Archive for the ‘Reports’ Category
Summary: Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan to the UN Security Council, April 2017
The de facto collapse of the transitional government of national unity envisaged in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of August 2015, as described in the Panel’s reports of September and November 2016 (S/2016/793 and S/2016/963), has left South Sudan with a political arrangement between the President, Salva Kiir, and the First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai, that does not meaningfully include significant segments of the opposition, other political factions and many influential non-Dinka community leaders. This arrangement is consequently not nationally unifying, has not arrested the security and humanitarian crisis and is increasingly an obstacle to genuine political reconciliation, undermining the transition to the inclusive and sustainable peace envisaged in resolutions 2206 (2015) and 2290 (2016).
The leadership and the country as a whole continue to fracture between and within tribes, as evidenced by a number of recent high-profile resignations from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition in February 2017, notably of one of the most prominent (and one of the last) senior Equatorian officers in SPLA, Lieutenant General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, who launched his own armed opposition movement in March. Notwithstanding some recent statements by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development of a collective position, the regional body has also fractured in its response to the conflict, and coordinated pressure within the region to enforce the Agreement has dissipated in favour of bilateral arrangements between its members and SPLM/A in Government, dictated by these States’ national security and economic interests.
While SPLM/A in Government, SPLM/A in Opposition and other armed groups undertook military operations, including the targeting of civilians, throughout 2016 and the first quarter of 2017, by far the largest-scale campaigns have been planned and executed by SPLM/A in Government under the leadership of Kiir. These campaigns — in Upper Nile, Unity, Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Jonglei, as well as in greater Equatoria — have followed a consistent tactical pattern since the major government offensives in 2015, namely a combination of tribal militia and Dinka SPLA forces (with SPLA now including a Dinka militia commonly r eferred to as the “Mathiang Anyoor”) supported by heavy weapons, such as Mi-24 attack helicopters, that the government has procured since the beginning of the war.
As anticipated in the Panel’s interim report, these military operations have constituted an escalation of the war in multiple areas during the dry season, the consequences of which are starkly illustrated by the accelerating displacement of the population, most notably — during the period since November — from greater Equatoria. At least 25 per cent of the population have been forced from their homes since December 2013. As at 28 February 2017, more than 1.9 million South Sudanese were internally displaced and more than 1.6 million had fled the country — an increase of almost 280,000 internally displaced persons and 670,000 refugees since the Panel’s interim report.
In its previous reports, the Panel presented evidence of widespread violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by all parties between the outbreak of the war in December 2013 and November 2016. The Panel has concluded that these trends have continued unabated, with nearcomplete impunity and a lack of any credible effort to prevent the violations or to S/2017/326 17-04364 3/51 punish the perpetrators. In addition to the Panel, at least four other United Nations agencies and investigations have documented the significant increase in tribal violence during and since the de facto collapse of the transitional government in July 2016.
While SPLM/A in Government, including Kiir, has made several public commitments in recent months to allowing unhindered humanitarian assistance, including in a joint communiqué with the Security Council in September 2016, the aid response continues to be obstructed, mainly by SPLM/A in Government. South Sudan remains the deadliest country in the world for humanitarian workers, with the number of reported humanitarian access incidents spiking significantly in the second half of 2016.
The famine declared in two counties of Unity in February 2017 — the implications of which are that at least 100,000 people are d ying of starvation and a further 1 million are near starvation — underscores the severity of the humanitarian emergency. The bulk of the evidence suggests that the famine, which had been predicted for two years, has resulted from protracted conflict and, in particular, the cumulative toll of military operations undertaken by the leadership in Juba, the denial of humanitarian access, primarily by SPLM/A in Government, and population displacement resulting from the war.
The scale and scope of the political, humanitarian and economic crises notwithstanding, the Panel continues to uncover evidence of the continuing procurement of weapons by SPLM/A in Government for SPLA, the National Security Service and other associated forces and militias. There is some, largely testimonial, evidence of arms acquisitions by opposition groups, but these supplies appear to have been limited to comparatively low numbers of small arms and light weapons and ammunition.
The political and tribal fractures described herein, although destructive for most South Sudanese, have become the default strategy for some of the country’s most prominent political and military figures. This strategy undermines organized, collective resistance to these actors’ control and ensures that they mainta in their dominance and access to the country’s resources. It also ensures that they are able to prevent genuine reforms, credible financial oversight and, ultimately, accountability for the crimes committed against the South Sudanese people, as documented by the Panel and multiple other independent investigations, including the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.
In addition to the confidential annex presented to the Committee in January 2016, the Panel provided evidence in its reports of 2016 of multiple other individuals responsible for or complicit in the actions and policies described in paragraph 9 of resolution 2290 (2016).
Bor County Report: Murle killed 793 people, abducted 276 children, raided 57,127 livestock and wounded 398 people from 2005 to 2012
By Mach Samuel Peter, Bor, Jonglei State
February 22, 2017 (SSB) — The office of the governor has released the atrocities committed by Murle between 2005 and 2012. Another report covering Duk and Twic East Counties will be released soon or later. In a long document entitled Bor County Peace conferences (Murle incidents from 2005 to 2012) Murle killed 793 people, abducted 276 children, raided 57,127 livestock and wounded 398 people from 2005 to 2012 in Bor County. This is the summary of the atrocities committed by Murle in Bor County from 2005 to 2012 in five Payams of Kolnyang, Anyidi, Jalle, Baidit and Makuach.
|S/No||Payam||People Killed||Children Abducted||People wounded||Raided livestock|
Summary of Kolnyang Payam data for Murle incidents from 2005 to 2012
|Payam||Boma||Source of Data/chief||People killed||People wounded||Abducted children||cattle||sheep||goats|
|Kolnyang||Boma||Name||M F||M F||M F|
Ceasefire & Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM)
PRESS RELEASE: CTSAMM Reports on Violations
The mandate of Ceasefire & Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) based on Chapter II of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) is to monitor and verify the implementation of the implementation Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA). Through the extensive investigative work done by the Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) under CTSAMM, incidents of conflict, allegations of violations and breach of the PCTSA by the two parties; SPLA and SPLM/A have been investigated and reports combined.
There are eight (8) investigative documents of which seven (7) areviolations of the PCTSA. The reports are as follows:
- CTSAMM Report 70 – Violations in Juba
- CTSAMM Report 71 – Violation in Leer Area, Upper Nile
- CTSAMM Report 72 – Violations in Unity State
- CTSAMM report 73 – Alleged violations in DigalaBoma, Central Equatoria
- CTSAMM Report 74 – Violations in the Malakal Area
- CTSAMM Report 75 – Alleged violations in Juba
- CTSAMM report 76 – Fighting in Nassir, Upper Nile State
- CTSAMM REPORT 77 – Monitoring Report January 2017
The documents attached to the press release offer incident summary, assessments and recommendations to the warring by CTSAMM. The information has been condensed, however to obtain a comprehensive report of the publications, please visit the CTSAMM website at: ctsammsouthsudan.org.
Government of South Sudan: Official report of the Investigation Committee on the Terrain Hotel incident of 11 July 2016
Note verbale dated 4 November 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to forward the official report of the Investigation Committee on the Terrain Hotel incident of 11 July 2016 (see annex).
The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan kindly seeks your assistance in having the present note verbale and its annex circulated among the members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.
Annex to the note verbale dated 4 November 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
Official report of the Investigation Committee on the Terrain Hotel incident of 11 July 2016
The nature of offences committed at Terrain Hotel against foreign aid workers and other foreign and local residents on 11 July 2016 are a reminder of the terrible consequences of the July fighting. What occurred at Terrain, particularly to the victims of rape, was inexcusable and deserves condemnation. I personally would not have been able to understand the feelings and distress caused to these victims if it were not for my appointment to lead this investigation. Through this investigation I and my colleagues were made to understand the physical and mental pain caused to the victims of this unfortunate incident. The Committee was also aware of the untold suffering caused to other victims of the fighting that occurred from 8 to 11 July 2016. While investigating these serious allegations, the Committee was mindful of its mandate to establish the facts of what took place at Terrain in the afternoon and evening hours of 11 July 2016. The Committee was able to gather enough information regarding the incident, and this enabled it to determine the circumstances and the nature of the offences committed at Terrain by the perpetrators. The Committee’s work was facilitated by the commitment of His Excellency General Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic, who personally directed the Committee to ensure that the investigation was comprehensive, transparent and independent. The President was also throughout clear that the perpetrators of the Terrain incident must take responsibility for their individual and collective acts. The Committee also had challenges associated with the investigation. One of the challenges that confronted the investigation was how to obtain statements from foreigners who were witnesses or victims of the Terrain incident. Many of the foreigners who were victims of the incident had either departed the country, were not traceable or were not willing to speak to the Committee. It was a painstaking exercise for my investigators to trace the victims of rape, given their reluctance to testify because of the confidentiality and stigma associated with the victims of these kind of offences. Having concluded this investigation, it is the Committee’s hope that this report would provide most if not all of the answers pertaining to the Terrain incident. We are, however, mindful that this report is not an end in itself, but a good reference for pursuing further criminal investigation and prosecution against suspects. It is our strong conviction that the findings and recommendations contained in this report would lead to accountability by those linked to the Terrain incident. There is no doubt that the victims of the Terrain incident would only find consolation or comfort if those who perpetrated these terrible crimes were held to account. It was a great honour for me and other members of my Committee to undertake this noble and challenging task. This Committee has tried its level best within the limited period and resources to determine the facts pertaining to the Terrain incident. It is my hope that the findings and recommendations contained in this report would be given the attention they deserve by the leadership and all the relevant institutions.
By Simon Deng Kuol Deng, New York, USA
December 29, 2016 (SSB) — A political party is a group of the individuals who choose one political ideology between several political ideologies such as modern liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etc. as their political party with which they might affiliate with because of programs or policy areas of political ideology. After a group of individuals has affiliated with political ideology to become their political party, then the individuals may either choose to remain with the name of political ideology or give political ideology a different name. If individuals, who are members changed a name of political ideology, then they might still remain to be identified by others or even by themselves with political ideology, which they have affiliated with even though they have given it a different name.
This paper emphasis to analysis modern liberalism and Democratic Party’s public social programs’ policy areas of how its leaders might protect the social security and Medicare, provide health care, stabilize the housing, provide education to everyone, support the military families and veterans, take care of American Disabilities, recognize faith-based organizations, protect the laws of the civil Rights, protect the laws of the voting Rights, protect a women’s right to choose, protect the freedom of individual to marry, ensure the public safety, justice, and crime prevention, promote social innovation and poverty eradication, and protect environment.
Children Of a Lesser God
Report of the investigation into the power politics behind the removal of the Kenyan Force Commander of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by the International Policy Group’s (IPG)
Morphophonemic Reforms in Thuɔŋjäŋ Orthography: An Excerpt from “Thuɔŋjäŋ Cïdmënde”
“Ideas are constructed in specific languages, and if we believe that ideas are important in development, in the determination of relations of wealth, power and values in a society, then … we cannot divorce issues of language and writing from issues of wealth, power and values” and as such, the contemporary African intellectuals “…will grow their roots in African languages and cultures. They will also learn the best they can from all world languages and cultures. They will view themselves as scouts in foreign linguistic territories and guides in their own linguistic space. In other words, they will take whatever is most advanced in those languages and cultures and translate those ideas into their own languages. They will see their role as that of doing for African languages and cultures what all writers and intellectuals of other cultures and histories have done for theirs”, Ngugi wa Thiong’o
By Alëw Majɔg Alëw, Malaysia
Whereas Thuɔŋjäŋ is arguably one of the few written and well researched South Sudanese languages, a host of orthographic challenges remain unresolved. These challenges are rooted in the unmarked phonemes and inaccurate morphophonemic designations that emanated from earlier missionary work in the language. There is a general consensus among a handful of western linguists, who researched into the language, on the approach that any new orthographic reforms, necessary as most of them content, should follow.
Nevertheless, discussions and proposals for reforms have so far focused on mostly the vowel system (representation of tones and length, having had the breathiness aspect already settled by Dhuruai’s umlauted vowels). The morphophonemic anomalies which form part of the reforms proposed in “Thuɔŋjäŋ Cïdmëndë”, a radical proposal for a total revision and revam of Thuɔŋjäŋ orthography and grammar, have not been raised or addressed anywhere in the available literature on the language. This note, an excerpt from “Thuɔŋjäŋ Cïdmënde”, provides a brief explanation and illustration on only the morphophonemic reforms on [b, p], [d, t], [dh, th], [k, g], [u, w] and [i, y] as codas in lone morphemes (or single basic word unit) and for [u, w] and [i, y] as nuclei (or median letters in words).
Credibility of these reforms
For the benefit of readers, I would like to, first and foremost, underline that I am not a linguist nor did I have a conventional training in this field to speak with authority on these proposed reforms. But usually linguists work with native speakers of a language in issues like these. Hence, as a passionate and analytical native speaker, I will attempt to illustrate the logic that necessitates these reforms which I believe are necessary to adopt if we are to retain the authenticity and ease the grammar of the language, Thuɔŋjäŋ. Radical as they may be, I hope they will be understandable and sensible to other native speakers.
Furthermore, the proposal on these reforms is a conclusion of observational and intuitive research work done with many Muɔnyjiëëŋ/Jiëëŋ; those who are literate in other languages as well as Thuɔŋjäŋ and those who are completely illiterate (only monolingual in spoken Thuɔŋjäŋ). While the former group may sometimes have their pronunciations corrupted under the influence of second langauges they are literate in, observations from the latter group remarkably manifest and support the validity of these reforms. It is therefore helpful to refer to this group where further investigations and substantiation are needed.
Another point to underscore is that, unlike dialect-specific spelling and other grammatical issues, these observations cut across all dialects and are in no way dialect constrained (at least as far as I have noted from my discussion with speakers of different dialects).
Peace Leadership Conference’s Paper: Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in Divided Societies Presented by David Mabior Atem Kuir, Canada
John Garang de Mabior, Iowa State University, 1981
Dr John Garang’s PhD Dissertation: Identifying, selecting, and implementing rural development strategies for socio-economic development in the Jonglei Projects Area, Southern Region, Sudan (PDF, 292 pages)
Do Democratic States Produce Peace Between Themselves Without Producing Peace with the Undemocratic States?Posted: October 14, 2016 by PaanLuel Wël in Books, Education, Reports
By Simon Deng Kuol Deng, New York, USA
October 14, 2016 (SSB) — The Democratic peace becomes the most popular theory in the international politics for its proposition that democratic states do not fight interstate wars among themselves as opposes by realist and neorealist theoretical traditions, which define international as an anarchy, where the state can act according to the reason of self-help. The democratic peace theory recognizes only liberal democratic states as the states that do not fight each other; however, the theory does not recognize illiberal democratic states as democratic states, even though, they frequently held the fair and free competitive elections. The democratic peace theory recognizes states as liberal democratic states when they have applied the principles of democracy such as citizen participation in decision-making, system of representation, rule of law, electoral system of majority rule and minority right, equality among the citizens, liberty or freedom granted to or retained by citizens, separation of state and religious, institutional system that ensures checks and balances, free press, etc. into the systems of their institutions. This paper aims at analyzing democratic peace theory’s proposition, which claims that democratic states do not fight the interstate war among themselves, doubts around the proposition of democratic peace theory, and valuation of democratic peace theory and its prospects for peaceful and cooperative relations in the international system.
Dr. Luka Biong and Dr. Jok Madut: Testimonies before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 20th, 2016.
“To a degree nearly unrivaled in Africa, South Sudan has no nationally unifying political figures with credibility or a constituency beyond their own tribe—or in most cases, beyond even a segment of a sub-clan of their tribe,” Kate Knopf at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
“The country was born into too much wealth, resources that fell into the hands of the liberators who had not seen such wealth before and who clearly opted to pay themselves and went on a shopping spree, showing very little willingness or ability to develop programs to lift the country out of its war time miseries,” Dr. Jok Madut Jok at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
“…speech by unscrupulous politicians that casts the international community as an enemy of South Sudan is misleading the soldiers and stirring up anger in the social media. These unprincipled adults need to be rendered powerless,” Dr. Luka Biong at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
“South Sudan is not on the brink of state failure. South Sudan is not in the process of failing. South Sudan has failed, at great cost to its people and with increasingly grave implications for regional security, including the stability of important U.S. partners in the Horn of Africa. South Sudan has ceased to perform even the minimal functions and responsibilities of a sovereign state. The government exercises no monopoly over coercive power, and its ability to deliver public services, provide basic security, and administer justice is virtually nonexistent. While the Kiir regime may claim legal sovereignty, in practice domestic sovereignty is entirely contested and discredited,” Kate Almquist Knopf at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
Find below the testimonies, PDF
South Sudan has plunged into civil war, economic collapse, and creeping international isolation. The country’s elites have built a kleptocratic regime that controls all sectors of the economy, and have squandered a historic chance for the development of a functional state.
Editor: Of the 75 mafias, The Sentry Investigative Report only succeeded to unmask 6 individuals: Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar, plus four top generals on gov’t side: Paul Malong, James Hoth, Malek Ruben, and Jok Riak. No one else from the SPLM-IO nor any from G-10. Nonetheless, there are some humorous occasions in the report, like when one finds sons of Salva Kiir listing their profession/occupation as “Son of the President” and another Madam listing her occupation as “wife of the governor”. Find out and enroll quickly if and when Juba University is offering those professional studies folks. And then this: “Road construction and vehicle imports are among the greatest sources of budget overruns. In the 2012-2013 budget period, the Ministry of Roads and Bridges overspent its budget by 1513%.” Breaking news: no tarmacked road in South Sudan for the overspent budget.
Deng Bol: THE SENTRY REPORT SUMMARY
1) WHAT THE SENTRY PROMISED US: To disrupt and ultimately dismantle the networks of perpetrators, facilitators, and enablers who fund and profit from South Sudan’s war since 2013.
2) WHAT WE EXPECTED FROM THE SENTRY REPORT: That Mr. X withdrew USD 5 Million from Y Bank operated by the Government of South Sudan to buy War Weapons from Country Z, Paid Mr. X USD 2, Million and that Mr. X stole and deposited the balance of USD 3 Million into Z Bank with account details….
3) WHAT WE READ FROM THE REPORT: That certain individuals own homes they can’t afford, because their salaries are very low, that they are engaged in businesses with foreigners, and that happen to be government and military officials and that their spouses, children and relatives have been living comfortably and bragging about it on Facebook and Instagram.
Click the link and read the PDF document: sentry-report-on-corrupt-in-south-sudan-the-top-corrupt-leaders-of-south-sudan
By Ayuen Ajok, Washington, DC, USA
September 7, 2016 (SSB) — The countries chosen for this analysis were based on country that had economic challenges similar to issues in South Sudan, such as Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Mozambique. The macroeconomic policies that are used in this analysis are drawn from the success of economic policies in Zambia, Mozambique, Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Additionally, a conceptual framework was established for these four countries in order to provide evidence of successful policy intervention implemented by them
It is determined that South Sudan is to address its economic challenges, it would be advisable for it to reform its economy by using interventions similar to the ones followed by the countries mentioned above. This analysis also looks at the role of the government in these countries, with regard to the promotion of economic growth and country development, and in other sectors of the economy. Finally, the paper considers contemporary challenges that derail economic activity in those countries, particularly challenges related to inflation and currencies reforms
John Kerry: There is a legal provision in the peace agreement to replace Riek Machar with Taban Deng Ghai as 1st Vice PresidentPosted: August 23, 2016 by PaanLuel Wël in History, Junub Sudan, Press Release, Reports, Speeches
US Secretary of State, John Kerry: “With respect to Machar, it’s not up to the United States; it’s up to the leaders of South Sudan and the people of South Sudan and the political parties and the political process, and their neighbors, to weigh in on what is best or not best with respect to Machar. But I think it’s quite clear that legally, under the agreement, there is allowance for the replacement in a transition of personnel, and that has been effected with the appointment of a new vice president. And what they decide to do is going to be dependent on them in the context of the implementation of the peace agreement.”
James Gatdet Dak : “The recent Summit in Addis Ababa of the Heads of State and Government of IGAD-Plus, including participation of representatives of the United States, passed a resolution which expects the “illegal” First Vice President, General Taban Deng Gai, to step down and for a third party force to be deployed in Juba before the “legitimate” First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, can return to Juba. Any other rumoured opinions are irrelevant and against the IGAD resolutions. We dismiss them as rumours or opinions from individual officials, and call on them to abide by the contents of the peace deal and the IGAD resolutions. We thank IGAD leaders for sticking to their resolutions! Having said that, despite the “rumoured irrelevant opinions attributed to some uninformed officials”, it is the prerogative of the leadership and members of the SPLM/SPLA (IO) to decide how best to stop the violations of the August 2015 peace agreement by President Salva Kiir.”