



# **Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission**

(JMEC)

**REPORT BY**

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**ON THE STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

**FOR THE PERIOD**

**November 1 2016- January 31 2017**

1. This report is submitted pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 5 of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) and covers the period November 1, 2016 to January 31, 2017.

## **Overview on the Status of Implementation of the Agreement**

1. The reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity has, over the reporting period forged ahead with implementation of the ARCSS. At the October, November and December JMEC plenary meetings, TGoNU presented the membership with progress reports outlining actions taken so far in implementing the peace agreement and in furthering the peace process generally, including reconstitution of key Transitional Security Arrangements mechanisms and approval of cantonment sites in greater Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal.
2. The TGoNU progress reports enable an appreciation of the efforts and challenges government faces in implementing the Peace Agreement. These reports also inform JMEC's monitoring and evaluation reports as required under chapter VII of the ARCSS.
3. As detailed in this report, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated markedly and the security and economic situations remained precarious.
4. There are continuing reports of violations of the permanent ceasefire and a spread of the conflict. The involvement of other armed groups not party to the ARCSS further complicated the environment for implementation of the agreement.

5. The conflict has in recent months been marked by the targeting of civilians, reportedly based on ethnic background and characterised by killings, sexual and gender based violence, kidnapping and destruction of property.
6. The solutions to the problems that South Sudan faces are political and not military. To this end I have engaged with the TGoNU, IGAD, the AU-PSC, the new UN Secretary General, the UNSC and our international partners in discussions and efforts to encourage an inclusive political process.
7. I welcomed the announcement by H.E. President Salva Kiir Mayardit in mid December 2016 of the National Dialogue Initiative. This process aimed at reconciling and unifying Southern Sudanese will succeed if and only if it is genuinely inclusive. A truly inclusive national dialogue would go a long way in mitigating drivers of conflict. It will also provide an opportunity to engage the former parties to the TGoNU to return to implementation of the peace agreement.
8. The involvement of traditional leaders, elders and chiefs has been useful in resolving community conflicts in South Sudan in the past. I was therefore pleased to meet with over 650 chiefs from all the 64 ethnic communities of South Sudan in early November 2016. The Chiefs expressed a desire to be more actively engaged in the peace process and considered themselves as effective agents for brokering and promoting inter communal understanding.

## **Chapter I – Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan**

9. The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) under the leadership of H.E Salva Kiir Mayardit and General Taban Deng Gai have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate and forge ahead with implementation of the ARCSS. JMEC welcomes this spirit of cooperation. However, JMEC also continues to receive sustained challenges and reproach from Dr. Riek Machar Teny (former First Vice President) and the other estranged parties who were previously part of the TGoNU, challenging the credibility of the current Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and the legality of the present arrangement.
10. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) members, regional and international partners have all expressed their concern with regard to the inadequacy of representation of the other groups in the current Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). Without genuine inclusivity that addresses the repercussions of the July events and other problems, there is unlikely to be sustainable peace in South Sudan.
11. While the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) is established and commenced business, a few positions remain vacant. These positions are assigned to a section of the Other Political Parties, and one former detainee. JMEC has submitted a list of the appointees in the absence of the National Constitution Amendment Committee to the President of the Republic of South Sudan and await his endorsement.
12. The National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) now has a substantive Chairperson appointed by IGAD and endorsed by the TGoNU. The new Chairman Mr. Gichira Kibara, a Kenyan Constitutional Law expert commenced his assignment with a series of orientation and consultative

meetings. From December 12-13 the new Chairperson conducted a two-day visit to Juba to introduce himself and consult with JMEC and members of the NCAC.

13. The work of the NCAC is important to complete the incorporation of the ARCSS into the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, 2011 in accordance with procedures outlined in Chapter 1 of the Agreement.

## **Chapter II – Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements**

### **Overview**

14. During the reporting period, the implementation of the ARCSS continued albeit in difficult circumstances. Security in the Republic of South Sudan continued to deteriorate with fighting between government, opposition and other armed groups across several states especially the Equatoria and Upper Nile regions. Armed Groups proliferated as did inter-communal clashes between pastoralist communities. Criminals and the politically disaffected all started to blend together. Generals allied to the two major opposition leaders, Dr. Riek Machar Teny and Dr. Lam Akol clashed in Upper Nile region.
15. There have been increasing reports of targeted and revenge killings, sexual violence, torture and destruction of farmland and property being committed by uniformed forces; the extent to which these can be attributed to forces aligned with the TGoNU, Opposition Groups or other armed groups is very difficult to prove. Since November 2016, the main highways from Uganda and Kenya remain extremely dangerous due to the high number of ambushes, killings, and robberies.

### *Ceasefire Violations*

16. There have been several ceasefire violations since November 2016. The intensity of fighting between the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IO (Dr. Riek Machar Teny) from 25 - 31 January in the Upper Nile region is a matter of grave concern. Unfortunately, verification of violations of the permanent ceasefire remains very difficult due to the split of SPLM/IO, proliferation of unidentified non-signatory armed groups who do not fall under CTSAMM's verification and investigation operations mandate. However, it is important to note that there has not been any reported fighting between SPLA-IO forces loyal to the First Vice President Gen. Taban Deng Gai, and the SPLA-IG.

### *Status of Transitional Security Arrangements Mechanisms*

17. The work within the Transitional Security Arrangements mechanisms such as the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), the Joint Operations Center (JOC), the Joint Integrated Police-Management Team (JIP-MT) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) was adversely affected by the July events. However, these institutions continue to build operational capacity.

### *The Joint Military and Ceasefire Commission*

18. The Joint Military and Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) has been meeting routinely with their main focus on developing and implementing their Chapter II responsibilities including cantonment of forces, National Architecture start up and other security related activities. The National Architecture, which includes the Area Joint Military Ceasefire Committees (AJMCCs), and the Joint Military Ceasefire Teams (JMCTs) are yet to be established due to lack of resources to support the formation of these JMCC sub-structures. The National Architecture is a critical mechanism for the command, control, and coordination of assembly, cantonment, and the unification of the former belligerent forces. This mechanism

was designed to work closely with CTSAMM Monitoring and Verification Teams deployed throughout the country. For the time being, joint liaison with the principal parties is conducted through the CTSAMM Monitoring and Verification Teams deployed across the country.

19. The JMCC is pressing forward with cantonment planning hosting two workshops and weekly coordination meetings. It has forwarded an initial budget for the first pilot cantonment site to the TGoNU for the President's approval. The JMCC plans to conduct joint site surveys of the cantonment sites with CTSAMM with the goal of having the initial pilot cantonment site operational and functional by the end of March 2017. This will include the requirements to train and deploy the National Architecture personnel and mechanisms.

20. Lastly, the JMCC has turned over the chairmanship of the commission from the SPLM/IG to the SPLM/IO effective 9 February 2017.

### **The Joint Operations Center**

21. The Joint Operations Center (JOC), which had been established, remains non-operational due to lack of resources including facilities, human and technical capacity. The reconstitution of the JOC remains a very urgent matter, given the fact that it will be the main coordination mechanism between the TGoNU security agencies, UNMISS and the future Regional Protection Force in Juba. I therefore call on the TGoNU and all regional and international partners to provide the urgent support needed to reconstitute the JOC.

### **The Joint Integrated Police - Management Team**

22. The recently appointed JIP Management Team is coordinating with multiple agencies such as JMEC, UNDP, SSNPS, UNPOL, CTSAMM and various partners to refurbish the JIP training facility and mechanisms in Rajaf (30 Km outside Juba).

There are currently 1,200 trainees both male and female, opposition and government on site in Rajaf. In spite of the inadequate training facilities, the JIP-MT intends to begin training by the end of February 2017.

### **Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism**

23. On 25 January 2017, CTSAMM held its first board meeting since June 2016. The SPLA-IO (Gen. Taban Deng Gai) have appointed their representatives to the Board, an issue that had delayed the reconstitution of the CTSAMM Board. CTSAMM has reported an improvement in access for its Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVT's) and has recently conducted patrols with the full support of TGoNU and UNMISS to areas in the Equatorias including Yei, Maridi and Mundri. Recently CTSAMM deployed an investigation team to Yei to verify and investigate an allegation of the burning of 1,900 houses in November 2016. In addition, CTSAMM is investigating several ceasefire violations a majority of which are in the Equatoria and Upper Nile regions.

24. However, there exists severe restriction of freedom of movement in other areas due to the activity of non-signatory unidentified armed groups in CTSAMM's operational areas. Whilst CTSAMM appreciates the administrative and Force Protection assistance it receives from UNMISS, the absence of dedicated force protection units that can deploy in a timely manner hampers its operations. These factors impede CTSAMM's ability to efficiently deliver on critical mission activities. Another significant challenge is the inability to contact leaders of armed/opposition groups in the Equatorias. This affects CTSAMM's ability to conduct investigations.

25. In addition, the absence of SPLA-IO (Dr. Riek Machar) in the monitoring and verification structures has severely affected CTSAMM's liaison capacity when ceasefire violations are reported. This lack of liaison is hampering CTSAMM's



efforts to thoroughly investigate reported violations and objectively apportion blame to the culpable party.

26. CTSAMM has increased the number of MVTs from 11 to 14. The increase has been constituted within UNMISS Temporary Operating Bases and has utilized staff from existing MVT's and their headquarters. CTSAMM continued its verification of the Transitional Security Arrangements in Juba and verified the number and composition of police trainees awaiting training at the Rajaf Police Training Academy.

27. According to CTSAMM, the security situation is rapidly deteriorating as fighting continues and ethnic tension still prevails resulting in wide scale displacement especially in the Equatoria and Upper Nile regions. An escalation of fighting between opposition forces and SPLA-IG in Upper Nile has been witnessed in January with several battles fought around Malakal and Renk. CTSAMM also reported incidents of killings, burning of people inside houses, rape, arbitrary arrests and detention, looting, and general denial of movement for civilians.

28. Security in Juba has significantly improved following the seizure of over 1,200 weapons during a house to house search by the TGoNU security forces during the Christmas and new year period.

29. The TGoNU has authorized and is planning cantonment of SPLA-IO forces loyal to First Vice President Taban Deng Gai in the Equatoria region. Once confirmed, CTSAMM will work closely with the JMCC in order to report on the locations.

### **Strategic Defence and Security Review Board**

30. The reconstituted Strategic Defense and Security Review Board has met and developed future plans. A Draft Strategic Security Assessment was produced in

December and the SDSR Secretariat is currently preparing a draft Defence Policy intended to be issued in February 2017. The SDSR board's work is behind schedule, is hampered by lack of dedicated resources and feels that it is disadvantaged as compared to other representative boards. The most recent Board meeting had attendance gaps but did have representation in-line with the stipulations of section 6.1 of Chapter II of the ARCSS. Although, it has to be pointed out that it currently is marginally below the 25% threshold for female representation.

### **The Regional Protection Force (RPF)**

31. The Expanded UNMISS mandate incorporating the Regional Protection Force was extended by UNSC 2327 (2016) December 15 2017. It is a matter of regret that the Regional Protection Force has not been deployed.
32. In mid November 2016, TGoNU and the United Nations Security Council agreed on the implementation of the Joint Communiqué of 4<sup>th</sup> September 2016. The Joint Communiqué reflected the joint desire to improve the security situation in South Sudan, and TGoNU gave its consent to the deployment, as part of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).
33. The deployment of the RPF is a critical factor in ensuring the protection of civilians and establishing a safe and secure environment for the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
34. I am hopeful that the participation of one of our key partners, Kenya, will be fully restored. As I have said before, Kenya played a significant, historic and important role in South Sudan's peace process.

### **Chapter III – Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction**

35. The spread of the conflict in the Equatorias has deepened the already dire humanitarian crisis. Violence against women and children including conflict related sexual and gender based violence has increased in scope and barbarity. Almost 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of the population remains food insecure as the economic crisis worsens and insecurity rises.
36. Provision of 'special consideration' envisaged in the ARCSS to those most affected by the conflict (i.e. children, widows, women, war wounded) has not been availed. In fact, the public service delivery of health and education services has deteriorated. However, Non Governmental Organisations and Multilateral agencies have stepped up their efforts to provide these much needed services.
37. Access to civilian population of much needed humanitarian assistance was routinely obstructed during the reporting period. The United Nations reported in December 2016, that it had recorded one hundred incidents against humanitarian workers and aid convoys.
38. Harassment and obstruction of Non Governmental Organisations took place in November and December 2016. This conduct runs counter to principles of enabling environment for delivery of humanitarian assistance. Such harassment included the arrest, detention and deportation of NGO staff as reported by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien in his December 19, 2016 briefing to the UN Security Council.
39. Neither the Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) nor its Board provided for in Chapter III of the ARCSS has been established. Action on this front is

unconscionably delayed. JMEC calls upon the TGoNU to expeditiously establish this critical Fund and Board.

40. My assessment is that despite some efforts in a positive direction, such as the establishment of the Humanitarian High Level Oversight Committee by H.E President Kiir Mayardit, much more needs to be done to ensure an enabling political, legal, administrative and operational environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the protection of humanitarian workers and assets.

#### **Chapter IV – Resource, Economic and Financial Management Arrangements**

41. After a period of instability and rapidly increasing inflation from the beginning of 2016, there are some hopeful signs on the economic front.
42. The first part of 2016 were marked by high and increasing inflation, a strong depreciation and a reduction in production, notably in the oil sector and in agriculture. Reduced production in agriculture is directly related to increased insecurity in rural areas. Insecurity has also negatively impacted oil production.
43. A steep fall in oil production combined with the decline in the oil price led to a sharp decline in both revenues and inflow of foreign currency. This combined with a high level of government expenditures financed by borrowing from the Bank of South Sudan created excess demand which also spilled into the currency market. The impacts on inflation and the exchange rate were exacerbated by the disruptive impacts of the July violence.
44. Indeed, monthly inflation reached 80 per cent in July 2016, well above the benchmark commonly used to delineate hyperinflation (50 per cent). There was fear that the economy was moving into a process of uncontrolled accelerating inflation. However, this did not happen. Inflation per month fell from 80 % in

July to 2% on average in the last quarter of 2016. There was also a less pronounced reduction in exchange rate depreciation towards the end of the year.

45. The sharp reduction in inflation may in part reflect temporary factors. But these developments must be seen against policy reforms that are enacted as part of the 2016/17 budget. The budget signals a new direction in economic policy by setting ambitious ceilings for government spending and the deficit. Cash budgeting has been introduced as a mechanism to ensure that spending is kept in line with revenues. Data for budget outturn in the first quarter of the budget year indicate that actual spending was in line with what was budgeted.

46. Despite strong curbs on spending, the approved budget still has a large deficit that has to be financed, either by increased borrowing, increasing revenues or cutting spending further. Oil prices have evolved more favourably than assumed in the fiscal budget. If this persists through the rest of the budget year, revenues will increase. This will ease the financing of the budget and have a positive impact on both the exchange rate and inflation. There is also a risk that increased revenues will strengthen pressures for increased spending.

47. Implementing the stabilization program, which indeed is a massive undertaking, poses huge challenges for the Government in terms of capacity and expertise. Mobilisation of technical assistance is vital both in order to support the government's stabilization program and to implement Chapter IV provisions.

## **Chapter V – Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing**

48. On the matter of the implementation of Chapter V of the ARCSS, there has been some movement forward. The establishment of a Technical Committee for the National Consultative Process for the Establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) by the Ministry of Justice, is in keeping with international norms and standards for initiating a process of establishing such a commission.

49. The Technical Committee comprises all stakeholders, including government, women, youth, faith based and civil society groups. The planned sensitization campaigns are geared towards ensuring informed participation in the consultations with victims and citizens. However, there has to be a cessation of all hostilities to create the conditions necessary for the work of the committee to proceed in an inclusive and consultative manner.

50. However, there is no progress in the establishment of the other critical transitional justice and accountability mechanisms outlined in Chapter V of the Agreement; the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA). With respect to the Hybrid Court, the African Union Commission, TGoNU and the TNLA have the responsibility to ensure its establishment.

## **Chapter VI – Parameters of Permanent Constitution**

51. The promulgation of a permanent constitution for the Republic of South Sudan is critical for the establishment of democracy, promotion of the rule of law, and sustainable peace building. Unfortunately, the TGoNU is yet to embark on this critical process as mandated by Chapter VI of the ARCSS. According to the President's recent pronouncement, the national dialogue initiative will also play

an important consultative role towards the new constitutional dispensation, and the views collected therefrom shall be subjected to the national constitutional conference. JMEC calls upon the TGoNU to enact the necessary legislation to reconstitute the National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC) and commence the permanent constitution making process as soon as is feasible.

## **Chapter VII- Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC)**

52. In furtherance of JMEC's mandate, the JMEC Secretariat has organized 3 JMEC plenary meetings during this quarter. The Chairperson engaged continuously with the leadership of the Republic of South Sudan, IGAD Heads of State and United Nations officials. JMEC welcomed delegations during the quarter from among others, the AUC- PSC, the Africa Union Commission Chairperson's Special Envoy for Women Peace and Security, United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations, the UN Human Rights Council mandated Human Rights Commission in South Sudan and the United Nations Expert Panel for South Sudan.

53. Over this period, I also engaged in bilateral discussions with the leaders in the region to draw their attention to the key issues that require their consideration and action to restore implementation of the peace agreement.

54. In November 2016, I attended a JMEC Partners Forum in Kampala and also met with H.E President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. I briefed the partners on the prevailing political, security, humanitarian, and economic situation in South Sudan and gave an update on JMEC accomplishments, priorities and progress, or lack thereof and challenges to the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan with a few

recommendations to facilitate resumption to full implementation of the peace agreement.

55. In December 2016, I briefed the IGAD Heads of State and Government Summit held in Addis Ababa on the situation in South Sudan.

56. In mid-January 2017, I briefed members of the United Nations Security Council on the situation in South Sudan. This was on the invitation of the President of the UN Security Council for the month of January, the Swedish Ambassador to the UN. I made recommendations to the Council geared towards advancing the peace process broadly and facilitating implementation of the peace agreement in particular. I also had an interactive session with all envoys of the Troika, IGAD, and Friends of South Sudan.

57. I attended the 28<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union and on the sidelines briefed a joint AU, UN and IGAD consultative meeting on South Sudan. The meeting was attended by among others, the Chairpersons of IGAD and the Africa Union Commission, H.E. Hailemariam Desalegn, Prime Minister of Ethiopia and H.E. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma respectively, the Secretary General of the United Nations, António Guterres and H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare, the AU High representative for South Sudan. Following this meeting the AU, IGAD and UN reiterated their call for cessation of hostilities and urged inclusivity in both the political process and in the implementation of the ARCSS.

58. JMEC continues to receive support from IGAD, AU, UN, TROIKA, EU, China, Germany, Australia and other international partners. JMEC greatly appreciates these generous contributions by our partners and welcomes the continued support and funding of its operations.



## **Observations and Recommendations**

59. The prevailing violence in different parts of South Sudan, including targeted killings of civilians, sexual violence and destruction of property particularly in the greater Equatoria, and renewed fighting in parts of Upper Nile and Unity States must be condemned by all. The cessation of hostilities must be observed as the current state of insecurity is not conducive to implementation of the peace agreement.
60. The Peace Agreement was undoubtedly compromised by the events of July 2016 in Juba and the withdrawal of some agreement parties. As I have stated before, the solution to the conflict in South Sudan is political, not military. The ARCSS provides the most viable framework through which to prevent further armed conflict, build peace and reconciliation, promote accountability in governance, combat impunity, reform institutions and establish the rule of law in the Republic of South Sudan.
61. I commend the National Dialogue Initiative announced by President Kiir in mid December 2015 and urge inclusion of all parties and shades of opinion if it is to achieve its goal of national reconciliation, lasting peace and prosperity in South Sudan. I appeal to the TGoNU, IGAD and the international community to take advantage of President Salva Kiir's National Dialogue initiative and reach out to the estranged Parties and their followers. For dialogue to have real meaning and effect, it must include more than those who already agree with the Government and take account of all views and concerns.

### *Recommendations to TGoNU*

1. Expedite in collaboration with the United Nations Security Council, the deployment of the Regional Protection Force in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2304 (2016), which seeks to advance the safety and security of the people of South Sudan and to create an enabling environment for implementation of the Peace Agreement.
2. The Transitional Government of National Unity submit a revised implementation schedule, and create the conditions necessary for the full implementation of the ARCSS. Such conditions include, ensuring a cessation of violence and inclusion of all parties and stakeholders in the political process.
3. Provide necessary cooperation to IGAD, the African Union Commission and the United Nations Security Council in implementing the various recommendations, resolutions and communiqués with respect to the implementation of the ARCSS.
4. It is imperative that TGoNU deepens the dialogue on economic policy with the IMF and stays on course.
5. The TGoNU also makes progress in the broader assessment on how the provisions in chapter IV may strengthen the economic policy framework in the medium and long term, and outline the requirements for technical assistance and capacity building.
6. President H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit to fast-track the appointment of nominees of other political parties and the former detainees to the TNLA to complete the expansion of the TNLA in accordance with the ARCSS.

*Recommendations to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly*

7. I urge continued cooperation between the Ministry of Justice and African Union Commission's Office of Legal Affairs in the work of concluding necessary legislation and the necessary constitutive legal instruments to facilitate the timely establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan.
8. Support the NCAC to conclude the necessary legislation and fully incorporate the ARCSS into the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (2011).

*Recommendations to IGAD*

9. Encourage the TGoNU to ensure a genuinely inclusive National Dialogue process that involve all the estranged parties to the ARCSS, other armed groups, civil society and women's groups.

*Recommendations to The African Union Commission – Peace and Security Council*

10. Continue to urge the parties to cease all hostilities and urge TGoNU to ensure inclusivity in the political and peace processes including in the implementation of the ARCSS.
11. Step up engagement with the African Union High- Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan, member states of IGAD – Plus and TGoNU to find a political solution to the conflict in South Sudan within the framework of the ARCSS.
12. Expedite the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan by providing the draft legislation required to the TGoNU as required under Article 3 of Chapter V of the ARCSS and the Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 26 September 2015 by providing necessary guidance on the

enumerated matters, including providing technical assistance and mobilizing resources for Chapter V institutions and mechanisms.

*Recommendations to the United Nations*

13. Provide technical assistance and related resources for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and other Chapter V mechanisms and institutions, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 2241 (2015) and 2252 (2015) and agreement with the African Union Commission.
14. Expedite in collaboration with the Transitional Government of National Unity the deployment of the Regional Protection Force in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2304 (2016), which seeks to advance the safety and security of the people of South Sudan and to create an enabling environment for implementation of the Peace Agreement.
15. Consider providing a dedicated UNMISS protection force for CTSAMM's operations to match the increased tasks and the anticipated cantonment monitoring and verification missions.