Dr. John Garang’s Speech on the Conclusion of the CPA, January 9, 2005.

Your Excellencies; Honorable Delegates; Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen;

Allow me to sincerely thank the people and the government of the Kingdom of Belgium for having honored the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) by inviting me as the Head of the organization to attend and address this important international conference on federalism. To us in Sudan, this conference is timely because it is taking place a few weeks after signing of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), an accord that has brought to an end one of the world’s longest civil wars. The theme of the Conference, Federalism or some cousin of federalism, is the bedrock of the CPA.

I said a cousin of federalism because I am not sure what to call the system of governance in the CPA. We have not used any formal word in the entire CPA to describe the type of governance that we have negotiated and agreed on. Perhaps we were guided by the African saying not to name a child before it is born. The CPA took us ten years to negotiate, from 1994 to 2004, and before this we had two years of negotiations in the Nigerian Capital of Abuja. Interestingly in Abuja the SPLM tabled confederation, which the Government of Sudan (GOS) rejected, while the GOS offered federation, which the SPLM rejected, and to add more confusion the Nigerian mediators recommended “true federalism”, which both sides, the GOS and SPLM, rejected. However, although the Abuja talks collapsed, they provided valuable experience for the subsequent negotiations sponsored by the countries of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

In the IGAD peace process and after eight years of frustrating negotiations the SPLM and GOS sat down to business in Machakos and Naivasha with the resolve to negotiate and solve the serious problem of war and peace, instead of being bogged down in whether we should have a federation, a confederation or true federalism. Now that the child has been born researchers can give the name that they believe best depicts the arrangements the Sudanese have agreed in the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

In the literature on federalism, analysts identify two processes of federalism: So-called “coming-together” federations formed by independent states for the sake of common goods otherwise unattainable, and “holding-together” federations, which develop from unitary states as governments respond to mitigate threats of secession. In the Sudanese situation both processes are involved as the Sudanese seek to “come together”, perhaps for the first time, and as they try to “hold together” to preserve a union that was imposed on them by colonialism.

While trying to “hold together” to preserve a union which was not of their making, the Sudanese are thus involved in an even more serious and complex project — that of evolving and developing a political entity, a new Sudanese political dispensation and union arrived at through consensus to replace the present Sudanese state, which some Sudanese inherited from the colonial regime and with which the majority of Sudanese do not identify.

I am not here bemoaning the colonial experience. Nations or nation-states are the product of the historical movement of peoples, even of historical accidents. People move for different reasons — in search of better opportunities, escaping religious or other forms of persecution, or even out of curiosity — what is behind the hill? And they often do not come back to their original home. They end up making a home behind the hill with different peoples who also ended up there for similar reasons. Overtime these different peoples interact and a new socio-political entity emerges, an entity organized at present by humanity in the form of “nation states”. The colonial encounter and the historical movement of peoples are thus some of the historical events that have contributed to the making of the present country called Sudan. The real task facing the Sudanese is therefore to build a Sudanese “nation-state” out of these circumstances, a Sudanese political dispensation that belongs equally to all its citizens irrespective of race, ethnicity, religion or gender, something which we have not done before and which lies at the root of the wars we are now seeing afflicting our country all over — in Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and Darfur.

What we really need to do, which we should have done 50 years ago at independence, but which I am happy we are doing now in Sudan, is to go back to appreciate the classical justification of the State as based on a “social contract” between the people and the State. I am aware of the controversy over the notion of the “social contract”, yet what should make the State legitimate is if it is the result of an agreement by the people who are subject or subject themselves to the State.

The question then is whether the present Sudanese State would be the object of an agreement if the Sudanese people were asked? The conventional wisdom is that Northern Sudanese would answer the question in the affirmative that the present Sudanese State is the object of an agreement and that Sudan exercised the right of self-determination at independence in 1956. Southern Sudanese on the other hand would answer in the negative, and instead argue that they have never been part of any agreement on the present Sudanese State before, at or after independence and therefore demand the right of self-determination. To compound things even more, the legitimacy of the present Sudanese State is not only being challenged by Southern Sudanese, it is also being questioned by the people of Darfur, Eastern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, the far North and other parts of the country. Many Sudanese are asking a serious question, whether the present Sudanese State as inherited from 1956 at independence represents their interests in their various groupings and regions. The present crisis and wars in the Sudan spring from the fact that many Sudanese do not associate with the present Sudanese State, although many identify with a Sudanese entity or homeland.

In fact, the present Sudanese State was originally contrived as a result of the colonial encounter and its initial objective was to achieve interests that were particular to colonialism. It was therefore not based on any social contract or agreement by the Sudanese people. It can even be argued that the colonial encounter shifted and distorted the trajectory of indigenous nation-state formation and that this continues to haunt Africa today.

It is this type of state that Sudanese elites in Khartoum and the adjacent Riverian areas of Central Sudan took over at independence. Sadly, there was no conscious attempt by these elites to recast the State, to base its legitimacy on a social contract and consensus of the people. These elites took over the colonial state and looked at it as if it were a magical tree that perpetually bears and gives to them fruits of all kinds. In Africa the colonially inherited State became like the proverbial goose that lays golden eggs. Unfortunately for them as the elites fought and continue to fight over custody of the goose, they killed the goose along with millions of innocent people. One sees the death of the goose in the collapse of the colonially inherited State from Liberia to Sierra Leone, to DR Congo, to Somalia, and the death of the goose threatens in my own country, the Sudan. This may be a blessing in disguise, unfortunately a terribly expensive blessing! With the collapse of the colonially inherited State, or the threat of its collapse, this may or should sufficiently challenge Africa to conceptualize a correct and sustainable form of State that is based on the notion of a social contract that represents the interests of all the people in that State. This approach could result in a possible redrawing of the colonially inherited boundaries in Africa so as to be better able to face the realities and challenges of the 21st Century and beyond, to forestall unnecessary and costly wars, and to promote development and prosperity for the peoples of Africa and the world using Africa’s vast natural resources.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement that the Sudanese negotiated voluntarily and signed on January 9th is based on this fundamental paradigm shift, the shift from the colonially inherited elitist State of the Old Sudan based on the hegemony of a few and marginalization of the vast majority, to a new Sudanese political dispensation of a plural Sudan in which political power, wealth and sovereignty are equitably shared, and with special security arrangements for the armed forces and other security forces, so that they protect rather than use their physical force to take over the state as has often happened in many countries.

During the negotiations, we took each problem and solved it pragmatically and with the aim of ultimately evolving a new Sudanese State, so that we have a Sudan that is united voluntarily by consensus of its peoples in a social contract, or otherwise failing to achieve such a voluntary and new union then we dissolve the colonially inherited Sudanese State amicably and peacefully.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen;

I would like in summary and conclusion to present the CPA in the context of this paradigm shift from the Old Sudan to the New Sudan by briefly illustrating how we resolved five of the most difficult issues in the negotiations – the right of self-determination, Sharia Islamic Law, power sharing, wealth sharing, and security Arrangements,

The first problem addressed by the CPA is how to accommodate the Sudanese diversity within the context of one country; how to keep people of diverse backgrounds together. The Sudan has over 500 different ethnic groups, speaking more than 130 distinct languages. These ethnic groups fall into two broad categories, indigenous African Sudanese, those whose mother tongue is some African language other than Arabic constituted 69% of the population at independence in 1956, while Arab Sudanese, those who have Arabic as their community language, were 31% of the population. Ethnicity is thus one major form of cotemporary diversity. The other form of contemporary diversity is religion. The Muslims are mostly in the North and constitute about 65% of the total population, while Christians and followers of Traditional African Religious constitute the remaining 35%. Sudan also has a rich and long historical heritage. Civilizations and various forms of the State have flourished and perished in the geographical area that constitutes the present modern Sudan, from ancient Cush of the Biblical days to Christian Nubia and Merowe, to the Islamic States of Sennar and Darfur, to the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian regimes of recent years.

Yet, and despite the richness of Sudan’s historical and contemporary diversity, the current and previous rulers of Khartoum present a false picture of the country. They based the Sudanese State on a poor mixture of a dysfunctional colonially inherited State and two exclusionist ideologies of Arabism and Islamism. They insisted that Islamic Sharia must be the supreme law of the land and even waged Jihad to impose it. This poor vision of Sudan by the present and previous regimes has been the fundamental problem of Sudan responsible for the many wars.

The CPA addresses the problem of diversity in the Machakos Protocol, signed in July 2002, by making two bold compromises. Firstly, the Agreement gives Sudan an Interim Period of six years to make unity attractive, at the end of which the people of Southern Sudan shall exercise the right of self-determination to choose between continuing in the unity framework that shall be put in place during the Interim Period, or otherwise opt for independence. Secondly, the Agreement accords the people of Northern Sudan their right to Sharia Islamic Law, confining Sharia to the North, and leaving it to Northerners to reconcile their demand to be ruled by Islamic Sharia in the public domain while at the same time sharing the same public domain with others. As for Southern Sudan Sharia Islamic Law will not apply during the Interim Period; instead there will be established a secular democratic state. The CPA thus establishes a “One-Country-Two Systems” Model, a secular system in the South and a theocratic system in Northern Sudan.

The Machakos Protocol has handled the two most contentious issues of Islamic Sharia law and the right of self-determination courageously and with the aim of accommodating diversity. One does not need to be a biologist to know that biodiversity is a good thing. A multiplicity of species of plants and animals on our planet increases every one’s chances of survival, and ensures that life continues on earth. Finding appropriate ways to accommodate diversity in Sudan will likewise ensure the survival of the Sudan as one country.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The third issue addressed in the CPA is that of power sharing. To reflect the “one country two systems” model there will an asymmetric system of two Governments, a Government of National Unity (GONU) at the centre for the whole country, and a largely autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), that shall have under it ten of Sudan’s 25 States, while the 15 States of the North will be under the GONU. There will also be strong local governments under the States in both North and South. The GOSS is linked to the GONU mainly through the constitutional Court, the Central Bank, the Joint Defense Board and the office of the 1st Vice President, who is also President of GOSS, otherwise Southern Sudan shall be largely autonomous in all its three branches of government: the executive, legislature and judiciary including a Supreme Court of Southern Sudan. The State Governments in both North and South also have considerable degree of autonomy. Power and sovereignty are truly shared between North and South and with the Sates. This system has a great potential and advantage of preserving and protecting the rights of all people belonging to different ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic groups who live in diverse parts of the Sudan.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The fourth problem addressed by the CPA is the issue of wealth sharing. The CPA would not work if the GOSS and the States are not afforded the necessary resources. Accordingly, the CPA provides the GOSS with three organic sources of revenues: 50% of oil revenues generated in Southern Sudan where most of Sudan’s oil lies; 50% of national non-oil revenues generated in Southern Sudan and GOSS own taxation. In addition to these three organic sources of revenue, the GOSS shall be entitled to engage in some international relations including “the initiation, negotiation and conclusion of international and regional agreements on culture, sports, trade, investment, credit, loans, grants and technical assistance with foreign governments and foreign non-governmental organizations”.

One of the most contentious problems in the wealth sharing negotiations was the status of the Central Bank of Sudan. The SPLM had demanded a separate Central Bank for Southern Sudan to reflect the “two system one country” model prescribed by the Machakos Protocol especially as it relates to Islamic banking in Northern Sudan. The compromise reached at the end was quite innovative: to have one Central Bank with one door and two windows; one window for Northern Sudan operating an Islamic banking system using Islamic financial Instruments, and the other window for Southern Sudan operated by the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) using conventional financial instruments. It was also agreed to have one currency that shall be agreed by the Parties, but in the meantime the Parties shall use the currencies they have in their respective areas as legal tender.

The fifth and final difficult issue in the CPA was that of security arrangements during the Interim Period. The question was the existence of two armies: that of the Government or Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and what to do with them. The Parties took a bold decision for each side to keep its armed forces during the entire six years of the Interim Period. The Parties further agreed to form Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) from the two armed forces. The main SPLA and some JIUs shall be deployed in the South, while the main SAF and some JIUs shall be deployed in the North. The Parties also agreed to develop a common military doctrine for training of the JIUs as well as for training of the two armed forces. The JIUs shall serve as a symbol of national unity and sovereignty of Sudan during the Interim Period and shall be commanded by a Joint Defense Board (JDB) that shall be co-chaired by the Chiefs of Staff of the two armed forces. The JIUs shall form the nucleus of the future unified army of Sudan should the referendum on self-determination confirm unity, otherwise they would be dissolved and melt back to their mother armies.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The CPA is a unique Sudanese achievement that I believe shall forever change Sudan as well as have fundamental and positive impact on our Region and Africa. At the onset, the CPA can be adapted and applied to solve the tragic situation of war in Darfur and Eastern Sudan, for it would make no sense to achieve peace in Southern Sudan and make war in other parts of Sudan. I also believe that the Sudan CPA can be adapted to solve similar situations in Africa and elsewhere. In particular the models of power sharing and security arrangements in the CPA can be used to achieve bigger governance entities in African. The 17 countries of our Region for example, from Sudan to the Horn to East and Central Africa, including DR Congo, have a combined population of about 300 million and an area of about 12 million Square Kilometers. By surrendering some of their sovereignty to a central political authority and retaining some sovereignty and state identity, the peoples of these countries can achieve tremendous development and prosperity using their vast resources, building physical infrastructure, viable markets, power generation and free movement of people goods and services instead of the inter and intra-State wars and instability that have afflicted our Region. This would be good for Africa, and it would it would provide lucrative markets and investment opportunities for Europe, America and the world.

Your Majesty, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

At this juncture, and before I close, I would like to bring to the attention of this august conference that the task ahead of us, the task of implementation of the CPA, is daunting and requires the commitment and participation first of all the Sudanese people and assistance from the international community. I therefore take the opportunity of this podium to ask the EU, Belgium and the individual countries of Europe to assist us translate the CPA into action so as to fulfill the expectations of the Sudanese people and achieve peace and stability in the Region and Africa.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have only presented a synopsis of the CPA as it relates to the theme of this conference. It is a long and detailed document of some 241 pages. I give a copy of the CPA here for the perusal of the conference. Now that the child has been born, you can decide what to call the form of governance that we have agreed to in the CPA, whether it is a federation, confederation or true federalism or some other “ism”. Whatever one calls it, it is an agreement that was negotiated by the Sudanese to end a war that had lasted 21 years with very high cost.

I thank you very much for inviting the SPLM and for your listening. Thank you.

Dr. John Garang de Mabior

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Greetings from Khartoum!

Read what I have written and give your views regarding the same.Thank you all – NDM

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South-South Dialogue is it Division of Power in the South?

By Nichola Dominic Mandil, Khartoum, Sudan

The central idea that dominates debates among Southerners these days here in Khartoum and abroad is the so-called “South-South Dialogue” to convene in Rumbek/Yerol on the 15th March 2005. The temperature in Rumbek will rise three times than ever as a result of tempestuous debates that will take place!

Why I say this is because Southern Sudanese from different walks of life will be present therein. Different professions, different specializations, political leaders, intellectuals, technocrats, youth, women and students will give their own views on the future of the South, and how they want the South to be like in the coming period. This is how I for see the Rumbek-South-South Dialogue will be all about. I hope it will be what Southerners want not what other people want it to be!

Apart from deliberating on the future of the South, yet, some of our people in South still are still pregnant with the spirit of animosity against their fellow Southerners! Their hearts are full of aversion towards others! These are the people who will most likely cause hullabaloos and turmoil in the South when the South gets it full autonomous status.

There are some tribes also complaining that since the war broke out in the South in 1983, they did not rule! Look at these poor people! They are thinking of ruling in state of thinking of now peace has come, what are we supposed to do in order to render quality services to our destitute people? They have no minds that think in this absolute manner!

I am speaking here specifically of Western Bahr El-Ghazal State (WBGS) with its capital Wau! There are some tribes in Wau who complain that they want to rule, because they have not been ruling for the last 21 years of civil strife in the South, they say now time has come for them. Is it that the war is over and they want to cause chaos again in Wau apart from what happened in 1980s when Wau became a scene of carnage? Let these people think twice before they act!

My concern is not who to rule Western Bahr El-Ghazal during the Interim Period or after, but rather who is qualified, ready and humble enough to render qualitative services to all citizens of Bahr El-Ghazal and South Sudan without discriminatory attitude? Those who are thinking of ruling, this is a lesson for you to learn.

Even though some of your leaders talked to Dr. John Garang the Leader of SPLM/A that during this Interim Period they want to rule Wau, I believe Garang in his capacity as a Leader of SPLM/A has no authority to choose who becomes a Wali (Governor) for any state in the South, it is the people of the state to choose who are capable of the positions of leadership in their regions. This is my understanding of what leadership in the South must be.

Let us know that New Sudan does not need people who practice ethnic politics and use their tribal system for ruling people! The South belongs to all of us together! We have the voice to say how the South must be ruled and administered, all the sons and daughters of the South must be accorded equal opportunities for positions of leadership, but mindful that people are selected based on merits, qualifications, professionalism, experiences and faithfulness to public funds and goods.

I am making these points because in the South we have the experiences of embezzlement of public funds by people in the government, who enrich them selves with the money that supposed to serve all the people, but only for growing their stomachs, building nice houses and for sending their children to study in the best schools in Khartoum and abroad, while the people in whose name they act in the government suffer! This is a very sad experience in the South! This must stop this time!

To the SPLM/A and all those who fought in one way or another and the result of their struggle is felt today in terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on Sunday, January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya and hopefully autonomy for the South after Six-Year-Interim Period. I would like to urge that let the issue of division of power not confuse us at the moment, especially during the Rumbek- South-South-Dialogue, where vital issues pertaining to the joie de vivre of the South supposed to be discussed.

In Khartoum now a days however, there micro debates among politicians, tribal leaders, intellectuals and even women that what will be the division of power like in the South? This is a crucial question, which needs people of rationality to cogitate upon it before making baseless judgments, and the result will be futile so to speak!

The wise question I grasped from one of the Southern intellectuals during family talks on some topical issues was, “now that the South is ours, why because we fought together and we have brought peace together, the remaining issue is how division of power, wealth is and resources- the 52 % of the South stipulated in the Peace Protocols going to be divided among the people of the South”? I was some how puzzled when that elderly man talked with sense of humor. I thought he was creating a joke, but I came to realize that he was meaning his words!

By the way this is a very question that needs the contributions of every Southerner, the answer to this question must come from all of us (we who are Southerners) who suffered humiliation and marginalization in the hands of the Arab-Muslim-North! This time let us not allow those who are Arabs-in-Black-Skin again mistreat us! Such issues raise above could give rise to another bloodbath in the South, which will so to say be an over-the-top reality in the history of the New Sudan we are dreaming of living happy life in!

Let us jabber less and do more for the profitability of the South, let us stop disagreement amongst us, and work for the construction of the New Sudan with new understanding of fraternity, solidarity and “the right man or woman in the right place to do the right things at the right time” be a philosophy that will guide us along as we triumphantly re-build our beloved South Sudan that was dilapidated by the war, leaving us like orphans!

What I have written here is a reminder to all of us, let us start thing seriously and acting on the questions raised and give our views with respect to the same. It is my hope that the Rumbek-South-South-Dialogue will be a reality and strong resolutions that will come out from there should be for the well-being of the South. Let us give our support to it, and encourage our brothers and sisters who will be coming from USA, Canada, UK, Europe and Australia to join in, make substantial contributions during the deliberations and think of coming back home to help re-construct the South. Long live Rumbek Conference, Long Live New Sudan, Long Live South Sudan and Long live SPLM/A the Liberation Struggle Movement! With homage

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This article was published on bitterlemons-international.org; an internet forum edited by Ghassan Elkhatib, a Director of Jerusalem Media Communication Center, and Yossi Alpher of American/ Jewish Center. Hope you find it and interesting reading..

The Naivasha enigma

Robert O. Collins

On January 9, 2005 the government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a peace agreement in Naivasha, Kenya, after 22 years of violent conflict that killed over two million southern Sudanese and displaced another six million. Make no mistake, this is an historic achievement concerning inscrutable and imponderable differences, the result of long and tortuous negotiations that could have failed at any moment without intense international pressure from the troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the stalwart Norwegians.

It was the vindication of Dr. John Garang, leader of the SPLM, who envisaged a new Sudan of unity in diversity in 1983, a conviction from which he has never deviated during two decades of military victories and defeats, revolts against his authority, and interminable negotiations with disingenuous Islamist members of the National Islamic Front (NIF). His consistency, determination, and patience have been rewarded. He is now on paper the most powerful man in the Sudan as first vice-president, president of the Southern Autonomous Government, and commander-in-chief of his own army.

The new Sudan will no longer be an Islamist state but a democratic “one Sudan regardless of race, religion, or tribe” in which the new South will have autonomy, retain its own army, receive 50 percent of Sudan’s oil revenues, and have the right to vote for secession after six years. Those who have worked so hard for so long to achieve this triumph deserve our heart-felt praise, but they have had neither the time nor the energy to realize what they have accomplished or how they achieved it. After the celebrations in the sober light of day the participants awoke to the fact that, in their focused determination to complete the Naivasha Agreement they had little or no understanding of reality in the southern Sudan.

What are the realities? No amount of rhetoric can overcome the fact that today the overwhelming numbers of southern Sudanese are open or “closet” separatists, including some within Garang’s SPLM National Leadership Council. This should come as no surprise after 150 years of slavery, discrimination, and racism by northern Sudanese and, since independence, too many promises broken and millions dead or driven from their homes. Moreover, there is a large body of silent northerners who are quite prepared to let the South go its own way. For, indeed, southerners are different, often despised, and not about to become Arabs and Muslims, so it’s time the two million unwanted southern refugees milling around Khartoum went home.

Among the European and the United States governments there is an accepted folklore that the southern Sudan does not have the necessary educated and experienced individuals to administer the new South. This is undoubtedly true, but it is a situation the international community has pledged to rectify by massive infusions of cash and personnel to help. And if the past is any prophet of the future, after winning a measure of autonomy at Addis Ababa in 1972 the southern Sudanese enjoyed themselves immensely managing or mismanaging their affairs, and see no reason not to try again on their own. During the six years before the promised referendum this enthusiasm for independence will be hard to contain despite the anticipated attempts by any northern government to subvert it.

The key to the success of the unified new Sudan, however, is not the evolution of a separatist movement in the new South, but the reception and acceptance of a large number of hitherto despised southerners by the northern Sudanese. Naivasha guaranteed that southerners would receive 30 percent of the executive and legislative seats in the government of north Sudan, 12 percent more than in the elected central government of 1958.

In 1958 the southern representatives were ill-educated, inexperienced, and naive. Some were fooled, most were bought. It is doubtful that the southern Sudanese veterans of war, political infighting within the SPLM, and years of negotiations with Islamists, supported by the educated and successful southern elite in the diaspora, will be bought or betray their constituents a second time around. The new southern politician, however, will soon perceive that his future lies in being a member of the independent government of the South and not as “minister of cows” in Khartoum.

Perhaps the greatest enigma of Naivasha is the seeming willingness by the leadership of the National Congress Party (formerly NIF) to abandon the Islamist state and the ideology upon which it was founded of converting all Sudanese into Arabs and Muslim fundamentalists. Many have long wondered at the incongruity of the professed policies of the Islamist government to transform multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious Sudan into an Arab nation run by Salafist militant Muslims, a policy whose current manifestation is disaster in Darfur.

Are the Sudanese Islamists ready to abandon their ideology, their mission, and above all their power in return for a united, democratic Sudan, or is it to be just more of the same tactics of give-and-take, stonewalling and prevarication that have characterized their governance during the past 16 years? That is the Naivasha enigma.- Published 10/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Robert O. Collins is professor of history emeritus at the University of California Santa Barbara. He first went to the Sudan in 1956 and has since written extensively on the Sudan, the Southern Sudan, and the Nile.

Your Excellencies; Honorable Delegates; Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen;

Allow me to sincerely thank the people and the government of the Kingdom of Belgium for having honored the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) by inviting me as the Head of the organization to attend and address this important international conference on federalism. To us in Sudan, this conference is timely because it is taking place a few weeks after signing of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), an accord that has brought to an end one of the world’s longest civil wars. The theme of the Conference, Federalism or some cousin of federalism, is the bedrock of the CPA.

I said a cousin of federalism because I am not sure what to call the system of governance in the CPA. We have not used any formal word in the entire CPA to describe the type of governance that we have negotiated and agreed on. Perhaps we were guided by the African saying not to name a child before it is born. The CPA took us ten years to negotiate, from 1994 to 2004, and before this we had two years of negotiations in the Nigerian Capital of Abuja. Interestingly in Abuja the SPLM tabled confederation, which the Government of Sudan (GOS) rejected, while the GOS offered federation, which the SPLM rejected, and to add more confusion the Nigerian mediators recommended “true federalism”, which both sides, the GOS and SPLM, rejected. However, although the Abuja talks collapsed, they provided valuable experience for the subsequent negotiations sponsored by the countries of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

In the IGAD peace process and after eight years of frustrating negotiations the SPLM and GOS sat down to business in Machakos and Naivasha with the resolve to negotiate and solve the serious problem of war and peace, instead of being bogged down in whether we should have a federation, a confederation or true federalism. Now that the child has been born researchers can give the name that they believe best depicts the arrangements the Sudanese have agreed in the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

In the literature on federalism, analysts identify two processes of federalism: So-called “coming-together” federations formed by independent states for the sake of common goods otherwise unattainable, and “holding-together” federations, which develop from unitary states as governments respond to mitigate threats of secession. In the Sudanese situation both processes are involved as the Sudanese seek to “come together”, perhaps for the first time, and as they try to “hold together” to preserve a union that was imposed on them by colonialism.

While trying to “hold together” to preserve a union which was not of their making, the Sudanese are thus involved in an even more serious and complex project — that of evolving and developing a political entity, a new Sudanese political dispensation and union arrived at through consensus to replace the present Sudanese state, which some Sudanese inherited from the colonial regime and with which the majority of Sudanese do not identify.

I am not here bemoaning the colonial experience. Nations or nation-states are the product of the historical movement of peoples, even of historical accidents. People move for different reasons — in search of better opportunities, escaping religious or other forms of persecution, or even out of curiosity — what is behind the hill? And they often do not come back to their original home. They end up making a home behind the hill with different peoples who also ended up there for similar reasons. Overtime these different peoples interact and a new socio-political entity emerges, an entity organized at present by humanity in the form of “nation states”. The colonial encounter and the historical movement of peoples are thus some of the historical events that have contributed to the making of the present country called Sudan. The real task facing the Sudanese is therefore to build a Sudanese “nation-state” out of these circumstances, a Sudanese political dispensation that belongs equally to all its citizens irrespective of race, ethnicity, religion or gender, something which we have not done before and which lies at the root of the wars we are now seeing afflicting our country all over — in Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and Darfur.

What we really need to do, which we should have done 50 years ago at independence, but which I am happy we are doing now in Sudan, is to go back to appreciate the classical justification of the State as based on a “social contract” between the people and the State. I am aware of the controversy over the notion of the “social contract”, yet what should make the State legitimate is if it is the result of an agreement by the people who are subject or subject themselves to the State.

The question then is whether the present Sudanese State would be the object of an agreement if the Sudanese people were asked? The conventional wisdom is that Northern Sudanese would answer the question in the affirmative that the present Sudanese State is the object of an agreement and that Sudan exercised the right of self-determination at independence in 1956. Southern Sudanese on the other hand would answer in the negative, and instead argue that they have never been part of any agreement on the present Sudanese State before, at or after independence and therefore demand the right of self-determination. To compound things even more, the legitimacy of the present Sudanese State is not only being challenged by Southern Sudanese, it is also being questioned by the people of Darfur, Eastern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, the far North and other parts of the country. Many Sudanese are asking a serious question, whether the present Sudanese State as inherited from 1956 at independence represents their interests in their various groupings and regions. The present crisis and wars in the Sudan spring from the fact that many Sudanese do not associate with the present Sudanese State, although many identify with a Sudanese entity or homeland.

In fact, the present Sudanese State was originally contrived as a result of the colonial encounter and its initial objective was to achieve interests that were particular to colonialism. It was therefore not based on any social contract or agreement by the Sudanese people. It can even be argued that the colonial encounter shifted and distorted the trajectory of indigenous nation-state formation and that this continues to haunt Africa today.

It is this type of state that Sudanese elites in Khartoum and the adjacent Riverian areas of Central Sudan took over at independence. Sadly, there was no conscious attempt by these elites to recast the State, to base its legitimacy on a social contract and consensus of the people. These elites took over the colonial state and looked at it as if it were a magical tree that perpetually bears and gives to them fruits of all kinds. In Africa the colonially inherited State became like the proverbial goose that lays golden eggs. Unfortunately for them as the elites fought and continue to fight over custody of the goose, they killed the goose along with millions of innocent people. One sees the death of the goose in the collapse of the colonially inherited State from Liberia to Sierra Leone, to DR Congo, to Somalia, and the death of the goose threatens in my own country, the Sudan. This may be a blessing in disguise, unfortunately a terribly expensive blessing! With the collapse of the colonially inherited State, or the threat of its collapse, this may or should sufficiently challenge Africa to conceptualize a correct and sustainable form of State that is based on the notion of a social contract that represents the interests of all the people in that State. This approach could result in a possible redrawing of the colonially inherited boundaries in Africa so as to be better able to face the realities and challenges of the 21st Century and beyond, to forestall unnecessary and costly wars, and to promote development and prosperity for the peoples of Africa and the world using Africa’s vast natural resources.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement that the Sudanese negotiated voluntarily and signed on January 9th is based on this fundamental paradigm shift, the shift from the colonially inherited elitist State of the Old Sudan based on the hegemony of a few and marginalization of the vast majority, to a new Sudanese political dispensation of a plural Sudan in which political power, wealth and sovereignty are equitably shared, and with special security arrangements for the armed forces and other security forces, so that they protect rather than use their physical force to take over the state as has often happened in many countries.

During the negotiations, we took each problem and solved it pragmatically and with the aim of ultimately evolving a new Sudanese State, so that we have a Sudan that is united voluntarily by consensus of its peoples in a social contract, or otherwise failing to achieve such a voluntary and new union then we dissolve the colonially inherited Sudanese State amicably and peacefully.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen;

I would like in summary and conclusion to present the CPA in the context of this paradigm shift from the Old Sudan to the New Sudan by briefly illustrating how we resolved five of the most difficult issues in the negotiations – the right of self-determination, Sharia Islamic Law, power sharing, wealth sharing, and security Arrangements,

The first problem addressed by the CPA is how to accommodate the Sudanese diversity within the context of one country; how to keep people of diverse backgrounds together. The Sudan has over 500 different ethnic groups, speaking more than 130 distinct languages. These ethnic groups fall into two broad categories, indigenous African Sudanese, those whose mother tongue is some African language other than Arabic constituted 69% of the population at independence in 1956, while Arab Sudanese, those who have Arabic as their community language, were 31% of the population. Ethnicity is thus one major form of cotemporary diversity. The other form of contemporary diversity is religion. The Muslims are mostly in the North and constitute about 65% of the total population, while Christians and followers of Traditional African Religious constitute the remaining 35%. Sudan also has a rich and long historical heritage. Civilizations and various forms of the State have flourished and perished in the geographical area that constitutes the present modern Sudan, from ancient Cush of the Biblical days to Christian Nubia and Merowe, to the Islamic States of Sennar and Darfur, to the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian regimes of recent years.

Yet, and despite the richness of Sudan’s historical and contemporary diversity, the current and previous rulers of Khartoum present a false picture of the country. They based the Sudanese State on a poor mixture of a dysfunctional colonially inherited State and two exclusionist ideologies of Arabism and Islamism. They insisted that Islamic Sharia must be the supreme law of the land and even waged Jihad to impose it. This poor vision of Sudan by the present and previous regimes has been the fundamental problem of Sudan responsible for the many wars.

The CPA addresses the problem of diversity in the Machakos Protocol, signed in July 2002, by making two bold compromises. Firstly, the Agreement gives Sudan an Interim Period of six years to make unity attractive, at the end of which the people of Southern Sudan shall exercise the right of self-determination to choose between continuing in the unity framework that shall be put in place during the Interim Period, or otherwise opt for independence. Secondly, the Agreement accords the people of Northern Sudan their right to Sharia Islamic Law, confining Sharia to the North, and leaving it to Northerners to reconcile their demand to be ruled by Islamic Sharia in the public domain while at the same time sharing the same public domain with others. As for Southern Sudan Sharia Islamic Law will not apply during the Interim Period; instead there will be established a secular democratic state. The CPA thus establishes a “One-Country-Two Systems” Model, a secular system in the South and a theocratic system in Northern Sudan.

The Machakos Protocol has handled the two most contentious issues of Islamic Sharia law and the right of self-determination courageously and with the aim of accommodating diversity. One does not need to be a biologist to know that biodiversity is a good thing. A multiplicity of species of plants and animals on our planet increases every one’s chances of survival, and ensures that life continues on earth. Finding appropriate ways to accommodate diversity in Sudan will likewise ensure the survival of the Sudan as one country.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The third issue addressed in the CPA is that of power sharing. To reflect the “one country two systems” model there will an asymmetric system of two Governments, a Government of National Unity (GONU) at the centre for the whole country, and a largely autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), that shall have under it ten of Sudan’s 25 States, while the 15 States of the North will be under the GONU. There will also be strong local governments under the States in both North and South. The GOSS is linked to the GONU mainly through the constitutional Court, the Central Bank, the Joint Defense Board and the office of the 1st Vice President, who is also President of GOSS, otherwise Southern Sudan shall be largely autonomous in all its three branches of government: the executive, legislature and judiciary including a Supreme Court of Southern Sudan. The State Governments in both North and South also have considerable degree of autonomy. Power and sovereignty are truly shared between North and South and with the Sates. This system has a great potential and advantage of preserving and protecting the rights of all people belonging to different ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic groups who live in diverse parts of the Sudan.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The fourth problem addressed by the CPA is the issue of wealth sharing. The CPA would not work if the GOSS and the States are not afforded the necessary resources. Accordingly, the CPA provides the GOSS with three organic sources of revenues: 50% of oil revenues generated in Southern Sudan where most of Sudan’s oil lies; 50% of national non-oil revenues generated in Southern Sudan and GOSS own taxation. In addition to these three organic sources of revenue, the GOSS shall be entitled to engage in some international relations including “the initiation, negotiation and conclusion of international and regional agreements on culture, sports, trade, investment, credit, loans, grants and technical assistance with foreign governments and foreign non-governmental organizations”.

One of the most contentious problems in the wealth sharing negotiations was the status of the Central Bank of Sudan. The SPLM had demanded a separate Central Bank for Southern Sudan to reflect the “two system one country” model prescribed by the Machakos Protocol especially as it relates to Islamic banking in Northern Sudan. The compromise reached at the end was quite innovative: to have one Central Bank with one door and two windows; one window for Northern Sudan operating an Islamic banking system using Islamic financial Instruments, and the other window for Southern Sudan operated by the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) using conventional financial instruments. It was also agreed to have one currency that shall be agreed by the Parties, but in the meantime the Parties shall use the currencies they have in their respective areas as legal tender.

The fifth and final difficult issue in the CPA was that of security arrangements during the Interim Period. The question was the existence of two armies: that of the Government or Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and what to do with them. The Parties took a bold decision for each side to keep its armed forces during the entire six years of the Interim Period. The Parties further agreed to form Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) from the two armed forces. The main SPLA and some JIUs shall be deployed in the South, while the main SAF and some JIUs shall be deployed in the North. The Parties also agreed to develop a common military doctrine for training of the JIUs as well as for training of the two armed forces. The JIUs shall serve as a symbol of national unity and sovereignty of Sudan during the Interim Period and shall be commanded by a Joint Defense Board (JDB) that shall be co-chaired by the Chiefs of Staff of the two armed forces. The JIUs shall form the nucleus of the future unified army of Sudan should the referendum on self-determination confirm unity, otherwise they would be dissolved and melt back to their mother armies.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The CPA is a unique Sudanese achievement that I believe shall forever change Sudan as well as have fundamental and positive impact on our Region and Africa. At the onset, the CPA can be adapted and applied to solve the tragic situation of war in Darfur and Eastern Sudan, for it would make no sense to achieve peace in Southern Sudan and make war in other parts of Sudan. I also believe that the Sudan CPA can be adapted to solve similar situations in Africa and elsewhere. In particular the models of power sharing and security arrangements in the CPA can be used to achieve bigger governance entities in African. The 17 countries of our Region for example, from Sudan to the Horn to East and Central Africa, including DR Congo, have a combined population of about 300 million and an area of about 12 million Square Kilometers. By surrendering some of their sovereignty to a central political authority and retaining some sovereignty and state identity, the peoples of these countries can achieve tremendous development and prosperity using their vast resources, building physical infrastructure, viable markets, power generation and free movement of people goods and services instead of the inter and intra-State wars and instability that have afflicted our Region. This would be good for Africa, and it would it would provide lucrative markets and investment opportunities for Europe, America and the world.

Your Majesty, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

At this juncture, and before I close, I would like to bring to the attention of this august conference that the task ahead of us, the task of implementation of the CPA, is daunting and requires the commitment and participation first of all the Sudanese people and assistance from the international community. I therefore take the opportunity of this podium to ask the EU, Belgium and the individual countries of Europe to assist us translate the CPA into action so as to fulfill the expectations of the Sudanese people and achieve peace and stability in the Region and Africa.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have only presented a synopsis of the CPA as it relates to the theme of this conference. It is a long and detailed document of some 241 pages. I give a copy of the CPA here for the perusal of the conference. Now that the child has been born, you can decide what to call the form of governance that we have agreed to in the CPA, whether it is a federation, confederation or true federalism or some other “ism”. Whatever one calls it, it is an agreement that was negotiated by the Sudanese to end a war that had lasted 21 years with very high cost.

I thank you very much for inviting the SPLM and for your listening. Thank you.

Dr. John Garang de Mabior

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Greetings from Khartoum!

Read what I have written and give your views regarding the same.Thank you all – NDM

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South-South Dialogue is it Division of Power in the South?

By Nichola Dominic Mandil, Khartoum, Sudan

The central idea that dominates debates among Southerners these days here in Khartoum and abroad is the so-called “South-South Dialogue” to convene in Rumbek/Yerol on the 15th March 2005. The temperature in Rumbek will rise three times than ever as a result of tempestuous debates that will take place!

Why I say this is because Southern Sudanese from different walks of life will be present therein. Different professions, different specializations, political leaders, intellectuals, technocrats, youth, women and students will give their own views on the future of the South, and how they want the South to be like in the coming period. This is how I for see the Rumbek-South-South Dialogue will be all about. I hope it will be what Southerners want not what other people want it to be!

Apart from deliberating on the future of the South, yet, some of our people in South still are still pregnant with the spirit of animosity against their fellow Southerners! Their hearts are full of aversion towards others! These are the people who will most likely cause hullabaloos and turmoil in the South when the South gets it full autonomous status.

There are some tribes also complaining that since the war broke out in the South in 1983, they did not rule! Look at these poor people! They are thinking of ruling in state of thinking of now peace has come, what are we supposed to do in order to render quality services to our destitute people? They have no minds that think in this absolute manner!

I am speaking here specifically of Western Bahr El-Ghazal State (WBGS) with its capital Wau! There are some tribes in Wau who complain that they want to rule, because they have not been ruling for the last 21 years of civil strife in the South, they say now time has come for them. Is it that the war is over and they want to cause chaos again in Wau apart from what happened in 1980s when Wau became a scene of carnage? Let these people think twice before they act!

My concern is not who to rule Western Bahr El-Ghazal during the Interim Period or after, but rather who is qualified, ready and humble enough to render qualitative services to all citizens of Bahr El-Ghazal and South Sudan without discriminatory attitude? Those who are thinking of ruling, this is a lesson for you to learn.

Even though some of your leaders talked to Dr. John Garang the Leader of SPLM/A that during this Interim Period they want to rule Wau, I believe Garang in his capacity as a Leader of SPLM/A has no authority to choose who becomes a Wali (Governor) for any state in the South, it is the people of the state to choose who are capable of the positions of leadership in their regions. This is my understanding of what leadership in the South must be.

Let us know that New Sudan does not need people who practice ethnic politics and use their tribal system for ruling people! The South belongs to all of us together! We have the voice to say how the South must be ruled and administered, all the sons and daughters of the South must be accorded equal opportunities for positions of leadership, but mindful that people are selected based on merits, qualifications, professionalism, experiences and faithfulness to public funds and goods.

I am making these points because in the South we have the experiences of embezzlement of public funds by people in the government, who enrich them selves with the money that supposed to serve all the people, but only for growing their stomachs, building nice houses and for sending their children to study in the best schools in Khartoum and abroad, while the people in whose name they act in the government suffer! This is a very sad experience in the South! This must stop this time!

To the SPLM/A and all those who fought in one way or another and the result of their struggle is felt today in terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on Sunday, January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya and hopefully autonomy for the South after Six-Year-Interim Period. I would like to urge that let the issue of division of power not confuse us at the moment, especially during the Rumbek- South-South-Dialogue, where vital issues pertaining to the joie de vivre of the South supposed to be discussed.

In Khartoum now a days however, there micro debates among politicians, tribal leaders, intellectuals and even women that what will be the division of power like in the South? This is a crucial question, which needs people of rationality to cogitate upon it before making baseless judgments, and the result will be futile so to speak!

The wise question I grasped from one of the Southern intellectuals during family talks on some topical issues was, “now that the South is ours, why because we fought together and we have brought peace together, the remaining issue is how division of power, wealth is and resources- the 52 % of the South stipulated in the Peace Protocols going to be divided among the people of the South”? I was some how puzzled when that elderly man talked with sense of humor. I thought he was creating a joke, but I came to realize that he was meaning his words!

By the way this is a very question that needs the contributions of every Southerner, the answer to this question must come from all of us (we who are Southerners) who suffered humiliation and marginalization in the hands of the Arab-Muslim-North! This time let us not allow those who are Arabs-in-Black-Skin again mistreat us! Such issues raise above could give rise to another bloodbath in the South, which will so to say be an over-the-top reality in the history of the New Sudan we are dreaming of living happy life in!

Let us jabber less and do more for the profitability of the South, let us stop disagreement amongst us, and work for the construction of the New Sudan with new understanding of fraternity, solidarity and “the right man or woman in the right place to do the right things at the right time” be a philosophy that will guide us along as we triumphantly re-build our beloved South Sudan that was dilapidated by the war, leaving us like orphans!

What I have written here is a reminder to all of us, let us start thing seriously and acting on the questions raised and give our views with respect to the same. It is my hope that the Rumbek-South-South-Dialogue will be a reality and strong resolutions that will come out from there should be for the well-being of the South. Let us give our support to it, and encourage our brothers and sisters who will be coming from USA, Canada, UK, Europe and Australia to join in, make substantial contributions during the deliberations and think of coming back home to help re-construct the South. Long live Rumbek Conference, Long Live New Sudan, Long Live South Sudan and Long live SPLM/A the Liberation Struggle Movement! With homage

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This article was published on bitterlemons-international.org; an internet forum edited by Ghassan Elkhatib, a Director of Jerusalem Media Communication Center, and Yossi Alpher of American/ Jewish Center. Hope you find it and interesting reading..

The Naivasha enigma

Robert O. Collins

On January 9, 2005 the government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a peace agreement in Naivasha, Kenya, after 22 years of violent conflict that killed over two million southern Sudanese and displaced another six million. Make no mistake, this is an historic achievement concerning inscrutable and imponderable differences, the result of long and tortuous negotiations that could have failed at any moment without intense international pressure from the troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the stalwart Norwegians.

It was the vindication of Dr. John Garang, leader of the SPLM, who envisaged a new Sudan of unity in diversity in 1983, a conviction from which he has never deviated during two decades of military victories and defeats, revolts against his authority, and interminable negotiations with disingenuous Islamist members of the National Islamic Front (NIF). His consistency, determination, and patience have been rewarded. He is now on paper the most powerful man in the Sudan as first vice-president, president of the Southern Autonomous Government, and commander-in-chief of his own army.

The new Sudan will no longer be an Islamist state but a democratic “one Sudan regardless of race, religion, or tribe” in which the new South will have autonomy, retain its own army, receive 50 percent of Sudan’s oil revenues, and have the right to vote for secession after six years. Those who have worked so hard for so long to achieve this triumph deserve our heart-felt praise, but they have had neither the time nor the energy to realize what they have accomplished or how they achieved it. After the celebrations in the sober light of day the participants awoke to the fact that, in their focused determination to complete the Naivasha Agreement they had little or no understanding of reality in the southern Sudan.

What are the realities? No amount of rhetoric can overcome the fact that today the overwhelming numbers of southern Sudanese are open or “closet” separatists, including some within Garang’s SPLM National Leadership Council. This should come as no surprise after 150 years of slavery, discrimination, and racism by northern Sudanese and, since independence, too many promises broken and millions dead or driven from their homes. Moreover, there is a large body of silent northerners who are quite prepared to let the South go its own way. For, indeed, southerners are different, often despised, and not about to become Arabs and Muslims, so it’s time the two million unwanted southern refugees milling around Khartoum went home.

Among the European and the United States governments there is an accepted folklore that the southern Sudan does not have the necessary educated and experienced individuals to administer the new South. This is undoubtedly true, but it is a situation the international community has pledged to rectify by massive infusions of cash and personnel to help. And if the past is any prophet of the future, after winning a measure of autonomy at Addis Ababa in 1972 the southern Sudanese enjoyed themselves immensely managing or mismanaging their affairs, and see no reason not to try again on their own. During the six years before the promised referendum this enthusiasm for independence will be hard to contain despite the anticipated attempts by any northern government to subvert it.

The key to the success of the unified new Sudan, however, is not the evolution of a separatist movement in the new South, but the reception and acceptance of a large number of hitherto despised southerners by the northern Sudanese. Naivasha guaranteed that southerners would receive 30 percent of the executive and legislative seats in the government of north Sudan, 12 percent more than in the elected central government of 1958.

In 1958 the southern representatives were ill-educated, inexperienced, and naive. Some were fooled, most were bought. It is doubtful that the southern Sudanese veterans of war, political infighting within the SPLM, and years of negotiations with Islamists, supported by the educated and successful southern elite in the diaspora, will be bought or betray their constituents a second time around. The new southern politician, however, will soon perceive that his future lies in being a member of the independent government of the South and not as “minister of cows” in Khartoum.

Perhaps the greatest enigma of Naivasha is the seeming willingness by the leadership of the National Congress Party (formerly NIF) to abandon the Islamist state and the ideology upon which it was founded of converting all Sudanese into Arabs and Muslim fundamentalists. Many have long wondered at the incongruity of the professed policies of the Islamist government to transform multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious Sudan into an Arab nation run by Salafist militant Muslims, a policy whose current manifestation is disaster in Darfur.

Are the Sudanese Islamists ready to abandon their ideology, their mission, and above all their power in return for a united, democratic Sudan, or is it to be just more of the same tactics of give-and-take, stonewalling and prevarication that have characterized their governance during the past 16 years? That is the Naivasha enigma.- Published 10/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Robert O. Collins is professor of history emeritus at the University of California Santa Barbara. He first went to the Sudan in 1956 and has since written extensively on the Sudan, the Southern Sudan, and the Nile.