Dr. Majak D’Agoot: Understanding the lethargy of Sudan’s periphery-originated insurgencies

The assumption that an insurgency effort must culminate in the seizure of state power became the go-to cliché of the twentieth-century understandings of the Civil War. However, historical counterfactuals about Sudan’s civil wars have cavilled at the accuracy of this postulate. This article argues that Sudan constitutes an outlier which does not perfectly fit this established convention. In essence, many factors have combined to be the sources of Sudan’s intractable, periphery-originated civil wars. Since the Torit Mutiny in August 1955, virtually all these uprisings have exhibited deep failings in inducing a complete change in the centre; or separating any part of the country through military means. Succinctly put, they have, with no exception, ended in a negotiated settlement rather than through a decisive military victory by the rebels. Based on the findings of this study, state violence, ethnic politics, and power struggle among the rebels, as well as geography, geopolitics, and the permeability of the borders have emerged as key explanatory variables to this alternative hypothesis.