Posts Tagged ‘SPLM/A’

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: Letters and Radio Messages of the Late SPLM/A's Leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabioor (Volume 2) Paperback – November 27, 2013

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: Letters and Radio Messages of the Late SPLM/A’s Leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabioor (Volume 2) Paperback – November 27, 2013, ON AMAZON.COM

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: Letters and Radio Messages of the Late SPLM/A’s Leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabioor (Volume 2) Paperback – November 27, 2013, ON AMAZON.COM






Southern Sudan

February 5th, 1972 

Dear Dominic:

Thank you for the correspondence you dispatched to this end on January 25th, instantly. Very lucky, I go them today from Kampala through the lorry. It is lucky because I am leaving tomorrow morning for the interior, about 500 miles footwork from where we last met and I will not be back for over 7 months, maybe more.

Find here enclosed a copy of a letter I wrote to General Lagu and the negotiations committee (See Captain John Garang’s 1972 Letter to General Joseph Lagu of Anyanya One, January 24, 1972). I have handwritten it (it is 2:00 a.m) since I have packed my typewriter for tomorrow’s long journey. You may type it and if necessary you have my permission to use it BUT AFTER the negotiations ONLY so as not to prejudice the same. As you can see I am not in favor of these so-called negotiations nor do I have any illusions that much will come out of them. What is more, a settlement with the enemy at the present time is not in the best interests of the Southern Sudanese people, the Sudanese people and the African people for some of the reasons given in the attached seven page letter (refer to Captain John Garang’s 1972 Letter to General Joseph Lagu of Anyanya One, January 24, 1972).

Firstly, the “solution” will be no solution since the Arab military dictatorship of General Numeiry seeks to “solve” the problem within the spirit of Arab Nationalism and the context of a United Arab Sudan. Secondly, the Numeiry regime is illegitimate, a regime of blood, rhetoric, instability and theft, it is only a matter of months before the Numeiry clique is couped out of office by a similar scum of political prostitutes. To sign a “settlement” with such unstable barbarians is criminal and makes one a member of that gang though in a different outfit. Thirdly, the conditions for permanent revolution have not as yet been sufficiently created within our own motion.

The objective of liberation (of armed struggle) is firstly the riddance of oppression and exploitation and the simultaneous creation of conditions and structures for the permanent (continuous) release of our productive forces, which have been so historically damned, deformed, stunted and impeded by exploitation, oppression and humiliation. This last point is central as it focuses on the essence, the particularity of our movement.

About my role as Information Officer for the Anyanya, it is true that there has been such talk, but after I finished my infantry training last October, I made a concrete analysis of the situation and objective factors indicated that I could not make my total contribution in that capacity. You know what I mean. And if that be the case, it would be an intolerable situation. I joined the Movement with total commitment and dedication. I have sacrificed (I don’t consider it so) all the benefits paper dehumanizing education is supposed to confer on the dehumanized, decultured native holder, I am resolved to give the ultimate sacrifice, my life, for I am bound by nothing else but duty and commitment to Africa and the African people starting with the Southern Sudanese people, as a matter of course. African liberation can only primarily be effected through combat and everything else must be built around the combat, must enhance and give political character to combat. 

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: (Volume 1)

It would take me a book to go into analytical, historical and practical exposition of this line, but it is sufficient to say that this is why I turned down the “Information” work and chose active combat, and so tomorrow I go to the interior to (eventually soon) take over command of a full battalion. War is war, should anything terminate my usefulness (services) to the African people and revolution, it is incumbent upon you to continue with the struggle and/or to prepare the children and generations to come for the revolution. It is our duty.

I am indeed sorry about brother Vuzi Zulu that he comes at a time I have to leave. It would have been my duty and pleasure to cooperate with him since I presume we are engaged in the same revolution. (I would have also found that out). At any rate, pass my regards and explanation to him on his return. Some other time we shall meet.

Yes, I shot all the five colored films you gave me. After the training I went to Kampala but failed to develop them, as they don’t have facilities for developing Ecktochrome film in Kampala. When Allen Reed came he took them to Nairobi and they were developed and printed on slides. He then returned them and gave me a bill of 80/= (eighty Uganda shillings) which I promptly paid and I got all the slides. Two days later he came to me in Bumbo (twenty miles from Kampala) and begged me to borrow him some of the slides to teach his (Southern Sudanese) photography cadets who were there assembled in Kampala and that he would return them the following day.

He went and disappeared, till now I have not seen him—a complete breach of trust. Please convey the charge of theft to him from me, and collect those slides from him, I had actually told him that I was going to send them to you. The balance, I have left them locked up in Bumbo as I could not send them in time expecting Allen to return the borrowed ones and then send them in lump. This concurs with your other remarks.

Also please convey my sincere appreciation to FOPANO, ANAM, and OFPA for their endorsement “in principle” to cooperation with you and the Movement in our “efforts towards the liberation of Africa” and to Roy Inis and Core for the inclusion of “the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement” in its support of African Liberation Movements.

Tell those citizens of Africa, snatched away from the great BLACK womb of our Mother, that time has come for their consciousness and ours on the mainland to merge (again) with one big black consciousness that will pull Mother Africa from the bloody teeth of the monster and usher in the total release of our productive forces long damned, deformed and impeded by centuries of oppression, exploitation and emasculating humiliation.

Greetings to all our students and brothers.

Brother Garang Mabior Atem

Southern Sudan, February 5th, 1972


By Captain Mabior Garang de Mabior

October 3rd, 2013, Kampala Uganda

The Vision Is Not Dead II (PDF)

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) ought to consider reexamining the vision of the new Sudan in order to regain the direction that was lost when it was neglected. The assertion by Comrades that the vision is dead and no longer relevant to the current reality of an independent Republic of South Sudan is not correct; the vision is not dead! This assertion comes from lack of concrete understanding of the history, principles and objectives of the Liberation Movement from its inception in May 1983, and the subsequent revolutionary corrections that have occurred throughout its history, up to 2005 when the principles began to be ignored.

The most notable of these events being the first SPLM National Convention held in April 1994, in which the 1983 Manifesto was revised and expanded. The Movement carried out reforms in organizational structure that helped it redefine its objectives within the context of the changing geo-political realities (of that time). The (1994) SPLM first National Convention marked the start of the period of recovery for the movement after the 1991 split; which marked the period of greatest weakness for the movement.

The reality is that the movement has been divided since its inception, and these divisions have hitherto been exploited by “the real and potential enemies of the Movement” as described in the SPLM Manifesto of 1983. The enemies of peace, stability and development will use any opportunity to divide the leadership of the people’s movement. This is why it is of utmost importance for every cadre of the movement to study and understand concretely the history, principles and objectives of the movement. This will allow us to have a “correct leadership of the SPLM so that the Movement is not hijacked by counter-revolutionaries” (SPLM Manifesto, July 1983).

It has been the policy of the Movement to look into itself throughout its existence in order to make revolutionary correction (necessary) for its survival. And in such an endeavor it is imperative to be completely honest and dispassionate, as the Liberation Movement brings together members from various walks of life. It is true; we all claim that we share the same aim: “The restoration of the dignity of our people.” It is, however, a broad objective and at times we may find that we are in a quandary when it comes to concrete understanding and implementation of this objective (and the God is in the detail, as it is said).

The SPLM is in a similar position today as it has been throughout its history; we are faced with the daunting task of answering the old questions that have divided the movement while adapting to a new geopolitical reality. There are forces that are beyond our control and for the movement to survive we must be able to harmonize these changing realities (beyond our control) with our objectives. The struggle of the marginalized people of Sudan has led to an independent Republic of South Sudan and North Sudan, with the SPLM being split in two. This current reality has led some Comrades to be misled by the false premise that, the independence of South Sudan is in contradiction to the vision of a new Sudan (the guiding vision of the Movement from 1983 – 2005).

This is not true!

In order to have an improved appreciation of this, it would be expedient to revisit briefly the history of the liberation struggle in the Sudan.

Historical Background

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army was an armed political movement that was established in 1983 by a group of officers from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). These young officers had participated in the first Sudanese civil conflict popularly known as the Anyanya, and had been absorbed into the SAF as part of an agreement signed in Addis Ababa (1972).  These cadres of the Anyanya movement where opposed to the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) as it later came to be known; however, their low rank made their voices insignificant and they would be of no consequence.

These officers included the likes of the late Dr. John Garang, the late Francis Ngor, the late Kerubino Kuanyin, the late William Nyuon; and others that are still with us, like Salva Kiir. The dissatisfaction of these former Anyanya cadres is reflected in a letter the late Dr. John sent to his Commander in Chief in 1972 (and copied to his colleagues), in which he stated:

There is no objective indication that the Khartoum-based Arab nationalist administration is capable of concluding a consistent social democratic solution to the National Question in the Sudan. Arab Nationalism in the Sudan, consistent with its predatory nature, proposes and declares solutions such as ‘local autonomy’ within the context of a United Arab Sudan. Such muddle-headedness returns us back to 1963 and1955 and is an objective indication that the necessary mutation which would enable ruling Northerners to face up to the objective realities of the Sudan has not yet taken root”

He then continues:

There are only two possible ways for resolving the Sudanese crises: The birth of two nation-states out of the present (geographical) Sudan or political autonomy for both the South and the North (and/or any other part that so demands) in a federated, united, new Sudan. Political Autonomy in this usage means that the autonomous regions have adequate political power, in terms of armed forces, to protect the region against the encroachment by the federation or by one of the regions in the federation, and, furthermore, that a region retains the right to secede from the federation if its interests are not adequately served by the federation. (It must be clear to Southerners that the retention of the right to secede from such a federation must be guaranteed by the federal constitution and by the existence of a physical Southern Armed Forces.

These cadres believed the enemy was weak and could be defeated, they argued that the government had only accepted negotiations due to this weakness. They anticipated that in future, the government, after effectively demobilizing the Anyanya units would surely violate the agreement.

In addition to those that had been absorbed against their will, there were many cadres of the Anyanya that rejected the agreement altogether, and refused to be absorbed into the SAF, this group later came to be known as Anyanya II. The Anyanya II cadres would later become instrumental in the birth and formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); the armed political movement that would eventually rise out of the gross violations of the Addis Ababa Agreement. This unity with Anyanya II was part of the strategic objectives of the SPLA/SPLM according to the Manifesto of the SPLM, July 1983 – Paragraph 25 d) and e) respectively which states:

d)         The SPLA must regroup the scattered fighting forces in Southern Sudan, win their confidence, give them further military and political training and through war and correct conduct, win the confidence and support of the masses of the people.

e)         In order to be able to regroup and politicize the fighting forces effectively, the SPLA shall need to establish its own progressive camps apart from those of Anyanya II, which are more or less tribal and sectional camps. The SPLA will then work to win the confidence of the Anyanya II forces and bring them under SPLA Command. (Manifesto: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 1983)

The 1972 Agreement had lasted eleven years, ending in its abrogation by then president, Jaffar Nimeri. “The Addis Ababa Agreement is neither the Bible nor the Koran,” he stated and he tore it to pieces in a final symbolic gesture. Islamic Sharia Law (known in our history as the September laws) soon became the supreme law of the land, in violation of every conceivable liberty of the Sudanese people. What followed was the bloodiest and longest running conflict that the African continent had ever known.

The SPLA was, however, a unique armed political movement in that it broke from the norms of the traditional movements that had emerged in the country (the south in particular). The fundamental difference between the SPLA and the traditional movements was that it proclaimed to be a socialist oriented movement, struggling for a united, secular Sudan. According to the Manifesto of the SPLM, July 1983- Paragraph 21:

The immediate task of the SPLA/SPLM is to transform the Southern Movement from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries and concerned only with the South, and self-interests to a progressive movement led by revolutionaries and dedicated to socialist transformation of the whole country. It must be reiterated that the principle objective of the SPLA/SPLM is not separation for the South. The South is an integral and inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has been fragmented sufficiently enough by colonialism and neo-colonialism and her further fragmentation can only be in the interests of her enemies. (Manifesto: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, July 1983)

The SPLA/SPLM espoused a new socio-political dispensation the new Sudan vision; which was difficult for most citizens to understand. In the South it was perceived (by the Southern intelligentsia) as a tactical maneuver, while in the north of the country it was regarded with suspicion. In addition to this obstacle, another divisive factor that arose at the inception of the movement was the primacy of the political element over the military: “was the SPLA primary or was the SPLM primary?” This was the question.

The argument that won the day was the primacy of the military element of the movement. These comrades argued that the military had to be primary; because in the absence of true representation of the people, there was no basis for building the political element of the movement. The military element would thus assume primacy and through the course of the struggle the armed element would create the necessary conditions for building the political element (it would be a dialectic relationship). The answers to these questions have divided the people’s movement since its inception, and we have struggled with them hitherto.

The other main divisive issue has been the independence of South Sudan vis-à-vis the Unity of the Sudan. This issue has not been correctly understood by many in the movement, and it has kept the movement divided for the greater part of the struggle. There are two main reasons for this division, and they stem from the way self-determination is understood. The SPLM clarified this point in the Resolutions of the SPLM/SPLA First National Convention, April 1994. Resolution no # 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 respectively which state:

7.2.1.   The objective of the SPLM is the complete destruction of the oppressive regime of the Old Sudan and the building of a free, just, democratic, secular New Sudan.

7.2.2.   The SPLM is committed to fight and achieve the right and exercise of self-determination for the oppressed people of the New Sudan following the demise of the regime of the Old Sudan, or in any peace talks with the Government of the day in Khartoum. (Resolutions Of The SPLM/SPLA First National Convention, April 1994)

The right of self-determination is not an exclusive right of the people of South Sudan; it is a universal human right. It is in following with this truth that it is stated as “self-determination for the oppressed people of the New Sudan” as opposed to South Sudan.

The SPLM succeeded in transforming the struggle (traditionally) of South Sudan into a revolution of the marginalized people of the whole Sudan, who all suffered from the same oppressive policies of governments that had come and gone in Khartoum since independence. The struggle of these marginalized peoples has always been divided and thus weak, unable to deliver a strong blow to the ruling elite. This blow was finally achieved through the unity of these marginalized people, which would afford them the best opportunity to take power in the center and restructure it according to their interest.

The mainstream of the SPLM held the view that the independence of South would not resolve the real problem, which was imposition of one culture to define the nation state (it was regarded as a temporary solution). It is this exclusion of the majority, the movement argued, that caused socioeconomic marginalization of the Sudanese people. The only practical solution would be the complete dismantling of the power in Khartoum after which the marginalized people would effectively exercise and achieve their human right of self-determination.

The independence of South Sudan was an accident of history, it was not part of the policies nor the principal objective set out by the movement in its Manifesto. There are some that may argue that there is no such thing as “an accident of history”, that there is reason behind every occurrence (one may call it the law of cause and effect). The fact remains that the SPLM/SPLA has never been a secessionist movement, in fact it was the National Islamic Front (NIF) that have been secessionist. The vision of the new Sudan is “a cancer that needs to be stopped” as it was once described by Abdul Gassim Haj Ahmed, an NIF Scholar.

The fact that today we have an independent Republic of South Sudan does not contradict the vision of the SPLA – SPLM of a new Sudan. The SPLM/SPLA, in its policy of negotiating with the government of the day in Khartoum had reached a deadlock on the question of separation of religion and state; and on interim arrangements during the interim period of the agreement. This is what would eventually lead to the breakup of the country, and it is the reason war persists in North Sudan.

The SPLM have traditionally been the defenders of the unity of the country, within the context of a new Sudan that is “voluntary united in diversity” as declared by the late Dr. John on the occasion of the signing of the CPA. The vision of Sudan within the context of a united Arab Sudan, which ignores the reality and the great diversity in the country, is not unity. This is in truth, exclusion. It is nothing short of apartheid and is what has led (as already mentioned) to the breakup of the Sudan.

It was the position of the SPLM that in order for the Sudan to remain united, a theocratic state should not be imposed on the people (religion and state should be separate). The NIF/NCP government’s counter argument was that secularism should also not be imposed on them. The solution to this is to have two states. This is the two-state solution referred to in the 1972 letter; it came about due to the NIF/NCP rejection of secularism as opposed to the SPLA/SPLM desire for secession.

The new Sudan (though it may have geographical references) is not a place on a map, it is (primarily) a socio-political philosophy and vision, and the Southerner and the Northerner are all Sudanese (as much as the citizens of both Koreas are all Koreans). The crisis as already cited, arose from a crisis in Sudanese identity (manifested) through the imposition of Arab culture on the diverse nationalities of the Sudan. The name Sudan which comes from the Arabic phrase bilad el-Sudan, means: country of the Blacks (in other words Africans) and is part of our identity. And the vision of the new Sudan still applies as a philosophy and vision with which Sudanese (North and South) can solve the problems both states have inherited from the old Sudan.

The Current Reality

It is doleful that today the Republic of South Sudan is being governed by old Sudan philosophies, lack of vision and privilege for the few. Furthermore, the bigoted imposition of one culture to define the new nation continues to be practiced by those that had set out to end it. There have been enough reports in the media of arbitrary arrests, extra judicial killings, not to mention gross violations of human rights as is the case in Jong’lei State; I needn’t overwhelm the reader with these statistics. There are an innumerable number of South Sudanese individuals and communities that are denied their civil rights and liberties based on profiling, they are harassed and often times labeled as foreigners, as if to suggest there is a phenotype that fits the criteria for South Sudanese.  

The current state of collapse in all sectors in the Republic of South Sudan is nothing short of a betrayal of the noble aspirations of our people, the great victory that was the independence of the South has been squandered. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) marked a time in our history when there was a real opportunity for our people to move away from the cycle of war and the evils that accompany it. The CPA was the last chance for the old Sudan to be saved from breaking apart. However, the internal contradictions had proven substantial. Dr. John (speaking in 2003) put it thus:

When I am asked whether self-determination can lead to separation I always say yesif in the interim period we fail to create a new Sudan which embraces all, because no one will opt to stay in a country where he is called Abid (slave)Therefore we must take the bull by the horns and transform this country fundamentallyOnly the Vision and Program of the new Sudan can stop this country from disintegratingIt is a program and challenge that must be taken up very seriously not only by the SPLM but all other political forces in the country including the National Congress Party. (Speaking in 2003 to NDA delegates)

The right of to self-determination as resolved in the 1994 SPLM National Convention and (enshrined in the CPA) has led to the establishment of the newest nation state in the world. This historical fact ought to have provided a better opportunity to carry the vision forward, as opposed to the current state of confusion.  The Republic of South Sudan is a territorial space recognized internationally within which the vision of a new Sudan could be made a reality.

This vision and philosophy has been dismissed by some in our leadership and has been labeled as “Garang” ideas and these “Garang” ideas have become taboo within the current political reality. This propaganda goes as far as suggesting that the late Dr. John Garang was a “unionist” and unity has been presented (within the context of a united Arab Sudan) as a threat to the existence of the Republic of South Sudan. This is false, they are not “Garang” ideas; instead, they are objective ideas, they are correct ideas. And in the absence of these ideas and theories, the new Republic has turned to the policies of the old Sudan and the SPLM literally has no vision.

The SPLM has forsaken its founding philosophy; the cornerstone of which was the vision of the new Sudan. We have failed to articulate the vision within the context of the new geopolitical reality. It is true that during the course of the armed struggle the new Sudan vision was articulated within the context of a united, democratic and secular Sudan. However, as stated, the failure of the two parties to agree on the nature of the state (secular vs. theocratic state) has led to a two state solution through the exercise of their right to self-determination.

The vision of the new Sudan and the independence of the South are not mutually exclusive; the vision of the new Sudan can still be pursued within the territorial boundaries of what is now the Republic of South Sudan. The new Sudan is not a place on the map; it is a vision and political philosophy comparable to the Magna Carta, or the Declaration on the Rights of Man. To say that the independence of South Sudan is in contradiction to the vision of the new Sudan is to (either) have a shallow understanding of what the vision of the new Sudan is about, or to betray the aspirations of our people to be free from all the constraints that keep them trapped in abject poverty.

This course of events can only lead to one outcome, and it would be wise to the SPLM leadership and all the Comrades in the struggle to heed the words of the late Dr. John Garang (in his letter to Gen. Lagu in 1972), in which he warned:

It is historically a universal law that in whatever multi-nationality country where one of the nationalities is economically and politically (and therefore socially and culturally) dominant over other nationalities, that country is pregnant with instability, discontent and crisis eventually erupting in warfare. (Letter to General Joseph Lagu, 1972)

In order to arrest this situation, it would be prudent for the Movement to revisit the vision of the new Sudan, as this is what the conflict was about, conflicting visions of Sudan.

The Background of the New Sudan Vision

In order to understand concretely the vision of the new Sudan, it is essential to understand the history of the inception of the liberation movements in Africa. The quest for a new society!

The founding fathers and mothers of the African liberation struggle realized that the old African society, having been destroyed by the Arab and European slave trade, and the colonization that followed, was no longer viable in a rapidly industrializing world. In addition, the nascent society that was being evolved was not one that could possibly serve the interests of the masses of the African people, as it was not reflective of the realities faced by majority of the people in their cattle camps and villages.

The rational solution was a new society that would take the positive from the old (pre-colonial Africa) and the contemporary (colonial Africa) leaving the negative, in order to form a new society. This would be a modern and new African society that could best serve the interests of the masses of the African people; and makes them take their rightful place in the world.

The idea of the new society lost favor over the new colonial society and over the years it has become entrenched in the process of classical neo-colonialism. There came to be two camps in the struggle against colonial domination, the Independence Movement, and the Liberation Movement. The former was only concerned with achieving independence, while the later was concerned with liberation in the overall sense.

It is deplorable that today the economic indicators in most African countries are far worse than the period immediately following African independence (in the mid 1950’s and 1960’s), as if to suggest that the African masses where better off under the yoke of foreign oppressors. The failure across Africa to implement the vision of a new society has left the masses of African people trapped in humiliating poverty.

In the pre-independence period the two camps had a common enemy so they worked together. However, when independence is achieved their interests rapidly diverge. The interest of those in the independence movement becomes maintaining political power at all costs (in order to maintain their privileged positions), while those in the liberation movement continue to have the same objective of social change, the restoration of the greatness of our people and the modernization of our societies (George Orwell described it best in his 1945 book – Animal Farm).

The truth is there need not be a contradiction between the vision of a new Society and African independence, not unless the intention is condemning our people to abject poverty for eternity. The vision of the new Sudan is how this struggle (Independence vs. Liberation) is being played out in our corner of Africa. The SPLA/SPLM has followed in the tradition of the African Liberation Movements from the PAIGC to FRELIMO; the late Chairman (John Garang) followed in the tradition of the leadership style of the revolutionary leaders of these movements.

The vision of a new Sudan is one that calls for unity in diversity (something we very much need in the South Sudan) and as cited above, should not be the sole responsibility of the SPLM. This vision should be the responsibility of every revolutionary organization and individual citizen. To have a new nation in which there is no anti-Bantu speakers, no anti-Semitic Speakers or anti-Nilotic Speakers; no anti this region or that region, no anti this tribe or that tribe; no anti Christianity or Anti Islam or anti Traditional African Religion; no male nor female chauvinism; but, a new synthesis where all these diversities are respected. That is what the vision of the new Sudan calls for.


There are many Comrades that have found it difficult to be consistent with the objectives of the movement because they are genuinely confused. This is reflected in the manner by which they attempt to reconcile the vision to the changing geopolitical realities. There are some Comrades that believe it is only a matter of editing the words “new Sudan” out and inserting “new South Sudan” and it is solved.

There are those; however, who in spite of understanding the vision are against it. They feel threatened by this vision (of liberating the masses); and in an attempt to maintain their privileged positions in Juba, they have set out to misinform the citizens of our Republic that unity and the vision of new Sudan are a threat to national security. That we should abandon the idea, because “we are now South Sudannew Sudan is a dead ideology…” as they often frame the argument.

They fear the vision of the new Sudan because it would result in the restructuring of power in Juba. The people would be in control as opposed to a few families that are loyal to their own self interests. This is why there has been no constitutional conference, the constitutional process has been compromised giving the head of state absolute power and “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men…” as expressed so eloquently by Lord Acton. The vision of the new Sudan is also not in the interests of the Khartoum regime and so ironically the interests of Juba and Khartoum at the moment coincide.

This is where we are today as a movement!

This author would like to assure all that the vision is not dead; this is only true for those who have achieved their objective (flag independence). These comrades did not want the independence of South Sudan for the same reason as the masses of the people in South Sudan. Their dissatisfaction with successive Khartoum regimes was their exclusion from the division of the national pie (in Khartoum), it was not out of indignation at the suffering and marginalization that Arabism and forced Islamisation was causing to the masses of Sudanese people. These Comrades yearned for a new nation state in which they would divide the national pie themselves.

These Comrades are not separatists due to their enthusiasm regarding the rights of people to self-determination as is evidenced by the current mismanagement of the economy. These Comrades in essence have accepted Sharia, because separation of the South has come within the context of compromise with a system of (double) Apartheid, which not only continues to harass us in the South (Western Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Abyei), but continues to oppress our Comrades in the struggle in Darfur, in Southern Khordofan, in Southern Blue Nile, Beja Country and other marginalized areas of the Sudan.

The movement has abandoned the vision and objectives of the movement under the false premise that it is no longer relevant to the current reality of an independent Southern Sudan. It is with such reasoning that we have forsaken the cause of the SPLM/SPLA North; a sister movement with which we share a common objective (the destruction of the old Sudan exclusivity replacing it with the new Sudan of inclusivity as stipulated in the Resolution of the SPLM/SPLA First National Convention, April 1994). Instead we are now working with the NIF, which is holding the economy of South Sudan hostage through the oil pipeline the Republic needs to export its crude. This is not self-determination by any standard; it is not the self-determination we defined during the struggle.

To these Comrades the vision might as well be dead; however, in the hearts and minds of the masses of our people, who continue to live in marginalization, abject poverty and still yearn for liberation from the real enemy which is poverty, disease, hunger and ignorance; I can assure you that: the vision of new Sudan is not dead!” It is just on hiatus, it will be back with the force of a tsunami as was predicted by the late Chairman (Speaking on the occasion of the signing of the CPA on January 9th, 2005).

It would be worthwhile in conclusion, to ponder on the words of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere who once said:

“…for we have both proclaimed our belief that poverty, in which the majority of our people now exist, is intolerable in the twentieth century. We are both aiming at the fundamental change of our respective societies so that they should be organized in the interest of human dignitya world in which race is irrelevant, and no one, whether they are black or white, suffers from racial prejudice…”

~   Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere (Kingston, Jamaica: September 1974)

A Luta Continua!

Captain Mabior Garang de Mabior is the eldest son of the late Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the Founding Father for South Sudan

Avoiding One-Party Rule In South Sudan

Posted: July 26, 2011 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in Junub Sudan
Tags: , ,

Tuesday, 26 July 2011
As the Republic of South Sudan embarks on establishing itself as an independent state, analysts are concerned that the ruling party’s domination of parliament and its close association with the military will hinder progress towards democracy.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, SPLM, the political wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, SPLA, which fought a 20-year war against the north, has held a 70 per cent majority in the South Sudan government since a landmark peace agreement was signed in 2005.

That deal, known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA, set out a roadmap which was completed in January this year with a referendum on independence, leading to South Sudan’s formal secession from the north on July 9.

Since the CPA was signed, the SPLM has sought to dominate politics in South Sudan at the expense of other factions. Its leader Salva Kiir was elected president of the semi-autonomous entity in 2005 and again in 2010. He continues as head of state of an independent South Sudan.

A few days before independence, South Sudan’s parliament approved a new version of the interim constitution which in theory should have contained only minor adjustments to take account of the country’s new status. But SPLM dominance, and the exclusion of other parties from the drafting process, produced a document that grants the president broad new powers to dissolve parliament, appoint and remove state governors, and declare war or a state of emergency without prior approval of parliament.

The trend towards one-party domination alarms many Sudan-watchers, who argue that it will not lead to stability over the long term.

According to David Anderson, professor of African politics at Oxford University, the SPLM “might have to learn that it is not a bad thing to have two or three other parties out there who are represented in your parliament. If they insist on maintaining a system that is so dominated by the SPLM when there is so much dissatisfaction with the SPLM, I think conflict is almost inevitable.”

The Brussels-based International Crisis Group expressed similar views in a report issued this month, saying, “The SPLM must recognise that a genuine multi-party system is not a threat to its power, but a long-term investment in stability.”

SPLM leaders “must avoid a ‘winner-takes-all’ mindset and view the appointment of a broadly representative government not as appeasement alone, but as recognition of Southern Sudan’s pluralist character”, the report said.

The SPLM is dominated by members of the Dinka ethnic group, and its differences with other southern parties are not just about politics; they also reflect historical rivalries with the communities those political forces represent.

Political and ethnic divisions in South Sudan have resulted in a plethora of groups opposed to the SPLM – up to 20, according to some estimates.

“The other tribes are feeling increasingly marginalised,” Olivia Warham, a director at Waging Peace, a group that campaigns against abuses in Sudan and central Africa, said.

Although the other groups have challenged the SPLM by military as well as political means, they have no common, coherent strategy, and are at risk of being marginalised from the institutions of government, raising questions about the future of democracy in the south.

“They [opposition groups] are not actually effective in terms of mobilising their supporters,” Hafiz Mohammed of the London-based advocacy group Justice Africa said. “They are weak. This is why the SPLM is dominating everything – and that is not a healthy environment for democracy.”

Fouad Hikmat, Sudan advisor with the International Crisis Group, said these other political forces enjoy limited appeal

“The other parties, during the war [with the north] and during the CPA, didn’t expand and incorporate to include people from different tribes and different regions,” he said. “These are not political parties. These are defectors…. some SPLA commanders whom the SPLM refused to put up as candidates during the elections, or [who] are contesting the outcomes of the elections, so they took up arms and wound up fighting.”

In the 2010 presidential election, Kiir’s sole challenger was Lam Akol, who leads one of the more significant opposition groups, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – Democratic Change, SPLM-DC, which is a splinter group from the original SPLM. An official with the United Nation mission in Sudan, speaking on condition of anonymity, told IWPR this was symptomatic of the lack of a credible opposition.

He added that it sometimes seemed that “every individual person has his own group and is waging war against the government of South Sudan”.

Hikmat believes opposition groups will have to change if they are to be part of a democratic system.

“Some of them are going to be dissolved into others, some of them are going to grow bigger, and some might disappear,” he said.

In the meantime, however, the SPLM is under little pressure to give ground.

As Hikmat put it, “They got the CPA, they got the referendum, they managed the house, they got the independence. Are they going to allow themselves to become a minority? Are they going to allow themselves to be the weakest party? Are they going to allow themselves not to be in the driving seat? I think most of the answers to those questions are no. The SPLM would like to continue what they have been doing.”

Anderson noted that centralising power is a feature of new governments on the African continent, adding ,“If you look at other post-liberation governments in Africa and elsewhere, autocratic tendencies are the norm, so militaries that become governments have a tendency to be undemocratic.”

In the case of South Sudan, this risk is especially high given that the ruling party’s military arm, the SPLA, has become the national army, yet the distinction between the two remain blurred.

“There is no cadre of elite politicians separate from a cadre of militia leaders. They are the same people, and that makes some of them very bad politicians,” Anderson said. “It is a post-liberation government, so it’s basically a military government masquerading as a democratic government, and it will be that way for the next decade, never mind the next year.

“The reality on the ground is how do you deal with that, and how do you turn soldiers into good representatives of their people?”

Hafiz Mohammed says the political party must make a decisive break with its old military wing.

“The SPLM has to disassociate itself with the SPLA, and they have to turn the SPLA into a national army which is not linked to a top political party, because you cannot have a party that has an army in a democracy,” he said, adding that the next step would be to “include some of the rivals of the SPLM – the other groups which have armies – in this army. And this army has to disassociate itself with the SPLM, the political party.”

In a speech on independence day, July 9, President Kiir offered an amnesty to all rebel groups, something which the UN official interviewed by IWPR said was a step in the right direction.

“He called them to come and join the government, not in the sense of being the actual government big shots, but at least they have to come and contribute to the development of South Sudan,” the official said.

Tuesday, 26 July 2011

The Machakos Protocol

Posted: July 21, 2011 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in History
Tags: , , ,

The Machakos Protocol
The Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army
Recognising South Sudan’s Right to Self Determination
[20 July 2002]

Text of the Agreement

WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the Parties) having met in Machakos Kenya, from 18 June 2002 through 20 July 2002 under the auspices of the IGAD Peace Process; and

WHEREAS the Parties have reiterated their commitment to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the Sudan Conflict within the Unity of Sudan; and

WHEREAS the Parties discussed at length and agreed on a broad framework which sets forth the principles of governance, the general procedures to be followed during the transitional process and the structures of government to be created under legal and constitutional arrangements to be established; and

NOW RECORD THAT the Parties have agreed to negotiate and elaborate in greater detail the specific terms of the Framework, including aspects not covered in this phase of the negotiations, as part of the overall Peace Agreement; and

FURTHER RECORD THAT within the above context, the Parties have reached specific agreement on the Right to Self-Determination for the people of South Sudan, State and Religion, as well as the Preamble, Principles, and the Transition Process from the Draft Framework, the initialed texts of which are annexed hereto, and all of which will be subsequently incorporated into the Final Agreement; and

IT IS AGREED AND CONFIRMED THAT the Parties shall resume negotiations in August, 2002 with the aim of resolving outstanding issues and realizing comprehensive peace in the Sudan.

Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani
(For the Government of Sudan)

Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit
(For the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army)

Witnessed by:

Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo
Special Envoy
IGAD Sudan Peace Process and
On behalf of the IGAD Envoys


WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (hereafter referred to as the Parties) having met in Machakos, Kenya, from 18 June 2002 through 20 July 2002; and

WHEREAS the Parties are desirous of resolving the Sudan Conflict in a just and sustainable manner by addressing the root causes of the conflict and by establishing a framework for governance through which power and wealth shall be equitably shared and human rights guaranteed; and

MINDFUL that the conflict in the Sudan is the longest running conflict in Africa, that it has caused horrendous loss of life and destroyed the infrastructure of the country, wasted economic resources, and has caused untold suffering, particularly with regard to the people of South Sudan; and

SENSITIVE to historical injustices and inequalities in development between the different regions of the Sudan that need to be redressed; and

RECOGNIZING that the present moment offers a window of opportunity to reach a just peace agreement to end the war; and

CONVINCED that the rejuvenated IGAD peace process under the chairmanship of the Kenyan President, H.E. Daniel T. arap Moi, provides the means to resolve the conflict and reach a just and sustainable peace; and

COMMITTED to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the conflict based on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) for the benefit of all the people of the Sudan;

NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereto hereby agree as follows:


1.1 That the unity of the Sudan, based on the free will of its people democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens of the Sudan is and shall be the priority of the parties and that it is possible to redress the grievances of the people of South Sudan and to meet their aspirations within such a framework.

1.2 That the people of South Sudan have the right to control and govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the National Government.

1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.

1.4 That religion, customs, and traditions are a source of moral strength and inspiration for the Sudanese people.

1.5 That the people of the Sudan share a common heritage and aspirations and accordingly agree to work together to:

1.6 Establish a democratic system of governance taking account of the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of the Sudan.

1.7 Find a comprehensive solution that addresses the economic and social deterioration of the Sudan and replaces war not just with peace, but also with social, political and economic justice which respects the fundamental human and political rights of all the Sudanese people.

1.8 Negotiate and implement a comprehensive cease-fire to end the suffering and killing of the Sudanese people.

1.9 Formulate a repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development plan to address the needs of those areas affected by the war and redress the historical imbalances of development and resource allocation.

1.10 Design and implement the Peace Agreement so as to make the unity of the Sudan an attractive option especially to the people of South Sudan.

1.11 Undertake the challenge by finding a framework by which these common objectives can be best realized and expressed for the benefit of all the Sudanese.


In order to end the conflict and to secure a peaceful and prosperous future for all the people of the Sudan and in order to collaborate in the task of governing the country, the Parties hereby agree to the implementation of the Peace Agreement in accordance with the sequence, time periods and process set out below.

2. There shall be a Pre-Interim Period, the duration of which shall be six (6) months.

2.1 During the Pre-Interim Period:

a) The institutions and mechanisms provided for in the Peace Agreement shall be established;
b) If not already in force, there shall be a cessation of hostilities with appropriate monitoring mechanisms established;
c) Mechanisms to implement and monitor the Peace Agreement shall be created;
d) Preparations shall be made for the implementation of a comprehensive cease-fire as soon as possible;
e) International assistance shall be sought; and
f) A Constitutional Framework for the Peace Agreement and the institutions referred to in 2.1 (a) shall be established.

2.2 The Interim Period will commence at the end of the Pre-Interim Period and shall last for six years.

2.3 Throughout the Interim Period:

a) The institutions and mechanisms established during the Pre-Interim Period shall be operating in accordance with thearrangements and principles set out in the Peace Agreement.
b) If not already accomplished, the negotiated comprehensive cease-fire will be implemented and international monitoring mechanisms shall be established and operationalized.

2.4 An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the Pre-Interim Period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and conduct a mid-term evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the Peace Agreement.

2.4.1 The composition of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall consist of equal representation from the GOS and the SPLM/A, and not more than two (2) representatives, respectively, from each of the following categories:

  • Member states of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda);
  • Observer States (Italy, Norway, UK, and US); and
  • Any other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the parties.

2.4.2 The Parties shall work with the Commission during the Interim Period with a view to improving the institutions and arrangements created under the Agreement and making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan.

2.5 At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.

2.6 The parties shall refrain from any form of unilateral revocation or abrogation of the Peace Agreement.


To give effect to the agreements set out in Part A, the Parties, within a framework of a unified Sudan which recognizes the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan, hereby agree that with respect to the division of powers and the structures and functions of the different organs of government, the political framework of governance in the Sudan shall be structured as follows:

3.1 Supreme Law

3.1.1 The National Constitution of the Sudan shall be the Supreme Law of the land. All laws must comply with the National Constitution. This constitution shall regulate the relations and allocate the powers and functions between the different levels of government as well as prescribe the wealth sharing arrangements between the same. The National Constitution shall guarantee freedom of belief, worship and religious practice in full to all Sudanese citizens.

3.1.2 A representative National Constitutional Review Commission shall be established during the Pre-Transition Period which shall have as its first task the drafting of a Legal and Constitutional Framework to govern the Interim Period and which incorporates the Peace Agreement.

3.1.3 The Framework mentioned above shall be adopted as shall be agreed upon by the Parties.

3.1.4 During the Interim Period an inclusive Constitutional Review Process shall be undertaken.

3.1.5 The Constitution shall not be amended or repealed except by way of special procedures and qualified majorities in order that the provisions of the Peace Agreement are protected.

3.2 National Government

3.2.1 There shall be a National Government which shall exercise such functions and pass such laws as must necessarily be exercised by a sovereign state at national level. The National Government in all its laws shall take into account the religious and cultural diversity of the Sudanese people.

3.2.2 Nationally enacted legislation having effect only in respect of the states outside Southern Sudan shall have as its source of legislation Sharia and the consensus of the people.

3.2.3 Nationally enacted legislation applicable to the southern States and/or the Southern Region shall have as its source of legislation popular consensus, the values and the customs of the people of Sudan including their traditions and religious beliefs, having regard to Sudan’s diversity).

3.2.4 Where national legislation is currently in operation or is enacted and its source is religious or customary law, then a state or region, the majority of whose residents do not practice such religion or customs may:

(i) Either introduce legislation so as to allow or provide for institutions or practices in that region consistent with their religion or customs, or
(ii) Refer the law to the Council of States for it to approve by a two-thirds majority or initiate national legislation which will provide for such necessary alternative institutions as is appropriate.

[sections 4 and 5 are not yet available; indications are that the subjects of these sections are still under negotiation]


Recognizing that Sudan is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual country and confirming that religion shall not be used as a divisive factor, the Parties hereby agree as follows:

6.1 Religions, customs and beliefs are a source of moral strength and inspiration for the Sudanese people.

6.2 There shall be freedom of belief, worship and conscience for followers of all religions or beliefs or customs and no one shall be discriminated against on such grounds.

6.3 Eligibility for public office, including the presidency, public service and the enjoyment of all rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, beliefs, or customs.

6.4 All personal and family matters including marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession, and affiliation may be governed by the personal laws (including Sharia or other religious laws, customs, or traditions) of those concerned.

6.5 The Parties agree to respect the following Rights:

  • To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
  • To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
  • To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
  • To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
  • To teach religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
  • To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;
  • To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
  • To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religious beliefs;
  • To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief and at the national and international levels;
  • For avoidance of doubt, no one shall be subject to discrimination by the National Government, state, institutions, group of persons or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs.

6.6 The Principles enumerated in Section 6.1 through 6.5 shall be reflected in the Constitution.


1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.

2.4 An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the Pre-Transition period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement during the Interim Period. This Commission shall conduct a mid-term evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the Peace Agreement.

2.4.1 The composition of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall consist of equal representation from the GOS and the SPLM/A, and not more than two (2) representatives, respectively, from each of the following categories:

  • Member states of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda);
  • Observer States (Italy, Norway, UK, and US); and
  • other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the parties.

2.4.2 The Parties shall work with the Commission during the Interim Period with a view to improving the institutions and arrangements created under the Agreement and making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan.

2.5 At the end of the six (6) year interim period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.

2.6 The Parties shall refrain from any form of unilateral revocation or abrogation of the Peace Agreement.


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pi The CPA – detail

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army

Source: Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
Date: 09 Jan 2005


WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A) (hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”), having met in continuous negotiations between May 2002 and December 2004, in Karen, Machakos, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nanyuki and Naivasha, Kenya, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process, and, in respect of the issues related to the Conflict Areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States and Abyei Area, under the auspices of the Government of the Republic of Kenya;

CONSCIOUS that the conflict in the Sudan is the longest running conflict in Africa; that it has caused tragic loss of life, destroyed the infrastructure of the country, eroded its economic resources and caused suffering to the people of the Sudan;

MINDFUL of the urgent need to bring peace and security to the people of the Sudan who have endured this conflict for far too long;

AWARE of the fact that peace, stability and development are aspirations shared by all people of the Sudan;

IN PURSUANCE OF the commitment of the Parties to a negotiated settlement on the basis of a democratic system of governance which, on the one hand, recognizes the right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination and seeks to make unity attractive during the Interim Period, while at the same time is founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, mutual understanding and tolerance of diversity within the realities of the Sudan;

RECORDING AND RECONFIRMING that in pursuance of this commitment the Parties duly reached agreement on the following texts: the Machakos Protocol, dated 20th July, 2002 which is set out in Chapter I of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); the Agreement on Security Arrangements, dated 25th September, 2003 which is set out in Chapter VI of the CPA; the Agreement on Wealth Sharing, dated 7th January, 2004 which is set out in Chapter III of the CPA; the Protocol on Power Sharing, dated 26th May, 2004 which is set out in Chapter II of the CPA; the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, dated 26th May, 2004 which is set out in Chapter V of the CPA; and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, dated 26th May, 2004 which is set out in Chapter IV of the CPA; and that the Security Council of the United Nations in its Resolution 1574 of 19th November, 2004, took note of these aforementioned Protocols and Agreements;

RECOGNIZING that the Parties have concluded an Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire and Security, Arrangements Implementation Modalities During the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods dated 31st December, 2004 which is set out in Annexure I of the CPA, within the Framework of the Agreement on Security Arrangements of 25th September, 2003; FURTHER RECOGNIZING that the Parties have also concluded the Agreement on the Implementation Modalities of the Protocols and Agreements dated 31st December, 2004 which is set out in Annexure Il of the CPA;

NOW HEREIN THE PARTIES JOINTLY ACKNOWLEDGE that the CPA offers not only hope but also a concrete model for solving problems and other conflicts in the country;

THE PARTIES FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGE that the successful implementation of the CPA shall provide a model for good governance in the Sudan that will help create a solid basis to preserve peace and make unity attractive and therefore undertake to fully adhere to the letter and spirit of the CPA so as to guarantee lasting peace, security for all, justice and equality in the Sudan;

NOW THEREFORE, THE PARTIES AGREE, upon signing this Agreement, on the following:

(1) The Pre-Interim Period shall commence, and all the obligations and commitments specified in the CPA shall be binding in accordance with the provisions thereof;

(2) The CPA shall be comprised of the texts of the Protocols and Agreements already signed, together with this Chapeau, the Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices as Annexure I and the Agreement on the Implementation Modalities and the Global Implementation Matrix and Appendices as Annexure II;

(3) The agreed Arabic and English texts of the CPA shall both be official and authentic. However, in the event of a dispute regarding the meaning of any provision of the text, and only if there is a difference in meaning between the Arabic and English texts; the English text shall be authoritative as English was the language of the peace negotiations.

(4) Upon compilation of the official and authentic Arabic and English texts of the CPA, the initialled copies of both texts shall be given to both Parties, and copies shall also be lodged with the United Nations, the African Union, IGAD Secretariat in Djibouti, the League of Arab States and the Republic of Kenya.

(5) All persons performing governmental functions shall continue to do so at the place at which they render such services or perform such functions unless or until redeployed or alternative instructions are received in accordance with the arrangements agreed to by the Parties.

(6) To establish such priority joint task teams, particularly the Joint National Transitional Team (JNTT), the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), the Constitutional Task Team and the Joint Technical Team on “New National Currency” as required to facilitate and prepare for the operationalization of the Agreement once it is put into force;

(7) To take the necessary steps to ensure the effective implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire;

(8) To take such steps as are necessary to ensure that resources and funds are available for the establishment of the structures, bodies and institutions contemplated by the CPA especially the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan;

THE PARTIES EXPRESS THEIR GRATITUDE for the persistent efforts of the Facilitators, the IGAD Member States, and the International Community in assisting the people of the Sudan to return to peace and stability, and in particular, to the African Union, IGAD Partners Forum, the United Nations, and the Governments of Italy, Norway, United Kingdom and the United States of America for their support for the IGAD Peace Initiative and their unwavering interest and consistent endeavours in support of the Peace Process;

THE PARTIES JOINTLY APPEAL to the Regional and International Community and call on Organizations and States which have been requested to witness the signing of this Agreement to provide and affirm their unwavering support to the implementation of the CPA, and further appeal to them to avail resources for the necessary and urgent programmes and activities of the transition to peace as contemplated and agreed herein;

THE PARTIES RECOGNIZE the enormity of the tasks that lie ahead in successfully implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and in signing below and before the witnesses here present, they reconfirm their commitment to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement fully and jointly.

H.E. Ali Osman Mohamed Taha
First Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan
On behalf of the Government Of the Republic of the Sudan

Dr. John Garang de Mabior
Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army
on behalf of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army

pi The CPA – detail