By Malith Kur, Montreal, Canada
Friday, November 20, 2020 (PW) — The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) has already gone into history books as an armed guerrilla movement that fought a long civil war against different Sudanese regimes. More importantly, the Sudanese people in the North and South divide will always remember it as a resistant political movement that has shaped the cultural and politicaldestiny of post-colonial Sudan. The people who have rewritten Sudan’s history with their blood, commitment, and sweat are the cornerstone of this historical transition. They will often have an important place in the hearts and minds of those who shall reflect on the shortcomings and achievements of the SPLM/A.Commander Kuol Manyang Juuk has witnessed both the failures and successes of the SPLM/A, and he has played an essential role in all of them. This final part of South Sudan’s VIPs seriesis a brief story that sheds some light on the rise of Commander Kuol Manyang Juuk in the rank and file of the SPLM/A. It discusses Kuol’s performances in South Sudan’s liberation struggle and contributions to post-2011 political developmentsin the world’s newest nation.
Kuol’s Membership & Rise in the SPLM/A
Kuol Manyang joined the SPLM/A in 1984, along with students and other civil servants who decided to abandon Sudan’s government following the army mutiny in Bor in May 1983. He left his post as a civil engineer working for the regional government in the South and became an SPLA soldier of Koryom’s Second Division. Jokou in the Upper Nile region was the first leg of his tour of duty as a commissioned officer of the SPLA. He fought in many battles at Jokou before transferring to Bor areas to replace Commander Arok Thon Arok in 1985.
Commander Kuol was not among the first founding members of the Movement. But his rise in the rank and file of the Movement is twofold: dedication to SPLM/A’s cause and military discipline. Kuol’s dedication to the aims and objectives of the SPLM/A propelled him to a prominent position in the Political-Military High Command. His dedication to the SPLMhas remained a lifelong commitment, distinguishing him from most of his colleagues. He is among the few high ranking SPLM/A members who have never switched sides or had significant differences with John Garang or Salva Kiir during the long years of the Second Sudanese Civil War.
The military discipline that Kuol exhibited during the war played a part in his rise as well. When he replaced Commander Arok Thon Arok in early 1985 to command the SPLA forces in Bor areas, the military discipline had already collapsed among the Koryom units in various locations. Rogue elements among the Koryom battalions grew more violent toward civilians. Lootings and intimidation were a daily occurrence in the area. It was total anarchy, but Kuol took a firm stand against it. He introduced military discipline and began reorganizing the SPLAmilitary units in the regions around Bor. He wanted to track the activities of his soldiers.
The initial phase of that military discipline and reorganization started with the arrest of all rogue soldiers. Their leaders received severe punishment, such as prison or death sentences under the SPLM/A penal code. It was a drive to root out corruption and malpractices within the Koryom Division in Bor areas. Those forces underwent retraining and were subsequently sent to the battlefields around Juba to conduct military offensives against the enemy instead of robbing and intimidating innocent civilians. That new administrative initiative rekindled the spirit of liberation among the Koryomforces in Bor and around Juba. Those actions set Kuol Manyangon the road to fame within the SPLM/A.
The reorganization of the SPLA units in Bor was just the beginning of difficult internal tasks ahead of Kuol. The 1991 events tested his resolve and commitment to serve the cause of the SPLM/A. The split within the Movement brought about a new phenomenon, political chaos unseen in the post-Addis Ababa Accord South Sudan. Riek Machar and Lam Akolconspired in Nasir in August 1991 to unseat John Garang from the Movement’s leadership for what they called “a lack of democracy in the SPLM/A.” However, they knew that it would not be an easy task because of Garang’s entrenched popularityamong the SPLA soldiers. They failed to take over the leadership from Garang. But for Riek and Lam, the only way to achieve their goal was to plan systematic destruction of what they saw as Garang’s power base. They used the ethnic card to recruit hostile Nuer militias and gave them the green light to loot, kill, and destroy anything they could not take with them. The result of such a policy was the 1991 infamous BorMassacre.
This new development compelled the SPLA to abandon its plan to capture Juba in 1991. Salva Kiir described it as “Riek’sbetrayal.” John Garang later lamented that Riek Machar and his colleagues would be known in history as people who “stabbedthe movement in the back when the SPLA was at the point of victory in Juba.” But Kuol Manyang and other brave SPLA commanders decisively responded to this grave situation. It was a struggle against all odds, but Kuol stood firm in such adverse military conditions. It was a real test of his longtime dedication to the cause of the SPLM/A. Kuol’s unwavering commitment to the SPLM/A eventually prevailed. It allowed him to expel Riek’s forces from Bor. In the end, Riek and Lam returned to the SPLM/A in 2002, proving that Kuol and other loyal members of the Movement were on the right side of history. Their commitment to the cause of the SPLM/A brought about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and, subsequently, South Sudan’s independence.
The CPA and its Implementation
It took many years and pressure from the international community to convince the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A to enter serious negotiations to meet the Sudanese people’s desire for peace. The SPLM/A and the NIF regime in Khartoum answered the call for peace in Naivasha in 2005.They negotiated and signed the CPA in Kenya in 2005, whichpaved the way for John Garang to return to Khartoum after more than two decades in the bush. But it was a short-lived historical moment because Garang died tragically in a helicopter crash on his way from Kampala to South Sudan. This incident occurredthree weeks after Garang was sworn in as Sudan’s First Vice President. John Garang represented the hopes and aspirations of most South Sudanese. In that context, his demise a few weeks after returning to Khartoum in July 2005 was an extremely challenging development for the Movement and South Sudanese political future. South Sudanese feared difficult times in the CPA’s implementation without Garang’s leadership. They were right because the current political mess in the country justifies that fear.
However, Garang’s death was not the first significant issue that faced the implementation of the CPA. Salva Kiir and JohnGarang had an uneasy relationship in the period leading to the signing of the peace agreement in Kenya in 2005. Many allegations and conspiracy theories flew around toward the end of 2004. They alleged that Garang was pushing Kiir away from the leadership center and was grooming Nhial Deng Nhial and other influential figures to take the second position in the Movement’s leadership. Garang vehemently denied such allegations, but Kiir and his supporters took them seriously. They were ready to fight should attempt to remove Kiir from his position take effect as alleged. It was another uncomfortablemoment of leadership’s crisis in the SPLM, which had the potential to affect the CPA’s implementation negatively. But Kuol Manyang, Deng Alor, and other senior members of the Movement played a crucial role in defusing the situation. Their intervention to address those rumors paved the way for the Rumbek SPLM Convention toward the end of 2004 (November 29-December 1 2004). It was another crucial time in which KuolManyang and other influential members of the Movement used their influence to save the day for the SPLM.
Following Garang’s untimely death, Kuol Manyang and other committed SPLM cadres stood firm in the face of Sudan’s adverse political climate. Their support for a smooth leadershiptransition within the SPLM was critical. There was a growing uncertainty as Riek Machar and Lam Akol thought their time to accomplish what they did not achieve in 1991 had arrived. Such feeling was not expressed openly, but it was flying around. Nonetheless, influential members of the SPLM’s political bureau, including Kuol Manyang, ensured the succession followed the right path. It was time to reward Salva Kiir for his loyalty to the Movement and cause of self-determination for South Sudanese. Indeed, Kiir was declared the new leader of the SPLM, and his ascension to the helm of the SPLM guaranteed a smooth path to self-determination for South Sudan.
It would have been a different story for South Sudan had Lam Akol or Riek Machar succeeded John Garang. The path to conduct a free and fair referendum in 2011 would have narrowed. For example, Lam Akol openly opposed the referendum, a political stand he has not abandoned up to now. He wanted the vote delayed for ten years, suggesting that it was not a necessary exercise. On the other hand, Riek Machar committed to maintaining his alliance with Bashir’s National Islamic Front (NIF), an association that remained in place until Bashir was ousted in 2019. That alliance did not serve the political demands of South Sudanese.
Kuol and the Post-2011 South Sudanese Politics
Kuol’s transition from a guerrilla military figure to a political actor came with challenges. His political and military influence began to wane within the SPLM/A right after being appointed a minister for transport representing the SPLM in the CPA-mandated government of national unity in Khartoum. Hefound himself in a political environment in which he commanded little respect or influence. The people in the circle of power in Khartoum knew him as one of the arch opponents of the Arabization and Islamization policy in Sudan. So, the Islamists-led government had little interest to work with Kuol.They stripped the ministry of transport of all essential components, such as the airport and other critical infrastructure, to show that they did not trust Kuol. In that situation, the SPLM saw that Kuol would be somewhat useful for South Sudan’s Government instead of being part of Khartoum’s central administration. After a few months as a minister of transport in Khartoum, the SPLM brought him back to the regional government.
Kuol returned to the regional government, replacing Philip Thon Leek as the governor of Jonglei State. His mission was to address the worsening security situation in the region. But at that point, Kuol was no longer the strong man we knew while fighting in the bush. The security situation in Jonglei remained precarious for the best part of his leadership. Perhaps he did not have adequate human resources or security apparatus to deal with the situation.
Further, joggling for political power within the SPLM increased rapidly as the pre-referendum elections got closer in 2010. The senior members of the SPLM who did not win the party’s nomination decided to stand as independents in the polls. George Athoor was one of them. He contested the Jonglei State governorship against Kuol, but he lost. However, that was not the end of the story. George Athoor disputed the election results, which caused significant security disruptions in Jonglei. That dispute developed into a full-blown rebellion, affecting Jonglei and the Upper Nile states. The National Islamic Front encouraged Athoor to fight because that action had the potentialto delay the referendum. Delaying the conduct of the referendum at that time would have served the political interests of the NIF.However, George Athoor met his death under mysterious circumstances between Uganda and South Sudan, and therebellion subsided. Despite Athoor’s death, military tension remained in the air at the border between Jonglei and the Upper Nile, for Athoor had left behind a group of well-armed militias. Nonetheless, things were calm enough for South Sudan’s government to organize a successful referendum vote in the Greater Upper Nile region.
Following the South Sudanese overwhelming vote for independence, Kuol played a lowkey political activity in Juba’s SPLM-led government. Still, he retained his position as the governor of Jonglei State. Before the referendum, observers and individuals within the SPLM expected Kuol to assume an influential part in Juba’s central government. They speculated that at the last stages of the CPA’s implementation, Kuol would become a minister of Defense (SPLA Affairs). They expected him to retain that position should the South secede from Sudan.After all, Kuol was not appointed a minister of Defense before or after the referendum. It is likely that the influential figures in the military who did not want to lose their unfettered access to resources succeeded in convincing President Kiir not to appoint Kuol to the defense portfolio. They knew that Kuol would come with new guidelines to fight corruption in the army, somethingthat would reduce their privileges. Two years down the line, however, the political climate changed drastically. After the independence vote, the first SPLM Convention degenerated into a chaos that set in motion the country’s current economic and political nightmares.
The 2013 rebellion brought Kuol back into the political limelight. He became the defense minister shortly before the coup attempt in December 2013. Kuol’s appointment as a minister of Defense breathed some life into Kiir’sadministration. He took some steps to reform the South Sudanese military after the coup attempt. Such a reform was necessary since many soldiers had already deserted to join the new rebel groups. Under Kuol’s supervision, the army fought off in many fronts the rebel advances and took back many rebel strongholds, including Nasir and later Pagak. Those successes contributed immensely to the initial peace process in 2015 and the revitalized accord in 2018, respectively.
But those military activities did not go down well with the peace sponsors. The US administration and other Troika nationsconsidered them a violation of the ceasefire agreed during the peace negotiations. The IGAD and peace mediators wanted to stop the fighting, allowing the conflicting parties to reach a comprehensive peace agreement. They had to apply pressure on both sides to reduce the ceasefire violations. Those developments brought Kuol, other government officials, and some rebel commanders into the USA sanction regime’s firing line. Now Kuol faces a travel ban to the USA. Despite those hurdles, Kuol does not regret his military actions against rebels.He maintains that the SPLM-led government of South Sudan, like any other government, has a legitimate right to defend itself against all forms of illegal rebellions.
Although Kuol has remained politically active, he is gradually winding down his political ambitions. He will leave the political scene with confidence after securing his place in South Sudan’s history books. He will always be remembered forthree things: his humble background, exceptional contribution to the liberation of South Sudan, and the current attempts to stabilize the post-independence South Sudanese political climate.
The author, Malith Kur, is a Ph.D. candidate at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His research focuses on the patterns of cooperation between the churches, African indigenous religious institutions, and the state for peacebuilding, reconciliation, and social reconstruction of South Sudan. Kur’s previous research examined the Christian contribution to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a possible model for peacebuilding in South Sudan. He can be reached @ malith.kur@mail.mcgill.ca.
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