Letter by General Joseph Lagu to Sudanese Community

TO MY FELLOW SUDANESE
WHICH WAY FORWARD?
By Lt. Gen. Mkungu Joseph Lagu (Retd.), Hon. D. Letts.
An Independent Interlocutor

Chairman, Peace Action for Sudan & Africa (PAFSA)
Date: 22 July 2002

Prelude

My fellow Sudanese,

Fraternal greetings from me Joseph Lagu, son of Yakobo Yanga, your compatriot from Moli, section of the Madi tribe. I was born in Momokwe, a hamlet in Moli area and bread in Nimule, southern Sudan. I attended schools at Akot in Dinka Agar area, Bahr el Ghazal Province, Loka in the Pajulu tribe territory, Yei River District, Equatoria Province, and then Rumbek for the secondary school, again in Agarland. Subsequently, I went to military academy at Omdurman in northern Sudan. I speak three of the southern languages: my mother tongue Madi, Dinka and Acholi, besides Arabic and English. I lived, worked and travelled extensively in the Sudan: from Nimule to Wadi Halfa and from Kassala to El Geneina. In this respect I know my country, the Sudan. By conviction, I took up arms to fight for the justifiable cause of South Sudan in an attempt to repel what looked like northern cultural aggression that I detested. When the north indicated acquiescence to halt that type of pressure, again by conviction, I made peace with the then leadership in the north, March 1972. I strove to consolidate that peace by remaining to serve as an officer in the armed forces for six years, quite unprecedented a move in revolutionary struggles. I was thereafter elected President of Southern Region of Sudan. Following that I was appointed Vice-President of the Republic. After the demise of that government, I sought leave to remain in the UK. I was recalled to the Sudan by Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi of an elected government in 1988 and subsequently appointed a roving ambassador. I was confirmed in that assignment by the government that followed. I dropped out of the system voluntarily in August 1998 in order to be able to express my views on the outstanding political issues in the country impartially.

I have served my country in three distinct but interrelated capacities namely: as a soldier, a politician and a diplomat. I have been an officer in the regular army and a guerrilla commander. I experienced both war and peace. Because of my eagerness to share with you my experiences, reflections and vision, I am writing to you this letter — which is my second exposition. I wrote to you the first letter in April 1991, when I was serving as our country’s ambassador to the United Nations. The purpose of this letter is:

a) to explore the way forward by reflecting upon past and current situation in our country,
b) to provoke and promote serious discussion, with a pragmatic view to attain peace and normality in our country,
c) to draw a proposal for an interim political arrangement pending a referendum, currently a popular call amongst southerners, the result of which shall decide the future of the country and status of the south.

Background to the Conflict

Fellow countrymen, time has come to reflect upon the impact of the atrocious civil war which has ravaged our country since 1983. It is time to seek solutions towards the attainment of peace — for it is peace that our people yearn for and desire today — it is what they must have! The people of our country especially southern Sudanese, have known little peace, since the dawn of independence 46 years ago. The principal cause of the civil war in the Sudan has been political disparity between north and south. This imbalance was partly a legacy of the colonial era. As we know, similar struggles have arisen elsewhere in the third world and in the African continent.

When I took up arms to fight against injustice being inflicted upon the people of southern Sudan, it was my conviction then as it is now that all men are equal and should have the freedom and opportunity to fully participate in the political processes and development of their country. The people of southern Sudan have been politically oppressed and marginalised for a long time. Some northern Sudanese political ideologues then and now seek to destroy the African culture and identity of southern Sudanese. They try to do so by imposing the Islamic faith and Arabism on the principally African and Christian people of southern Sudan. Though a political agreement was signed in Addis Ababa, March 1972, giving southern Sudan an autonomous status within a unitary Sudan, it did not take another leader to abrogate it. It was President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri himself who signed the peace agreement with the south that watered the agreement down and eventually abrogated it, June 1983. The apparent steps towards the abrogation of the agreement precipitated the second armed conflict that erupted in May 1983.

I follow with great concern that since then about three million people have lost their lives either in battle, or as a consequence of the war, due to diseases, malnutrition or starvation. Many more live in Diaspora either in neighbouring countries or far afield in Europe, Canada, Australia and America. Thousands who have fled to northern Sudan in search of peace and hospitality found very little of those. Instead they are subjected to continuous harassment, forceful relocation and have no easy access to food or shelter. This is dehumanising. School-age children too, find difficulty to secure education, and if they do, are instructed in Arabic and taught the Islamic faith against their will and the will of their parents, if they are still alive. None of the successive governments stand free of blame from this abuse of power since the eruption of the ongoing conflict in May 1983. It is to be noted that any infrastructure which was established during the relative peace, 1972-1982, has been reduced to rubbles. It is against this background that I ask the question, “My fellow Sudanese, which way forward?”

A challenge to Sudanese

Since the reconciliation between France and Germany, western Europe has become a dynamic power for the world dialogue of peace. It was western Europe that kept the dynamics of hope which finally broke the Marxist stronghold of eastern Europe. There are still problems and social excesses in Europe, but there is also a dynamic quest for an enlightened world where religious and cultural values of Africa and Asia are gaining acceptance and respect.

It is incumbent upon the Sudan government to demonstrate a positive attitude towards peace and reconciliation. This will give the impression of a realistic and forward looking politics. Since independence, our country has experienced many political dynamics. Political parties and military juntas of different political shades and colours have all had the chance to rule or mis-rule the country, without resolving the standing national political problems. It is high time that a system is designed to accommodate all the different political aspirations and expectations expressed by all the different sectors of the Sudanese population. I wish to emphasize that this would be the prerequisite for attainment of sustainable peace and stability in our beloved country.

Positive moves

I noticed some moves, aimed towards softening the situation taken by the government since August 1995 that I considered relevant moves. These were the ministerial changes, the reorganisation of the security organs, the release of political detainees; and the rather relaxed security situation that followed. Subsequently, the relaxation embraced political tolerance that allowed other political view points to be expressed freely inside the country. After the events of the 11th of September the Government of Sudan became more cooperative with the US and the international community. This made potential friends of the country hopeful that the government was preparing the grounds for political dispensation that will advance the cause of internal peace and open the door to national reconciliation. It is my perception that the moves, if advanced, will improve government relationship with the wider world community.

Practical steps

The need for attaining peace with justice cannot be over emphasized. If someone were to ask me a down-to-earth question, what would you Joseph Lagu do in these circumstances, my reply would be:

1. To advise a cease-fire and immediate halt to the fighting. The opposing forces to freeze where they are at the time of announcement of such a cease-fire and peace talks continue as is the case now in Sri-Lanka. The oil companies to suspend operations in the south until peace agreement is concluded.

2. To urge the incumbent administration to renew overtures for peace with the south which offers a link with the north through a single southern authority within the structure of a national government similar to the Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972. That is to be adopted as an interim arrangement.

3. To encourage and broaden open national debate without pre-conditions as this could provide the basis for achievement of comprehensive and sustainable peace.

4. To solicit for declaration of multi-party politics, general amnesty, lifting harzadous measures obstructing other political parties, and registration of the SPLM and political wings of the other remaining opposition groups as legitimate parties.

In my opinion these moves will indicate positive steps towards national reconciliation. It may lead to the evolution of a new political system involving the various shades of political opinions in the country. And, could enable members of the present administration to participate in any future government of national reconciliation, without being victimised. I perceive that the process may result in a new revolution for genuine peace and reconciliation in the pattern of South Africa.

I had always felt welcomed during visits to the Sudan. I wish to register the warmth and attention I received both from the government and the public especially in May and September 1996 and later in May-June 2001. I realised that our people still had confidence in what I have to say, and expect my contribution towards the achievement of peace in our country. I felt most obliged and would therefore wish to do something to meet that trust. In May and September 1996, I had the chance to meet principal political figures. I met the President of the Republic and his then deputies, as well as the then Speaker of the Assembly and deputies. I also met the then Minister for Foreign Affairs and few other Ministers. In addition, I met two of my former colleagues: Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi and Sayed Abel Alier. With the latter two, my main contention was that, it was the duty of the three of us to moderate political temperature. This was by the virtue of our being considered elders at national level. It was clear that they concurred with me. After all, they too would not wish the political situation to deteriorate any further than it already had. Mr. El Mahdi said that his decision to remain in the country, despite constant harassment by the security forces indicated his commitment to non-violent methods as means to resolving political problems. “That is my practical demonstration of goodwill.” He said.

In the May-June 2002 visit I also met the President, the second Vice-President, and the Chairman of the Southern Coordination Council. I was offered the courtecy to be taken to Juba to talk to the people there and also hear from them. In Khartoum I also met the Secretary General of the ruling party, the National Congress. I expressed my views and also heard from him. I met other officials involved in the peace process. During that visit I also met my two colleagues and comrades, Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi and Mr. Abel Alier. We exchanged views and shared experiences as before. The purpose of the visit was to advise a halt to the war while peace talks continue, and strive for a national understanding: south-south dialogue parrallel to north-north dialogue then panSudan dialogue. I believe that is the way to peace in the Sudan.

My visit to New York, January 1996

The significance of the Moral Re-armament’s international work has attracted the attention of intellectuals, as a result of a book entitled, Religion the missing Dimension of Statecraft. The organisation is renamed Initiative for Change (IC). Its Office in New York provides liaison between Initiative for Change, the diplomatic missions as well as the United Nations Secretariat. This book which impressed the Archbishop of Canterbury, who made a specific reference to it in his address in Khartoum and at Al-Azhar University, is the product of a study sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It took the US State Department to task, for its failure to understand the sensitivity and importance of religious culture, which guide nations in the making of national policies. The secularisation of international diplomacy leads to failure, the book argues. It is therefore opportune and quintessential to appreciate the value and the contribution made to human condition by the great religions.

My visit to New York coincided with the Security Council’s decision to support the Ethiopian request for the extradition from Sudan of those allegedly involved in the attempted assassination of President Mubarak. At the same time the Secretary General’s office announced that the amount of humanitarian assistance needed to compensate for the effect of the war in the Sudan was over $100 million for 1996. “Does this not make the need for peace urgent?” I reasoned. Among those I talked to was ambassador Legwaila of Botswana, a member of the Security Council, who was to assume presidency of the Security Council in March 1996. He was of the impression that any peace initiative by government of the Sudan would be welcomed by the UN Security Council. I then inferred from this that a serious peace proposal from the Sudan Government would have a positive impact on how the Security Council would view the extradition question. This prompted me to propose to the government that I be invited to open a dialogue between the government and leadership of the SPLM/A. I indicated that this effort for arbitration could be extended to include northern opposition groups.

In a letter to the President of the Republic, I had this to say: “The decision to impose the Sharia Law in the Sudan was not of your government but that of former President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, in addition, your government did not initiate but inherited the current conflict from preceding regimes. If you share my views, I would suggest that you initiate concrete proposals for peace. My position as a former anya-nya (the guerrilla army preceding SPLA) leader, President of the HEC for the Southern Region, and Vice-President of the Republic, gives me a unique position for the task of mediation at national level. It was a sad day when the Addis Ababa agreement was breached, Mr. President; since then you will agree that our country has known little else, but war and poverty. Is it not time to revisit the principles of the Addis Ababa Agreement? It might be that concessions have to be made by your government to elicit response from the people of southern Sudan to resume a solution modelled on Addis Ababa. I believe this is the only way forward and I strongly commend it to you. I also hold the view that the Sudan should be a federation of two states, equal in status: north and south.

Each state with its institutions empowered to impart educational, religious and cultural development to sustain their respective identities. At this juncture, it is imperative for northern Sudanese to recognise, accept and leave southern Sudanese to practice and develop their own culture. For I believe this is the cardinal point of the continuous unrest between south and north and for the ongoing civil strife, and it must be addressed in any new political or constitutional arrangement”. Sadiq el Mahdi had to go into exile On 10 December 1996 in a surprise move the Ansar leader, Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi escaped from the Sudan. There were reports that he was waited for at a spot specified by a group of friends where he was air-lifted by a helicopter. On 12 December, two days after, the exit was in the world news headlines, the BBC radio world programme and television channels were reporting on the dramatic escape. I watched over the Middle-East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) Arabic service, Mr. El Mahdi being received in an Eritrean country-side by the Secretary-General of the Umma party, Dr. Omar Nur el Daim. No helicopter apparently appeared at the scene of the reception. The departure of Mr. El Mahdi from the Sudan appeared to contrast sharply with the principle which he said he stood for during my visits in May and in September 1996. Whatever its merits or demerits, the defection of Mr. El Mahdi indicated the beginning of a new development that was soon to be. It seemed the opposition NDA alliance waited for Mr. El Mahdi to join them in exile, because the opposition forces hitherto silent, resumed military actions shortly after Mr. El Mahdi joined them. In January 1997, the Sudan Allied Forces (SAF) started some military operations against government positions bordering Eritrea.

On 12 January 1997, Northern Sudan Brigade (NSB), an SPLA regiment in the north, overran the towns of Kurmuk and Geisan along Ethiopia-Sudan border threatening the strategic town of Damazin and nearby Roseires hydro-electric dam. The opposition groups called for a popular uprising. Whilst the government was urging the same population for a popular support to repel what they believed was a foreign backed invasion of the Sudan from north-east. Khartoum announced that the country had been invaded by a force of combined Tigrean armies of Ethiopia and Eritrea. After about a month’s interlude, the SPLA forces were on the offensive again. They launched a series of lightening attacks as from 6 March, this time from the south along the borders with Uganda’s West Nile Province. Similarly Khartoum reported the invasion of the country by neighbouring Uganda. The invading forces overran army posts of Kaya, Morobo, Iwatoka and Limbe (Juba – Yei Kajo Keji road junction). On 13 March, the Arabic Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), interrupted its programme and announced the fall of Yei to the SPLA while Loka and Lainya were under siege.

Those out posts of Yei subsequently fell to the SPLA as well, bringing the SPLA closer to Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The strategy seemed to be to encircle the government forces, exhaust and force them to rebel to join the opposition in toppling the system. Amazing! Unprecedented strange political scenarios were taking place in the Sudan at the time. The opposition forces comprising of SPLA, SAF, NDA have grouped into an alliance on one side: Whilst Riak Machar’s SSIM/A, SPLM/A Bahr el Ghazal group and the incumbents of Khartoum administration on the other. Incredible! It seems strangely in politics, interests or basic need for survival supersedes logic.

Laughable situations

What is more ludicrous is the behaviour of some of the northern leaders when out of power! They don’t seem to indicate any sign of patriotism in such situations.

1. Fieldmarshal President Leader, El Imam Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, who precipitated the eruption of the ongoing conflict tried to suppress the new movement ruthlessly. He used all means he could grab to do so. In his attempts to isolate the south, he sought friendship and cooperation of leaders of the immediate neighbouring states. Subsequently, he commissioned the training at the Sudan Military Academy large numbers of military officers more specifically, for two neighbouring states: Uganda and Tanzania. Certainly, the then Ugandan leader, Dr. Milton Obote, was aware that the services rendered to his country could only amount to a political bribe. He must have been equally aware, that he was expected in return, not to allow southern Sudanese to use Uganda as a sanctuary. Rather, he was expected to turn such fugitives to the Sudanese authorities across the borders, should another conflict erupt in the Sudan. What one could not read at the time were the thoughts in the mind of the Tanzanian leader, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.

In furthering such cynical moves, the Fieldmarshal was jammed in series of clandestine contacts with other leaders, including those of the State of Israel supposedly at war with the Sudan. Consequently, the Imam President, flew to Nairobi, Kenya, and met reportedly, none other than Ariel Sharon. One Israeli leader, the Arabs regard as the most radical and belligerent towards them, of all Israeli leaders. The meeting accounted for took place somewhere outside Nairobi. There, the transportation of the Fallasha Jews from Ethiopia through the Sudan was presumably concluded or advanced. Apart from the financial reward he was alleged to have received from the friendship of the Israelis. A vital guarantee that southern leaders would be turned away by the Israelis should they go to them again to seek military support. Confident of the results of his diplomatic manoeuvres, the former President irritated the political atmosphere, to precipitate the ongoing conflict. On losing power, the Fieldmarshal made advances for an alliance with the SPLA in order to regain power. This is ludicrous. He shamelessly sought the alliance of those he drove into rebellion and wanted to use them to overthrow the government of the day in Khartoum.

What a man? When the country was no longer under his leadership, the government there is bad and must be dislodged, even with the help of mutineers, the Imam perceived. He was alleged to have promised to resolve the southern problem on his return to power. Would he? That alliance nonetheless, failed to materialise! I learnt from the SPLA that the Fieldmarshal declined to meet their modest request, to help with provision of clothes (uniforms) for the guerrillas to prove his seriousness. Thereafter, SPLM/A leadership lost interest and could not trust the Fieldmarshal any longer. Plainly, that has become the case with most southern compatriots. The former President, outwardly behaving as a chameleon; one day a communist, another day an Arab nationalist, or a Pan-African, over displayed the change of colours. He exhibited that by exercising Machiavellian type of politics too much, during the 16 years of his rule. Consequently he lost ground in the country — sad for him, in the south that was for good. One wonders what may be in the mind of the Fieldmarshal/Imam as a new peace agreement seems immenent following the Machakos protocol of 20 July 2002.

2. The Khatmiyya sect leader, the patron of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sayed Mohammed Osman El Mirghani, rushed to the front line in Damazin when the SPLA launched their first penetration into northern Sudan in November 1987. He subsequently championed a call to the Arab world to support the Muslims in the Sudan under the Umma/DUP coalition government, 1986-89. He appealed for support to repel an invasion by ‘alien infidels’ as he termed them, from the south. The same man later became the leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which included those he called ‘alien infidels.’ Is not that ludicrous?

Ironically he thereafter resolutely pleaded with the same Arab world to support the alliance, spearheaded by the SPLA, those he once referred to as alien infidels. He did this in his drive to shatter the ongoing administration in Khartoum.

The Khatmiya leader was outraged as his Egyptian supporters following the progress of the IGAD sponsored peace talks into something realistics ? the Machakos protocol. He didn’t like it. It forced him to come out in his true colours.

3. The Ansar sect leader and President of the Umma Party, Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi, Prime Minister of the Umma/DUP coalition government at the time, declared a state of emergency when the SPLA made the incursion into the north. He tried to push through the assembly a bill that would have legitimised the then existing militias, that included the dreaded murahileen, allegedly raised by him and therefore loyal to him. Those, reportedly, wrecked such havoc on the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal. The same man escaped from Khartoum and found himself safe and sound in the headquarters of the NDA in Asmara. He was received with fervour there on defection from the Sudan. Subsequently he became the chief spokesman of the new opposition front, comprising of former rivals and enemies: the northern political parties grouped as NDA, and their southern counterpart, the SPLM. An unprecedented situation!

However, the Ansar leader didn’t seem to fit comfortably well in the NDA, an organisation chaired by his life long rival. After four years in a relative discomfort he took another serious decision and announced his plan to return to the Sudan to do politics from within. Apparently, he was assured by the government that it was possible for him to lead his opposition party from within. He believed them. The system had announced general amnesty, allowed other political parties to operate within the Sudan and relaxed restrictions of free expressions to attract the opposition groups. The Ansar leader duely returned to Khartoum in May 2000 and had a populous reception by his ansar followers and other curious onlookers, a contrast to the dramatic escape four year earlier. He is the only northern leader that seems to keep pace with the changing world. He welcomed the Machakos protocol as a move to the right direction? Meaningful peace.

4. The National Islamic Front (NIF) leader and founder, mentor and champion of the Islamic system in the Sudan, Dr. Hassan Abdallah Turabi, followed the same trend of action as the above mentioned three leaders, following a split in the NIF due to power struggle between him and the President. He had indicated plans to unseat the President through an act of the assembly.

President Beshir moved decisively and swiftly. He dissolved the National Assembly to render Dr. Turabi toothless. The quarrel led to the split of NIF with the President’s group emerging stronger. The weaker group was progressively isolated and its members were placed under security surveilance. Subsequently, the militant among them including their leader were apprehended and placed behind the bars. The NIF founder, one that strove to bring to power the ongoing administration, turned nowhere else other than to the SPLM/A for alliance. He intucted those still loyal to him to go to meet SPLM/A representatives at an appropriate venue to scheme together to unseat the Beshir government. That is what prompted President Beshir to order his apprehension with some of his friends as mensioned above. Yet this chamelion was quick to denounce the Machakos protocol as a development against the Arabs and Islam, singing the same chorus as the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak.

It isn’t a surprise any more. It has become the culture of the northern leaders as seen from the behaviour of those preceding the last actor, Dr. Hassan Abdallah Turabi. Coincidently, the NIF squabble for power and the split occurred around the same period with the return and populous reception accorded to the Ansar leader. Things did not remain that good in the Umma Party, the political organ of the Ansar movement however. Following his seemingly triumphant return, it has been rumoured that the Ansar leader began to experience acts of insubordination from his cousin, Mubarak el Fadil el Mahdi. The actions of this other Mahdi as it is now clear seems to have caused a schism in Sudan’s largest political party. Whichever way one look at it, it is another set back. Any splits in any of the political groups or parties at this stage is a set back in contrast to mergers, which I consider as positive steps.

In summary however, one doubts if any of the four mentioned characters will ever behave differently should they come to power again in Khartoum. Yet, one’s assumption may be wrong. It remains to be seen. Nevertheless, I doubt if any one of the four personalities will ever exercise political power again in the Sudan. If by miracle that happens, I hope the lucky survivor will benefit from the past mistakes and behave differently, having passed through the hard school of life.

Doubtful endeavours

These political scenarios were not only strange but time proved that they could not be feasible. The position of SSIM/A and SPLM/A Bahr el Ghazal group was that of independence for South Sudan — which must be said was and still is the popular aspiration of the people of South Sudan. It was unlikely that the NIF administration in Khartoum would accede to that, which however they did but tactically. As it turned out, it was only a move to pass time and survive. They prepared to dishonour it. At the time the position of the SPLA leader (Col. John Garang) was not clear. He also maintained a tactical position. The rank and file in the SPLA concurred with that of the other southern political groups, the right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan. It is the stand of SPLM at the IGAD sponsored peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, that started on 17th of June 2002. During the visit of the UN Secretary Genenral to the Sudan this month, the Sudanese Minister of external relations, Sayed Mustafa Osman Ismail declared, “We have all come out of our tactical positions and are now in our true colours, Government and SPLM”. That ends the doubtful endeavours.

Compatriots, the situation in the country requires us citizens to turn to our senses: consult one another, ponder unselfishly, and seek guidance for peace and reconciliation in our country. Also we should appreciate the positions of the two combatant groups who now seem to understand what they are fighting for. Let us aim to construct a political arrangement that will accommodate all sides where victory will be to the Sudanese people as a whole and not to individuals, groups, or communities. I did agree with Mr. Abel Alier in his open letter addressed to the President of the Republic and the then Speaker of the National Assembly. In the letter he maintained that there was then sufficient basis for comprehensive peace talks, which according to him should include all the parties involved in the conflict. He added that concerned citizens who have not taken up arms, must also be involved in the peace process. He pointed out that the material for contention was provided by the following:

1) IGAD Declaration of Principles 1994,
2) Asmara Resolutions 1995 and 1996,
3) The letter of the Concerned Southerners 1995,
4) The Peace Charter, April 1996, signed between the GOS on one side, and SSIM and Associates on the other.

Fellow compatriots, let us stand together to see that an agreement is reached with justice for all. First and foremost, it is the Sudanese to secure that. Other nations and people can only act as catalysts to enable us Sudanese to reach an agreement and attain peace.

Focus on Northerners

I wish to refer at this point to you our northern compatriots. I believe there is still room to find a solution to the north-south conflict within one geographical Sudan. This can possibly be a form of union between south and north as two equal partners. I have consistently pointed out as early as the 1980s that a decentralised southern Sudan should be linked to the north through a single southern authority. This should be integrated into any emerging peace formula.

Perhaps you will want to know that most southern Sudanese resent the paternalistic attitude you demonstrate towards them, more-or-less as Egyptians display towards you. Again, this is a legacy of the colonial era: the grades of human beings was determined by the colour of skin they wore. Those with the white skin (colour of the imperial race) top and down wards as the colour of skin darkens to black (slave race colour) that we in the south wore. Our country was jointly ruled by Britain and Egypt with the latter being a junior partner in the condominium in accordance to the grade of human evaluation at the time. During the time, the Egyptians bowed to the British, and lorded over the Sudanese. And in turn, you bowed to the Egyptians and wanted to lord over us. This is the cause of our conflict with you. Why do you behave towards southerners as the imperialists do towards subject people, if truly you regard southerners as compatriots? You may have to convince them (southerners) that you do accept them as your equals just as they are, and not primitive people under your rule to be civilized. You may have to be content to retain your culture to yourselves. In addition, I advise that you keep your hands off southern matters. I observe that these are the main causes of resentment and hostilities. The south will reciprocate and reconsider its position with the north more favourably, if you take note of these and adjust your conduct accordingly. The outcome could be voluntary assent by the south to remain linked with the north in a form of a union, federation or confederation. I hope you will take my advice and reconsider your attitude towards the south and southerners.

The Interim arrangement

For the interim period, I suggest that we explore political arrangement based on the Addis Ababa Agreement. In which case there should be established two self-governing regions in the Sudan. The northern region comprising of the six provinces of the north, as at the time of independence. It may have Khartoum as its capital. The component part in the union will be the southern region comprising of the three provinces of southern Sudan. This is to have as its capital the town of Juba as was the case following the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement. In my opinion, Kosti is an appropriate location for the new capital of the federation or confederation, in view of its central position.

Sovereignty and the supreme command of the armed forces should be vested in a five-man head of state commission with rotating chair. It should be recalled that this was the system the country adopted at independence in January 1956. This, in my opinion, will be acceptable to the various segments of the Sudanese community as a compromise solution. Whereas, at independence, the commission composed of one southerner and four northerners, this time it has to be fair and proportional. In other words, it should consist of two southerners. This will take into account the in-homogeneity of the south, a region that is inhabited by two distinct categories of peoples: the sedentary peoples of the equatorial crescent and the semi-nomadic pastoral peoples of the riverain plains. These are to be reflected in the commission.

The three seats of the north should be allocated geographically: to the east, north, and west, but not to be apportioned to the political parties as was the case before. That system of allocation did not take into account even distribution of seats to the regions. The federal government or the common authority of the confederation is to be similarly selected and composed. Each of the nine provinces, designated at independence, must be represented at least by one cabinet minister. This is essential, if the federal government is to have a truly national character. It is my vision for a stable and prosperous Sudan, a vision that could bring the warring, ethnic and religious groups in the country together. It will reduce discontentment, fear, marginalisation, or domination. As the regions will be self governing, and political power shared over what remains to be catered for at the centre, no region will be dominating, or marginalised.

Structure and Function of the Regular Forces

Experience has shown elsewhere, and in the Sudan, that the command of an armed force once dominated by a section of the community, can be hazardous to democracy. Such a force will strive to alienate segments of other communities from the centre of political power. This is true because the armed forces have proved to be a massive power base in our part of the world. It is therefore essential that the composition of the armed forces is re-structured and balanced.

The infantry: the basic element of the force should be restructured on the basis of the former Sudan Defence Force (SDF) with its units locally recruited. The system will have administrative advantages. For instance, familiarity with and use of local means of transport will be cheaper for the government. It will reduce the distance to be covered by the soldiers and their families on their way home or back from holidays. It will also reduce the spread of the killer virous (AIDS) as soldiers will remain with their families most of the time within their military districts.

The cadres of the air force, the navy and the other support arms, are to be recruited from all the provinces on a quota basis.

The staff and the rank and file of the external and internal security agencies should be similarly mustered as the above.

The police, the prison wardens and other auxiliary forces should be mobilized and deployed locally. In addition, there should be a federal police force, with limited duties to discharge local as well as national tasks. The federal police should have the task to observe and discharge professional standards within the police force nationwide.

The Forces must be apolitical

It is imperative for the armed forces and the auxiliary forces to adopt an apolitical stance on national issues. The government of the day should desist from using the forces to their advantage vis-à-vis their political opponents.

It appears extraordinary to expect the police and the armed forces to uphold the national constitution and preserve the unity of the country if the population at large does not feel any bond of common citizenship. A constitution that is not drawn up and ratified by a common consensus is likely to be seen as being imposed by a privileged segment of the population on the others hitherto marginalised by the system. Such a constitution does not carry any justice or validity in the eyes of those who feel so marginalised. It is an established fact that anything imposed is looked at with contempt, and therefore subject to rejection. Let us learn from the history of other nations. Great empires have crumbled, albeit attempts to impose their culture and values on others. The use of the armed forces to preserve a standing system can be oppressive. This situation usually arises when political power in a country is not balanced and the composition of the armed forces conforms with the imbalance.

The people of southern Sudan have been for a long time edged off from fair representation in the armed forces. Consequently they have been subjected to political oppression, cultural bondage and military occupation. It resulted in the suppression of their political expressions and aspirations. It is to be recalled that since independence, southerners have consistently and systematically advocated a federal system of government as the most appropriate system that can accommodate the expressions and development of the various cultures of the Sudanese people. Sadly, this has been misconstrued by some northern political ideologues to mean secession.

That category of northerners who have patronising attitudes, like our former colonial masters, regard the south to be their dominion and the people there their subjects. To them, the call for federation amounts to denying them the motive to ascend as masters over southerners. Those political ideologues forget that southerners contributed in the struggle for the independence of the country. Therefore, like any free people elsewhere in the world, they are entitled to their human and political rights. Instead of waging an atrocious war against the people of southern Sudan, the north should realise the irrelevance of the situation and must accept the realities and welcome to resolve national political problems through dialogue. This is the acknowledged norm in the current world situation.

The riverain people of the north, obviously those who stepped into the shoes of the former colonial powers, must accept the other peoples of theSudan as their equals, to participate fully with them in the affairs of the country as equal citizens. Thus aiming to create a situation that is conducive for the development of the nation and for keeping the country united. To act otherwise will result in the alienation of the other peoples, consequently, diminishing the chances of uniting the country.

Challenging the Armed Forces

In the 46 years of Sudan’s national history, the armed forces have been repeatedly challenged in the south, because of their seemingly alien composition. They are seen in their present form as an instrument for advancement of northern culture and domination. It is to be noted that northern culture has been, and is still regarded as alien in the south. These sentiments have become progressively shared by people from other parts of the Sudan, outside the riverain region of the north.

Since the dissolution of the Equatoria Corps (Units of the SDF in southern Sudan before independence), the rank and file units of the armed forces brought from the north, mainly blacks from the marginalised areas and officered by the brown riverain northerners, are viewed by southerners with contempt. They are regarded as mentioned earlier, instruments of oppression. To the southerners, these are occupation forces designed to maintain northern hegemony or colonial rule. Southern youths anticipate the days when they will expel those aliens and liberate their country. This is a factor in the continued civil strife. Contrast this with the relative peace during the regional government, when the anya-nya soldiers were integrated into the national army and deployed predominantly in the south. The situation gave southerners a sense of security and confidence, in which case, they had a measure of control over their lives within their region. Troubles came when an attempt to upset the preponderance of southerners in the southern garrisons was uncovered!

Misuse of the regular forces

Compatriots, take caution! Let us learn from experiences of the past. The armed forces do not always necessarily remain in the barracks to discharge their designated duties. Experience has shown that from time to time they violated the very constitution they were supposed to uphold, preserve and honour. They crossed over into politics, whenever they could, where they clashed with politicians — in short they became an alternate political band rivaling that of the civilians! Typically, they seize power in military coups d’ etate by capturing important military and civil installations in the capital. They depose civilian governments and assume power through the barrel of the gun. It is to be recalled that since independence, the army has seized power three times. Although initially the coups have been bloodless, they became bloody following subsequent counter coup d’etate attempts.

It is to be comprehended that the armed forces are staffed by fellow human beings who have human feelings, fears and ambitions. Some of them join the army to make their living as other people do in other professions. Drawn from a wide cross-section of the population, it may be unrealistic to expect them to have unwavering single dimensional political loyalty. They are not obliged to uphold indefinitely a military ruler. The armed forces dropped General Abboud to whom power was handed supposedly by the then Prime Minister, Abdullah Khalil, after they supported and applauded the General for six years. Following that, the armed forces sided with the mob in an uprising and ended the rule of Fieldmarshal Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, after sustaining and keeping him in power for 16 years. In later years of his rule, they even paid him baya allegiance in accordance to Islamic rites, when he declared himself Imam (Islamic religious and temporal leader) as well. It is to be recalled that the Fieldmarshal seized power, at the rank of Colonel, from an elected civilian Prime Minister, Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub. Obviously, the armed forces can be relied upon for political support for sometime, but not always. As authenticated by the examples above, the armed forces can be a double-edge sword.

Unprecedented political and military alliances

In the mid-1990s, strange and unprecedented political and military developments occurred in the Sudan. Of course they were not genuine, time remained to prove that, not long thereafter. The northern politicians who rigorously advocated military defeat of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), whilst in power, had in opposition become allies of the southern based politico-military movement. Similarly, the yielding to self-determination for the south by the ongoing system which has a programme to islamise and arabise the south and keep it within a united Islamic Sudan was a deceptive move. Amazing! There was ostensibly a surprise move. Unexpectedly, the Islamists were those evidently moving towards an understanding with the supposed extremists’ elements of southern liberation factions! These were: South Sudan Independence Movement, SPLM/A Bahr el Ghazal group, SPLM/A Bor, and the Equatoria Defence Force. The declared aim of those groups is the independence of the south. It was to that effect that the incumbent administration signed a Peace Charter with leadership of those allied factions. Now the same administration wants to jump off from that commitment. Incredible! At the time, the warring factions in the Sudan were grouped into two hostile camps: across racial and cultural divides.

Few would understand this sort of camping or grouping, because the political and cultural differences that divided the people behind them which precipitated the civil war had not been resolved. One presumed that the purpose of government understanding with those allied factions, as opposed to NDA-SPLA alliance was consequence of politics of survival, leave alone the so called tactical consideration. This is affirmed by the saying: In politics, there is no permanent enmity and no permanent friendship, what is permanent is interest.

Certainly, those alliances could only be construed as politics of convenience. Logic and patriotism do not seem to have place in this type of political scenario! The dynamics of politics in the Sudan necessitate the grouping of politicians into two categories: patriots and opportunists. The latter predominate the political culture in the country. More often than not, these opportunists, either in the government or in the opposition movements, change allegiance when power changes from hand to another in the country or movement. These political opportunists lack consistent political direction and often, as indicated above, desert their leaders once they are out of power. Besides, there are disgruntled politicians who resort to, or, instigate military rebellion so as to overthrow the government of the day. Those go underground or filter out of the country to connive against an incumbent administration. Subsequently, they seek alliance with any opposition to an existing system. One example is that the NDA has allied with the SPLA, the very movement, whilst in power, they had contemptuously, with the northern masses behind them, termed mutineers. Conspicuously northerners use the term derogatorily to mean southern freedom fighters or separatists. They have not used the term in reference to the northern opposition elements, not even against those who took arms to fight the government in Khartoum.

It would be unfair, however, to term all Sudanese politicians and soldiers, as opportunists. There are patriots and statesmen among them, those put national interest first. I appeal to that category of Sudanese to objectively address the causes of the atrocious civil war and heed to the aspirations of the southern people. This will promote the cause of peace and political stability in the country. It is time to resolve this conflict congenially in order that the country may attain prosperity, long denied to it. Contemporary Southern Sudanese should be clear in their objectives in the endeavour to change northern hearts and minds. It may be wise that they stick to the political objectives they inherited from their predecessors, which in the first place motivated them to take up arms. On the other side, the present northern leaders should refrain from exploiting ethnic differences and divisions in the south, because southerners are capable of playing the same game these days. Together we should embark on re-constructing a political system that will accommodate the aspirations and needs of all Sudanese.

Inter-regional and intra-regional conflicts

Since independence, the Sudan has not fought wars with other countries. For most of the past four decades, the country has been waging an atrocious war against itself, destroying its people, and material resources. The north-south conflict started at the eve of independence, August 1955. The present civil war erupted on 16 May 1983. Through experience and tenacious efforts, southerners have now acquired military skills which formerly have been northern exclusive possession. When it became clear that the anya-nya officers in Sudan army were gradually being phased out, some of the remaining officers of the former guerrilla army found themselves pressed hard against the wall. That pressure forced them into rebellion to form the SPLA; since then, the subsequent northern regimes failed to exercise restraint, wisdom and statesmanship, to handle the issue. In stead, they responded by greater militarisation of the north and the use of force to subdue the south. This they thought is the most appropriate method to resolve the conflict. Inevitably, the policy plunged the country into a civil war of a greater magnitude never experienced before.

It needs to be mentioned here that further destruction of lives occurred within the south, when the movement split in 1991 into Torit and Nasir factions as they were referred to after the schism. These factions were later renamed, SPLA mainstream and SPLA-United. No sooner were these groups established than there were further inter-factional defections and counter defections. This was followed by fierce, bloody battles between the factions. The divisions were prompted and inspired principally by tribal loyalty. It is noticeable that when southern leaders quarrel, the northerner, their supposed opponent, becomes a distant enemy. They tend to turn their guns on each other more vigorously than when fighting an external aggressor. The enemy who is near becomes a greater threat to survival than the distant one! The result is always disastrous on the common people. As the saying goes, it is the grass that suffers when the big game fight. The inter-factional combat among the various factions of the SPLA has no doubt tarnished the legitimate cause of the southern people, opening a dark, unprecedented chapter in the history of South Sudan. With the capture of Kurmuk and Geisan and raids on Kassala Town, the war had been taken to the north. Notwithstanding, in the north too, the military has been drawn into internal conflicts since the late 1950s by squabbling politicians. The army is made to defend or unseat regimes. During the first series of squabbles, 1959, several brilliant officers, mostly infantry school instructors, were condemned and executed after an abortive attempt to dislodge General Abboud’s regime. Later, at the time of a subsequent military regime, the bloody incident at Wad Nubawi, Omdurman occurred. This was followed by the murder of a prominent spiritual-political leader, Imam el Hadi Abdelrahman el Mahdi, leader of the Ansar Sect. Inconceivable, at the time, those disastrous events could occur among northern Sudanese. The above events were but few examples of disastrous intra-regional, and inter-regional, complex and senseless, political and military squabbles in our country.

Power Struggle

Fellow Sudanese, let us also remember the series of bloody and abortive coup attempts designated to depose the May Regime. Let us reflect on those who fell in defence of the system and those who were killed while fighting to eliminate it! This baseless destruction of human lives is orchestrated by the so-called educated class who form the bulk of the political and military elite. Their endless struggle for control of power, political and national institutions, without prerogative to humanity is irrelevant. It cannot be justified. There is a need, I believe, to review the situation. Is it not timely that we acknowledge that things have not gone well as they should have been and seek guidance about the future? We may all have no peace in our greater days if things continue in this sequence. It is better to act now and put things right before it is too late. Presently, the situation in our country can be rightly summed up as ‘power struggle’ among the intellectual population, which unfortunately has adversely affected the welfare of the common people.

In reviewing the circumstances that have befallen our nation, it is befitting and timely thereunder to reflect upon the verses of a mindful caring British poet, Janet Mace:

The Significance of Peace

For at least 30 years out of 46 years of independence, the Sudan has engaged in a war of self-destruction. For that long, our people have had no experience of real peace or prosperity. Our lives and histories have been littered with monstrous destruction. In this context, therefore, the achievement of peace should have a profound impact on the life of the common person. Inevitably, it will also have impact upon the lives of political and military elite, who have themselves been born or bread into the culture of war. The attainment of peace will also be a tribute to the many mothers and wives left aggrieved by the loss of their sons or husbands, due to the war. For the Sudanese, peace will have two dimensions:

1. Intra-ethnic conciliation among warring tribes,
2. Inter-regional political conflict resolution between north and south.

It is to be hoped that national political processes will develop thereafter. Along side that will be the realisation that in a democracy, differences of political opinion, parties, or otherwise, are tolerable and legitimate. A realisation that will then not provoke the desire to physically terminate the existence of opponents. New dimension will then be nurtured by personal acquaintances and appreciation of one another’s views, on which to build so that true democracy may become the accepted norm. As the third millennium progresses, the global political climate will be that of tolerance and co-existence. The trend will be to share political power and national wealth or material resources. To secure such a comprehensive peace, concerted commitment by all Sudanese is obligatory.. This will require the restructuring of the entire political system based on multi-party democracy and federalism as well as restructuring of the armed and auxiliary forces to be compatible with the system. Most important is the right of the regions to develop their educational and cultural institutions to meet the aspirations of their respective peoples. In my mind, this will provide the check and balances, the different nationalities and religions need to feel secure within the national political structures and processes. It is only then that the Sudan will be at peace with itself.

It is never too late to avert the country from total anarchy and disintegration. It is never too late either to avoid the magnitude of savagery and disoderly dismemberment of the country as had occurred to former Yugoslavia, or dissection with parts coming under the rules of antagonistic war lords as for the case of Somalia. Let us save our country from falling into that situation. This is my wish and dream, to that end, I direct my prayers, my peace anthem:

Lord send blessings to Sudan,
Renew goodness in our land,
Lord, hurry our salvation: draw our peoples towards You,
Let them worship You.
And, in peace inhabit the Sudan;
God bless our Nation.

RECOMMENDATION

Therefore I recommend:

1. The halting of the war, cessation of all hostilities by all combat groups and freezing of all combatants where they are at the time of such announcement while peace talks continue as is the case now in Sri-Lanka..
2. Halting of oil exploitation pending restoration of normalcy in the region.
3. The recognition and registration of SPLM and other political wings of the liberation movement as legitimate political parties as adopted in post-apartheid South Africa.
4. The holding of general elections in the south and in the north separately and simultaneously.
5. The institution as an interim arrangement of two regional assemblies: to be based in Omdurman and Juba for the north and south respectively.
6. The institution of an interim national assembly by joint sittings of the interim regional assemblies.
7. The election by the interim national assembly of a supreme commission that will exercise the powers of the head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
8. The institution by the respective regional assemblies their respective executive councils to be based in Khartoum and Juba respectively.
9. The interim national assembly to elect a federal prime minister who will appoint federal ministers on directives set by the interim national assembly.
10. The supreme commission and federal government may temporarily function from Khartoum and Juba alternatively until their premises are constructed in the new capital to be Kosti.

Signed

Joseph Lagu
Lt. Gen. (Rtd.)
Former 2nd Vice-President of Sudan