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SPLM-North and the Fate of the Sudans (Part 3)

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By David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan

John Garang
The vision of John Garang

September 19, 2016 (SSB) — In the last two notes on this topic I argued that it was high time the SPLM-N started making serious concessions on the methods of executing its revolution. For many strategic reasons, time has come for it to drop armed struggle in favour of political struggle. Many have argued that the choice is Khartoum’s to make, while SPLM-N could only adopt a reactive posture. To some large extent that may not be far from the truth. Indeed, as it (SPLM-N) has already signed the Road Map agreement as part of a wider opposition umbrella, Khartoum is expected to reciprocate. However, it may not be the whole truth that SPLM-N’s choices are exhausted simply by signing a road map agreement.

Many South Sudanese agree that Juba must take its legal commitments more seriously; assuming that there are commitment gaps to be filled on its part, such as one in which SPLM-N commanders and leaders are told that they became foreigners from July 9, 2011 as far as Juba is concerned. And by being citizens of another state, the revolutionary ‘ball game’ has changed. Of course, they might ask for a barrel of salt just to stomach the news, but this is Juba’s obligation to initiate and commitment to make.

Supporters of the assumed right of South Sudan to launch an “intervention” in Sudan have based their outlook on two grounds. One ground is what parts one and two of these notes have attempted to illuminate, which related to a CPA assignment accorded to Juba. That assignment was constrained within a six-year time frame that was called a “Transitional Period” before an ultimate goal which was the referendum.  Within that period Juba and Khartoum were supposed to respect and oversee several arrangements, including Popular Consultation for the people of Abyei (disputed area) and the two areas (undisputed territory) in Sudan.

What is now important for Juba to note is that there was no strict stipulation in the CPA that in case the two capitals failed to implement all provisions therein, a new period would be given to either party to finish other unfinished business. In fact, it was this circumstance which complicated the issue of Abyei until it was reintroduced through an intervention by the ICJ (International Court of Justice) whose ruling has become Juba’s strongest reference point, rather than the CPA per se. Consequently, Abyei became a UN-AU virtual protectorate until further notice. One wonders whether the two areas cannot ask AU-UN to accord them a status closer to that of Abyei within the context of Sudan, until a permanent settlement to their genuine case is reached.

The second rational claimed by the ‘New Sudanese’ of both countries is rather a weaker one premised on Juba having a moral obligation towards former comrades in arms. As we must know, the conflict between morality, international law and politics has remained controversial since times immemorial, up through the New World Order of post-World War II (1945) to date. Within this context, commitments to preventing human rights violations by the Arabs of Khartoum against Darfuris, Nuba, Funj, etc. is for the whole  world to make, not only Juba’s to make.

Surely, South Sudanese’ commitment to their brethren across the border ought to be deeper than that of the rest of the world because of a shared history and future. No quarrel about this point to which we all agree. However, ought we not have the same moral commitment towards the hundreds of thousands of Nuer civilians who are currently suffering in Upper Nile or our other refugees in neighboring countries? Will it not be hypocrisy of the highest level to pretend to value the human rights of citizens of a foreign country and turn a blind eye to our own?

The bitter truth we must face is that millions of our own citizens have been caught at the wrong end of a violent power struggle which quickly degenerated into one of the most regrettable civil wars in Africa.  Whether you think it was Dr. Riek’s responsibility or that of any other group is immaterial at this point. The humanitarian situation in Upper Nile is far much dire and urgent than that in Darfur or the two areas of Sudan toward which ‘revolutionary’ New Sudanese would want to divert all the country’s resources, if there any resources left to divert.

The point I am struggling to make or some pretend not to see is that New Sudanese of South Sudan have no moral high ground whatsoever to claim human rights as their basis of encouraging continuity of intervention in Sudan’s internal affairs. Neither history nor morality will justify their claims, especially when they are part and parcel of the current wanton destruction of the new born Republic of South Sudan and the lives of its more than 10 million inhabitants.

We South Sudanese of different political affiliations and factions have no moral higher ground on we could stand anywhere in the world, all of us, especially when we failed to bring peace to our country. We have already turned our guns to the heads of our own innocent children including unborn fetuses; we are now on a rampage of rapes against our own women and girls. We have become worse than wild predators of men; we have come so close to a situation where heaven itself will disown us for what we have done and preparing to further do.

No one in his right mind can deny that the Nuba, Four and Bija of Sudan have a genuine case against Khartoum. But let the debate not be minimized to that shallow context of the right to fight through guns or the morality of human rights commitments. New realities must dictate new rules of engagement with Khartoum and the two areas; rules that could bring about a win-win-win situation to all parties involved in that protracted and complex civil war.

Mayen Ayarbior is a Lawyer, Political Economist, and International Security specialist. He is the author of: House of War (Civil War and State Failure in Africa). He could be reached at mayen.ayarbior@gmail.com.

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