Revisiting Africa’s Indifference to Somaliland’s Quest for Self-Determination
5 min readBY Timothy Walker
8 August 2011
Amid the independence celebrations in Juba, South Sudan, on July 9, many observers might have overlooked the presence of representatives of Somaliland, a territory that hopes to imitate South Sudan’s example soon.
An autonomous self-declared territory that broke away from the Republic of Somalia in 1991, Somaliland recently celebrated twenty years of independence despite not being recognised as a sovereign state by any state or international organisation.
Since the 1990s, many African states have regarded the thought of an independent Somaliland with a marked indifference that in some cases bordered on hostility, despite the territory fulfilling many of the criteria listed in agreements that define statehood, particularly the Montevideo Convention of 1933.
Somaliland emerged in a context of state-level disintegration and inter-clan conflict, but this did not prevent the formation of a government that has proved relatively acceptable and representative of the territory’s inhabitants. It has held two presidential elections: one in 2003 that brought Dahir Riyale Kahin to power and one in 2010 in which incumbent Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo emerged triumphant. International monitors assessed the 2010 elections and observed that they were relatively free and fair, although several problems with the process were identified. The 2010 presidential elections were in fact supposed to have occurred in August 2008. Somaliland has, however, set itself a precedent of a peaceful transfer of power between elected heads of the executive branch of the government.
As an entity that, arguably, has all the trappings of a state and that provides more human security for its inhabitants than many of the recognised states on the continent, the response towards Somaliland appears to make little sense when one regards the welcome accorded to South Sudan. While the African Union (AU), and its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), made the inviolability of inherited colonial borders a key principle of pan-African relations, Somaliland’s search for greater self-determination can be justified on the basis that, unlike South Sudan, it has been recognised as an independent state in the past, even if just for three days after it gained its independence from Britain in 1960 and before it chose to unify with the south (a former Italian colony) to form the Somali Republic.
Representatives of Somaliland have been making concerted efforts at increasing their country’s visibility and have increased their political contacts not just at the regional and continental level, but now also at the global level For instance, the recent offer by President Silanyo to host United Nations (UN)-backed prisons for captured pirates has been seriously considered by various countries. Somaliland has attempted to establish international relationships, mostly of an informal nature, but the increase in links on both sub- and supra-state level, particularly in the Horn of Africa region, means that there is a possibility of countries proceeding to unilaterally recognise Somaliland. Moreover, the recent celebrations marking twenty years of independence in Somaliland and among its sizeable diaspora in cities such as London, appear also to have given an added impetus to the attempts at attaining international recognition and aid.
Somaliland’s greatest assets that could help it secure international recognition and support are its strategic location bordering the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, and its deep-water port of Berbera. The future prosperity of the country arguably centres on Berbera, and on the industrialisation and development that would occur if regional and international investment increased. A commitment to use the port in combatting piracy or to assist patrols in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean would require supporting facilities, factories, storehouses and infrastructure. Berbera therefore has the potential to become a thriving hub of international trade and a centre for security in the region. Such moves could also interest Ethiopia, which has been landlocked since the 1990s and is reliant on Djibouti for much of its imports and exports. In addition Berbera was used as a naval port during the Cold War. However, Somaliland at present cannot guarantee that it can secure the inland areas through which goods can move cheaply enough to appeal to investors and businesses, meaning that at present the expense and risk involved in investing and utilising this route remain unappealing.
Somalilanders have managed to build their state without access to resources, funding or aid, a task that they have carried out impressively. This contrasts with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, which is almost totally dependant on foreign support and which has not been assisted by the massive amount of aid in establishing sovereignty over the country. The answer to Somaliland’s isolation must therefore be located in international relations theory – and in the imaginations of those in power in states that could face secessionist claims or the irredentist policies of their neighbours should such a transformation of the African geopolitical map gather momentum. The fear that a successful secession would lead to similar calls across the continent, fracturing tenuous stability and possibly causing internecine conflicts, can also be located in Morocco and Western Sahara, Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Cabinda in Angola.
While there is much to admire about Somaliland, there is still need for caution. Its quest for recognition does not warrant unbridled enthusiasm. The region has frequently clashed with its neighbour Puntland, itself a relatively stable territory that also seeks to secede from Somalia. The clashes have revolved around border demarcation and there is a danger of the conflict intensifying. Within Somaliland itself, inhabitants of the Adal state also seek to declare their autonomy.
Broadly looking at the case of South Sudan and Somalia, the criteria for statehood seem to be inconsistently applied. It appears that geopolitical ideas play a much more prominent role than legal principles such as the Montevideo Convention, a situation that blurs legitimate and compelling cases for self-determination such as that of Somaliland. The AU, therefore, needs to critically reflect on the topic of self-determination, particularly that of Somaliland, in order to give its people a fair chance of participating in international and global relations.
Timothy Walker is an intern with the African Conflict Prevention Programme of the ISS.
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