



MANIFESTO

SUDAN PEOPLE'S  
LIBERATION MOVEMENT

31st July, 1983

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## HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE SUDAN

1. The so-called "Problem of Southern Sudan" is really a general problem in the Sudan. It is generally a "problem of Backward Areas" in the whole country that is particularized and exacerbated in the South by successive oppressive minority clique regimes in Khartoum. In fact, the problem has its origins in the spread of capitalism and colonialism towards the end of the last century when Africa was divided up among European colonial powers and the policy of divide-and-rule instituted among and within the colonies. Differences between North and South Sudan arising from levels of socio-economic development, nationality, culture and religion were aggravated during the colonial period as a matter of policy. It is the colonial policy of divide-and-rule and the mechanics of peripheral development in the Sudan that are mainly responsible for the post-independence crises in the country.
2. Internal contradictions and crisis within the capitalist system precipitated the First and Second World Wars. After the Second World War direct colonialism became untenable and collapsed, and was replaced by neo-colonialism, that is, domination by



...cal and  
establishment agency relations  
between capitalist countries and former  
colonies that were "granted" independence.  
The transformation from direct colonialism  
to indirect colonialism (neo-colonialism)  
was accomplished through granting of  
"independence" to the colonies.

3. When it became clear that genuine wars of liberations were imminent and would result in total de-colonization and establishment of genuine independent states in Africa colonialism struck a deal with the emerging African bourgeoisified bureaucratic elite. These Africans who helped in the administration of direct colonialism (the elementary school teachers, nurses, church boys, priests, corporals, petty traders, etc) were encouraged to form political parties and were invited to the metropolitan capitals of London, Paris, and Brussels to negotiate the "terms of independence". These gentlemen went and returned with the "instruments of independence" locked up in their brief-cases to be greeted at airports with great joy and expectation by the masses. Oh, poor masses! They did not know what was contained in those brief-cases; it was neo-colonialism. Colonial administrators were simply replaced by native administrators, but exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the



colonial powers abated.

4. Neo-colonialism brought about the second re-division of Africa. Those colonies that would be too big to be administered indirectly through the local elites were divided up into small neo-colonies. Thus, British East Africa was divided into the "independent" states of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda; British Central Africa was divided up into what are now Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi; while French Equatorial Africa was divided into three neo-colonies, the elite around Lake Chad were encouraged to go and "bring" their independence from Paris as Chadians, those around the City of Brazzaville as Congo Brazzavillians, and, for want of a better name, those in the middle became Central Africans. Thus from two British and two French colonies 14 independent African states were created.



THE ORIGINS OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS  
IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS OF  
THE SUDAN

5. The Liberation Movements in the backward areas of the Sudan which became known as Anya-nya in the South, SUNNI and GUN in the West and Beja Congress in the East, were a direct product of the phenomenon of post-World War II African independence. This "independence" was predicated on the results of the colonial policy of divide-and-rule which pitted the North against the rest of the country in terms of colonial peripheral development, which development was perpetuated by all minority clique regimes in Khartoum, and herein lies the essence of the so-called "Southern Problem".
6. It is necessary at this point to pause and define the term "the North", so that it is never again misquoted, misinterpreted and used by the oppressive minority clique regimes in Khartoum to divide the Sudanese people. The term "The North" is used throughout the Manifesto to refer to those areas in Northern Sudan in which peripheral development became necessary in order to facilitate cheap extraction of surplus by the colonial regime. It therefore includes the old Provinces of Khartoum and Blue Nile,



and excludes all of Northern Sudan. The old Provinces of Darfur, Kordofan, Kassala and Northern Province are underdeveloped areas just like the Southern Provinces of Bhar el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile that are known as Southern Sudan.

7. What we have defined as underdeveloped areas in Northern Sudan are the most deceived and neglected by the ruling minority clique regime in Khartoum. These minority clique regimes have always used the questions of nationality and religion to isolate the struggle in the South from that of the underdeveloped areas in the North. Hitherto, the focus has been on the South, but the principal lessons of the liberation movement in the South can be generalized to all underdeveloped areas in the rest of the country. The liberation movements in the North like those in the South, have their origins in past unequal peripheral colonial development and post-independence anti-liberation schemes by Khartoum repressive minority clique regimes in collusion with both advanced and primitive international reaction.
8. There was much more colonial exploitation, and therefore peripheral development, in the North than in the backward areas of the Sudan. Cotton trade competition between



...the capitalist world, especially Africa and China necessitated the development of the Gezira for cheap extraction of cotton to feed the ailing textile industries of Manchester and Liverpool. It became necessary to provide the North with general and technical education in order to produce the required native junior staff to assist the colonial administration in the extraction of surplus.



### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE ANYA-NYA

9. The problem of underdeveloped areas was particularized in the South especially in the field of education. Education in the South was relegated and left to various Christian Missionary Societies that had no further motive beyond providing the necessary education for the propagation of their faith. Unlike the case in the North, there was no necessity in the South to train junior administrators. The Northern elite therefore developed much more rapidly than the Southern one as a matter of colonial policy, and this was to become the central problem in Sudan's post-independence politics.
10. When Sudan became "independent" in January 1956, colonial jobs were "unfairly" divided between the North and South. The Southern elite felt cheated and betrayed by British colonialism. However, the unfair distribution of colonial jobs between North and South, as pointed out earlier was an historical necessity rooted in the unequal peripheral development of the North and South during the colonial period.
11. As Northernization of the Civil Service became imminent in the South, the Southern



Army Garrison at Torit mutinied in August 1955, four months before "independence". This mutiny marks the beginning of Anya-nya I and 17 years of war (1955 - 1972) Anya-nya I was thus precipitated by dissatisfaction with Sudanization, that is, by the unfair distribution of colonial jobs between the Southern and Northern bourgeoisified bureaucratic elites.

12. The objectives and aims of Anya-nya I therefore centred around jobs and job titles. The jobbist character of Anya-nya I forms an important experience from which the present Movement (SPLM) has a great deal to learn. During Anya-nya I there was a proliferation of Governments and political parties such as SANU, SSLF, Southern Front, Sue Republic, Nile Provisional Government, the State of Anyidi and many others. Each of these "governments" and parties was complete with its Western-type cabinet. The bourgeoisified Southern Bureaucratic elite of Anya-nya I were quite content with the job titles even though most of these titles carried no functions. Similarly, in the armed component of the Movement, Anya-nya I had many field-grade officers (generals, brigadiers, colonels, etc) without armies to command. The SPLA will never allow such fake governments and parties to exist.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE ADDIS ABABA "PEACE" AGREEMENT

13. The desire of Southerners for ministerial titles and similar positions in the army and Civil Service was at last belatedly satisfied in 1972 in Addis Ababa instead of 1956 in London. The Addis Ababa Agreement was a deal between the Southern and Northern bourgeoisified bureaucratic elites. The Northern elite dictated the terms while the Southern elite compromised the interests of the masses in return for jobs which had long been denied them. The jobs that Southerners felt should have been given to them in 1956 were finally given to them in 1972 at an estimated cost of one and a half million lives. The Agreement was thus bound to collapse as it ignored the real interests of the masses of the people. The Southern elite would use the Agreement as a means to enrich themselves, while the Northern elite, having removed the armed component (Anyanya I) at Addis Ababa, would try to return the country to the pre-1972 status quo when they were dominant in both North and South.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE POLITICAL DISMANTLING OF THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT AND ENSUING POLITICAL CRISIS

14. The minority clique regime in Khartoum quickly moved to dismantle the Agreement almost from the day it was signed. On the political side the ruling Northern elite initiated policies designed to undermine the Addis Ababa Agreement. These policies include the following:
  - (a) Determination of leadership in the "Autonomous Southern Region" by the minority clique regime in Khartoum.
  - (b) Construction of the Jonglei Canal, and especially the plan to resettle two and a half million Egyptian peasants along the Canal. This plan led to mass unrest in the South, leaving three students dead, and several politicians arrested.
  - (c) Capricious and unconstitutional dissolution of Southern People's Regional Assemblies and Governments in 1980, 1981 and 1983.
  - (d) Attempts to redraw the border between



Northern and Southern Sudan to include the oil areas, the rich agricultural lands of Renk and the nickel and uranium discoveries in the South as part of the North.

- (e) Decision to build the oil refinery in Kosti instead of Bentiu, where oil was discovered in Southern Sudan. It was later decided to abandon the Kosti refinery, and pipe the crude to Port Sudan for export.
- (f) Deliberate neglect of the South in terms of socio-economic development.
- (g) Integration of Sudan with Egypt and conclusion of a Joint Defence Treaty between the two countries.
- (h) Division of the South into more regions in order to weaken the South through divide-and-rule. This policy was supported by part of the Southern elite that saw benefits in a divided South and opposed by those who saw losses. The same politicians changed sides several times within a day in support or in opposition to re-division of the South, depending on changing fortunes as to which side was seen to be winning.



15. The above attempts by the repressive minority clique regime in Khartoum to dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement on the political front were used by prominent Southern politicians to organize several opposition groups including the following:
1. NAM - National Action Movement.
  2. MTLSS - Movement for Total liberation of Southern Sudan.
  3. ECC - Equatoria Central Committee (for re-division).
  4. CUSS - Council for the Unity of South Sudan.
16. In the Northern backward areas, the old CNF (Congress of New Forces, which included the Fur, Nuba and Beja) took advantage of the political crisis in the South and organized African-based coups against Khartoum. One of these was led by Lt. Col. Hassen Hussein in 1975, and later developed into guerrilla movements led by people like Lt. Col. Yacoub Ismael and Major Zekeria Abdalla.



## CHAPTER SIX

### THE MILITARY DISMANTLING OF THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT AND THE ENSUING MILITARY CRISIS

7. On the military side the minority clique regime in Khartoum initiated several policies to dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement. These policies included the following:
- (a) Absorption of 6,000 Anya-nya guerrillas in 1972 into the Sudanese armed forces, leaving about 32,000 to be absorbed in unproductive civil jobs, and paid under a special fund. When the fund was exhausted two years later these 32,000 Ex-Anya-nya guerrillas were summarily dismissed and left in limbo.
  - (b) Integration of the 6,000 absorbed Anya-nya guerrillas into the rest of the Sudanese army within the Southern Command. This policy was fiercely resisted by the absorbed Anya-nya. It resulted in several mutinies, such as the Akobo incident led by Lt. Vincent Kuany and Corporal Bol Kur. Elements of this mutiny combined with some of the dismissed 32,000 Ex-Anya-nya laid



off workers and formed what became known as Anya-nya II. The origins and objectives of Anya-nya II were therefore similar to those of Anya-nya I; both were dissatisfied with the jobs offered or denied them by the Northern and Southern bourgeoisified ruling elites.

- (c) Transfer to the North of the 6,000 absorbed Anya-nya I battalions and their planned eventual liquidation in Northern Sudan. The plan envisaged the transfer of three battalions during 1982/83 and the remaining battalions in 1983/84. The first transfer included Battalions 105, 110 and 117. Battalion 110 (Aweil) has all been transferred except for its support company that is still resisting in Melut. Battalion 117 (Kapoeta) is still resisting transfer except for one company. Battalion 105 (Bor) resisted and planned to capture Juba before their transfer could be implemented. The second transfer for 1983/84 was to involve Battalions 104 (Nasir), 111 (Rumbek) and 116 (Juba).
18. The above attempts by the repressive minority clique regime in Khartoum to dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement on the



military side were used by prominent absorbed Anynya I officers as a basis to organize two contingency plans within the Sudanese Army.

(a) The first plan was to attack and capture Juba, Capital of the Southern Region. This plan was to be executed by Battalion 105 with re-inforcement from Torit and Kapoeta, and from Anynya II who were to assemble near Ayod and Pachalla. A socialist government was to be established in Juba and measures taken to assist in transforming the situation in Khartoum.

(b) The second plan, in the event that Khartoum attacked first displacing and dislodging Battalions 105 and 104 from their bases, was to regroup and reorganize to wage a protracted armed struggle for the total liberation of the Sudan. It is the second plan that has become necessary. Khartoum attacked Bor and Pibor Garrisons on 16/5/1983, and later the Ayod Garrison attacked Khartoum forces that were sent to arrest the Commander.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### FORMATION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SPLA AND SPLM

19. The battles of Bor (commanded by Major Kerubino Kuanyin), Pibor and Ayod (commanded by Major William Nyuon) caused widespread desertions in other units of the Southern Command and in Northern Sudan, and an exodus of refugees to bordering countries.
20. Elements of the military and political organizations in paragraphs 15 and 18 have established the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Although the Movement has started by necessity in the South, it aims eventually at engulfing the whole country in socialist transformation. The SPLA is fighting to establish a United Socialist Sudan, not a separate Southern Sudan.
21. The immediate task of the SPLA/SPLM is to transform the Southern Movement from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries and concerned only with the South, jobs and self interest to a progressive movement led by revolutionaries and dedicated to the socialist transformation of the whole country. It must be reiterated that the



principal objective of the SPLA/SPLM is not separation for the South. The South is an integral and inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has been fragmented sufficiently enough by colonialism and neo-colonialism and its further fragmentation can only be in the interests of her enemies.

22. The separatist attitude that has developed in the South since 1955 has caught the imagination of the backward areas in Northern Sudan. Separatist Movements have already emerged with guerrillas fighting in Western and Eastern Sudan. If left unchecked, these separatist movements in the South, East and the West coupled with the stubborn determination of a repressive minority clique regime in Khartoum to hang on to power in the Sudan at all costs will lead to the total disintegration of the Sudan. This imminent, latent and impending disintegration and fragmentation of the Sudan is what the SPLA/SPLM aims to stop by developing and implementing a consistent democratic solution to both the nationality and religious questions within the context of a United Socialist Sudan.



now is to a conventional force that will be able to destroy Sudan's reactionary army.

- (d) The SPLA must regroup the scattered fighting forces in Southern Sudan, win their confidence, give them further military and political training and through war and correct conduct, win the confidence and support of the masses of the people.
- (e) In order to be able to regroup and politicize the fighting forces effectively, the SPLA shall need to establish its own progressive camps apart from those of Anya-nya II, which are more or less tribal and sectional camps. The SPLA will then work to win the confidence of Anya-nya II forces and bring them under SPLA command.
- (f) Establishment of an effective propaganda machinery to involve as many masses of the people as possible. This will include among other methods of propaganda and agitation, the establishment of an SPLM radio station.
- (g) Establishment of political office in all countries to pursue external contacts for military and other assistances. Such offices will, of



course, be under the supervision of SPLM Headquarters.

- (h) Establishment of an institute for Revolutionary War studies in a liberated area for training political and military cadres. These cadres will be drawn from the many students, workers and officials who have left or will leave the Towns for the bush. Officers and other ranks who desert Sudan's reactionary army will be screened and required to attend this institute for political orientation and refresher military training.
- (i) Transformation of the fighting units in the field into organic units of the SPLA. The trained cadres from the institute for Revolutionary War Studies shall take over these units, and impart their revolutionary knowledge and practice to all under their commands.
- (j) Politicization, organization and militarization of the peasantry shall follow as areas become liberated.
- (k) Contacting opposition groups in both North and South with the view of forming a United Front with these groups, provided that leadership of