The Causes of Sudan’s break up and the Future of South Sudan
15 min readBy Lam Jok Wai Wuor, Calgary, Canada.
Introduction:
Sudan, once regarded as the largest country in Africa, broke up into two on July, 9, 2011, after decades of conflict. The first civil war between the North and the South broke out few months before the independence of Sudan on January, 1st, 1956 and was settled through peace in 1972. The second Sudanese civil war broke out on May, 16, 1983 and lasted until a peace deal was concluded in Naivasha, Kenya on January, 9, 2005.Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, South Sudan was given six years interim period before exercising referendum on whether to secede from the rest of the country or confirm unity on a new basis.
Since its independence in 1956, Sudan was a country of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. The cultural, ethnic and political diversity of the country was not managed for the benefit of all and the failure to do so led to outbreaks of civil wars twice. There is no doubt that cultural and ethnic diversities, which existed in Sudan, are also found in many African countries which never experienced civil wars or breakups.
Everywhere in Africa, one can find Muslims, Christians and Animists living side by side without having to break up the country. Although the case of Biafra in Nigeria could be brought up as an example of secessionism, it could be argued that Biafra war was fueled more by political grievances than ethnic and cultural differences. If ethnicity and religion were the reasons, the non-Muslim groups like Yoruba and others could have joined the war against the Nigerian state that was dominated by the Muslims at the time of independence.
The case of Sudan is totally different from that of Nigeria and the root causes of the breakup of Sudan in 2011 could be attributed to mismanagement of diversity and the attempt of the Sudanese state to impose Arabism and Islamism at the expense of African indigenous cultures. Ethnic and cultural diversities are not the real causes of separatism. If countries could experience civil wars and secessionism because of diversity, many countries in Africa would experience separation. However, the mismanagement of diversity by the state is what determines the fate of a diverse country. The failure to manage diversity is what led to breakup of the Africa’s largest country.
The failure of managing diversity is not a curse of the old Sudan alone. The newly independent South Sudan could experience instability if the government of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) fails to manage diversity and practice equality, democracy and the rule of law. The newly independent state of South Sudan is not homogenous country as some people may think. It is a country with sixty three tribes with various cultures. Religious diversity does also exist in South Sudan because Islam and Animism do have followers.
The paper will analyse the colonial history of Sudan, the failures of the Sudanese state to manage diversity after the independence and the future of South Sudan one year after independence.
Colonial history of Sudan
The invasion of the Turks, followed by the Anglo-Egyptian rule, resulted in the birth of a diverse country called Sudan through the process Robert Collins called the “creation of an artificial state controlled by new forms of governance” (Collins, 2008). From the Turks and Egyptians came civilizations and cultures that had been brought from the Ottoman Empire and Arabs while the British imposed imperialism, education, religion and technology of the West. Within each rule, the different colonial powers or rulers brought and left behind various layers of complex institutions that developed the Sudan yet, simultaneously created division between the North and South (Collins, 2008).
Under Turco-Egyptian rule led by Muhammad Ali, came the “reforms in taxation, land ownership and its use” (Johnson, 2003). As a result of those reforms, the Nuba tribes sought to escape taxation by moving further south. One could imply that this movement to the South could be “the reason why the Sudanese capital city kept on being shifted southward to its present site in Khartoum” (Johnson, 2003). Johnson argued that through taxation Nuba farmers became indebted and found themselves in servitude of commercial companies who were exploiting the “newly opened lands in the South where the ivory and slave trades became the main avenue for enrichment” (Johnson, 2003).
The historical enmity between the Arab tribes of the North and the African tribes of the South started when the former, having superior weaponry than the latter, began slavery in the South through raids. It could be strongly argued that slavery practiced by Northerners before it was abolished by the British created hatred between Arab tribes and the Southern tribes which were raided. This is what started the internal division between Arabs and blacks of Sudan.Throughout the Turco-Egyptian regime there was a repetition of exploitation and slave trade. This has contributed to the major issues that were pushed or moved forward to modern day Sudan after the independence.
After the rule of Turco-Egyptian regime, a domestic powerful force of the Mahdist state came into existence. Initially perceived by the southerners as a “liberation movement,” the Mahdi revolution turned out to be a regime that reintroduced the practice of slavery which was abolished by the British. Through their continuous exploitation of the south and the resumption of slave trade, racial tensions spurred between the nomadic tribes of the north and pastoralists of the South. The Mahdist state also “re-enacted the origins of Islam” (Anderson, 1999) in which their leader of the sect called Ansar, proclaimed himself to be the “long awaited messiah,” and, “played an integrating role by recruiting many adherents among southerners captured while serving in the Turco-Egyptian forces” (Anderson, 1999). His successor, Khalifa, then took over and began to practice the policy of spreading Islam to the so called “infidel south” (Anderson, 1999). But, his rule was not received well in southern areas and the indigenous tribes resisted Islamization and slavery until the British defeat of the Mahdist state in 1898.
After the demise of the Mahdist state, British colonization took another form of governance over Sudan known as indirect rule. This policy, initiated by Lord Frederick Lugard of Imperial Britain, devised a form of separate development in which “the two parts of the country” that is north and south, “never felt belonging to one another” (Both, 2003). Through the indirect rule policy, south Sudan remained underdeveloped and the wealth was mainly concentrated in the North. Although the intention of the British could be perceived to have been influenced by the need to protect the South from slavery coming from the north, the policy of indirect rule further polarized both communities of Sudan to an extent that they never felt as one people. As Douglas Johnson observed, the British active promotion of Christianity in the South by excluding Islamic Proselytization entrenched religious conflict that would later bedevil the independence state of Sudan (Johnson, 2003).
The post-independent Sudanese state
Prior to the independence of Sudan, the British administration formally asked the political representatives of the South in Juba Conference of 1947 whether they would wish to be part of Sudan together with northern tribes or be part of East Africa, which was also ruled by the British. Majority of Southern representatives who still remembered slave trade from northern tribes refused to be part of Sudan (Johnson, 2003). However, the British overruled the position of South Sudanese and accepted the Egyptian’s interest that both the north and South should be united as one country.
When Sudan became independent in January, 1956, the colonial state was replaced by the very northern tribes who enslaved South Sudanese in the past. The Arab tribes that inherited colonial institutions saw to it that the South remained underdeveloped in terms of education; economy and infrastructure. Although there was disparity in development between the North and the South prior to independence, the independent state of Sudan was not interested to promote development due to the fear that Southerners would challenge the cultural dominance of the North in the long run. The new rulers of Sudan introduced a policy of Sudanization, which could be regarded as northernization of the Sudanese state because all the British civil service jobs were filled by northern Sudanese (Johnson, 2003).
Rather than promoting federal structure of agovernance, which was agreed upon by the political representatives of both the north and the South prior to the independence of Sudan, the post-independent state embarked on civilization project of promoting Islam in the South (Wai, 1973). Islamization was continuously imposed on Southerners by all successive regime of Khartoum. For South Sudanese, an independent Sudan was seen as an opportunity for the Northern Arabs to continue dominating and enslaving Africans in the south. The growing hatred and antagonism towards the Arabs of the North caused rebellion in the south which broke out four months before independence. This was the beginning of many more conflicts to come as various national interests led to deaths of millions.
The question of diversity and how to manage it rocked the Sudanese state throughout its history because the first civil war, 1955—72, was pursued by South Sudanese on the basis that the successive Khartoum regimes rejected federal structure of governance which could have given the South an autonomy to safeguard its cultures from Islamization and Arabization. Not long after the independence of Sudan that Southern political leaders accused the governments of Khartoum of withholding their promises on a federal state (Poggo, 2008). They accused successive Khartoum governments of wanting to impose an Islamic and Arabic identity all over the country. Among those leaders were Abel Alier and Both Diu, who criticized the policies that were created by Northern governments (Iyob et al, 2006).
The failure of the regime in Khartoum to introduce federalism after the independence could be blamed for the growing resentment towards the Northerners political elites—such resentment led to the widespread killings of Northerners in the South when Anyanya (snake poison) guerrillas embarked on armed struggle. The first civil war lasted for seventeen years and was settled when an agreement was signed in 1972 which gave the South local autonomy.
After years of bloodshed due to the inability of successive regimes in Khartoum to accept political demands of the south, Colonel Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri “urged the government to adopt a new approach toward the Southern question” (Poggo, 2008). For the first time, his regime understood the “Southern problem”. The military Junta which took power justified carrying out the coup to remove Maghoub’s ineffective government because of “… failing to resolve the civil war in the southern Sudan” (Poggo, 2008). The new government also sought to promote development in the South and stated that “it is the result of the policies of British colonialism, which left the legacy of uneven development between the North and Southern parts of the country…..Our revolution is……directed against imperialists, the reactionary circles and corrupt parties that destroyed against imperialists, the reactionary circles and corrupt parties that destroyed the October Revolution [ that overthrew General Abboud in 1964 ] and were aiming at finally liquidating any progressive movement and installing a Reactionary Dictatorship” (Poggo, 2008).
The second Sudanese civil war and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
Worn out by the seventeen years of civil war (1955-1972), South Sudanese welcomed the peace agreement of 1972 which brought about an autonomous South. However, autonomy lasted only for ten years because the regime of Jaafar Nimeiri abrogated the agreement in 1983 and imposed Sharia on South Sudanese. Nimeiri abrogated the deal and divided the South into three regions, Upper Nile, Bahr el Gazal and Equatoria. This act was seen by Southern Sudanese as “another blatant act of aggression by the Central Government and one designed to further weaken the South in all aspects, thereby resulting in further social and economic inequality, not only between North and South but also between the three Southern Regions” (Both, 2003). The Nimeiri’s regime initiated policies to “redefine the boundaries between North and South, so that the oil rich areas around Bentiu, the fertile lands of Renk, together with the nick and uranium deposits all fall into northern territory” (Poggo, 2008).
After the signing of 1972 Addis Ababa Accord with the Southern rebels, the military Junta of Jaafar Nimeiri gave Chevron Oil Company the right to explore oil in the South. Chevron discovered oil in Upper Nile region of the south in 1974. The Khartoum government proposed a site for refinery which was decided to be in the north. The government also “decided to pump oil unrefined to Port Sudan” (Both, 2003). Southerners saw this as “an attempt to deprive the region of a valuable industrial investment” (Jendia, 2002). Nimeiri’s intentions were to create Unity Region, which would give Khartoum direct control over this resource. This intention reinforced Southern Sudanese beliefs that this was a political act sought to deprive the Southern Region of its resources.
The abrogation of Addis Ababa Agreement led to the formation of the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLM/A) in 1983. This movement’s goal was directed towards “the creation of a New Sudan, in which there would be no discrimination on the bases of race, ethnicity, culture, religion or gender” (Deng, 1995). At first, SPLM/A views were directed towards Socialism, which the leader of the Movement, John Garang, believed would create unity of Sudan without the possibility of secession. But, for Southerners, who overwhelmingly preferred separation, Garang’s idea of New Sudan was “incongruent with their aspirations, and in any case was utopian, since the North could never allow it” (Deng, 2010). Although Southern Sudanese rejected Garang’s views, non-Arab regions of the North “became more conscious of their own marginalization by the Arab-dominated centre” (Deng, 2010).
Over time, Garang’s vision of a New Sudan inspired more support across the North-South division. However, successive governments saw this as a threat to their establishment or “Arab-Islamic Identity of their country” (Deng, 2010). After the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power through coup in 1989 with an agenda of Islamization, the vision of New Sudan, which was predicated on secularism, was seen by the Islamists as worse than separation of the country.
The second Sudanese civil war ended on January, 9, 2005 when the Government of Sudan (GoS) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the SPLM/A in Kenya. Some observers saw the peace deal as a method of “resolving complex issues of diversity of and identity and to set a new basis for consensual national unity based on the free will of the people” (Thomas, 2010). It is considered one of the longest negotiated peace agreements in Africa to restructure the centre of the state. Each party involved in the conflicts recognized the strength of the other side in terms of political and military might. As a result of this agreement, the South was able to set up an autonomous government in which it had its own army that was financed from “Southern oil reserves which are shared between the two parties, NCP and the SPLM” (Thomas, 2010).
One is baffled how the Islamists of the NIF could prefer separation of the South to unity of Sudan on a new basis as articulated by Dr. John Garang. Since the start of the peace processes between the GoS and the SPLM/A in early 1990s, Dr. Garang insisted on the creation of a secular country based on a confederation structure of governance. Such kind of a system would be able to address the cultural concerns of the people of South Sudan to have autonomy and could also guarantee inclusive state where Sudanese with different religious backgrounds would be accommodated. Despite the fact that over ninety five percent of Northern Sudanese are Muslims, there are Communists, progressives and atheists who support the idea of secular Sudan as the basis to unite the country.
The GoS of Sudan’s rejection of Dr. John Garang’s vision for so long culminated into the adoption of self-determination as an option to resolve the conflict. Although various peace agreements had been dishonored in the past, the CPA has certain uniqueness. It is unique in the sense that it allows people at appropriate levels to manage and direct their own affairs. It also “gives people of southern Sudan their first opportunity to exercise the right of self-determination-a frame work for ensuring that the unity of the Sudan is based on the free will of its people” (Machakos Protocol, 2003).
South Sudan independence and the future of the new state.
The separation of South Sudan was a foregone conclusion because the Sudanese state was not structured in a way that could accommodate diversity in the country. The CPA didn’t resolve the question of religion and state. The SPLM/A had hoped, before the CPA, that the unity of Sudan should have been based on secularism to accommodate South Sudanese. The idea of confederation within secular structure could have attracted South Sudanese to vote for unity of the country on January, 9, 2011 referendum. But the CPA left Sharia law intact in the North and most South Sudanese did not want to experience what Jaafar Nimeiri did in 1983 when he decided to annul the autonomous structure of the South with a stroke of a pen and imposed Sharia on South Sudanese.
A fierce debate took place among South Sudanese before the exercise of the referendum on whether separation would be in the economic interest of the South. One thing stood out as a reason for South Sudanese to opt for separation, that is, the existence of Sharia law in the North is an indication that the Northern political establishment is not interested in the unity of the country. Most argued that autonomy alone, without addressing the problem of secularism in the central government, does not guarantee lasting peace within a united Sudan. When the South settled for autonomy without structuring the centre in 1972, the result was the imposition of Sharia and abrogation of Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983. South Sudanese were scared with the repeat of 1983 and decided to vote overwhelmingly for separation.
Despite the transitional period of six years, many Southerners had little hope for change because the “CPA did not address the conflicts outside the South-centre axis, and did little to address the conflicts within the South itself” (Thomas, 2009). Not only that the SPLM party and the National Congress Party failed in addressing conflicts in Darfur and the question of religion in relation to state, but progress towards implementing national unity and “provisions that are needed to make a reality of peace have been more or less abandoned” (Thomas, 2009).
Within one year of its independence, the state of South Sudan is poised to experience the same curse which befell the old Sudan. As a state with sixty three tribes, the South will be experiencing more ethnic clashes than North Sudan. Prior to independence on July, 9, 2011, rebellion broke out against the ruling SPLM government and the rebels accused the Dinka ruling clique of practicing the same discrimination South Sudanese experienced from Northern Sudanese prior to independence of South Sudan. One observer argued that:
Finally ,
The main cause of the breakup of Sudan could be attributed to the failures of successive Khartoum regimes to manage diversity of the country. In the North, Islam not only served as a faith but it became a way of life, and a specific prestigious cultural and ethnic identity associated with Arabism. In the South, animism and Christianity were the dominant religions prior to the departure of the British. When Sudan gained independence in 1956, the questions, which bedeviled the Northern and Southern political elites, were whether Sudan should be a federal or unitary state or whether it should have a secular or an Islamic constitution. The Northern elites never appreciated the fact that the South should be granted an autonomy to safeguard it cultures until the military Junta seized power in 1969 and signed an accord which granted autonomy to the South. However, the agreement didn’t last long because the centre was not structured in a way that would have entrenched federalism and secularism.
The CPA of 2005 did not address the relationship between the state and religion because Sharia was left intact in the North. Many South Sudanese saw the failure of the GoS to abandon Islamic project to adopt secularism as a rejection of the unity of Sudan. When South Sudanese voted in a referendum, they opted for separation because of historical fears. However, the newly independent state of the South is experiencing the same mismanagement of the state experienced by the old Sudan. The ruling Dinka are accused by the rest of the tribes as practicing discriminatory policies not dissimilar to policies successive regimes in Khartoum practiced.
By Lam Jok Wai WUOR, in Calgary, Canada
He can be reach @ lamwour@yahoo.ca
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