South Sudan IGAD Talks: Reviving the Stalled Peace Process – Part I
South Sudan IGAD Talks
Suggestions for Reviving the Stalled Peace Process – Part I
By Paul Muortat
College Administrator
BA History, MA Peace Studies
Mawan Muortat
IT Specialist
Political Analyst
BSc MSc Agriculture, Post Grad Dip Computing
24th August 2014
Version 1.0
Introduction
This document is aimed at South Sudanese and all who are concerned about South Sudan and its welfare. We are ordinary South Sudanese citizens who are based in the UK. The desire to produce this document arose from our deep frustration with the lack of progress in the Addis Ababa IGAD led peace talks and how this is prolonging death and suffering among our people and the destruction of our country. We start by offering some ideas about how the gulf between the warring sides might be bridged. The aim is not to provide anything prescriptive, but rather to encourage further discussion around the challenges facing the peace process. We further add background sections about the rise of South Sudan nationhood and the post-peace experience.
Proposed Approach to the Political Crisis
- There is no military solution
Several proposals for resolving the on-going conflict have been presented. We welcome all these initiatives, both domestic and international. We hope that our modest contribution will encourage further discussion among all concerned so that a final, workable and just solution is found. We add our voice to those who are calling for an immediate end to hostilities since an outright military victory by either side is impossible.
- The importance of ethnicity in the war
Although the war was triggered by political in-fighting among the senior leaders of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), it has quickly taken an alarming ethnic character with tens of thousands killed in the last nine months. Tensions that have accumulated between various South Sudanese communities, particularly during the last north-south war, have not been adequately addressed. They have not gone away, but have been lurking below the surface, threating to explode at any moment.
Each community is now largely rallying behind their figurehead (Dinkas behind President Kiir and Nuers behind Dr Riek) for fear of obliteration or marginalisation. Hence, any solution that seeks to exclude Riek Machar or Salva Kiir is unlikely to bring an end to the fighting as it will unquestionably be rejected by either community. Other groups also exist and they too have their grievances as well as aspirations. The historic demand of Greater Equatoria for a more decentralised form of government is a typical illustration of such potentially volatile issues that South Sudanese must ultimately address.
- Poor governance in South Sudan
It is no secret that the government, under both President Kiir and Dr Riek Machar, has failed to meet the high expectations that many people had when South Sudan won its independence. Little has been achieved by way of service delivery or economic development and billions of dollars belonging to the people of South Sudan and donor countries’ tax payers have been misappropriated.
Consequently, many people want the peace talks to yield not just an end to the fighting, but also a restructuring of the system in South Sudan so that future governments perform better. This restructuring process, which we will – for the purpose of illustration – refer to here as the Comprehensive Review of the State Structures (CRSS), is likely to be a lengthy and complicated process requiring constitutional changes and strong involvement by other stake holders.
- What is holding back the talks?
There are essentially two intractable problems; first, there is the power struggle issue between the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army In-Opposition (SPLM/A I-O) and the government which will require a power sharing deal.
Secondly, there is the demand of the public and development partners for the CRSS process to be included in the peace negotiations.
Owing perhaps to the difficulty in reconciling these competing priorities, the peace talks have been frustratingly slow. Conceivably, the objectives (i.e. solving the issues of power struggle and the CRSS simultaneously) have been set too high and perhaps it is now time to recognise that the human and economic costs required to meet these objectives may have become untenable.
The negotiation partners should be assisted to reach a mutually agreeable balance of power in the upcoming proposed interim government. Moreover, they and other stake holders should identify the elements that will constitute the CRSS process.
The aim should not be to fully analyse, discuss and complete the CRSS process during the negotiations period, but rather to identify its main components and to setup, staff and sign off the bodies or commissions that will be tasked with undertaking and completing the process during the interim period.
We hope that by separating the formation of the interim government from the CRSS process in this way, we may be able to speed up negotiations somewhat while providing South Sudanese with the means and time, during the interim period, to improve the structures of their country.
Interim Government
We believe that one of the main obstacles in the peace talks is the challenge of finding a formula that is mutually acceptable to the warring sides. Such a formula must offer the SPLM/A I-O a significant role in the proposed interim government without diminishing the role of the current leadership.
- The role of the interim President
The interim President would be the head of state and the commander in chief of the national army. He or she would have executive powers over the security, economic and diplomatic sectors. In addition, he or she would appoint the ministers for these sectors subject to parliamentary approval. This position could be filled by President Kiir or another individual he or the SPLM/A party will appoint.
- An new executive role for SPLM/A I-O
We suggest that a new executive post be created and charged with the development and service delivery functions. This position will – for the purpose of illustration – be referred to as the interim Head of Development and Services Executive (HDSE), presiding over ministries such as health, education, industry, agriculture and others. The interim HDSE will also be a Vice-President. He or she will appoint the development and service ministers, who will report directly to him or her. This position will be given to the SPLM/A I-O, to be filled by Dr Riek Machar or another individual he or the SPLM/A I-O will appoint. The interim HDSE will report to the interim President.
- The role of the First-Vice-President
Vice-President Wani Igga would become the interim First Vice-President and this role will remain unchanged. He will remain deputy to the interim President and the person to assume the role of the interim President when the latter is absent.
- The interim Presidency
The interim President, interim First Vice-President and the interim HDSE will form the interim Presidency of South Sudan and will be duty bound to work consensually and cooperatively as a unit for the welfare of South Sudanese public.
- The CRSS Process
The interim period should be set to two or three years to allow the CRSS process to be completed. The CRSS process should involve the active participation of the civil society and other sectors as well as a very strong and binding presence of the international community. It should include, among others, a peace and reconciliation process, the reregistration of all political parties, constitutional review, the adoption of stronger and more transparent fiscal control systems, better anti-corruption provisions, the strengthening of the law and order sector, safeguarding human rights and freedom of expression and preparing for national elections.
- Limits of the interim Presidency
The interim government will take full charge of the everyday running of the country but should never interfere with the CRSS process. The role of the interim Presidency is to deliver during its term and not to be concerned about the shape of future governments.
The three individuals serving in the interim Presidency will not be allowed to stand for their position in the following elections to discourage the use of the interim period as platform for electoral campaign. Should President Kiir, Wani Igga or Dr Riek Machar be interested in standing for leadership in the next elections, they could refrain from entering the interim government and propose other people to take their position.
The Genesis of Nationhood
South Sudan has been described as the land where time stood still. A land scarred by the legacy of colonialism, enslaved and downtrodden by the burden of Islamisation and Arabisation.
As is the case elsewhere in Africa, the genesis of political and national consciousness in South Sudan goes back to the 1940s and 1950s. The people of South Sudan have suffered and fought back collectively beginning from the 18th century when the slave trade arrived, through the brutal British pacification wars, to the civil wars waged against them by the Khartoum based governments since 1955.
In a manner similar to that seen elsewhere, from India to South Africa, it was the modern Western educated elite, drawn from all regions and ethnicities, who championed and spearheaded the cause of liberation. They were also joined by chiefs, workers’ unions, students as well as other sectors of society.
In 1972 a tenuous peace agreement was reached with the Khartoum government, but this later failed due to a raft of factors including the rise of Islamism in the north and the unfulfilled aspirations of the south for independence. War returned in 1983 on a much larger scale.
The two wars killed over 2.5 million South Sudanese and by the end of the 1990s, South Sudan’s cause had finally touched the conscience of the regional and international players. American, European and African diplomatic support for a just end to the war culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This guaranteed South Sudan the right for self-determination and opened a new page in north-south relations. South Sudan gained its independence in 2011.
The Post-Peace Experience
The biggest success in this period was the achievement of independence, the primary credit for which goes to President Kiir, former Vice-President Riek Machar and all the higher echelons of the SPLM. However, throughout this entire period, the government was also beset with daunting problems including huge developmental challenges, intractable and unresolved issues with Sudan, an acute lack of capacity, inter-communal violence and rampant corruption.
Both the government and the society as a whole were ill prepared to meet these challenges. The ex-combatants who had been accustomed to the unrestrained life of the bush were perhaps not the best suited to govern a population that was expecting high levels of delivery, accountability and financial trustworthiness.
The war created many adverse changes, some of which were caused by the SPLM’S own policies. These include the favouring of fighting ability over educational credentials, the observance of ethnic balance when appointing officials and the interference with traditional authority in order to guarantee loyalty to the movement. These have left the SPLM with fewer educated leaders than it otherwise might have had, while at the same time rendering the society more ethnically divided and less respecting of law and order than it was before the war.
South Sudanese patriotism was toned down in favour of the united Sudan policy which the leadership had adopted. This departure from traditional South Sudan political thinking might have gained the movement regional and international respectability, but it is also to blame, at least in part, for the decline in patriotism and self-sacrifice among South Sudan’s current political ruling class.
Embattled and weighed down by enormous problems, the government was unable to present a clear vision for the future. Pressure on the government began to build up under mounting public dissatisfaction. The veneer of a united leadership began to crack along predictable fault lines. The old and volatile ethnic tensions (Nuer vs. Dinka or Equatoria vs. the Nilotic) and ideological struggles (Garang’s camp vs. Kiir’s camp), that had been buried but not resolved, were rekindled and the country was plunged into chaos.
It is worth emphasising here that it is the blind ambition and uncompromising attitude of all concerned and their readiness to use all that is at their disposal to reach their goal – rather than ethnicity or ideology per se – that is to blame for the current conflict.
The Role of International Partners in the Post Peace Period
The tools for supporting fragile war-racked states have been well studied and it is beyond the scope of this document to cover them in any detail. Suffice to say that if we were to rewind the clock or if the actors had anticipated the current crisis, things might have been done differently. Some resources that were pledged never materialised. International technical support for South Sudan was far below that given to similar countries, such as Mozambique and Sierra Leone.
Insufficient pressure was brought to bear on the government to support a national reconciliation exercise which might have redressed past grievances. State-building was prioritised above nation-building. Army strength was prioritised above its ethos and professionalism. It is easy in hindsight to see where things went wrong, but the return of peace will open a new window for improved policies to be adopted.
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