Memoirs of an African Refugee: Civil War in Ifo 1997 (part 2)
5 min readBy David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
June 10, 2016 (SSB) — The recent threat by Kenya to close down Dadaab refugee camps prompted me to recall my own experience as a refugee in the same camp. Worldwide, rural refugees could be called the retched of the earth because they are at the bottom of humanity’s economic order. They are sometimes victimized by both their own states from which they flee and by the host states where they seek safety. Moreover, they could still be victimized by UNHCR instead of getting necessary help. The collective victimization of refugees and IDPs has sometimes led to what psychologists have termed as “frustration-aggression syndrome.” The syndrome often leads to internal fighting in refugee/IDP camps for the stupidest of reasons like the ones witnessed in UNMISS PoCs across the country – which we also experienced in Dadaab in 1997.
Of course, the title of this article is a scientific misnomer because what happened in Ifo (one of three distant camps in Dadaab) in 1997 was not a civil war as such. It was just a tribal fight pitting Sudan 2 (Nuer) against Sudan 4 (Equatorians). In political science, the term “civil war” means a war involving government forces against a rebel group whose aim relates to having full or partial control of the state or changing its character. Not only that, the casualties of the war must include more than a thousand fatalities per year. Going by those widely acceptable criteria, tribal wars that occur between two or more tribes without the involvement of state forces may not be defined as civil war, even if their casualties exceed the death threshold of one thousand a year.
Nevertheless, even though our experience in Ifo included many injuries and two fatalities (one Nuer and one Madi), the tension before and after the fight did resemble what I later experienced in our civil war of liberation. It was like a miniature war between two mini countries (Republic of Sudan 2 against Republic of Sudan 4). It even included a total blockade imposed on Sudan 4 by spear-wielding warriors from Sudan 2. That blockade included prohibition from going for hunting. And even though prohibition from going to the market for buying food was intended, it was not possible to implement because the Kenyan police had stationed three Land Cruisers around our camps to prevent infighting. In addition, they would surely shoot dead whoever kills another in broad day light at the market place.
The frustration-aggression syndrome leading to the mini-war between Sudan 4 and Sudan 2 was caused by many factors such as a one year long refusal of UNHCR to register us (South Sudanese) as refugees. It (UNHCR) claimed that our presence at the Kenya-Somali border, instead of that of Kenya-South Sudan, was enough evidence that we were not normal refugees. They had consequently refused to give us our food ration for the whole year leading to our “civil war.” In fact, we considered ourselves hostages of Kenya and the UN because we were also prevented by the Kenyan police from going back to Nairobi en route to New Sudan or anywhere else, for they insisted that ‘refugees’ should not leave their camps.
For long, we were virtually stranded in Ifo without any recognizable status. It became like a Nazi concentration camp. And since the only road to Nairobi passed through Garissa River Bridge (about 50 miles from Ifo), it was virtually impossible to get out of Ifo without paying bribes all the way, especially at the bridge. But that was a big ask for most of us who had to sell all their cloths for buying maize floor.
Consequently, the ‘frustration-aggression’ we had out of that situation created room for daily rumors about who is responsible for our virtual detention in such inhospitable and hostile environment. One such rumor originated in Sudan 2 (Nuer) and Sudan 3 (Bahar Algazal) that the person responsible for our lack of recognition and resettlement was our coverall chairman who was from Sudan 4 (Equatoria). Baseless rumors spread that he was using his status as overall Chairman to work for resettling his family instead of talking about our collective plight and need for recognition and resettlement. And because he was protected by his community members who refuted the rumors, then they were deemed to be collectively responsible for the situation.
As the baseless rumors became almost a reality in many people’s minds, preparation for invading Sudan 4 (Equatoria) by Sudan 2 and 3 (Nuer and Bahar Algazal) gained momentum. However, in one meeting the Chairman of Sudan 3 (who is currently a prominent judge in the Judiciary of South Sudan) presented a convincing reason why we should not go to war with our good neighbors in Equatoria because the rumors against the overall Chairman was unfounded. And since we were in the middle between the two Sudans (2 and 4), we refused ‘our territory’ to be used by Sudan 2 on their way to launching their imminent attack. That decision to refuse our territory be used as a launching pad created further hostility between us and Sudan 2. In fact, we also had our reasonless short stick-fight with Sudan 2 a few months earlier, but there were few injuries and no deaths. Reason? They had celebrated rumors that Dr. John Garang had died.
All inhabitants of the three sub-camps are now preparing for a possible “ethnic civil war” among the [South] Sudanese communities. Mini factories for ‘white weapons’ (spears, arrows, and daggers) were established in the three sub-camps, and the sound of iron hitting pierced the air around for many weeks. For us in Sudan 3, we were making ourselves ready for a possible attack from Sudan 2 since we were now dubbed ‘enemy collaborators’. As the D-day was growing nearer, the warriors in Sudan 2 had mostly manufactured spears while those in Sudan 4 made enough arrows (danga). We had also made enough spears and each of us was having at least two spears. We started serving in night shifts as deployed by the former SPLA soldiers who formed an absolute majority in the camps.
Mayen Ayarbior has a Bachelor Degree in Economics and Political Science from Kampala International University (Uganda), Masters in International Security from JKSIS-University of Denver (USA), and Bachelor of Laws (LLB) from the University of London. He is the author of “House of War (Civil War and State Failure in Africa) 2013” and currently the Press Secretary/ Spokesperson in the Office of South Sudan’s Vice President, H.E. James Wani Igga. You can reach him via his email address: mayen.ayarbior@gmail.com.
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