The Elusive Quest for Peace in Darfur: Brian Adeba spoke to Professor Eric Reeves, a well-known Darfur researcher
8 min readThe Elusive Search for Peace in Darfur
By Brian Adeba
October 31, 2011
In mid July, a fringe Darfur rebel movement called the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) signed a peace agreement with the government of Sudan in Doha, Qatar. The Doha Agreement stipulates that the LJM will head an interim governing body called the Darfur Transitional Authority (DTA). In October, LJM leader Tijani El-Sissi returned to Khartoum to head the DTA. But analysts say the peace deal cannot solve the conflict in Darfur as long as Darfur’s main rebel groups, the Justice and Liberation Movement (JEM) of Khalil Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Movement factions of Abdel Wahid and Minni Minnawi, have not signed on to it.
In the meantime, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, who was living in Libya and prevented from returning to Darfur by the former Libyan government, is now back in the region following the demise of the Gadhafi regime.
Brian Adeba spoke to Eric Reeves, a well-known Darfur researcher and author of the book A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide about the Doha peace deal, the impact of Khalil Ibrahim’s return and future prospects for a comprehensive peace in Darfur.
Regarding recent developments in Darfur, what should we make of the LJM agreement with the government of Sudan and the return of the LJM to Khartoum?
Eric Reeves: There are a number of complicated and interlocked issues here. The peace negotiated in Doha and signed by the Liberation and Justice Movement is an agreement that has very little popularity in Darfur. It is not a basis for peace and indeed the regime in Khartoum will use this to say ‘We have made a peace agreement. We are not going to make any further agreements.’ That will make it very difficult to bring the other main rebel factions and the other ethnic groups into the peace process. There is already, in the displaced camps, great tension between LJM supporters and the vast majority [who oppose
the agreement].
The LJM is going to head the Darfur Transitional Authority. What is the significance of this move given the fact that there is, as you say, minimal support for the LJM in Darfur?
Eric Reeves: Tijani El-Sissi is a former governor of Darfur but he is not highly regarded by most of his fellow Fur tribesmen and particularly by the educated elite, particularly in the diaspora and in various professions. He does not command a lot of popular support. I am not sure whether anyone in the present circumstances in Darfur could, but he certainly does not and for him to try and exert control at the present time is quite possible going to be a trigger for increased violence within the camps for displaced persons.
On a related note, a referendum was supposed to have been held in Darfur in July, but that’s been postponed to next year. With the LJM in the mix now, what are the prospects of this referendum?
Eric Reeves: There is really no prospect of a meaningful referendum anywhere in Darfur. The registration process, voter security, tabulation, and integrity are just impossible. As long as the National Congress Party [ruling party] remains in control as it does, its security services will dictate the outcome of any referendum.
On another note, we have learned that the leader of the JEM, Khalil Ibrahim, has returned to Darfur. What is the significance of this return to Darfur?
He brings a commanding leadership back. On the other hand, many, including myself are very troubled by his past, by his stridency, by his connection to Hassan Al Turabi and the Islamists in Khartoum. He comes back and at the same time there are also a great many, particularly Zaghawa [one of the main ethnic groups from which the JEM draws support] mercenaries, who were working in Libya for Gadhafi. They have now, in many cases, returned with their weapons to Darfur. Probably, and in most cases, backed by Chad. This poses many problems because these guys are mercenaries. They are not rebels. They are men who are used to using weapons for pay. And in Darfur, opportunistic banditry, violence, extortion, kidnapping are all too common. And we may be seeing an uptake in that. I think we have to be concerned about the return of Darfuris who were serving as mercenaries for Gadhafi, and particularly well-armed Zaghawa. As far as an attack on Khartoum, which Khalil Ibrahim has attempted once and promised he will do again, he’s counting on a popular uprising to support this. The first time around [May 2008], there was no popular support—it was a suicide mission. Now it is a very different political situation. The northern economy is in shambles, there have been repeated protests, which have been immediately repressed, but they keep occurring. There is very high inflation, particularly since the government removed subsidies on sugar and petrol. Inflation is over 20 percent, unemployment is very high, and the government has no realistic budget, and is unable to begin to deal with its external debt of US$ 38 to 39 billion dollars. This is an economy deeply, deeply depressed. With much popular unrest there is going to be an effort by various rebel groups across the country, in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Darfur [to try
to topple the regime] and that’s why the really brutal counter-insurgency efforts in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states are underway. This is likely to create a situation in which rebels do ally with one another and that makes an attack on Khartoum conceivable.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, which is active in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, has in the past talked of an alliance with other rebel groups in Darfur. How far has this move progressed?
Eric Reeves: It seemed to have stalled. I must say that Khalil Ibrahim is a big part of the problem here. He of course had a nasty role fighting southerners during the civil war. His agenda is very different from the other Dafuri rebels. He’s got much broader national ambitions whereas the Sudan Liberation Movements of Abdel Wahid and Minni Minnawi are much more focused on Darfur. So as far as I have been able to learn, there is no agreement even on principle, on how a united rebel front would develop. But if it does, and if there are effectively combined operations, then it would be a very potent force especially given how widely and thinly stretched the Sudan armed forces are.
Looking at the battle fronts in Darfur, everything seems so quite now. It looks like the rebel groups no longer have the clout to engage the Sudanese government in military activities. What is the future of the armed struggle in Darfur and how should the protagonists move forward?
Eric Reeves: Well, in the last year or two or perhaps a little longer, it was clear we were headed for a stalemate in which Khartoum controls urban areas and some of the countryside around the urban areas. But I think they [government] have given up trying to take Jebel Mara [a mountain range believed to be the base of the Sudan
Liberation Movement] or they are going to let humanitarian conditions deteriorate to a point where the people will be so weakened that will include a broader weakening of the rebel groups. [But] In war, men with guns are the last to starve. The situation in Darfur has gone on for so long now and it’s been so debilitating that I think we may see a drift into stalemate, especially since it’s clear that Khartoum had to divert substantial military resources to fighting in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. I track very carefully the number of bombing attacks Khartoum carries out and they are still occurring but they are less frequent in Darfur now even as they have picked up tremendously in Blue Nile and South Kordofan where they have seriously disrupted the agricultural season, right from the beginning of the rainy season [April] and right now the rains are ending and harvests begin and yet the Nuba people were unable to plant and tend crops. In Blue Nile, people will be unable to harvest crops [because of fighting that
flared up in September]. There’s a tremendous need for food aid and Khartoum is imposing an embargo and people are going to die very quickly. I think Khartoum’s goal is to crush the rebellions in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, retain Abyei and allow the status quo to remain in Darfur.
If the peace agenda was to move forward in Darfur, what would be required of the government and the rebel groups?
Eric Reeves: The rebel groups, of course this has been true for years, need to find a way to find a common platform. Right now they are absurdly fractured and the trouble began of course with the fact that the Darfur Peace Agreement negotiated in Abuja [in 2006] badly split the rebels, especially Abdel Wahid from Minnawi. But I think the real issue is the fact that in Khartoum, I believe we have seen over the last few months, a creeping military coup. Calling the shots now, are the most ruthless and most brutal men within the regime. The generals are those who are going to make decisions about how to deal with Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Darfur. The evidence is that these generals are willing to renege on agreements. Nafie Ali Nafie [presidential advisor] signed an agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North on June 28 and three days later, Omar El Bashir, clearly at the behest of the generals, renounced the agreement and talked about cleansing all of South Kordofan. Language like that is indicative of how militarily brutal this regime is at the moment and how dangerous, but also how vulnerable.
http://www.africaportal.org/articles/2011/10/31/elusive-quest-peace-darfur-0
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