The December 15th Coup D’état
By Pinyë Junub
On the evening of December 14th, the atmosphere in Juba was tense, given the events that transpired a little over a week. Riek Machar and his group held a press conference and gave an ultimatum to the president to respond to their demands or else. Those who know politics in South Sudan saw the writing on the wall.
On December 15th a coup attempt was in full motion, preempting events that were planned to precede it.
South Sudan’s Intelligence service received actionable intelligence about a major operation that was to take place in Juba on December 15th 2013. In fact, there had been a great deal of chatter among Riek’s supporters and their desire to overthrow Kiir’s government for over a year. However, the President had been keen to overlook the threats in an attempt to keep the peace.
Ever since, the July reshuffle of the government which saw Riek lose his job, his supporters were very eager to overthrow the government. The weeks leading up to December 15th had seen intense chatter especially from Riek’s supporters in the diaspora. On the 14th the intelligence service intercepted a message where the caller from the US cautioned about “the major event on December 15th”. The message mentions a new era is at hand.
Furthermore, block 107 had seen increased movement by plain clothes men carrying arms. The district is populated mainly by Nuer. Intelligence reports had confirmed that Riek housed a number of his own private militia in the area for the last three years. On Sunday December 14th, several presidential guards mainly from Nuer went to block 107 and came back with large amounts of cash. Dr John A Akec, an academic from South Sudan wrote in an article titled “Making Sense of December the 15th, the Political Causes of the Unrest” said the following: “That same evening Riek Machar attempted to force his way into the NLC (National Liberation Council) with 30 personal guards. No one else had more than two guards, including the president.
Investigations confirmed that Maj. Gen. Marial Chanuong was at the division headquarters up to 6 pm on Sunday after which he went home. At 8 pm, he received a report that there had been a dispute at first battalion where a certain Nuer major expressed anger because the number of guards at ammunition store was higher than normal. Chanuong sent a Nuer colonel to resolve the issue. He then requested the colonel on duty to be alert. He also noted that colonels John Malual Biel and Peter Lok, both Nuers, who are first and second battalion commanders had arrived back at the army garrison that evening. “The two were believed to have been in contact with their politicians”, according to Chanuong. Also eye witnesses said money was distributed to Nuer soldiers on Sunday and many of them came back to garrison and took up their arms early in the evening that day”.
At around 10:17 pm exactly, Colonel John Malual Biel, head of first Battalion shot his deputy, Akol Reec (a Dinka from Warap State) unprovoked. He died a day later from his bullet wounds. At the same time, Abraham Manyuat Ajou was shot by a certain Nuer Brigadier General James Koch Gak (there is slight variation as to who was shot first). Hence at the start of the incidence, the shooters were all Nuer, and the victims were all Dinka. The killing of the two Dinka officers was in cold blood, and was never preceded by arguments or “wrist fight” as some media has reported it.
Fighting then erupted. Around 170 soldiers were killed on the side of government forces and mutineers. And contrary to reports that the mutineers had control of army headquarters on Sunday night, Maj. Gen. Chanuong said the battle raged throughout the night and that the mutineers could not succeed to capture the ammunition store and were pushed out of the garrison by 2am of morning of 16 December 2013 into Jebel area of Juba, according to Chanuong.
“Nuer soldiers in non-uniform mobilized Nuer civilians in 107 area and they tried unsuccessfully to take over the ammunition store at New Site”, Chanuong relates. Riek’s supporters were repulsed back into block 107. As they were being pursued, they disappeared into civilian areas. This was followed by intense fighting whereby several civilians were caught in the cross-hairs.
These were coordinated efforts by a force that was loyal to Dr. Riek Machar. Riek may deny his involvement, but he was fully aware about the planned “operation” on December 15th 2013. All evidence points towards an organized coup attempt. The level of involvement by the detained SPLM politicians is still under investigation. So far nothing tangible links the senior SPLM politicians to the coordinated events.
This is a very interesting and clear narrative, in the style of a factual report. But surely the story of that day is highly contested? And it is in fact being contested in a current court case. If you publish a factual-looking report on such a topic, shouldn’t there be more references in it, and more account of the author and their methods, so we can judge how likely it is to be reliable?