IGAD-Plus: The Paradox of a Presidential Signature
6 min readBy David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
August 19, 2015 (SSB) — As baffling news trickled from Addis Ababa on the anxiously awaited deadline of August 17, that the peace agreement was signed by Dr. Riek and Cde. Pagan, and initialed by H.E. President Kiir, most people did not know whether to be happy or sad. Surely, drained by the current senseless carnage, the people of South Sudan had remained in a state of constant prayer, especially in IDP and UN PoC camps across the country in anticipation of divine intervention to end their nightmare.
Pundits and politicians in South Sudan have argued that the current IGAD-Plus peace agreement is a unique experiment in conflict resolution. Unique in the sense that one might not find a similar approach having been applied elsewhere, so have they contented. These disputations have made the people distrustful about the prospects of real (good) peace through IGAD-Plus, leading to demonstrations in all the ten states of the country. But the IGAD-Plus proposal might not be so unique after all.
As H.E. President Kiir is back for final consultations, the people of South Sudan shall keep their breaths and continue to pray for two more weeks. But what are the perspectives of the ‘pro-sign’ compatriots who argued that the president should sign the agreement on his return to Addis Ababa in a few days?
Having listen to the government’s contention against signing, which is full of sensible viewpoints, this article will attempt to summarize the views of those who insist that H.E. the president should sign the agreement for the sake of peace, as we intend to clarify some, not all, of these points of contention. Of all the contentions, this piece will focus on the issue of percentages and security arrangements (demilitarization), as they might prove to be the most contentious.
The Myth of Percentages: This relates to the fact that when we hear 53%, 46%, 40%, 33%, etc. such divisions often lead to a misconception of what they truly are. As they are in theory applied to power sharing at state levels, in fact they only apply to no more than 15 citizens (ministers) at state levels and 25 ministers at the Juba level who constitute the executive branches of the two tiers of government. In fact (on the ground) 40% and 60% of a population of 10 ministers means 4 ministers to IO and 6 to the government. 15% to IO in all the ten states translated into one (only one!) minister to be nominated by IO at each of the seven states to which the percentage applied. . Similarly, 33% out of 10 ministers means 3 ministers to be nominated by IO.
Security Arrangements: This was earlier titled Demilitarization of Juba, which was a scary name for most. The camp for signing argues that, of course, it is a security arrangement rather than total demilitarization. They argued that, after all, the entire police, CID, and national security forces are not going to be affected by such security arrangements. In fact, such arrangements whereby soldiers remain in barracks outside towns was supposed to be adopted as a standard policy since 2005 all over South Sudan, instead of waiting for it to be imposed in an agreement. After all, these forces (police, CID, and NS) are the ones that have a constitutional mandate to protect civilians inside towns, not the army as such. And as a balancing act, Juba could just increase their numbers and make their massive presence and patrolling conspicuous across the city.
The pro-sign camp argues that government has no basis to suspect a conspiracy theory being undertaken by IGAD-Plus and Troika against the president (who they acknowledged as popular leader and astute liberator) or the people of South Sudan and the country’s territorial integrity. The President remains the C-in-C and Executive President for the entire duration of interim period. Moreover, tens of thousands of foreign troops are already here in form of UNMISS and UPDF, adding a few more from Ethiopia and Kenya may not lead to loss of sovereignty, they argued.
These people who are for signing argue that the other aspects of the proposal are manageable. For example, they contend that separation of forces is a standard procedure of conflict resolution worldwide- for obvious reasons.
This camp also recognized that the two governors of Unity and Upper Nile States to be nominated by SPLM-IO could be among the most problematic areas to be solved. This concern is based on two things. A letter written by the “Nuer in Government” who are the majority in those states and genuine commitment to peace by the would-be governors from IO. The concerned Nuer in Government who wrote the letter are the commissioners of twenty-plus counties that have resisted IO troops for the last infamous twenty months of conflict. The fear is that, ones an IO governor takes over, he (she) might try to appoint his own loyalists as commissioners and thereby leading to another rebellion.
The solution to such a predicament, as the pro-sign camp would see, will be to attach a “Goodwill Undertaking” Annex to the IGAD-Plus agreement stipulating that all commissioners of those states are to be appointed and relieved by H.E. the President, not the IO governors. Since the agreement is a take-or-leave one, then government concerns may be presented in form of annexes rather than touching on the text itself. Once those commissioners are satisfied that IO’s appointed Governors will not temper with their powers, then they may be convinced to also accept the agreement for the sake of peace.
Finally, the pro-sign camp contend that the country has bled more than enough. A military solution is not even near impossible, but it is impossible given the geographical terrains of South Sudan. The meaning of compromise is that each party must go out of the negotiating room with some disappointments. However, the main question is always whether or not such disappointments are stomach-able? The pro-sign camp believe that the current disappointments are stomach-able, hence the President should sign the agreement.
The pro-sign camp contends tha H.E. President Salva Kiir Mayardit is a tested patriot and popular leader who has many times taken the country through rough roads, before and after its independence. This fact could be attested to by his foes before his friends. He has been doing it successfully whenever he is faced with such challenges of promoting the unity of the people of South Sudan. Let him bring in Dr. Riek and defeat him through the ballot box in less than 30 months to come. Let his overlook the new dynamics created by Peter Gadet’s re-defection, real as they are, and focus on one thing at a time.
As I personally perceive some sense in what the pro-sign camp have argued, I also recognize the reason why the issue of sovereignty is a sensitive area that the pro-sign camp might not have given due weight. If H.E. the President decides to agree with some elements and maintain reservation over others, the people of South Sudan and pro-sign camp should understand why, rather than jumping into the conclusion that he is the obstacle. But one thing is certain, whether his reason for refusing to sign could be addressed through an annex or not might determine the fate of many generations to come.
David Mayen Ayarbior, BA Econ- Poli.Science (KIU), MA International Security (JKSIS -University of Denver), LLB (University of London)- dmayend@yahoo.com
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