SPLM Strategic Framework for war-to-Peace Transition (2004)…SPLM’s Vision for the Post-war Era

SPLM Strategic Framework for war-to-Peace Transition by the SPLM Economic Commission

New Site, Kapoeta County: April 2004; (Revised August  2004 after the Naivasha Protocols)

Foreword

This document marks the end of the last phase of our armed struggle and the beginning of a new era of Peace through Development in our long quest for New Sudan of freedom, liberty, human rights, equality and social harmony among our people. When we took up arms 21 years ago, our aim was to establish a New Sudan in which all the Sudanese participate equally in its governance irrespective of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, socio-economic status or political affiliation. The armed struggle of two decades long has now created an enabling environment (policy, institutional and technical), in the form of the comprehensive peace agreement, for articulating the key elements of the SPLM strategic framework for war-to-peace transition that would in turn create the necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving our vision of the New Sudan. Indeed, the peace agreement provides us with both challenges and opportunities to translate the SPLM vision of New Sudan into practice.  The peace agreement also provides a unique Sudanese model for resolving the problem of armed conflict in other parts of the country, such as the ones now raging in Darfur and Eastern Sudan.

The Interim Period constitutes an important point of departure for the SPLM to initiate a process of institutional building and reform with the overall objective of establishing institutions of good governance in a one country two systems Sudan. The SPLM leadership will ensure that this process of institutional building and reform must be inclusive, so as to   safeguard legitimate concerns and aspirations of all the stakeholders in the political stability and socio-economic development of our country. As illustrated by the Venn Diagrams presented in Chart 2, the peace agreement enables us to move from the status quo of the present Islamic Arab state (Model 3) to the Interim Model 2 of Two Systems One Country, which could end in two possible final outcomes: (a) a Transformed Democratic New Sudan of Model 1, or (b) Total Independence of Model 5.  Hence, this strategic framework is an attempt to set the rules of the game for all the stakeholders – Sudanese and non-Sudanese – to actively participate in the process of war-to-peace transition and in the management of the Interim Period. In formulating this framework, we are aware of the enormous challenges of managing a transition. But, these are also opportunities that would enable us to meet these challenges if we continue with the resolve and determination of the last two decades.

I take this opportunity to thank all those who have contributed in the preparation of this strategic framework, which will guide us to leap-frog into the 21st Century global economy. I would like to acknowledge the contribution of the SPLM Economic Commission under the able stewardship of Cdr. Kuol Manyang Juuk. Finally, I would like to thank the Government of the United States of America and the Royal Government of Norway in providing financial support to the SPLM Core Team that conducted seminars and workshops at New Site, Kapoeta County, during the period from December 2003 to April 2004; a support that has facilitated the formulation of this document.

John Garang de Mabior

Chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA

New Site, Kapeota County, New Sudan

July 2004

1. I.     Background   

The third quarter of 2003 witnessed increased efforts, among the Sudanese peace negotiators and international mediators, for a comprehensive settlement of Sudan’s crisis of state and identity. This in turn led the SPLM leadership to realize that once a just and comprehensive peace agreement is reached, its administration will face enormous challenges of institutional building or transformation of existing ones. It will also be faced with the gigantic tasks of repatriation (more than 3 million IDPs and refuges), reconciliation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction (5Rs) of war-torn communities. This is because war-torn communities would normally have high expectations for quick delivery of basic public services: administration of justice, security, education, health (including HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention), water and sanitation, social cohesion, and food security/livelihood.

Moreover, the SPLM leadership has recognized that managing rising expectations would undoubtedly require urgent actions to enhance the ability of its various organs to manage the war-to-peace transition by gradually moving from a guerilla institutional environment to formal institutional arrangements for democratic governance. In addition to the above challenges, lessons learnt elsewhere (e.g. Afghanistan, East Timor, Mozambique, Eritrea, Rwanda, etc.) do indicate that post-conflict rehabilitation would typically involve multi-stakeholders (local, national and donors) with varied policy agendas, interests, work-habits and so forth. But, these multi-stakeholders do not have a common vision/understanding of how some of the basic issues and priorities of the 5Rs relate to each other and therefore require synergy. There is also urgency for a harmonious coordination of efforts aimed at the simultaneous demands of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, development and security conditions.

This framework document, therefore, outlines some of the urgent actions for addressing the challenges and opportunities of war-to-peace transition. It is one of the outputs produced by the SPLM Core Team that was assembled at New Site, Kapeota County in Equatoria Region during the period December 2003 – April 2004. The SPLM Core Team of over 100 persons drawn from the various Secretariats has been tasked with the formulation of strategies and programs for the war-to-peace transition. The rest of the document is organized as follows: section two outlines how the transition process is being managed; section three provides the vision of the Interim Period; the key elements of the strategic framework are highlighted in section four; while section five presents concluding remarks.  Some photographs of the June/July SPLM Leadership peace tour of the New Sudan are included to capture the spirit of peace and to show how the Peace Agreement was popularly received by all the communities of New Sudan.

1. II.     Managing the Transition Process

Sustainability of a comprehensive peace agreement will essentially depend on the ability of the SPLM to manage the war-to-peace transition. This ability will depend on three critical factors: (i) construction of a civil administration complex that will act as a transition headquarters for the SPLM leadership from which it can manage the various elements of the transition process; (ii) highly motivated transition teams that can provide effective assistance to the leadership; and (iii) a robust mechanism for the effective and efficient coordination of the transition teams.  Hence, the Economic Commission of the SPLM was tasked to find ways and means for addressing these three factors. The Economic Commission was able to secure funding from the governments of Norway and United States of America, which in turn led to the setting up of a “Tent City” near WODRANS School at New Site, Kapoeta County in Equatoria Region. The “Tent City” became a temporary civil administration complex from which the SPLM Core Team began its work in December 2003.

The SPLM Leadership has decided that the Civil Administration Complex will be centrally located at Ram-Chiel where the three Regions of Southern Sudan meet.  This should not be confused with the issue of the Capital Southern Sudan.  The Capital of Southern Sudan will initially be in Juba, which shall be the seat of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).  Any change in the Capital, should it be deemed necessary, shall be a decision by the GOSS.  Ram-chiel on the other hand shall be where the SPLM/A will organize itself for governance pending movement to Juba, which shall be preceded by GOS military evacuation of Juba.  Ram-Chiel is where the SPLA will be disaggregated with some remaining in the ‘mother’ SPLA, others stransferred to the JIUs and others shifted to the Police, Prisons, Firefighters, Wildlife, the National Reserved, civil service and civil society institutions and DDR in general.

Once financial resources were secured, the task was to tackle the third factor – establishing a robust coordination mechanism. In this regard, the Chairman of the SPLM, after wide consultation with the various segments of the Movement during the third quarter of 2003, instructed the Economic Commission to begin preparations for war-to-peace transition (see chart 1 below). The Chairman in his instructions stressed the need to transform the SPLM structures into institutions of participatory governance so that they can begin to:

(a)   Perform basic functions of a government;

(b)  Build up civil administration;

(c)   Prioritize and build up physical transport infrastructure

(d)  Develop strategies for receiving returnees, reconciling communities, reintegrating, reinserting and resettling them;

(e)   Formulate policies and guidelines for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan; and

(f)   Encourage Southern Sudanese citizens to effectively participate in the institutions of the future governments – Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and Government of National Unity (GONU) during the Interim Period.

(g)   Encourage the citizens of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States and Abyei District to effectively participate in the institutions of the future governments of these three areas as stipulated in the Naivasha Protocols.

Requirements of the transition process should be seen in the context of the prevailing institutional environment in the SPLM administered areas of Sudan. For instance, the current institutional arrangement centers on the SPLM-Leadership Council (LC), which has a tripartite function. That is, the SPLM-LC acts as a: (i) political bureau (politbureau) of the SPLM; (ii) legislature, i.e. performing the urgent functions of the National Liberation Council (NLC) when it is not in session; and (iii) executive through five Commissions and associated Secretariats. The objective conditions of the conflict environment necessitated the development of such institutional arrangements, which were the outcome of the institutions of the liberation struggle. With greater prospects for a comprehensive settlement, the SPLM leadership has decided to initiate now the process of war-to-peace transition, so that it would be able to perform at the very basic level, essential tasks of government.

In light of the preceding paragraph the SPLM Transition Chart, presented below, depicts how the process of war-to-peace transition will be managed, so that essential tasks of government are performed at the various levels of governance. In this regard, the SPLM leadership has established nine (9) transition teams (TTs), which are categorized into three clusters. The first Cluster will be chaired by a senior member of the SPLM-LC and membership of four other members of the Leadership Council, and it consists of Transition Teams 1 and 2 corresponding to the SPLM Political Affairs and Civil Society Commissions, respectively. The primary task of this cluster is to assist the SPLM-LC to restructure and transform the SPLM from a guerilla movement to a political organization that is ready to effectively participate in an environment of democratic pluralism in the post-conflict Sudan. This would be done through political and social transformation by the Political Affairs Commission and community empowerment and social inclusion by the Civil Society Commission. For instance, political and civic education, reconciliation and south-south dialogue will be among the duties of this cluster. At the end of the pre-interim period (or the beginning of the Interim Period of six years) the SPLM-LC will only act as a polibureau for the SPLM as a political organization.

The second Cluster will be chaired by a senior member of the SPLM-LC and membership of ten other members of the Leadership Council, and it consists of five Transition Teams: 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9.  These five teams are to assist the SPLM leadership in five broad areas of activities: (i) the transformation of the present SPLM-CANS structures of guerilla movement into the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and State Governments of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile and the autonomous Abyei Executive Council (AEC) of the Ngok Dinka; (ii) the prioritization and building up of physical transport infrastructure, (iii) organizing and transforming the current SPLM law enforcement agencies into those of the emerging GOSS and Governments of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States and Abyei Area; (iv) mobilization of human and financial resources and planning and budgeting for post-conflict economic recovery and re-construction; (v) the formulation of policies and monitoring of implementation of policy decisions and focal point for the international community and donor funding.  Each of these five areas of activities will be headed by an SPLM Leadership Council member under the overall supervision of the Cluster 2 Chairman.

The third Cluster will be chaired by a senior member of the SPLM-LC and membership of four other members of the Leadership council and it consists of two Transition Teams: 5 and 8.  Team 8 is for organizing the office of the SPLM Chairman and transforming it into the office of the President of the GOSS (eventually in Juba) and office of the 1st Vice President of the Republic (eventually in Khartoum) and how these two offices shall be coordinated. Team 5 is for organizing the military elements referred to in the Security Arrangements Agreement of September 2003. The task of Team 5 will focus encampment and screening of SPLA forces as to those who will remain in the SPLA standing armed forces, those who will go into the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), those who will go into the Police, Prisons, Firefighters and Wildlife services and those who will undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) into civil service.

It will be recalled that previous attempts by the SPLM to establish its central institutions of governance that work in coordination with one another and in one place did not yield the desired results. This has mainly been due to the environment of conflict and war as well as to lack of financial resources. Moreover, lessons of experience from post-conflict situations indicate that one of the critical instruments for managing the transition process is to put in place a robust mechanism for the coordination of donor community activities, so as to ensure national ownership of the transition process. It was in this context that the SPLM leadership established an Inter-departmental Strategic Coordination Team (ISCOORT).  Decision making and coordination within the SPLM-LC is further streamlined by putting each of the above three clusters of Transition Teams under one SPLM-LC Cluster and thereby enabling all members of the Leadership Council to participate in the practical operations of the transition process and at the same time in decision making.

The ISCOORT is under the direct supervision of the SPLM Chairman (i.e. Office of the Chairman, see the above SPLM Transition Diagram) with the Chairman giving guidance on the vision and policies of the SPLM.  ISCOORT is a coordinating mechanism for the nine transition teams as well as serving as Secretariat for the SPLM Leadership Council in the transition process and focal point for the international community, donor funding and international investments.  It consists of three groups/segments: (i) a policy group comprising of a chairman and four members of the SPLM-LC, who shall include Secretaries of the three SPLM-LC Clusters; (ii) expert/technical group representing the nine transition teams; and (iii) a six-person secretariat of which three are to be based in Nairobi, as an SPLM liaison Secretariat for the SPLM Core Operating Team of the SPLM Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). The Secretariat of the SPLM-JAM Core Operating Team  is under the SPLM-JAM National Coordinating Team, which gets its policy guidelines from the Leadership level of the SPLM Sudan Joint Assessment Mission.

1. Understanding the One Country Two-System Model in the Context of the SPLM Vision of New Sudan

The point of departure for members of SPLM-JAM leadership level, ISCOORT, the SPLM-JAM National Coordination Team and the SPLM-JAM Core Operating Team is the internalization of the SPLM vision of New Sudan. This is to enable the Core Team to have a common understanding of the vision and subsequent steps for operationalizing it as conceptualized by the SPLM. This was one of the aims of the SPLM-JAM retreat held at New Site from August 3 to 9th 2004, to internalize the vision of the SPLM as it relates to the JAM process.  Such an understanding is critical to the work of the Core Team, since the vision has been arrived at after the correct identification of the central problem of Sudan; a problem that the peace agreement and the JAM process address. This problem is stated in the 1998 SPLM Vision, Program and Constitution as follows: “The central problem of the Sudan, therefore, is that the post 1956 Sudanese state is essentially an artificial state, based on a political system and institutional framework of ethnic and religious chauvinism, and after 1989 on Islamic Fundamentalism. It is a state that excludes the vast majority of its citizens”. Chart 1: SPLM TRANSITION DIAGRAM

The correct diagnosis of the central problem of Sudan has, in turn, enabled the SPLM to conceptualize a vision of the New Sudan as the most appropriate solution to the crisis of state and identity and the crisis in the politics, development and administration of the country. That is, our vision is a New Sudan in which all its citizens fully participate in the management of the country’s affairs at all levels without discrimination on grounds of gender, race, region, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, or language.   

Our mission then is to bring about fundamental and democratic transformation of the Sudan by restructuring power on a new basis that allows for the establishment of good governance where, according to UNDP (1994), the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of the country’s affairs at all levels is people-based, so that individuals and groups have an effective say in the allocation and management of resources and in decisions that affect their lives. This, however, requires a phased approach in which the transformation of the country is done through peaceful means (e.g. referendum) instead of brutal violence. Hence, the interim arrangement of one country two-system model (see model 2 of Chart 2 below) is the backbone of this strategic framework, since it provides a golden opportunity for all the stakeholders in the Sudan to effectively participate in the determination of its destiny, by either transforming the Interim “one country two systems” of Model 2 to the New Sudan of Model 1 during the six year interim period, or, failing that opting for Total Independence of Model 5 in the referendum on self-determination at the end of the interim period.

The SPLM in its search for an optimal solution to the central problem of Sudan has produced five possible outcomes of which only two (i.e. Models 1 and 5 of Chart 2 below) would lead to a viable and final settlement of the Sudanese conflict.  The desired solution from the SPLM perspective is Model 1, which is consistent with the vision of New Sudan of liberty, freedom and respect of basic human rights.  However, if the pre-conditions for achieving Model 1 – a transformed democratic New Sudan – are not met, then Model 5 (i.e. Total Independence Model) would be the logical outcome for ending the conflict. The viability of any of the two models (i.e. Model 1 and 5) would be a function of the quality of governance in the Sudan at all levels during the Interim Period.

The challenge then is how to arrive at the desired Model 1 from Model 3, which is the current situation or the old Sudan premised on two principles – Arabism and Islamic fundamentalism – that are among the underlying causes of the Sudanese crisis of state and identity. These two factors (Arabism and Islamism in governance) make Model 3 unsustainable as evidenced by 38 years of conflict out of 48 years of Sudan’s political independence on January 1, 1956. Similarly Model 4, which is hypothetical, would be unsustainable if it were to be premised on Africanism to the exclusion of the Arab element. As articulated by Francis Deng, Models 3 and 4 are mutually unacceptable:

“The war in Sudan is over the very soul of the country. Powerful factions in the north, spearheaded by the NIF [National Islamic Front], believe that Sudan is an Arab, Muslim country and that anyone who wants to be part of it must either adopt this identity or consent to being grossly marginalized. Southern Sudanese, most of whom adhere to traditional religious beliefs, and the modern elite of which is primarily Christian, believe that Sudan is African, syncretic, and pluralistic. These are mutually exclusive realities, mutually unacceptable models as they constitute the basis for a genocidal war, even if there is no widespread intent to physically eliminate the other group. Whether they can be reconciled within the framework of unity, or the country split into two independent states, is the critical question confronting the Sudanese.” 

Hence, the SPLM contribution to the resolution of the Sudanese conflict is to negotiate with the NIF government a just and comprehensive peace agreement that gives an opportunity for the two extremist positions (Models 3 & 4) to be excluded and reconciled within the framework of a united New Sudan.  That is, the most appropriate route to either Model 1 orModel 5 is through Model 2 in the form of the interim period of six years.  Of course one can go directly to Model 1 through a revolution, taking over Khartoum for example and declaring the New Sudan and forming a government of the New Sudan, but this has not be possible.  Similarly one can directly move to Model 5 by taking over Juba, Malakal, Wau and the oil fields and declaring an independent Southern Sudan, but this also has not been possible during Anyanya-1 or now.  One can also choose to maintain Model 3 by force as has been the case since independence in 1956, but this is no longer possible because it has been fiercely and successfully resisted by the  SPLM/A and previous liberation movements in both the South and North.  Because of these objective realities the parties to the conflict opted for a peaceful and negotiated political settlement which led to the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) to solve the Sudan conflict and to the Machakos Protocol.

The Machakos Protocol of 20thJuly 2002 calls for a one-country two-system model of governing Sudan during the interim period.  This is a mechanism for ending the war as well as a strategy for addressing and establishing the preconditions for achieving the vision of New Sudan. For example, the Security Arrangements Framework Agreement calls for the establishment of two Armed Forces, the SPLM Armed Forces (SPLA), and the present National Congress-based Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from which Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) shall be formed consisting of equal numbers from SPLA and SAF. A new military doctrinewill be introduced to train the JIUs as the nucleus of the future army of Sudan (Model 1) should the referendum on self-determination confirm unity; otherwise the JIUs would be dissolved into their respective ‘mother’ Armed Forces. The new military doctrine will also be used in training the two Armed Forces (SPLA and SAF).  However, if we fail to meet the preconditions of unity on a new basis during the interim period, then Sudan is likely to break up into at least two independent states (Model 5), and with the current situation in Darfur and the Eastern there may be no Sudan . 

The choice in the referendum on the right of self-determination will be between: (a) Unity under Model 2, i.e., continuation of the one country two systems arrangements, or (b) the total independence of Model 5.  In terms of Chart 2, the choice of total independence means that the shaded area, commonalities or Government of National Unity (GONU) shrinks and disappears with the result that we end up with at least two independent states (Model 5).  If on the other hand the vote is in favor of unity, this means maintaining Model 2 and then expanding the shaded area of Model 2 over time until the full shaded circle of Model 1 is achieved, i.e., until the full New Sudan is achieved. These are the challenges and opportunities the peace agreement brings.

IV.       Key Elements of the Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition

This framework is guided by the SPLM three strategic policy objectives of poverty eradication, sustainable economic growth with agriculture fueled by oil money as the engine of growth, leading eventually to industrialization in a wider Pan-African context, and integration into the global economy.  Two of these – poverty eradication and sustainable economic growth – were first identified in the SPLM document: “Peace Through Development”, published in 2000. Moreover, the framework is formulated in light of lessons of experience in post-conflict countries and the experience of economic development in general. For instance, in reviewing lessons of experience from the post-conflict literature (e.g. from Afghanistan, East Timor, Kosovo, Mozambique, Eritrea, Rwanda, etc.), we have found that civil wars do more often than not[1]:

• Devastate institutional infrastructure by inducing the best human capacities to seek refuge abroad (if they are not killed) or to be used in the destruction of existing assets, including knowledge, acquired before the on-set of conflict;
• Destroy physical infrastructure;
• Diminish fiscal resources and damage financial management systems;
• Weaken networks of civic engagement;
• Reduce service delivery capacities; and
• Usually inhibit the functioning of governance structures, especially democratically accountable mechanisms at all levels.

Reversing the damage caused by a more than two decades long conflict in the Sudan would undoubtedly be a daunting task. In the case of New Sudan the situation is further compounded by the fact that there was hardly any development before the war, for example, there has never been a tarmac road in Southern Sudan since creation for an area the size of Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi put together.  When we use the term reconstruction we therefore really mean construction.  It is in this context that the SPLM Core Team identified seven general, but strategic actions that would need to be taken in preparation of the post-conflict recovery and reconstruction program. That is, these actions constitute specification of the key elements of our strategic framework for war-to-peace transition.  They are:

a)     Developing Institutional Infrastructure for better governance;

b)    Developing Physical Infrastructure;

c)     Regenerating Social Capital;

d)    Restoring Peace and Harmony;

e)     Prioritizing Agriculture as the Engine of Economic Growth and Poverty Eradication;

f)     Transforming the SPLM from a wartime guerrilla organization to a peace time political organization in an environment of democracy and political pluralism; and

g)     Transforming the SPLA from an insurgency-based guerrilla army into a conventional Armed Forces that shall be a component of Sudan’s National Armed Forces as stipulated in the Security Arrangements Agreement, and contributing SPLA’s share to the Joint Integrated Units.

Articulation of the above stated elements will be carried out during the pre-interim period with possible assistance from the international development community. These seven strategic action programmes of the SPLM strategic framework are the basis for the three clusters of the SPLM Leadership Council.  Four programmes (a, b, d and e) are under Cluster 2, while programme (f) is under Cluster 1 and programme (g) under Cluster 3.  These seven strategic action programmes are of course cross-cutting and none of them can succeed without the others.  Restoring peace and harmony, for example, is equally the responsibility of all the three SPLM-LC clusters.  The SPLM strategic framework will also provide guidance to the SPLM Joint Assessment Mission at all its three levels of the National Leadership, Coordinating Team and Core Operating Team (JAM).  A brief outline of each element of the strategic framework is, however, provided below. These brief outlines are in turn intended to guide in the formulation of a long-term program for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Such a program will have to consist of near-, medium- and long-term programs that are consistent with the interim period.

A.        Developing Institutional Infrastructure for Better Governance

Realization of the other six elements – developing physical infrastructure, regenerating social capital, restoring peace and harmony, prioritizing agriculture, transforming the SPLM and SPLA – depends on the establishment and development of institutional infrastructure for better governance. But what is meant by institutional infrastructure? As was the case with the vision, members of the SPLM Core Team first established a common understanding among themselves about the concept of institutional infrastructure, which encompasses human and organizational capacities. Institutions in this document are to be understood, as defined by John R. Commons, to mean the “working rules of collective action in restraint, liberation, and expansion of individual action” (1990:73). Moreover, Vernon Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami (1984) define institutions as “rules and conventions of society that facilitate coordination among people regarding their behavior”[2]. The World Bank also defines institutions as “rules, enforcement mechanisms, and organizations” (2002:6).

With this understanding of what is meant by institutions, it is imperative that establishing and revitalizing institutional infrastructure is one of the key strategic actions of this framework. Moreover, our understanding of institutions as the working rules of collective action implies that even though structures of governance before the on-set of conflict have effectively collapsed, and this is inevitable in most revolutions, it is nevertheless important to know that new ones have emerged during the process of the liberation struggle. We have, for instance, established, since 1994, guerrilla-based institutions of governance (e.g. liberation councils at all levels of government) as illustrated by the SPLM institutional arrangement presented in table 1 below. However, the liberation councils would urgently need to be transformed, so as to effectively face the new challenges. This would call for their capacities to be enhanced if they were to be prepared for the war-to-peace transition, so that they become effective grassroots organs of power in the hands of people.

New Sudan/Southern Sudan is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society and to the extent of John R. Commons’ definition of institutions as working rules of collective action, the institutions of Southern Sudan/New Sudan would be a summation of the positive elements of social values, traditions and beliefs of all its peoples. That is, institutions of Southern Sudan/New Sudan must be a reflection of the country’s diversity. This would require two things to be done by the SPLM. The first concerns the identification of positive elements of all the cultures of the various groups of New Sudan/Southern Sudan. The second task would be to amalgamate these positive elements of varied cultures and integrate them into rules and conventions of New Sudan/Southern Sudan society that would enhance coordination among the people of New Sudan/Southern Sudanese people regarding their behavior. The task of harmonization and integration of working rules of collective action of all the various ethnic, cultural and professional groups would constitute a central challenge in the process of institutional development that has been initiated by the SPLM.  

From the perspectives of the SPLM, the central problem of Sudan would be tackled through a comprehensive development strategy that is based on a system of participatory democracy and robust institutions of governance.  Moreover, participatory democracy and good governance rely on the establishment of a broad-based civil authority, such as the Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS), transformed into the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and Governments of Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei, which derive their legitimacy from People’s Liberation Congresses and Councils at the Boma, Payam, County, Regional, and National levels.  However, a comprehensive strategy and an effective civil authority presuppose an enabling institutional environment, which would, among other things, ensure a sustained culture of peace within and among the various communities of the country.

The urgent task before the SPLM-LC with respect to this element is how to reform the SPLM institutions of resistance to those of participatory governance, so that they are responsive to the challenges of peace and re-building in the post-conflict environment. The institutional arrangement shown above together with the proposed system of administration of justice (i.e. judiciary and associated rule of law enforcement agencies/organs) would demand the establishment of an efficient cabinet supported by a robust public service with competent technical skills[4]. In this regard, capacity development and /or enhancement would be required at all levels of government.

At the cabinet (executive) level, capacity would be enhanced to:

• Make decisions;
• Transform strategies, policies and institutions of resistance to those of participatory governance;
• Establish transparent budget and procurement systems with clear procedures;
• Provide leadership;
• Formulate policies; and
•  Take responsibility within a collegial public policy-making environment.

At the technical level, capacity would be developed to:

• Formulate strategies based on policies formulated by the cabinet;
• Design programs/projects;
• Implement policy directives, projects/programs that have been approved for implementation;
• Provide quality support/services to the policy-makers;
• Monitor and evaluate programs, projects and policies;  
• Prepare administrative budget for each government institution and level of government; 
• Plan and develop for key deliverables and initiate development budget in each of the following areas a) physical infrastructure, b) provision of basic services, c) economic revitalization, and IDP reintegration;
• Manage budgets and financial resources, follow procurement procedures;
• Respect human rights and ensure administration of justice; and
• Mobilize full complement of civil service staff.

The SPLM leadership is aware of the critical role of institutions in economic development and has therefore approached the international donor community to support our efforts in formulating a long-term program for institutional reform and capacity development (IRCD). The response of the international donor community has been positive in that a multi-donor Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF) has been established with UNICEF as its custodian. The CBTF would, inter alia, enable the SPLM to address in the near term the absorptive capacity problematic that is often a major constraint for post-conflict economies. Hence, the CBTF will support, among other things, the following five key dimensions of capacity building[5]:

• Decision-making capacity.  This refers to the ability to make decisions in a timely manner. Poor decision-making systems are often associated with centralization of decision making, institutional weakness and capacity deficiencies, which can in turn be a major constraining factor on absorptive capacity during the transition period.  This is a critical area, especially in Africa where traditional African decision-making systems/processes are based on consensus – elders can sit under a tree and debate a single issue the whole day until all those present have spoken. Such a system of decision making would undoubtedly, in our view, contribute toward the general problem of absorptive capacity within the overall framework of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. This is of course not to say that we want to discourage the‘under-the-tree’ democracy of Africans, which has its role and merit under certain circumstances.

• Policy reform capacity. This refers to the ability of war-to-peace transition leadership to put in place a set of rules, policies and strategies for good governance. These rules, policies and strategies would in turn create or foster an enabling environment for all stakeholders to undertake economic activities at the macro, meso and micro levels of a newly established governance system resulting from a peace agreement.

• Implementation capacity.  This refers to the ability to translate policies into actions — implement formulated policies, strategies and related programs/projects within given resource constraints, including time, human and financial resources. It would also include capacity for monitoring and evaluation of activities being implemented, capacity for budgeting and financial management, and capacity for procurement of goods and services. The SPLM will start from scratch in this area.

• Service delivery capacity. This refers to the ability of newly established administration in Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei after peace agreement to provide quick start impact programs, such as delivery of basic public services, e.g. security and administration of justice, including human rights protection, education, health, water, and physical infrastructure. Effective, efficient and equitable provision of these basic needs is central to the sustainability of peace as well as post-conflict economic recovery and reconstruction. Here, one of the key features of good governance is sustained peace, which is necessary for economic development and an important indicator of political stability.

• Aid management capacity.  This refers to the ability for efficient utilization of aid resources and effective coordination of donors’ support in the immediate aftermath of the peace agreement. This is also one of the weakest areas of the SPLM civil administration.

B.      Developing Physical Infrastructure

The role of physical infrastructure in the life of a nation is well established. The movement of people, goods and services in Southern Sudan/New Sudan is severely constrained by undeveloped infrastructure.  The overall vision of the SPLM and GOSS regarding transport infrastructure is based on three levels of connectivity:  (a) transport networks linking Southern Sudan/New Sudan with Northern Sudan and with the countries of the Region, such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and DR Congo; (b) transport networks linking the Regions/States of Southern Sudan/New Sudan; and (c) transport networks linking Counties, Payams and Bomas in each Region/State.  The first two transport networks shall be the responsibility of the GONU and GOSS, while the third shall be a State level responsibility.

Road Transport

Southern Sudan, with a land area approximately equal to that of Nigeria, has no single kilometer of paved road other than few kilometers inside the three garrison towns of Juba, Malakal and Wau. There were about 7,000 km of unpaved roads network in Southern Sudan of which 40% were seasonal roads (World Bank, 1984). The road system was originally developed by the British Colonial Administration to complement and feed the river transport system. By the mid-1950s, a sparse system of roads had been developed.

However, in Upper Nile and other flood-prone areas of Southern Sudan, roads were originally aligned almost entirely for administrative and security purposes. They followed the distribution of population and generally ran near watercourses in order to reach centers of habitation, so as to meet labor requirements for land clearance and maintenance. With the excavation of more watering points in rural Upper Nile, more roads were constructed, especially north of Malakal thereby enabling the connection of the Southern capital Juba with the national capital Khartoum via Bor-Malakal-Renk (1,054 km) – Kosti-Medani-Khartoum. It is interesting to note that only the northern (i.e.398 km long Kosti-Medani-Khartoum) portion of Juba-Khartoum 1,755 km long highway is paved. In the Equatorial Zone, roads connected the main centers with the river transport contact point in Juba.

The state of our physical infrastructure, on the eve of the current conflict, is depicted by the following passage written two decades ago:

The Southern Sudan’s internal road network includes approximately 4300 kms of primary road and another 2900 kms of important secondary or feeder roads. While significant reconstruction efforts have been made by a number of donors, the network is still deficient. For much of the rainy season, travel on the main links is impossible for weeks at a time as streams and marsh areas flood inadequate roadbeds which turn into a sea of mud with potholes sometimes over one meter deep. Markets are constrained for lack of produce, commerce slows to a crawl, and food supplies cannot readily be moved from areas of surplus to deficit. In short, for much of the six-month rainy season the south’s commercial and social intercourse comes to a standstill.  (USAID, 1983:6).

The above situation has undoubtedly worsened given the intensity of the conflict. The strategy for this element of the framework would be to make use of past feasibility studies, project documents and development plans prepared before the onset of the current conflict. This would in turn facilitate formulation of an integrated approach to the rehabilitation, development and maintenance of physical infrastructure within the overall program for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. In this regard, rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure will focus on the following priority areas:

• Network of priority roads that need immediate rehabilitation and maintenance
• River transport
• Railway (Wau – Kosti – Khartoum)
• Air transport
• Telecommunications
• Town planning and public utilities (i.e. water supply and electric power)
• Dykes in flood prone areas and water harvesting in water scarce areas.
• Micro-dams for small scale hydro-electric generation for rural electrification.
• Windmills for water at the sustainable homestead level.

 

Priority Roads

Repatriation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees would play a critical role in the determination of which route is given top priority for rehabilitation and maintenance. There are over three million IDPs in the North, especially in the Khartoum area, but the most economical means of repatriating them back to Southern Sudan would be through Khartoum-Kosti-Aweil-Wau rail line and Kosti-Malakal-Bor-Juba river transport. The rest of the IDPs population is in Equatoria and the Boma area of southeastern Upper Nile.  In addition to the IDPs are refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC Congo, CAR, Egypt and Eritrea in the Region as well as in Europe, America, Australia and the Middle East. By way of illustration, a program of roads rehabilitation by period and length in kilometers is proposed in table 2 below.

River Transport

This mode of transportation would be used in transporting IDPs from the North to Southern Sudan. An appropriate rehabilitation strategy would call for a quick assessment of both boats/steamers and navigation routes on Juba-Bor-Malakal-Kosti sector of the White Nile. Here, the role of the GOSS would be confined to regulation and technical management of navigation routes and to allow the private sector to operate boats/steamers. Such an approach is likely to lead to accelerated improvement in the efficiency of river transport.

Railway System

The sector that would require urgent efforts at rehabilitation and systematic maintenance of the rail line linking Wau with Port Sudan via Khartoum-Kosti, is the Babanousa – Aweil -Wau section. The Khartoum-Kosti-Babanousa-Aweil-Wau railway line is critical not only to the repatriation of IDPs, but also for movement of consumer and capital goods that are needed for the post-conflict economic recovery and development of Southern Sudan.  In the medium and long term we shall look at the following possible regional and internal railway linkages:

1. Juba –Torit –Kapoeta – Lokichoggio (in Kenya) for outlet at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam
2. Pakwac (in Uganda)-Kaya– Yei – Juba – RamChiel – Yirol – Rumbek – Wau
3. (Kaya) – (Yei) – Maridi – (Yambio) – Tambura – Wau –Aweil  (to Kosti and Port Sudan)
4. Juba – Yei – Lasu – Kisangani (in DR Congo) for outlet on the Atlantic Ocean
5. Juba – Bor – Malakal – Kosti

Air Transport

The number of airstrips has increased by 900 percent during the conflict. The system would not however be sustainable during peace time, especially if there is significant improvement in overland routes. The strategy would be to rehabilitate the three regional airports in Juba, Malakal and Wau and make them international airports, while rehabilitating only the County airstrips by improving runways, putting in place navigation communications and air traffic control systems. There is also need for a major airport at Ram-Chiel where the SPLM/A plans to have its General Head Quarters (GHQ) for purposes of assembling, planning and preparing for the transition before moving to Juba as the GOSS after the SAF (Sudan Armed forces) have moved out of Juba. It may also be necessary to have another major airport at New Site (Kamuto) in Kapoeta County, opposite to Lokichoggio, so that it serves as a border airport facility alongside Lokichoggio. However, with economic expansion in the post-war Southern Sudan, a demand-driven regular air transport is likely to emerge. This would in turn create, other things being equal, its own supply response. The challenge here would be to create an enabling institutional environment for the emergence of air transport systems on competitive basis with the alternative modes of transportation in the post-conflict Southern Sudan/New Sudan.

Telecommunications

Southern Sudan has a golden opportunity in the post-conflict period to “leap-frog” into the latest Information and Communication (ICT) systems, such as VSAT-based telecommunications, which are increasingly becoming cost-effective for distance learning, Internet connectivity, telemedicine, farming, marketing of agricultural products, videoconferencing and so forth. Through a network of VSAT-based telecommunications, Southern Sudan/New Sudan could be connected within itself and with the rest of the globe within few months. For instance, schools, hospitals, farms, community resource centers, civil society organizations, Counties and public institutions could all be linked through this network. There are now satellite modems[6] that provide full access to the Internet, which make them ideal to the situation of Southern Sudan/New Sudan where there are no telephone lines.

 

Town Planning and Public Utilities

This is a critical component, especially in the light of anticipated return of IDPs and refugees with newly acquired behavior and propensity to live in urban centers. Priority would be given to the three regional capitals of Juba, Malakal and Wau on the one hand, and on the other to all the County capitals (e.g. Rumbek, Yei, Yambio, etc.).  Southern Sudan would benefit from the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) with respect to hydroelectric power. There are surpluses in hydroelectricity in both Ethiopia and Uganda that could be utilized in Southern Sudan within the overall cooperative agreement of NBI. The challenge would be to initiate feasibility studies to assess the needs for power supply in the context of economic viability. Rural electrification and small rural towns will be a priority, noting that making agriculture as the engine of growth as alluded to earlier, will be included in the feasibility studies. Alternative energy sources for rural electrification should be considered, such as wind, solar and micro-dams for small-scale hydro-electric generation (five to ten megawatts can be easily generated per plant), and this would be sufficient for the electricity needs of a small rural town.

C.        Regenerating Social Capital

This is one of the areas that have been severely affected by the conflict. As Southern Sudan/New Sudan emerges out of the devastating violent conflict, it will have to reinvest in its social capital as the basis for accelerated rates of accumulation in human, financial, physical and natural capital. Social capital is used here to mean networks and norms of communal/civic engagement. In addition, Robert Putnam uses the term social capital “as reserves of mutual assistance created through norms and networks of civic engagement, just as monetary capital is accumulated through one set of activities to others, thereby mobilizing collaborative action to further community well-being” (1995:256).  Moreover, these networks and norms of communal engagement are facilitated and enhanced through the principle of reciprocity, which is based on feelings of trust and the “willingness of people to help one another with the expectation that they in turn can call for help” (Wallis et al, 1998).

The principle of reciprocity is articulated by one of African great leaders – Julius Nyerere – stating that “[I]n our African traditional society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us (1967:166).” It would be recalled that policies of marginalization pursued by successive regimes in Khartoum have weakened networks of communal engagement in Southern Sudan/New Sudan. Now Southern Sudan/New Sudan has the opportunity to revitalize its social capital and to design her own development paradigm. The SPLM envisages that this new development paradigm will center on the human dignity of our people, so as to ensure sustained incremental improvement in all aspects of the quality of their lives.

The concept of a person within a community is critical to the process of social reconstruction, which would in turn restore human dignity and self-respect to our people. Specifically, revitalization of social capital would focus on:

• Reconciliation of communities and families using traditional methods of conflict management (i.e. prevention and resolution);
• Reinsertion of returning IDPs and refugees;
• Counseling of traumatized persons, families and communities;
• Restoration of social values, norms and ethics as the basis for reciprocity;
• Civic and political education on the basic principles of human rights, ethics, political morality, social responsibility and obligation;
• Articulation of African systems of thought and aspirations of our people;
• Enunciation of the common destiny and vision of New Sudan of justice, equality, liberty, freedom, and democratic governance;
• Establishment of community resource centers as vehicles for the preservation and development of our cultural heritage and renewal through positive aspects of social ritual/initiation, art, dance, Sudanese music and teaching of ancient and modern history of the Sudan, the Region and Africa;
• Integration of our social systems of thought into the school curriculum at all levels of our educational system; and
• Establishment of a social museum for the artifacts of all Southern Sudan/New Sudan communities.
• Establishment of war monuments and history museums depicting the struggle of the Sudanese people for human dignity over the last 5,000 years.

D.      Restoring Peace and Harmony

One of the pillars of our vision of New Sudan is sustained peace and social harmony in the whole country. Hence, restoring peace and harmony will be one of the key challenges of post-conflict recovery and development. This calls for community empowerment and social inclusion strategies that would in turn enable people to be in charge of their own lives and destiny. The SPLM leadership has, since the inception of the Movement, been encouraging as well as supporting conflict management – prevention and resolution – initiatives at the grass-root levels. Such initiatives have used traditional Southern Sudanese methods of conflict resolution (e.g. the Wunlit model of Dinka-Nuer peace agreement) as the basis for restoring durable peace and tranquility to our people. Moreover, the SPLM has taken leadership of south-south dialogue as by way of institutionalizing traditional methods of conflict management in our system of governance at all levels (i.e. Boma, Payam, County, Region and nation).  Several South-South dialogue initiatives and conferences have already been implemented with very good results – these include unity and merger with various armed groups and conferences such as the recent history making Traditional Leaders and Chiefs’ Conference (TLCC).  Similar meetings, conferences and workshops will also be held with various political and armed groups as well as with religious and civil society groups.

Restoring sustained peace and social harmony would entail preparation of specific operational measures/actions that will in turn create the basis for peace dividends in the eyes of ordinary people. Quick start impact programs will have to be initiated in the following areas – popularly known within the SPLM as 5Rs:

• Repatriation of IDPs and refugees to the places of their choice within Southern Sudan/New Sudan. This would require formulation of guidelines for repatriating IDPs and refugees, including identification of routes and transit centers in collaboration with the relevant local authorities through which the returnees will be passing through.

• Reconciliation of communities is an important component of the peace and social harmony process. The leadership will be consulting relevant stakeholders in Southern Sudan/New Sudan on the possibility of adopting a South African model of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with branches at all levels of our system of governance.

• Reintegration/reinsertion of returnees into host communities. This will require counseling of traumatized individuals and communities using a combination of traditional and modern techniques of counseling.

• Resettlement of returnees through provision of basic services and skills. This would in turn enable the returnees to be engaged in human dignity-enhancing productive economic activities instead of dependency on humanitarian assistance handouts and emergency relief supplies.

• Rehabilitation of basic social services, e.g. primary schools and primary health care facilities.

E.      Prioritizing Agriculture as the Engine of Economic Growth and Poverty Eradication

Southern Sudan is endowed with vast amounts of natural resources – land, minerals, forests, wildlife and water. With the attainment of a just and comprehensive peace agreement, these resources will be used for improving the livelihoods for more than 98% of our population. The total surface area of Southern Sudan (excluding Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Funj regions) is about 650,000 square kilometers with more than 95% suitable for agriculture and of which dense forests occupy about 24%. The population of Southern Sudan after the return of IDPs and refugees is estimated to be around 11.5 million persons and more than 98% would be expected to reside in the rural areas. This in itself would make agriculture to be the lead sector of Southern Sudan economy. Moreover, the agricultural sector is the key sector toward the achievement of the SPLM three strategic policy objectives of poverty eradication, sustainable economic growth and integration into the regional and global economies.

Feasibility studies carried out before the war indicate that less than two percent of land suitable for agricultural production was under cultivation (see table 3 below). The percentage of agricultural land under cultivation would undoubtedly now be below one percent given the prevailing conflict environment. If the total area under cultivation were disaggregated by sub-region, it would be noted that Upper Nile, Western Equatoria and Lakes are slightly above the average for Southern Sudan. While Bahr el Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei are below Southern Sudan average. The challenge then is how to revitalize and transform the agricultural sector, so that it is the engine of economic growth, and through it achieve effective poverty eradication.

The SPLM Secretariat of Agriculture and Animal Resources (SAAR) has recently formulated a model of sustainable homestead, which we consider to be the cornerstone of the SPLM strategy for eradicating rural poverty and attaining sustainable economic growth. The SAAR model of sustainable homestead is conceptualized to address the three conventional factors of production that would normally constrain agriculture-led rural development. These are a) land; b) capital; and c) labor. Our focus on agriculture led community-driven rural development is guided by the relative availability of land suitable for agricultural production in the New Sudan (see table 3 above).

Given the nature of our land tenure system, the SAAR envisages each rural family in Southern Sudan to have a plot of at least 20 acres for farming. Land, per se, would not be a problem at the initial stages of development in Southern Sudan. The problem would lie on the system of land tenure and technological innovations adopted by the GOSS. The present system of land ownership in Southern Sudan is communal and consistent with African customs and beliefs. The stability of the African land tenure system is now acknowledged. In this regard, a correct understanding of the African customary systems of land tenure as exercised in Southern Sudan is imperative in the formulation of this strategic framework. This is because the system provides requisite legal rights and protection to the households within the community to own and manage their land and associated natural resources.   These legal rights of communal ownership of land must be incorporated into the Interim Constitution so that there is water-tight constitutional protection from encroachment by the Central Government under the so-called Unregistered Land Act.

Hence, the importance of regenerating social capital, as discussed in sub-section C of this document, is critical to the stability of land tenure system in post-conflict Southern Sudan. It is embedded in the “working rules of collective action in restraint, liberation and expansion of individual action.” Moreover, management regimes are fundamentally different from open access systems (or the so-called unregistered lands). Management of African land tenure system is guided by social capital – networks and norms of civic/communal engagement – that are based on trust, reciprocity, solidarity, social responsibility, accountability, and a sense of common purpose and shared destiny.

The central role, therefore, of networks and norms of communal engagement is information sharing about appropriate techniques of sustainable patterns of resource use on the one hand, and enforcement of rules (rights) governing access to and utilization of communal land, water, and forests on the other. These networks and norms of civic/communal engagement – the working rules of collective action – enhance the ability of community-level mechanisms to enforce rules and adjudicate conflicts, thus ensuring social harmony and sustained culture of peace (Deng, 2000). And “when community-level enforcement mechanisms are rendered ineffective by public policies designed at the national level, common property systems disintegrate into open access regimes in which the state is the nominal landlord without working rules of collective action[7].”  This further breeds insecurity of tenure, conflict and social instability, a point well illustrated by the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) coordinated by the World Bank:

Tenure security in terms of exclusive rights of groups and individuals can be a major basis of political and social power and status.  When such rights are overly subordinated to the state, it follows that the political rights of rural people are diminished, and that democratic processes and institutions are undermined[8].

In the case of Sudan, the central government has pursued policies that subordinate property rights in Southern Sudan/New Sudan to the state. Such policies are incompatible with the legal foundation of property rights in this part of the country, which is embedded in the African customs, value systems and beliefs. These traditions and value systems define a set of orderly relations in the form of duties (e.g. social responsibility), rights and liberties. The set of orderly relations in turn provides order, predictability, stability and reliability of any system of property rights (Bromley, 1989, 1991). By way of illustration, there are four general categories of land rights. These are:

1.         Use rights – they allow/permit people (even if they do not own the land) to have rights to grow crops, trees, build home, collect woods, fruits, water and fish;

2.         Transfer rights – they allow people to either transfer use rights or ownership rights through social (bequeath or give) or market mechanisms (sell, lease/rent);

3.         Exclusion and inclusion rights – they allow individual, group or community the right to exclude or include others from exercising use and/or transfer rights; and

4.         Enforcement rights – these concern the legal, institutional and administrative provisions established to guarantee property rights.

On the second factor of production – capital – the strategy will be to encourage adoption of appropriate technologies that are consistent with the underlying premise of sustainable the homestead model. Moreover, the strategy will strive to make credit easily available to rural households through the establishment of micro-credit institutions modeled on the Grameen bank in Bangladesh or Kenya Rural Enterprise (K-Rep) bank. The basis for microfinance has already been laid by the USAID funded Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program, especially the Grant Making and Capacity Building (GM/CB) component being implemented by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS).  This microfinance infrastructure is in the form of County Development Revolving Fund (CDRF), which utilizes the traditional methods of savings –sanduk- sanduk (i.e. savings co-operatives and associations).

The STAR program has funded groups in nine counties in Equatorial and Bahr el Ghazal to jump-start their economic activities. These groups are required to repay these funds to the County Development Committee (CDC), which is an interface between civil society and Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS). The CDCs are in the process of establishing an appropriate financial institution for proper management of the re-flows (repayments).  This institution is the CDRF, which would constitute the basis for developing microfinance institutions and possibly community/village banks in Southern Sudan. One of the outcomes of the STAR program is the recently launched Southern Sudan Agricultural Enterprise Finance Program (AEFP) funded by USAID and under implementation by a USA-based Chemonics International, Inc.

The overall goal of the CDRF is to empower the civil society to effectively manage its resources through the provision of financial service intermediation on the basis of character of the individual clients within the framework of a group-based lending model (e.g. co-operatives and veterans association).  In this regard, the CDRF is envisioned to evolve into an independent microfinance institution, which is managed by its members (who are both clients and owners) through a governance structure consisting of an advisory board and a management team. It will, however, be subject to the regulation of the financial system of Southern Sudan under the overall supervision of the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) when it is established.

Enterprise credit products must generally be size, sector and purpose specific.  In this regard, there are valid reservations on whether credit delivery methods that have worked successfully in socially stable countries can be equally effective in Southern Sudan.  Moreover, the CRS GM/CB program’s methodology of a community group-based enterprise (CGBE) development paradigm, does not stress the critical issues of sustainability that are required to reduce heavy reliance on relief and humanitarian assistance in Southern Sudan.  However, methods and systems used by microfinance schemes in other countries have proven to be most favorable to trading and service enterprises with short investment maturity cycles.  And trading and service enterprises play an important role in economies, such as Southern Sudan, that are concerned primarily with employment generation, improvement of income opportunities and distribution of goods and services.

The CDRF is, in our view, the most appropriate vehicle for achieving the strategic principles advocated by the SPLM: a) development of co-operative sector; b) food security; c) natural resource management; d) poverty eradication; and e) improving the social well-being of war veterans, widows and orphans.  Moreover, the economy of Southern Sudan is dominated by informal enterprise activities that are driven by subsistence needs. There is, nevertheless, an effective demand for financial services that is not being met, even though some recent assessments by CRS and others indicate a potential capacity to take on debt within the relatively stable counties. In this regard, increased investments in microenterprise activities are likely to add tremendous value to the economy through a well-designed microfinance or community/village banking service delivery.  This will require ownership and management of the CDCs, CDRFs and CGBEs by the beneficiaries rather than by international NGOs.

The above stated points call for a holistic approach to rural infrastructure that covers credit, marketing, storage facilities, roads, power, etc.  The provision of these production services along with social services (schools, healthcare, clean water, etc.) would provide a basis for the conceptualization and implementation of community-driven rural development strategy that is premised on the growth of community centers.  Such community centers could develop into small rural towns that would be the focal points for community-driven rural development.  An example is New Site (Kamuto) in Eastern Equatoria, which was started by WODRANS five years ago and and is now well on its way to growing into a small rural town.  A place like New Site could be replicated in every Payam across New Sudan, which would mean the growth of more than 500 small rural towns and focal points for socio-economic development.  The aim is a community-driven development paradigm that emphasizes and promotes the concept of taking towns and services to people in the rural areas, where 98% of our people live, instead of the conventional development paradigm that results in attracting rural people to towns and trapping them in slums with a consequent reduced quality of life.  This will be an SPLM contribution to development economics.

Moreover, improved rural infrastructure (e.g. credit, marketing, storage facilities and roads) is the glue between forward and backward production linkages and to the extent that it is a precondition for a value-added ladder.  Hence, adequate resources (say some adequate percentage of net oil revenues accruing to the GOSS) can be allocated to the development of rural infrastructure as one of the key components ofmaking Southern Sudan agriculture productive and competitive, so that it becomes the true engine of growth and thus effectively contribute to poverty reduction and eventual eradication and transformation of the New Sudan economy through agriculture and agro-industries. Promoting forward and backward production linkages would also entail investment in agricultural research and extension (R&E).  The main objective of investing in R&E is to increase the efficiency of agricultural production.  That is, it would raise productivity and growth in the agricultural sector, and subsequently raise the purchasing power of smallholders for non-farm products.

The third factor that will face agriculture-led sustainable economic development is labor. Rural families in Southern Sudan will have to initially rely on family labor. This would in essence call for the enhancement of local capacities and restoration of traditional community institutions. In agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), we in the SPLM must strive to understand “what these local institutions are, how they work, who uses them” (FAO, 2002). This is due to the fact that “traditional community institutions and traditional authority systems are not always visible to the outsider – unless some representatives of such systems are already incorporated into local government structures, and their hereditary (ascribed) positions are confirmed and recognized officially” (FAO, 2002).

In addition to the above conventional factors of production, there are other challenges that are likely to face our strategy of revitalizing agriculture as the engine of growth. These other challenges with respect to agricultural development in the post-conflict Southern Sudan economy are grouped into three factors that are likely to influence the performance of agricultural production. Lessons of experience from Africa and the rest of the world would support the grouping of these constraints into factors affecting a) productivity; b) competitiveness; and c) sustainability. These factors are summarized in table 5 below.

Table 5: Factors That Would Affect Performance of Southern Sudan Agriculture

Productivity

Competitiveness

Sustainability

1. Inadequate inputs
2. Inappropriate mix of inputs
3. Low level of skilled labor
4. Low prices of outputs
5. Weak domestic demand
6. Poverty, health and nutrition conditions

1. Quality of commodities
2. Access to international markets, trade barriers and weak marketing and branding techniques
3. Infrastructure
4. Lack of vertical integration
5. Inadequacies in policy environment for processors, traders and exporters

1. Soil degradation
2. Deforestation
3. Water management
4. Inappropriate patterns of natural resource use
5. Global environment (e.g. global warming affecting patterns of rainfall)
6. Inadequacies in policy environment for natural resource users

In light of the preceding paragraphs, the task for the SPLM-SAAR would therefore be to conceptualize a value-added ladder between farm production levels and establishment of processing agro-industry/manufacturing gates. Such a value-added ladder would enable the identification of major institutional and technical constraints as well as the design of corresponding policy actions for their removal. In short, it emphasizes the critical role that the public sector can play in the provision of public goods, such as an efficient network of roads and extension services that cannot easily be provided by the private sector at the initial stages of our economic development, as well as advocacy for Southern Sudan/New Sudan products in world markets.

The role of the processors is often the backbone of the vertically integrated agro-business groups that constitute a networking of business engagements, such as financial firms, farmer associations, transporters, traders and manufacturers.  Operational measures and action-oriented policies must be put in place in support of processors, so as to ensure smooth and timely movement of agricultural goods and services from the farm production level to the consumer markets (domestic and foreign).  This movement of agricultural products, which is normally enhanced by efficient network of roads/transport facilities, credit and market and skilled labor to handle the smooth and timely delivery, would create forward linkages for these products.  And through forward linkages, farmers are able to respond in a timely manner to effective demand for their products originating from both domestic and foreign consumer markets.

Similarly, farmers would be able to receive payments for their products on a timely manner with a relatively developed network of rural infrastructure and under active policy intervention that promotes multi-sectoral approaches to agricultural development.  Growth in farmers’ earnings made possible through forward linkages would in turn create, other things being equal, effective demand for consumer goods and farm inputs from the urban areas (i.e. from other sectors of the economy) and thereby establishing a strong backward linkage between agriculture and industry.  These domestic linkages would normally generate employment in both rural and urban sectors.  Employment generation resulting from forward and backward linkages would lead to a situation of sustained food security, effective poverty reduction and eventual eradication and sustainable patterns of natural resource utilization.

Critical to the smooth movement on the value-added ladder is the promotion of investment in ICT, which we have identified in sub-section B of this document as an integral part of bridging the infrastructure gap, especially the Internet, human resource development and a viable network of rural roads.  Here, the role of the private and cooperative sectors is extremely important for the development of these networks of communications. The Internet has made information sharing about products and dissemination of results easily accessible. In Uganda, for instance, a rural Internet Service Provider (ISP) known as Bush-net is enabling people in the remote rural areas to communicate not only with Kampala and the rest of the country, but also with the rest of the world. The models of e-Commerce, e-Banking, e-Learning and so forth, could be modified and applied in Africa in the form of e-Agriculture or e-Farm Africa, e-Farm Southern Sudan, e-Farm, etc.

The development of ICT will enhance the functioning of information systems and means of information diffusion. It will also expand experience sharing and capacity building actions for community-based economic agents, such as local private input/output suppliers, trader, agribusiness and farmer organizations, and networks of village entrepreneurs.  Moreover, it would reduce transaction costs associated with market search for exchange opportunities and partners; with screening of product information; with terms of trade bargaining; with the transferring of goods, services, titles and cash; with monitoring of the exchange; and with enforcing the stipulated terms on the commodity or service being transacted and exchanged.

F.      Transforming the SPLM into a Peacetime Political Organization in the Context of Participatory Democracy and Democratic Transformation of the Sudan during the Interim Period

The SPLM strategic framework for war-to-peace transition is anchored on the transformation of the SPLM into a political organization that is capable of managing the process of overhauling the Sudanese state from a theocratic state into a democratic country of liberty, freedom, and prosperity. As the Chairman of the SPLM has recently emphasized, the process of democratic transformation of the Sudan must start with the SPLM itself. That is, transformation of the SPLM is a sine quo non for transforming the Sudan. A transformed SPLM would be able to create political space as well as an enabling environment for participatory democracy and a culture of political tolerance to differing views in the post-conflict Sudan. Moreover, the SPLM must transform itself from a largely southern-based Movement into an inclusive national political organization that embraces traditions and institutions of all the Sudanese people irrespective of ethnicity, gender, region, socio-economic status, or religion.

For the SPLM to effectively manage the war-to-peace transition and in the light of the above paragraph, the SPLM Political Affairs Commission will embark on the following:

• Reorganization of the SPLM structures and formation of departments/bureaus with the view of making it the center as well as the driving force for democratic transformation of the Sudan consistent with our vision of the New Sudan. This would call for the establishment of SPLM head offices in Khartoum and Juba and branches in all 25 States of the Sudan with sub-branches in all Districts, Counties, Payams and Bomas so that they can start immediately political mobilization and the drive for membership registration and mobilization of resources for effective political organization in all parts of the country.

• Transforming the SPLM-LC to become a central organ or political bureau of the SPLM representing all segments of the Sudanese society, including women with at least 15% of the membership of the Central Organ or political bureau.

• Transforming the National Liberation Council to become the Central Committee of the Movement with an immediate task of revising the SPLM draft constitution. At least 25% of membership of the Central Committee should be women and the youth should also be adequately represented. The new constitution of the SPLM will be premised on the Chairman’s recent call for a social contract between the new Sudanese state and its citizens, as the main stakeholders in ensuring better governance in the post-conflict era as well as taken into account the experience and sacrifices made by our people during the long liberation struggle including aspects of the first SPLM Manifesto of 1983.

• Convening of the SPLM Second National Convention before end-December 2004 to adopt the SPLM program for the Interim Period; to elect the SPLM Chairperson and members of the National Liberation Council/Central Committee who will in turn elect the Polibureau; SPLM Deputy Chairpersons and other office holders.

• Formulation of the SPLM strategy for post-conflict economic recovery and reconstruction of the Sudan.

• Screening of SPLM members to fill ministerial positions at the GONU, GOSS and State Governments of Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, and Abyei Area Executive Council as well as SPLM’s 10% representation in the executive and legislative bodies of the remaining 13 States in the North.

• Preparation of a social contract document that defines the relationship between the people and their government. Such a contract must be based on justice, accountability, inclusiveness, responsibility, and openness (JAIRO). That is, the motto of the SPLM: A social contract that is based on JAIRO.

G.      Transforming the SPLA into a Peacetime Conventional Army

The SPLA has been, during the first phase (16 May 1983 – 26 May 2004), the primary instrument of our quest for the establishment of New Sudan. With the signing on 26th May 2004 of the last three Protocols of the IGAD sponsored peace process the SPLA has successfully accomplished its mission for the first phase with dignity and honor, though through enormous sacrifices. Our victory has, thus, been made possible by the sustained resolve of the gallant SPLA forces evidenced by our martyrs and wounded heroes. We take this opportunity to salute our fallen heroes for the ultimate sacrifices they have made in restoring dignity and pride to our people and to our beloved country.

As we enter the second phase of the liberation struggle, the role and focus of the SPLA will shift. The SPLA will be required to protect the peace agreement and our quest for a new constitutional order, which embodies the critical attributes of the SPLM formulated social contract.  The shift in the role and focus of the SPLA will in turn ensure a qualitative leap from Model 3e to Model 1 through Model 2 (see Chart 2). In this regard, the point of departure for the transformation of the SPLA is to prepare a concept paper on the security sector (armed forces, including ground forces, air force, navy and air defense, and civilian security forces including the police, prisons, wildlife and other law enforcement agencies) in which the new mission of the SPLA and associated strategies will be spelled out clearly. The new mission and associated strategies will in turn determine the re-classification and re-assignment of the current SPLA forces into the following:

a)     Joint Integrated Units;

b)    SPLA: Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Air Defense, National Reserve.

c)     Police and other law enforcement agencies; and

d)    DDR, including re-assignment to civil service and re-integration to productive economic activities.

The reassignment exercise will require that all the SPLA forces report to their respective units and assembling points at which these forces will receive comprehensive orientation and briefing about the new mission from the SPLA leadership. Further orientation and training will be received by each of the above categories consistent with the nature and requirements of their respective missions to establish an efficient security sector for sustained peace in the country.

One of the key characteristics of a liberation army is the nature of its deployment. Being an army of unpaid volunteers, objective conditions on the ground have dictated over the years that the SPLA forces live in the community when there are no military operations and reporting to specified assembling points in case of military campaigns. With the signing on 26th May 2004 of the last three Protocols of the IGAD sponsored peace process, the SPLA Chief of General Staff has ordered all SPLA forces to report to their respective units. The challenge then is how to create conducive physical environment in which to re-orient the assembled forces toward a new mission that requires their re-classification/re-assignment/re-deployment into: a) JIUs; b) conventional armed forces; c) police, prison and wildlife forces; d) civil service; and e) DDR.

V.      Concluding Remarks

This strategic framework for war-to-peace transition is premised on the SPLM stated economic policy objective of a tripartite partnership between the public, private and cooperative sectors. Hence, the framework would, when implemented, enhance opportunities for sustained economic growth and poverty eradication in the post-conflict Southern Sudan/New Sudan. It would also address the critical questions of equity in access to resources – economic and otherwise. The proposed fiscal decentralization in the context of the peace process would simultaneously address issues of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious cleavages and their consequential disparities.

The SPLM leadership is aware of the huge oil reserves in Southern Sudan and of the share of GOSS (51%) from the net oil revenues accruing to the country.  However, oil is a non-renewable natural resource and we cannot therefore anchor our long-term development on it. Thus, our rationale for making agriculture the engine of economic growth to achieve effective poverty eradication is premised on this reality and the fact that more than 95% of the population of Southern Sudan/New Sudan live in rural areas. This notwithstanding, oil revenues would contribute toward the development of agriculture by raising the purchasing power of our rural population.  In short, the policy thrust of an SPLM-based GOSS will be based on using oil to literally fuel agriculture as the engine of growth.

The resulting increase in rural peoples’ purchasing power will also lead to higher effective demand for manufactured goods, which could in turn facilitate development of agro- and other industries in Southern Sudan/New Sudan. The induced dynamics would constitute a significant source of economic growth. This would, however, require concerted efforts on the part of the SPLM leadership, especially in formulating public policies that favor the rural sector (e.g. allocating a higher percentage of oil revenues to this sector). Lessons of experience from South East Asia demonstrate, for instance, the critical role of public policy in the development of primary commodity processing industries, going up the value added ladder and aim at reaching the final consumer at supermarkets, etc. That is, the most serious factors affecting the growth of agro-industries are often of policy nature than technical and/or economic.

Selected References

Bromley, Daniel W. 1989. Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy.  Basil Blackwell: Oxford.

Commons, John R. (1990 edition). Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy.  New Brunswick (USA):  Transaction Publishers.

Deng, Francis M.  1995. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan.  Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.

Deng, Lual A. 2002. The Challenges of Institutional Development in the SPLM-Administered Areas of Sudan. Unpublished Manuscript: Yambio, NS.

Garang, John.  1997. The Vision of New Sudan: Questions of Unity and Identity.

Johansson, Patrik. 2001. Aid and Conflict in Sudan.  A Report to SIDA, Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management, Stockholm, Sweden.

MEFIT S. p. A. 1979. Regional Development Plan: General Report. Vol. 1 Part One, a report for Southern Sudan Regional Government.

Nyerere, Julius K. 1967.

Putnam, Robert. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy

SPLM. 2000. Peace Through Development: Perspectives and Prospects in the Sudan. Yei/New Cush, New Sudan.

_____. 1998. The Vision, Programme and Constitution of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.  Yei/New Cush, New Sudan.

UNDP. See various Human Development Reports, especially those published after the Earth Summit in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

World Bank. 2002. Building Institutions for Markets. World Development Report 2002. Oxford University Press: New York.

[1] See “Institutional Reform and Capacity Development in Post-conflict Countries: Can Countries Emerging out of Civil Wars Get Institutions Right?,” by Lual A. Deng and Wema J. Kategile (2004).

[2]  Quoted from Daniel Bromley (1989:22).

[3] Key: BC – Boma Congress, BLC – Boma Liberation Council, BEC – Boma Executive Council; PC – Payam Congress, PLC – Payam Liberation Council, PEC – Payam Executive Council; CC – County Congress, CLC – County Liberation Council, CEC – County Executive Council; RC – Regional Congress, RLC – Regional Liberation Council, REC – Regional Executive Council; NC – National Congress, NLC – National Liberation Council, and NEC – National Executive Council.

[4] A Workshop on Southern Sudan Civil Service was organized by the World Bank in Washington, D.C. during the period 5 – 17 April 2004. The Workshop was facilitated by Dr. S. Schiavo-Campo and produced recommendations to the SPLM-LC on the establishment of an efficient Civil Service for GOSS.

[5] As identified by Deng and Kategile (2004)

[6] A complete unit costs less than $1,500.

[7] From Integration of Drylands Issues Into Country Assistance Strategies: A Review, by Lual A. Deng (2000), Environment Department, The World Bank.

[8] Cited from Promoting Agricultural Productivity and Competitiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa. A report presented to the GCA meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya on 9-10 April 1999.

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