Finding an Anti-Authoritarian Social Contract
5 min readBy David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
May 17, 2016 (SSB) — The extract herein are from Chapter one of “House of War” which was published in January 2013 by a German publishing house, Lambart Academic Publishing (LAP). It (extract) is meant as an introduction to the hypothesis on which the book was premised, stating that: Where a government is authoritarian, inter-ethnic political competition would inevitably lead to civil war and state failure in Africa. As a thesis, I argued that post-independence African countries have not done enough to promulgate constitutionalism through a social contract that corresponds to the region’s characteristics. Below are some of the extracts:
Africa is one continent where social contracts have yet to be consciously conceived, appreciated, and employed to the interest of its inhabitants. Having attained formal independence in the 1950s and 1960s, most nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa did little to engage in promulgating constitutionalism. Some of the politicians who resettled or received power from colonial administrations manipulated ethnic alliances to perpetuate themselves in power for decades; while many military officers, in the name of patriotism, usurped political power through military coup d’états and transformed their countries into one party states with limited to no opposition, political rights, or civil liberties. Those two government categories (civilian or military) shared similar characteristics in that they were all authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarianism might mean different things to different people, but in the context of African nation-states, it denotes blatant disregard by governments of any social contract with the governed. It also denotes a political regime where existing social contracts are superficial and do not represent the will of the governed. The governed, in our case, are specific ethnic groups that existed in organized communities that possessed internal authority well before the formation of the current states.
Prior to the emergence of modern states in Africa, all ethnic groups in the region paid full allegiance to tribal chiefs or kings whose authority over economic, social, and security matters was often effective. Those chiefs/kings passed verdicts on a spectrum of issues after consultation with notable elders in their ethnic groups. But even after the advent of the modern state, tribally-based ethnopolitical structures persisted and loyalty to ethnic groups continues to maintain precedence over loyalty to the nation-state and its representative institutions.
For many, if not most, after over five decades of political sovereignty, it still remains practically inconceivable for an ethnic African to respect and obey the authority of one man (or woman) who belongs to another tribe, sits in a distant and remote town which is not part of one’s traditional tribal boundaries, and speaks a language one does not understand. African countries continue to be political states, but have failed to evolve into nations. The major reason for failure to create nations out of states is a preoccupation of authoritarian regimes with regime survival, rather than nation building and economic growth. Up until present times, the authoritarian leaders of African states have manipulated existing ethnic/kinship relationships with ulterior self-serving motives, instead of building new national interests that would be to the benefit of their countrymen and countries.
It could therefore be observed that most civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa are caused by strong anti-government sentiments in tribal heartlands where tribal loyalties are potent and conspicuous. Such sentiments had existed throughout colonialism because colonial administrations benefited from fueling tribal nationalism. However, antigovernment sentiments and lack of internal unity within states consistently prevailed long after colonialism. Indigenous heirs to colonial governments faced the challenge of consolidation of power and nation building, which most did not handle successfully. A major reason for failure is that the majority of post-colonial governments in the region were/are authoritarian governments that also played the colonial divide-and-rule game. They reignited tribal animosities, and adamantly refused to leave or share political power through enabling periodic peaceful political transition.
Faced with tribally based opposition and aspiring to insure their self-perpetuation in power, authoritarian regimes created political alliances with carefully selected ethnic communities and representative politicians who were ready to shift political posts in exchange for political favors. With lack of accountability in an environment where political power guarantees a swift change in tribal economic fortunes, seldom did tribal politicians decline an opportunity to serve in authoritarian governments. Political alliances became the waves that carried tribal boats at the whims and trickery of incumbent presidents. In such socio-political settings, the security of states became a variable that is dependent on the political games and tribal alliances of the time. Greater alliances maintained greater stability, while lack of inclusivity led to ethnic civil wars.
David Mayen Ayarbior, BA Econ Poli.Science (KIU), MA Int’l Security (JKSIS), LLB (U. London). Author of: House of War (Civil War and State Failure in Africa) 2013. mayen.ayarbior@gmail.com.
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