Archive for the ‘Reports’ Category
Government of South Sudan: Official report of the Investigation Committee on the Terrain Hotel incident of 11 July 2016
Note verbale dated 4 November 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to forward the official report of the Investigation Committee on the Terrain Hotel incident of 11 July 2016 (see annex).
The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan kindly seeks your assistance in having the present note verbale and its annex circulated among the members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.
Annex to the note verbale dated 4 November 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
Official report of the Investigation Committee on the Terrain Hotel incident of 11 July 2016
The nature of offences committed at Terrain Hotel against foreign aid workers and other foreign and local residents on 11 July 2016 are a reminder of the terrible consequences of the July fighting. What occurred at Terrain, particularly to the victims of rape, was inexcusable and deserves condemnation. I personally would not have been able to understand the feelings and distress caused to these victims if it were not for my appointment to lead this investigation. Through this investigation I and my colleagues were made to understand the physical and mental pain caused to the victims of this unfortunate incident. The Committee was also aware of the untold suffering caused to other victims of the fighting that occurred from 8 to 11 July 2016. While investigating these serious allegations, the Committee was mindful of its mandate to establish the facts of what took place at Terrain in the afternoon and evening hours of 11 July 2016. The Committee was able to gather enough information regarding the incident, and this enabled it to determine the circumstances and the nature of the offences committed at Terrain by the perpetrators. The Committee’s work was facilitated by the commitment of His Excellency General Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic, who personally directed the Committee to ensure that the investigation was comprehensive, transparent and independent. The President was also throughout clear that the perpetrators of the Terrain incident must take responsibility for their individual and collective acts. The Committee also had challenges associated with the investigation. One of the challenges that confronted the investigation was how to obtain statements from foreigners who were witnesses or victims of the Terrain incident. Many of the foreigners who were victims of the incident had either departed the country, were not traceable or were not willing to speak to the Committee. It was a painstaking exercise for my investigators to trace the victims of rape, given their reluctance to testify because of the confidentiality and stigma associated with the victims of these kind of offences. Having concluded this investigation, it is the Committee’s hope that this report would provide most if not all of the answers pertaining to the Terrain incident. We are, however, mindful that this report is not an end in itself, but a good reference for pursuing further criminal investigation and prosecution against suspects. It is our strong conviction that the findings and recommendations contained in this report would lead to accountability by those linked to the Terrain incident. There is no doubt that the victims of the Terrain incident would only find consolation or comfort if those who perpetrated these terrible crimes were held to account. It was a great honour for me and other members of my Committee to undertake this noble and challenging task. This Committee has tried its level best within the limited period and resources to determine the facts pertaining to the Terrain incident. It is my hope that the findings and recommendations contained in this report would be given the attention they deserve by the leadership and all the relevant institutions.
By Simon Deng Kuol Deng, New York, USA
December 29, 2016 (SSB) — A political party is a group of the individuals who choose one political ideology between several political ideologies such as modern liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etc. as their political party with which they might affiliate with because of programs or policy areas of political ideology. After a group of individuals has affiliated with political ideology to become their political party, then the individuals may either choose to remain with the name of political ideology or give political ideology a different name. If individuals, who are members changed a name of political ideology, then they might still remain to be identified by others or even by themselves with political ideology, which they have affiliated with even though they have given it a different name.
This paper emphasis to analysis modern liberalism and Democratic Party’s public social programs’ policy areas of how its leaders might protect the social security and Medicare, provide health care, stabilize the housing, provide education to everyone, support the military families and veterans, take care of American Disabilities, recognize faith-based organizations, protect the laws of the civil Rights, protect the laws of the voting Rights, protect a women’s right to choose, protect the freedom of individual to marry, ensure the public safety, justice, and crime prevention, promote social innovation and poverty eradication, and protect environment.
Children Of a Lesser God
Report of the investigation into the power politics behind the removal of the Kenyan Force Commander of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by the International Policy Group’s (IPG)
Morphophonemic Reforms in Thuɔŋjäŋ Orthography: An Excerpt from “Thuɔŋjäŋ Cïdmënde”
“Ideas are constructed in specific languages, and if we believe that ideas are important in development, in the determination of relations of wealth, power and values in a society, then … we cannot divorce issues of language and writing from issues of wealth, power and values” and as such, the contemporary African intellectuals “…will grow their roots in African languages and cultures. They will also learn the best they can from all world languages and cultures. They will view themselves as scouts in foreign linguistic territories and guides in their own linguistic space. In other words, they will take whatever is most advanced in those languages and cultures and translate those ideas into their own languages. They will see their role as that of doing for African languages and cultures what all writers and intellectuals of other cultures and histories have done for theirs”, Ngugi wa Thiong’o
By Alëw Majɔg Alëw, Malaysia
Whereas Thuɔŋjäŋ is arguably one of the few written and well researched South Sudanese languages, a host of orthographic challenges remain unresolved. These challenges are rooted in the unmarked phonemes and inaccurate morphophonemic designations that emanated from earlier missionary work in the language. There is a general consensus among a handful of western linguists, who researched into the language, on the approach that any new orthographic reforms, necessary as most of them content, should follow.
Nevertheless, discussions and proposals for reforms have so far focused on mostly the vowel system (representation of tones and length, having had the breathiness aspect already settled by Dhuruai’s umlauted vowels). The morphophonemic anomalies which form part of the reforms proposed in “Thuɔŋjäŋ Cïdmëndë”, a radical proposal for a total revision and revam of Thuɔŋjäŋ orthography and grammar, have not been raised or addressed anywhere in the available literature on the language. This note, an excerpt from “Thuɔŋjäŋ Cïdmënde”, provides a brief explanation and illustration on only the morphophonemic reforms on [b, p], [d, t], [dh, th], [k, g], [u, w] and [i, y] as codas in lone morphemes (or single basic word unit) and for [u, w] and [i, y] as nuclei (or median letters in words).
Credibility of these reforms
For the benefit of readers, I would like to, first and foremost, underline that I am not a linguist nor did I have a conventional training in this field to speak with authority on these proposed reforms. But usually linguists work with native speakers of a language in issues like these. Hence, as a passionate and analytical native speaker, I will attempt to illustrate the logic that necessitates these reforms which I believe are necessary to adopt if we are to retain the authenticity and ease the grammar of the language, Thuɔŋjäŋ. Radical as they may be, I hope they will be understandable and sensible to other native speakers.
Furthermore, the proposal on these reforms is a conclusion of observational and intuitive research work done with many Muɔnyjiëëŋ/Jiëëŋ; those who are literate in other languages as well as Thuɔŋjäŋ and those who are completely illiterate (only monolingual in spoken Thuɔŋjäŋ). While the former group may sometimes have their pronunciations corrupted under the influence of second langauges they are literate in, observations from the latter group remarkably manifest and support the validity of these reforms. It is therefore helpful to refer to this group where further investigations and substantiation are needed.
Another point to underscore is that, unlike dialect-specific spelling and other grammatical issues, these observations cut across all dialects and are in no way dialect constrained (at least as far as I have noted from my discussion with speakers of different dialects).
Peace Leadership Conference’s Paper: Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in Divided Societies Presented by David Mabior Atem Kuir, Canada
John Garang de Mabior, Iowa State University, 1981
Dr John Garang’s PhD Dissertation: Identifying, selecting, and implementing rural development strategies for socio-economic development in the Jonglei Projects Area, Southern Region, Sudan (PDF, 292 pages)
Do Democratic States Produce Peace Between Themselves Without Producing Peace with the Undemocratic States?Posted: October 14, 2016 by PaanLuel Wël in Books, Education, Reports
By Simon Deng Kuol Deng, New York, USA
October 14, 2016 (SSB) — The Democratic peace becomes the most popular theory in the international politics for its proposition that democratic states do not fight interstate wars among themselves as opposes by realist and neorealist theoretical traditions, which define international as an anarchy, where the state can act according to the reason of self-help. The democratic peace theory recognizes only liberal democratic states as the states that do not fight each other; however, the theory does not recognize illiberal democratic states as democratic states, even though, they frequently held the fair and free competitive elections. The democratic peace theory recognizes states as liberal democratic states when they have applied the principles of democracy such as citizen participation in decision-making, system of representation, rule of law, electoral system of majority rule and minority right, equality among the citizens, liberty or freedom granted to or retained by citizens, separation of state and religious, institutional system that ensures checks and balances, free press, etc. into the systems of their institutions. This paper aims at analyzing democratic peace theory’s proposition, which claims that democratic states do not fight the interstate war among themselves, doubts around the proposition of democratic peace theory, and valuation of democratic peace theory and its prospects for peaceful and cooperative relations in the international system.
Dr. Luka Biong and Dr. Jok Madut: Testimonies before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 20th, 2016.
“To a degree nearly unrivaled in Africa, South Sudan has no nationally unifying political figures with credibility or a constituency beyond their own tribe—or in most cases, beyond even a segment of a sub-clan of their tribe,” Kate Knopf at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
“The country was born into too much wealth, resources that fell into the hands of the liberators who had not seen such wealth before and who clearly opted to pay themselves and went on a shopping spree, showing very little willingness or ability to develop programs to lift the country out of its war time miseries,” Dr. Jok Madut Jok at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
“…speech by unscrupulous politicians that casts the international community as an enemy of South Sudan is misleading the soldiers and stirring up anger in the social media. These unprincipled adults need to be rendered powerless,” Dr. Luka Biong at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
“South Sudan is not on the brink of state failure. South Sudan is not in the process of failing. South Sudan has failed, at great cost to its people and with increasingly grave implications for regional security, including the stability of important U.S. partners in the Horn of Africa. South Sudan has ceased to perform even the minimal functions and responsibilities of a sovereign state. The government exercises no monopoly over coercive power, and its ability to deliver public services, provide basic security, and administer justice is virtually nonexistent. While the Kiir regime may claim legal sovereignty, in practice domestic sovereignty is entirely contested and discredited,” Kate Almquist Knopf at the U.S. Senate committee, September 20th, 2016.
Find below the testimonies, PDF
South Sudan has plunged into civil war, economic collapse, and creeping international isolation. The country’s elites have built a kleptocratic regime that controls all sectors of the economy, and have squandered a historic chance for the development of a functional state.
Editor: Of the 75 mafias, The Sentry Investigative Report only succeeded to unmask 6 individuals: Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar, plus four top generals on gov’t side: Paul Malong, James Hoth, Malek Ruben, and Jok Riak. No one else from the SPLM-IO nor any from G-10. Nonetheless, there are some humorous occasions in the report, like when one finds sons of Salva Kiir listing their profession/occupation as “Son of the President” and another Madam listing her occupation as “wife of the governor”. Find out and enroll quickly if and when Juba University is offering those professional studies folks. And then this: “Road construction and vehicle imports are among the greatest sources of budget overruns. In the 2012-2013 budget period, the Ministry of Roads and Bridges overspent its budget by 1513%.” Breaking news: no tarmacked road in South Sudan for the overspent budget.
Deng Bol: THE SENTRY REPORT SUMMARY
1) WHAT THE SENTRY PROMISED US: To disrupt and ultimately dismantle the networks of perpetrators, facilitators, and enablers who fund and profit from South Sudan’s war since 2013.
2) WHAT WE EXPECTED FROM THE SENTRY REPORT: That Mr. X withdrew USD 5 Million from Y Bank operated by the Government of South Sudan to buy War Weapons from Country Z, Paid Mr. X USD 2, Million and that Mr. X stole and deposited the balance of USD 3 Million into Z Bank with account details….
3) WHAT WE READ FROM THE REPORT: That certain individuals own homes they can’t afford, because their salaries are very low, that they are engaged in businesses with foreigners, and that happen to be government and military officials and that their spouses, children and relatives have been living comfortably and bragging about it on Facebook and Instagram.
Click the link and read the PDF document: sentry-report-on-corrupt-in-south-sudan-the-top-corrupt-leaders-of-south-sudan
By Ayuen Ajok, Washington, DC, USA
September 7, 2016 (SSB) — The countries chosen for this analysis were based on country that had economic challenges similar to issues in South Sudan, such as Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Mozambique. The macroeconomic policies that are used in this analysis are drawn from the success of economic policies in Zambia, Mozambique, Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Additionally, a conceptual framework was established for these four countries in order to provide evidence of successful policy intervention implemented by them
It is determined that South Sudan is to address its economic challenges, it would be advisable for it to reform its economy by using interventions similar to the ones followed by the countries mentioned above. This analysis also looks at the role of the government in these countries, with regard to the promotion of economic growth and country development, and in other sectors of the economy. Finally, the paper considers contemporary challenges that derail economic activity in those countries, particularly challenges related to inflation and currencies reforms
John Kerry: There is a legal provision in the peace agreement to replace Riek Machar with Taban Deng Ghai as 1st Vice PresidentPosted: August 23, 2016 by PaanLuel Wël in History, Junub Sudan, Press Release, Reports, Speeches
US Secretary of State, John Kerry: “With respect to Machar, it’s not up to the United States; it’s up to the leaders of South Sudan and the people of South Sudan and the political parties and the political process, and their neighbors, to weigh in on what is best or not best with respect to Machar. But I think it’s quite clear that legally, under the agreement, there is allowance for the replacement in a transition of personnel, and that has been effected with the appointment of a new vice president. And what they decide to do is going to be dependent on them in the context of the implementation of the peace agreement.”
James Gatdet Dak : “The recent Summit in Addis Ababa of the Heads of State and Government of IGAD-Plus, including participation of representatives of the United States, passed a resolution which expects the “illegal” First Vice President, General Taban Deng Gai, to step down and for a third party force to be deployed in Juba before the “legitimate” First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, can return to Juba. Any other rumoured opinions are irrelevant and against the IGAD resolutions. We dismiss them as rumours or opinions from individual officials, and call on them to abide by the contents of the peace deal and the IGAD resolutions. We thank IGAD leaders for sticking to their resolutions! Having said that, despite the “rumoured irrelevant opinions attributed to some uninformed officials”, it is the prerogative of the leadership and members of the SPLM/SPLA (IO) to decide how best to stop the violations of the August 2015 peace agreement by President Salva Kiir.”
International actors are struggling to respond to the evolving situation in South Sudan. Meanwhile, regional actors are busy creating facts on the ground. Commentary by CASIE COPELAND for INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.
First published by International Crisis Group
One year ago, the main warring parties in South Sudan – the government and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) signed a peace agreement designed to end South Sudan’s nearly two-year civil war. The government only signed under concerted pressure from regional and international powers; yet despite Juba’s reservations, the agreement stopped the worst of the fighting.
By mid-2016, peace implementation halted and fighting erupted between the government and rebel forces brought into Juba under a contentious post-agreement security deal. Following the brief fighting, the First Vice President and SPLM/A-IO leader, Dr Riek Machar, left Juba and remained in the bush, waging a limited guerrilla conflict, for over a month. As the international community was focused on the security of Juba and their nationals, the South Sudanese government seized the opportunity and replaced Machar with the SPLM/A-IO’s General Taban Deng Gai as First Vice President.
Last week, the UN Security Council authorised a regional protection force, on the basis of regional endorsement for the force after the clashes in Juba. Despite agreeing in principle to a protection force, the South Sudanese government strenuously objects to the mandate, leaving little option but negotiations to secure consent for deployment. The regional force is to operate under the existing UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which includes more than 13,000 troops and police. The over-focus on a new peacekeeping mandate at the expense of political developments in the country reflects international disunity and a lack of political strategy. International actors are struggling to respond to the evolving situation while regional actors are busy creating facts on the ground. A stronger government, watered down peace agreement, a new regional force under the UN (which has little linkage to peace implementation) and growing regional divisions are some of the outcomes of the last month’s events.
Major African Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Lessons for South Sudanese Government and Civil SocietyPosted: July 8, 2016 by PaanLuel Wël in Education, Featured Articles, Reports
By Malith Jongkuch Kur, London Ontario, Canada
July 8, 2016 (SSB) — The conflict in South Sudan which began in December 2013 has attracted international attention, particularly the regional and continental bodies—the AU and the IGAD nations. In fact, the South Sudanese conflict is not different from other crises that affected and continue to affect the African continent. Therefore, this paper has examined briefly the African transitional justice mechanisms of Rwanda, South Africa, and Sierra Leone to highlight important lessons in those mechanisms, which can possibly help both the government and civil society in South Sudan to work together for a sustainable peace and justice in the country. It offers general observations on the potential difficulties the agreement and the proposed transitional justice mechanism may face before the end of the interim period. The direct involvement of the AU and the IGAD nations in a search for a peaceful solution to the conflict in South Sudan has resulted in the signing of a shaky peace agreement to resolve the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015. Also, agencies related to the work of the United Nations are playing active parts in the process of protecting civilians, investigating human rights abuses, and helping to end the conflict that has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions more. The agreement has provided for the creation of Transitional Government of National Unity, the establishment of Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and National Healing, Compensation and Reparation Authority, and Hybrid Court for South Sudan. Those institutions have been proposed in the agreement to consolidate peace and deal with issues related to justice and accountability for the crimes committed in the course of the conflict.
By Simon Deng Kuol Deng, New Hampshire, USA
April 27, 2016 (SSB) —- Abstract. People who cast their votes or abstain their votes in elections organized by democratic or authoritarian states are defined by the constitutions and laws of their respective states as citizens who have rights and privileges to vote in election. Unlike authoritarian, or some democratic states which have compulsory voting laws where voters can face the penalties when they vote in elections against what the state authorities want or abstain, voters from some democratic states with no compulsory voting laws are voluntarily voted in election or abstained without facing penalties for abstaining. What is a cause of political phenomenon which concern political researchers or scientists to ask “why do some people vote in elections, while other do not vote”? A root cause of political phenomenon in which some voters vote, while others abstain is based on the voters’ greatest expectations and prospects for the public and individuals’ interests to be addressed by the candidates, but it is also depended on voters’ political knowledge and interest in politics, included strengthen in party identification. This paper intends to analysis the eligible voters’ roles in voting or abstaining, what motivate the older voters, voters who interest in politics, and voters who strengthen in party identification as indicate at the following hypothesizes: (1) Older citizens are more likely to vote in elections than younger citizens are; (2) Citizens who interest in politics are more likely to vote in elections than citizens who not interest in politics; and (3) citizens who strengthen in party identification are more likely to vote in elections than citizens who not strengthen in party identification.
Response of the Jieng (Dinka) Padang Community on the Report of HSBA-Small Arms Survey: The Conflict in Upper Nile State (Describing events through 8 March 2016)
“The lives of countless men, women and children depend on the truth” John Pilger
April 17, 2016 (SSB) —– The Padang Jieng (Dinka) Community has received your report of the “Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA)-Small Arms Survey for Sudan and South Sudan, describing events from March 8, 2016” with amazement. In this report, HSBA has dishonestly incriminated Padang community over the violence in the greater Upper Nile region (former States of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei), with specific blackmailing focus on the people and the counties of Akoka, Baliet, Melut, Pigi, Renk, Panrieng and Abiemnhom.
While Padang recognizes the importance of evidence gathering to aid in the process of accountability, we sadly find this report based on a partial narrative of the conflict, engineered by those whose agenda is nothing but an attempt to demonize Padang community and its leaders and settle political score. Above all, the report significantly changes the facts regarding the conflict raging in South Sudan, especially in the former Upper Nile State and has a potential of tilting public opinion against the real victims of the conflict in the state, the Padang community. It further mobilizes the international community against Padang community with the aim of denying them justice, while vindicating the real perpetuators of the war. No doubt the stories, which form the basis of this report were told by Collo sources and this completely biased the objectivity that the report was supposed to uphold as the facts are seriously distorted.
In light of the above, Padang community finds it necessary to respond to the malicious allegations narrated in the HSBA report. This response is not intended to make your report a judicial platform for articulating the root causes and the actors’ roles in the ongoing conflict in the former Upper Nile State, however, because your report sets precedence for consolidating a gravely misleading narrative, with a potential of denying justice to the real victims of the conflict, we wish to highlight to you the actual narrative as follows: