The history of peace making process in the historical Sudan was a story of ‘Too Many Agreements Dishonored’ in the arduous effort by the North to convince the South that the hyena had signed a truth charter committing itself never again to eat meat. The history of peace making process among warring South Sudanese has been (and will continue to be) the story of ‘Too Many Agreements Dishonored’ in the grueling effort by the status quo (Garang, 1991; Kiir, 2013) to prevent the rebels (Riek, 1991 & 2013) from winning the cuop on the negotiating table (Nairobi, Addis Ababa)!!
By PaanLuel Wël, Juba
South Sudan’s cease-fire agreement is in tatters and the proposed transitional government is already in limbo.
It is not clear what the gov’t and the rebels had in mind when they voluntarily accepted to sign and commit themselves to the terms and conditions of the ceasefire. They had over four months to settle their parochial differences through a barrel of gun, but they were unable to.
The gov’t troops could not hold their positions in the face of the white army fighters; the rebels are not militarily strong enough to topple the gov’t as they have been chanting. The result was/is a costly military stalemate on the ground, with far-reaching political implications and humanitarian crisis across the country.
When everyone thought that the two warring parties have finally wisened up to the wisdom of giving peaceful political settlement of the crisis a chance, the gov’t and the rebels are still being intransigent, breaking the Cessation of Hostilities Accord as quickly as it was inked by President Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar in Addis Ababa.
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Somehow, the gov’t can’t bring itself to the cold reality that it can’t get the head of Riek Machar in a coffin as they had hyped themselves up to believe. The gov’t attempt to kill two birds with one stone–killing or sending Riek into permanent exile while jailing other political opponents of the President–has faltered, much to embarrassment of the President.
The falsely accused political detainees have been vindicated, and are out breathing fire on Kiir’s neck, spoiling for political revenge. Riek Machar is at large, alive and kicking, fighting the gov’t in almost 7 of the 10 states of South Sudan. The nation army, long subjected to humiliating neglect and total dilapidation, is deeply demoralized and outnumbered in most front-lines.
Similarly, the white army, long misled to believe that they are the warrior race, is yet to come to term with the stark reality that the country would still be under the leadership of President Kiir. And that it is precisely because they have been unable to get rid of him, five months of fierce fighting notwithstanding, is deeply unsettling.
Mythical stories of Ngundeng, polished to suit the taste of the moment, have clouded the white army’s mindset to fancy that they are involved in a tribal war pitting the Dinka and the Nuer.
There has never been a war between the whole Dinka nation and Nuer nation; only among some sections of the two communities.
Ngundeng, the god of the white army, fought only one battle with the Ngok Dinka of Pigi, the victory of which was attributed to divine intervention, not Ngundeng’s exceptional bravery. Ngundeng’s son, Guek Ngundeng, tried to replicate his father’s magic but got killed by the British.
To his credit, Riek Machar has been spectacularly successful to mobilize his supporters, all of whom are his tribe-mates, to his cause. Luckily, Kiir has been unable to get the same fanatical backing from his tribe-mates, many of whom are quick to dismiss the white army as “Nuer craziness” founded on nothing more than a wishful thinking.
To them, if it were to be Dinka-Nuer war, then, Dinka being twice the number of Nuer, the white army that rely on numbers would be quickly neutralized and defeated. The gov’t has been a great disappointment to all South Sudanese since 2005 and many are reluctant to die in a war that has nothing to do with their lives, and one that is not threatening enough to topple the gov’t of Kiir.
In fact, apart from those young men recruited before December 15th as Gel-Beny, it is not even clear if President Kiir has been actively trying to tribalize the conflict as much as Riek Machar has succeeded to do by relying exclusively on the support of his Nuer ethnic group.
More or less, President Kiir’s reluctance or failure to fire up the Dinkas has done much to de-tribalize the sprawling conflict in South Sudan. And that scenario might last long enough unless someone somewhere would impose Riek-led government without Kiir on South Sudanese.
The Dinkas would likely go to the bush with their own white armies to fight Riek. The Equatorians would too, for the message would be that the shortest way to power is through armed rebellion.
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As of May 9, 2014, when President Kiir and Riek Machar re-committed themselves to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and accepted in principle to form an interim government comprising of all parties, it was crystal clear to the gov’t and the rebels and the international community that the war is not winnable militarily. This is why, five months into the war, none of them has been able to take over the country completely.
The war has been nothing more than a ceaseless cycle of capture and recapture and re-re-capture game, albeit a tragicomical one.
Yet, the two parties are still arrogant enough to breach and re-breach the ceasefire accord within the same day it was re-signed. What is their game plan? What do they hope to achieve in their vain intransigence? What is their incentive for breaking the ceasefire agreement?
Well, the rebels, having failed to remove Kiir from power, are hoping that, by continuing with the war, Kiir would commit enough human rights abuses and atrocities to the extent that the international community would deem him another Laurent Gbagbo or Charles Taylor and remove him by force from power.
Hopefully, if everything goes according to plan, Riek Machar would be installed into power in Juba, much the same way that Paul Kagame rode into power in Rwanda after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This is way it is common to read such terms as ‘Kiir genocidal regime’ must go for South Sudan to have peace from the rebels.
On its part too, the gov’t wish to continue with the war, hoping that Riek Machar, who is accused of committing the 1991 Bor Massacre, would commit enough human rights abuses and crime against humanity to the extent that the international community would find it expedient to take him to the ICC. Rebels atrocities in Bor and Bentiu are portrayed as what is in store for South Sudanese if Riek Machar is allowed to roam large for too long.
Ideally, the gov’t wish that the international community would turn Riek Machar into Joseph Konyi of South Sudan and his Movement into the LRA. After all, it is not a secret that most gov’t officials do contemplate that there is cordial relationship between Konyi and Riek. While the gov’t has been hoping to wipe out the rebellion like what the Sri Lankan gov’t did to the Tamil Tigers, it has now settled on turning Riek into Konyi of South Sudan.
Surely, both are wishful thinking. As per the statement of John Kerry, US Secretary of State, President Kiir is far from being Gbagbo or Taylor of South Sudan, nor is his government the genocidal one of Rwanda. He is the democratically, constitutionally, and legitimately elected leader of South Sudan, affirmed Kerry. President Kiir is still the most popular politician in the entire country—more than Riek, Pagan or Mama Nyandeng, in spite of the utter failures of his corrupt government. This is partly due to his indispensable role in the liberation of South Sudan and partly due to lack of better alternative leader as Riek has controversial past in the war for liberation.
Likewise, Riek Machar is not soon graduating into the Joseph Konyi of South Sudan and nor is his rebel movement getting crush anytime soon like that of the Tamil Tigers or the LRA of Uganda or the M-23 rebels of DRC Congo. Unlike Konyi, Riek is meeting, laughing and shaking hands with regional and world leaders. He is legally free to travel anywhere in the world. Unlike the LRA, his rebellion has a formidable present and support in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states.
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It must be abundantly clear to all concerned that there were/are many outcomes to the current conflict: (1) Kiir-led gov’t without Riek because the rebellion has been defeated, (2) Kiir-led gov’t with Riek as a result of political settlement as in the proposed transitional government, (3) Riek-led gov’t without Kiir because the gov’t has been defeated as was the case in Ivory Coast or Rwanda, (4) Riek-led gov’t without Kiir as part of the political compromise as in the proposed transitional government, (5) Third-party led gov’t as a result of the political settlement as was the case in Liberia after Taylor went into political exile in Nigeria and rebel leaders were barred from assuming the mantle of power.
A scenario where there is a Riek-led gov’t with Kiir is improbable in African politics, maybe in Israel.
But assume any of the above political scenarios is the case, how will the interim coalition gov’t look like, leadership-wise? If that question were to be grappled with by the core supporters of Kiir or Riek, it would automatically be the case that pro-rebels group would prefer an interim government without President Kiir while the pro-government camp would want nothing more than the head of Dr. Riek Machar.
And the stalemate—political and military—would continue as talks in Addis Ababa are treated as necessarily evil to be tolerated but never taken seriously. The government would be wishing, and the rebels would be dreaming, for a decisive military victory!!
Most likely, however, the transitional gov’t would include both Kiir and Riek—called it the reconstitution of the status quo that had economically, politically and socially failed and ruined South Sudan through corruption and mismanagement, tribalism and nepotism, armed conflicts and mindless power struggle.
Composition-wise, Kiir would retain the presidency and Wani Igga, having given up his position to Riek Machar in 2002, would not this time round give it up again. NOT AGAIN. After all, his political constituent, the three states of Equatoria region, are more than Riek’s constituent, only second to the Dinka in numbers.
Most probably, a position of a Prime Minister-ship would be created to accommodate Riek, with Wani retaining the vice presidency. Of course, Riek would NEVER countenance the position of the second vice presidency; it is out of the question from the get-go.
There have been clear precedences in using the position of the prime minister as a problem-solving tool. It happened in Kenya and Zimbabwe where that position was created to accommodate Raila Odinga in Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe, both after a disputed presidential election. Since, it would be an interim government, perhaps for 1-2 years, it is possible that the government and the rebels would both accept and use that respite to recoup their war—political or/and military—arsenals for the next round of the fight for the big prize, the presidency.
For the record, Riek stands no chance of defeating Kiir, since Kiir would have the support of the two biggest political blocs in the nation—his Dinka ethnic group that is about 40% of the country population, and the Equatorians (through Wani Igga, who is Bari from Juba) who are about 33% of the population. This is besides the privileges of the incumbent, which include rigging the election—either directly or indirectly through money or control of the media and so forth.
Will Riek Machar accept the results of a free and fair, internationally monitored, election that give a resounding victory to Kiir or any of his henchmen, let alone a rigged one? Will he go back to the bush? So far, it is possible that Riek is not winning the war any time soon or forever, and may soon possibly come short in a democratic election: what will he do to get the power he so desires?
Surely, it would be feasible to get a quick compromise having Kiir as the president, Riek as the PM, and Wani as the VP, and possibly one or two deputy PMs—one going to Pagan Amum and another maybe going to Nhial Deng or Mama Nyandeng, depending on the political compromise.
The devil in the details would surface at the distribution of the cabinet positions, however. The rebels (and the third-party group) would insist that the following key ministries are shared equally: Interior and National Security; Defence and Chief of General Staff; Finance/Economic Planning and Mining/Petroleum; Foreign Affairs and Information; Governor of Central Bank and Chief Justice; Inspector of Police and Director of Military Intelligence etc.
Will the gov’t cede any of those portfolios to Riek Machar? Not easily, for the argument so far is that, as far as the formation of the interim gov’t is concerned, Riek Machar doesn’t represent South Sudan, but his Nuer ethnic group. The implication is that the gov’t of South Sudan can’t be shared between the Nuer on one side and the other 63 tribes of South Sudan on the other side. It is unfair, unjust and undemocratic, it is argued. But will Riek accept a proportion of seats, say 15%, representative of his Nuer ethnic group?
How about the Nuer ministers and leaders on the side of the gov’t of Kiir? Remember none of the Nuer serving leaders/ministers and governors joined the rebellion; will they be counted on the rebel side to avoid Nuer dominating the interim government, or on the gov’t side where they rightfully belong? Riek and Kiir may benefit a lot from the Kibaki/Raila coalition government in which such questions were wrestled with and apparently resolved.
After all, besides the G-11 who are the third party to the conflict, there are also Mabioor Garang and Dr. Mathok and Lado Gore on Riek’s side. Still, they are not representative of their respective communities to solve the dilemma of proportional representation in the interim gov’t, which would, no doubt, touch on ethnicity.
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Interestingly though, President Kiir recently restored around six ministerial positions that had been axed during the austerity measures period. It has been about a month or so since he decreed the restoration of those ministries and yet they have not been filled so far. It is rumoured that the gov’t would keep all the current functioning ministries to itself and offer the rebels those six or so ministries in any future deal over the proposed interim gov’t. Will the rebels feel insulted? Honoured?
More interestingly, Riek Machar is rumoured to be fronting either Pagan or Nyandeng or Taban Deng for any big position that would be given to the rebel in the proposed transitional gov’t. His pre-condition is that President Kiir too should step aside from the interim gov’t, just like him. To the gov’t, that is a cheap political gambit by Riek to appear as someone who is not hungry for power.
The question though is whether or not his fanatical Nuer supporters would accept any gov’t without Riek in it, no matter how sincere or politically savvy Riek Machar is.
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If you think the interim gov’t is already in limbo over disagreement on cabinet positions, just ponder on the security reform, which is an euphemism for the restructuring of the army. Think of Gadet who killed Ajak Yen in cold blood coming back to head a division or a sector of the SPLA? Think of the white army, over god-knows in numbers being fully integrated into the national army?
If over 50% of the national army was Nuer (who are less than 20% of the national population) before December 15th, what would it be in the interim period? Will the army be reconstituted on tribal basis? To what level?
What about the Equatorians who have been underrepresented in the army? Will ethnicity play a role in the security reform or will it be just 50-50 between the rebels and the gov’t? Some leaders in Juba have been quick to retort that the white army would go back to the cattle camps, will they? Will Riek come to Juba without them for protection, as he would be afraid for his dear life?
Some people have suggested that the white army would be disarmed and disbanded, is that a possibility when they fancy that “their mission” of getting rid of Kiir (read Dinka domination) is hanging in the balance?
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Ultimately, it is one thing for the two warring parties to drag their feet on and continually violate the ceasefire agreement; it will be another question altogether for them to overcome the hurdle of forming the interim government among themselves and to effect security reform in the army.
For South Sudanese, there is long way to go before long lasting peace and political stability is fully restored in the country. If the two warring parties can’t agree on and abide by the simple issue of the cessation of hostilities, how much faith can one have in their ability to overcome their perennial differences and strike a viable deal on the composition of the transitional gov’t and security reform?
Indeed, the history of peace making process in the historical Sudan was a story of ‘Too Many Agreements Dishonored’ in the arduous effort by the North to convince the South that the hyena had signed a truth charter committing itself never again to eat meat.
On the other hand, the history of peace making process among warring South Sudanese has been (and will continue to be) the story of ‘Too Many Agreements Dishonored’ in the gruelling effort by the status quo (Garang, 1991; Kiir, 2013) to prevent the rebels (Riek, 1991 & 2013) from winning the ‘coup’ on the negotiating table (Nairobi, Addis Ababa)!
It remains to be seen how the current political and military crisis would end in South Sudan. The jury is still out there.