transformative Post-2015 Development Agenda”. It is not a surprise that the Republic of South Sudan, being a 3-year-old country with numerous challenges, has missed the MDG targets.

We congratulate the UN Secretary General and the Working Group for coordinating the discussions on the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will form the post-2015 global development agenda. It is vital that the SDGs focus the efforts of the Nations on reducing poverty; end hunger and achieve food security; address our health concerns, especially those issues affecting women and children; promote gender equality and empowerment of women and girls; address the issues of access, equity and quality of education and tackle youth unemployment.

We strongly believe that attainment of the SDGs will require strong, sustained partnership, collaboration and coordination at international, regional and national levels and leadership of the UN. On our part, we will exert our maximal efforts and will work in partnership with the international community and our partners in the ‘New Deal’, as a member of fragile states in g7+, to achieve the new development goals. I wish to take this opportunity to express our solidarity and support to the victims of Ebola in the greater West African Region, particularly, in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leon. We acknowledge the leading role of the USA in assisting the continent to combat this virus. It is vital that the SDGs address such global health threats.

On the other hand, the Republic of South Sudan strongly condemns all forms of terrorism, including piracy, which has become a menace to international peace and security.

Climate Change

Mr President,

Climate change is now recognised as a huge global threat. It is the single biggest threat that can wipe out the planet Earth and the entire human race. I congratulate the UN Secretary General for convening the UN Climate Summit 2014 to focus attention on this global problem and I urge you all to heed the call of the UN Secretary General and “Take bold actions”. I am pleased that the SDGs cover environmental issues of concern to the international community. And I hope the climate summit in Paris in December 2015 will result in an agreement on a new global and a legally binding framework for tackling climate change. We must race against the clock to save our planet and the human race before it is too late. As Madam Graca Machel said, tackling climate change requires leadership, courage and ambition from all of us. Let us act in solidarity to create “The Future we want”.

Finally Mr President,

I reiterate my resolve to continue my firm commitment to return the people of South Sudan to peace, to full implementation of the Cooperation Agreements with the Republic of the Sudan, to unrestricted support to Humanitarian Assistance, to respect for Human Rights, to democratic governance in my Country, and to stronger working relationship with UNMISS and the entire International Community without exception. I promise that we will work together, united to establish a safe, secure, peaceful and prosperous South Sudan.

Your Excellencies, we are all one in this world, whether strong or weak, rich or poor. So, let us stick together.

Thank you.


Posted: September 28, 2014 by PaanLuel Wël in Junub Sudan

By Job Kiir Garang

Politics is, surely, a dirty game. However, it does justify its definition if the players are, by any stretch of imagination, smart. I wonder whether that definition holds the same when it comes to political discourses in South Sudan.

Some politicians in my country are just absolute jokes. Apart from being non-ideologues, they have no vision. They have no sense of direction as to where the country should be driven to. They are a metaphorical “Kayaker without a paddle” in the middle of a rough tided river.

The saddest part is, they seem to thrive among these rough conditions at the expense of the lives of the innocent majority. Corruption: is the word. Country’s resources are the waters through which they wallow. Their bellies are fully extended and they always need a little more.

No one embellishes these, qualities than the leader of our country: Salva Kiir Mayar-dit. He is the very definition of what is wrong with South Sudan.

Up until the assignation of CPA, Kiir was wrapped up in the same garment as Dr. John Garang and as a result, he was always perceived as a man who fought for our values and freedom. He was exalted and appreciated and it does not surprise me that upon his appointment as the president of South Sudan, albeit by default, he was overwhelming accepted.

However, over the course of his tenureship and especially over the last year and a half, all has been revealed about the man. The demons of corruption, tribalism, nepotism, and sexual immorality have been exposed and are out there for the public to see.

In his last speech, delivered on the 8th of September in which he gave an ultimatum that Riek should accept the post of prime minister within 45 days, he foolishly or maybe intentionally quoted the great Karl Marx and this is how he went about it:

The Philosopher Karl Marx said in his theory of class struggle ‘’ the classes emerge when society starts to produce private property. When society starts realizing private property, social division of labour emerges with one social category or class attempting to control the private property at the expense of other classes. Class struggles are nothing but struggles aiming at controlling private property and means of production. in order to maintain their control over means of production , one class seek to control state power and its uses state power to enhance its class interest  vis –a – vis other classes , that is  political struggles are nothing but the extension of economic struggles for private property’’

Looking at this quote, two things come into mind:

  1. President is trying to give us the impression that he does read a few scripts here and there (something I definitely doubt).
  2. He absolutely does not know why he is quoting Karl Marx or if he does know, he was unknowingly putting himself in a trap of shame.

One thing is for certain, the president has been ignorant all along and it is evident in this quote. If he had taken a moment to pause, breath and think about it, he might have had a different thought whether or not he needs to put that quote across.

He needs not look farther to see that he is self contradictory. His government is 80% Dinka (his tribe). Private property that he alludes to is certainly in the hands of the aforementioned tribe (mainly from his inner circles: Bar-el-ghazal).

I am not saying that it is all Bar-el-ghazal because I am sure there are many out there that are suffering just like the rest of the country. I am talking of the fat cats within the ranks of Kiir who own property locally, in foreign countries such as Uganda and Kenya or both locally and regionally.

No wonder he has surrounded himself with his own tribesmen because only then can he control state power, means of production and to try and crush any other tribe that tries to rise against him. The current situation in the country is a simple evident.

Kiir has declared war against the Nuer with the intention of wiping them out not knowing that this will have very nasty backlash whether now or in the near future. He is using public fund to train mainly his own tribesmen to protect himself as well as pay foreign soldiers in the shape of AU peace keepers. Kiir by anyone’s estimation is not the president we need.

Apart from declaring war against a tribe in his own country (the Nuer that is), he has failed on all occasions to visit the three regions being devastated by war at the moment. His actions have convinced me and am sure many others out there that he is not a president for South Sudan and definitely not a president for peace.

Dr. Riek Machar and indeed many others that are aspiring to lead one day should not be intimidated or baited with positions such as those of prime minister.

This is an illegitimate way of making peace. All he needs (the president that is) is, first and foremost, stop bloodshed in the Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei regions and then come to a discussion table. He needs to come clean and face his so-called-foes instead of chickening out. What is he afraid of?

Once he provide a less intimidating environment for those in opposition, only then can they move forward to 2015 and hopefully see elections come and go conducted in good spirits.

I hope Dr. Riek Machar, the current leader in opposition, comes top for I believe that with him in office, South Sudan would be a better place. He has the glue that can unite that country.

I have been attacked for saying this before but I say it again, he has the better chance of providing the peace we need the most. May peace prevail at last cometh the hour!

By Job Kiir Garang: A DINKA FOR ALL