The Hurting Stalemate of the South Sudan’s Peace Talks—Part 1
A Comprehensive Outlook on War and Peace in the Republic of South Sudan within the Context of the Present Civil War
By PaanLuel Wël, Juba
I
January 6, 2015 (SSB) — On the 18th of December 2014, the warring South Sudanese factions resumed the stalled peace talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This was after IGAD mediators had given them 15-day ultimatum to consult and to reach a political compromise over the outstanding issues within the parameters of the proposed power sharing arrangements leading to the formation of the transitional government of national unity, comprising of all the stakeholders in the conflict pitting the government of President Kiir and the rebels of Dr. Riek Machar.
The recommencement of the peace talks, however, born little fruits in insofar as furthering the pace of the peace talks is concerned. Apparently, the consultative conferences have hardened positions on both sides, leading to some reneging on previously agreed clauses of the IGAD-brokered power sharing accord. Hence, the talks were abruptly adjourned on December 21st, allegedly for Christmas break. The New Year 2015 has seen the renewal of fighting in and around Nasir and Bentiu, and palpable fear for more violence in and around Ayod in Jonglei and Renk in Upper Nile state.
How did it all come to this quagmire? This is a briefing on the outlook for how the current conflict between government forces and the SPLM-IO led by former vice president, Dr. Riek Machar, has so far developed and how it might progress in the next months or years, including the existing hurting stalemate on the ongoing South Sudan’s peace talks in the Ethiopian capital city of Addis Ababa.
II
Currently, most of the major towns in the conflict-affected states of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states—Bor, Gadiang, Ayod, Malakal, Nasir, Mayom, Bentiu etc.—that were once captured by the rebels are under government control. The government has considerable present in all the counties of Upper Nile state, and all the counties of Unity state except Leer County (the birthplace of Riek Machar). In Jonglei state, however, majorities of the counties are still under formidable control of the rebels. This could be due to the fact that the Lou Nuer white army is from Jonglei, mostly from the three counties—Akobo, Nyirol and Uror—of Lou Nuer community. These are the remaining strongholds of Riek Machar’s rebels.
The Lou Nuer pride themselves of having fought off the British in the 19th century under the leadership of Guek Ngundeng, the son of the famed Lou Nuer prophet, Ngundeng Bong. Guek was captured and killed by the British and the resistance was crushed. However, the legacy of that resistance inspires and sustains the war spirit of the Lou Nuer white army today against the government of President Kiir. While Ayod town is under the government control, the rebels control the county itself (inhabited by the Gawaar Nuer). That is also true of other Nuer counties in Jonglei such as Fangak and Waat, even though the headquarters of Fangak County was said to have been captured and still being maintained by government forces.
Even if the government were to take all the major towns in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, and Leer County in Unity state, the rebels would still have considerable control over the countryside. This was the case during the war between the SPLM/A and Khartoum. The Khartoum government used to control the major towns in Southern Sudan while the SPLM/A controlled the entire countryside. Khartoum was compelled to seek political settlement resulting in the CPA. The same could be the case with the Machar’s rebels and the government of President Kiir. Riek Machar is not oblivious to this glaring fact. This is the basis of his negotiation in Addis Ababa.
While there is palpable military stalemate in the battlefields across the country, the fact that the rebels have lost significant ground to the government is a cause for consternation among the rebel delegates to the IGAD-led South Sudan’s peace talks in Ethiopia. The rebels appear to be under the impression that the more towns the government takes from them, the more reluctant the government would become to pursue peaceful means to the conflict through a political compromise/settlement (i.e. endorsement and implementation of the proposed transitional government) under the mediation of the IGAD countries.
Moreover, there is a reason to believe that the government may backtrack from the peace talks were they to capture more towns from the rebels. That would be a blunder because the rebels would still control the countryside and they would continue to press on and attack the major towns. A back and forth capture and recapturing of the towns witnessed in earlier 2014 may resumed, once more. It was dangerously expensive and pointlessly imprudent. A military stalemate would be the most likely military outcome, not a win-win best-case scenario for any of the warring camps.
There is likely to be more fighting in and around major towns such as Mayom, Bentiu, Nasir, Renk, Ayod and Malakal in this dry season, conceivably before the resumption of the next round of peace talks. Reportedly, there is fighting already around Nasir and Bentiu. A fall of towns such as Renk (Upper Nile) and/or Bentiu (Unity state) to the rebels would definitely extend the conflict to the oilfields—that is Paloch oilfields in Upper Nile state if Renk and/or Malakal were to fall to the rebels; and Panrieng and Tharjath oilfields in Unity state if Bentiu and Mayom were to fall to the rebels.
If Ayod falls to the rebels, the fighting would spread to Gadiang and Bortown would be threatened if not attacked/taken by the rebels. That would bring the war to the gravity witnessed in late December 2013 and earlier January 2014 when the fighting almost came to Juba city.
It was expected that the dawn of the last year rainy season would greatly inhibit the movement of government heavy war equipment and weapons, that the rebels would be on the offensive and would possibly retake some towns from the government. That has not materialized, however, because the white army seems to have lost much of their earlier war morale and numbers. The white army numbers, which can’t be readily replenished, have substantially dwindled with time. (It appears most the Nuer youth were mobilized in the first assaults in December 2013 through much of the early part of 2014 and few were left for further recruitment). Furthermore, the fact that the government had successfully thwarted their attempt to take Juba in late December 2013 and earlier January 2014 had a profound impact on the fighting momentum of the white army who were made to believe that it would be a matter of few battles before Juba would fall and President Kiir depose.
With the rebels having made no military gains in the rainy season (the government forces have actually extended their hold on Nasir and areas around it), it is highly likely that the military stalemate as it is now would continue to be the case in the forthcoming dry season. The government has no compelling incentive to go into the countryside/villages/counties were rebels mobilize to attack major towns such as Nasir, Bentiu, Renk, Ayod and Malakal. This is mainly because the government forces would be outnumbered and defeated were they to venture outside the major towns within the Nuer territory.
Therefore, it is likely to be the case that the fighting would take the form of rebels mobilizing in the countryside—and across the border in the neighboring Sudan—and then launch combination of sporadic and sustained military attacks on the government garrison towns. Some of these towns such as Bentiu and Nasir could fall to the rebels, though it is unlikely that the rebels would successfully defend and maintain them for long (as have been shown to be the case in Nasir and Bentiu which have, mid last year, been temporarily taken over by the rebels but then retaken by the government forces).
There are valid indications therefore to think that, at the moment, the government is simply happy and somehow prepared to defend major towns—Nasir, Ayod, Renk, Malakal, Bentiu, Mayom and Gadiang—from rebel attacks; on the other hands, the rebels would continue to launch a blend of sustained and sporadic attacks on these vulnerable towns in spite of their supposedly commitment to the cessation of hostility (CoH) agreement. Much of these military maneuvers by the warring parties is, and will continue to be, done with the conviction that it would strengthen government’/rebels’ hands at the negotiating table in Addis Ababa.
After all, Riek Machar, the rebel leader, is on record that it is the government that has been taking rebel held-towns even after the signing of the CoH. In other words, the rebels perceive their continued offensive attacks (presented as counter-offensive response to government aggression) as righting the wrong done to them, which they argue the IGAD has not done (that is, forcing the government to withdraw from towns (Bentiu and Nasir) taken from the rebels after the signing of the CoH.
III
However, whether the fighting between the rebels and the government would be sporadic clashes, big escalation or successful retake of the above cited towns (by the rebels) will most likely be determined by the degree of military and logistics support Khartoum will continued to extend to the rebels of Dr. Riek Machar. It would also depend on how much President Museveni of Uganda would be prepared to support President Kiir of South Sudan. It is not a secret that Khartoum is not amused by the continued military and logistics support provided to the government of President Kiir by President Museveni of Uganda whose troops (UPDF) had fought alongside the SPLA in late December 2013 and earlier January 2014 along the Juba-Bor highway.
Most of the UPDF are now stationed in strategic places around Juba and Bortown and there are some reports that some were temporarily taken to Malakal when it was under attack from the rebels earlier last year. Intriguingly, the rebels and the government of Uganda recently signed a memorandum of understanding (after much feuding and glitches) in which the rebels have agreed to the continued presence of UPDF in South Sudan, allegedly to protect civilians caught up in the crossfire. It is possible that President Museveni might have traded off something to get such concession from the rebels who have all along been adamant that the continued presence of UPDF on the South Sudanese soil is a grave violation of not just the CoH but also of South Sudan’s national integrity and territorial sovereignty.
Perhaps, Museveni has extended his recognition of the rebels under Riek Machar in exchange for that concession—allowing the UPDF to remain in South Sudan until the conflict is over. After all, Museveni have already come out disputing Juba’s version of the alleged failed coup attempt (in a meeting in Addis Ababa after meeting Riek Machar for the first time since the December 15th mutiny). The outspoken spokesperson of the UPDF in South Sudan is on record declaring that they would not hesitate to defend Bortown if it were to come under attack from the rebels. With the recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Kampala and the rebels, it is not clear what would happen should the fighting reach Bortown where the UPDF is stationed. Will Ugandan troops stay neutral as per the MOU or take the government side, as has been the case since they arrived in South Sudan in late December 2013?
There is reason to suppose that the UPDF would stick with supporting the government against the rebels in spite of MOU. Museveni might have warmed up to the rebels in order to regain his challenged legitimacy at the negotiating table in Addis Ababa where Uganda is a leading member of the IGAD. It was unsustainable for President Museveni to be considered as an honest peace broker while publicly backing the side of the government. The MOU with the rebel allowed him to navigate his way while still executing his will—talking of killing two birds with one stone.
As for the Sudan, much would depend on how much continued Ugandan support would threaten the rebels (like what the Sri Lankan government did to the Tamil Tigers). Khartoum has been supplying military hardware, safe passage to Renk and Bentiu, some training and logistics support, to the rebels. Khartoum is interested to see a long-drawn out fight between the government and the rebels so as to weaken the whole country. A weakened South Sudan would not be able to stand up to Khartoum in so far as Abyei area, border demarcation, disputed oilfields and towns and other outstanding issues such as the pipeline and transit fees etc. are concerned.
Khartoum is also aware of the alleged presence of Darfur rebels in South Sudan. Darfur rebels and soldiers of the SPLM-North are reported to have fought alongside the SPLA in Bentiu. Thus, Khartoum support for the rebels and the Juba courting of the Darfur rebels and SPLM-North soldiers tantamount to a proxy war between Juba and Khartoum. Darfuri rebels and the SPLM-North discern that a defeat of President Kiir by the rebels of Riek Machar would be a disaster to their military campaign against Khartoum.
Given the substantial support given to the rebels so far by Khartoum, it is conceivable that Khartoum may not be that unsettled were the rebels to take (and successfully defend) the oilfields from the government. If at all, it could be that Khartoum would double their support for the rebels so as to defend and maintain their control of the oilfields. Riek Machar is reportedly on record that were the rebels to take the oilfields, then he would share the oil revenue 50-50 with the government of Khartoum. Khartoum would certainly be comfortable with that tentative offer.
The other party to this conflict is Ethiopia, which has been presented by Juba as favoring the rebel side, at least politically. While there is no concrete evidence to back up this view, it should be noted that unlike Uganda or Sudan, Ethiopia is the one hosting the IGAD-led peace talks in Addis Ababa between the rebels and the government. Moreover, there is a large population of Jikany Nuer citizens in the Gambella region of southwestern Ethiopia. There has been pronounced conflict between the Ethiopian Nuer and the Anyuak in the Gambella region.
The Ethiopian Nuers, like their cousins in South Sudan, wholeheartedly support Riek Machar to take the leadership of South Sudan in whatever means possible. Ethiopia worried that the fighting in South Sudan, if not handled well and arrested in time, may spill over into Ethiopia. Already, there are ten of thousands of Nuer refugees in Ethiopia and they have settled in the Gambella region among their Nuer cousins. They are armed and could foment trouble in Ethiopia. The significance of Gambella region to problems in South Sudan has some historical precedence too. For example, when the SPLM/A was founded in 1983, it was mostly in Gambela region because of the Ethiopian Nuers who were then wholeheartedly backing South Sudanese revolutionary struggle against Khartoum.
What is felt (projected/presented) in Juba as an apparent Ethiopian support to the rebels (Nuer) is possibly the calculated attempt by Ethiopia to strike the right balance in resolving the conflict in South Sudan. Therefore, in contrast against the backdrop of Uganda continued support to Juba, Ethiopia, to the government in Juba, is seen to be backing the rebels.
IV
The fighting between the rebels and the government will also depend on whether or not the IGAD countries would be ready, willing and able to levy heavy punishment on the violators of the signed (but largely neglected) Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement between the government and the rebels. Both sides have been violating the CoH agreement with impunity, prompting the IGAD nations to threaten stiff sanction on the top leaders of the warring factions. In spite of the continued violation of the CoH in and around Bentiu and Nasir and Renk, and despite the fact that the two warring camps have failed to agree to the formation of the IGAD-proposed interim government within 60 days, IGAD has not been brave enough to effect their threat of levying sanction on the said leaders.
The reading on the wall appears to be that any sanction—think of the EU and the US sanctions on Gen. Peter Gadet Yak (former head of SPLA Division Eight in Bor and now a prominent military on the rebel side) and Gen. Marial Chanour (head of the presidential guards (Tigers) among whom the fighting began on December 15th, 2013), —has been largely ineffective as far as ending the fighting and agreeing to a timely peaceful settlement of the conflict is concerned. The IGAD seems to prefer carrots to stick, at least for now. Perhaps, IGAD preference for carrot to stick could be an attempt to keep the two warring parties engaged at the negotiating table in Addis Ababa. Besides, IGAD countries do not have the wherewithal to execute their demands on the warring parties. That is a prerogative of the big boys at the UN Security Council.
Nevertheless, the continued military stalemate/fatigue on the battlefield across South Sudan could be a sign of hope for the beleaguered nation of South Sudan. With no pretense on the side of either the government or the rebel to achieve an outright military victory over one another, it is possible that the two warring camps would (sooner than later) certainly reach a mutually acceptable compromise on the formation (and particularly the constitution) of the proposed interim government. Both President Kiir and Riek Machar have, on principle, agreed to the proposed interim power sharing arrangement. President Kiir has signed the document while the rebels’ new position resolved in Pagak, which is contrary to the signed document, is more on the question of the details rather than out of principle. More specifically, the document has earlier (to the dismay of the rebels) stipulated that the holder of the proposed office of the prime minister would be barred from running for the office of the president after the end of the transitioning government.
Presently, the lingering, seemingly unresolvable quagmire, is rebels insistence that the proposed prime minister, likely to be Riek Machar, should be an executive one while the president (rebels’ have Salva Kiir in mind) would merely be a ceremonial one. However, that contention by the rebels, couple with the utter rejection by the government, to have an executive prime minister (Riek Machar) with a ceremonial president (Salva Kiir) have complicated the talks in Addis Ababa. Thus, the government is looking for way to convince the rebels to accept a non-executive prime minister with an executive president. Ostensibly, the problem is that IGAD got President Kiir to approve the creation of the office of the prime minister on the condition that the holder of that office would not exercise the powers of an executive authority; surely it is hard to picture Michael Makwei Lueth endorsing the creation of an executive prime minister.
Since it is unlikely that the government would agree to an interim government with an executive prime minister, the best option for IGAD is to go back to the rebels of Riek Machar and persuade them to remove the controversial condition calling for an executive prime minister with no deputies and a ceremonial president without the vice presidency.
Persuading the rebels to waive that precondition (and allow President Kiir to retain his executive powers, though much trimmed) would not be easy since the rebels appear to have resolved during the Pagak Consultative Conference that they would not tolerate a transitional government headed by President Kiir. Interestingly, the rebels appear to be negotiating, reasoning, against the backdrop of the 2005 CPA negotiation. They see themselves as the SPLM/A and Juba as Khartoum. In other words, they demand nothing less than a 50-50 sharing of everything, crown with a two-person presidency. As glimpse-able from Makwei Lueth’s press conference of December 24th, 2014, it is something that the government just laugh at, taking it as a bad joke on a serious situation. “They are criminals”, declare Minister Michael Makwei.
However, persuading the rebels to give up their demand is the only viable way forward. For one, it was wrong for the government to have tried to bar (Prime Minister) Riek Machar from opposing President Kiir in any future election. If indeed the government of Juba believes that they have the support of the majority of the citizens, they should not have worried about (Prime Minister) Riek Machar taking on President Kiir in any future political contest. It was simply in bad faith and could have poisoned future relationship between President Kiir and Riek Machar in the proposed interim government. Besides, it was undemocratic to bar someone on an account of having held a certain political office.
Similarly, it is irrational for the rebels to expect the government to give them executive powers on a silver plate. After all, they had the chance to unseat the government militarily but they failed—miserably. For them to demand executive powers at the negotiation table which they have failed to secure in the battlefield is, to say the least, outrageous. It is only meant to obstruct peaceful settlement of the deadly conflict. If the government has compromised to accept Riek Machar as a prime minister, especially given their earlier hostility towards him, why can’t the rebels accept the reality of the situation—their failure to remove President Kiir by force—and settle for the position of the prime minister in a shared interim government?
V
This conflict will most likely end when both President Kiir and Riek Machar are part of the interim government. For the government, the redline is that President Kiir should be the one to head the transitional government (and the rebels have conceded this, though not explicitly so far). Interestingly, Juba has come out insisting that they are not the one offering the post of PM to the rebels; it is IGAD. Meanwhile, the rebels are not so oppose to the retention of President Kiir in his position as much as they are oppose to that contentious condition placed upon the office of the prime minister (the clause that designate him a non-executive prime minister).
For the government, as far as the IGAD proposed interim arrangement is concerned, it is to have President Kiir as an executive president and to allow him to run for the office of the president in the next presidential election. The rebels are yet to concede that condition (waiving the condition of having an executive prime minster with a ceremonial president with no deputy president) but they have no choice, they would give in, sooner than later.
In the event that the two warring parties become more intransigence and insist on taking on each other militarily, then it is definitely the case that more and more civilians would be caught up in the crossfire, once more. UNMISS peacekeepers, such as the pledge contingent of 700 Chinese peacekeepers, would make a big difference in so far as saving and protecting lives is concerned. UNMISS peacekeepers may not be in a possible to force the two warring parties to observe and respect the CoH but they can be counted upon to protect innocent civilians, women and children and the elderly that would be taking refuge in the various UNMISS compounds across the nation.
Nevertheless, the most apparent outcome is the formation of the transitional government in which both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar participate. While the government and the rebels have been hostile to the presence of the other stakeholders to the peace talks in Addis Ababa (because the warring groups prefer to share the carcass between themselves only), it is going to be the case that the former political detainees would have a share in the transitional government. How much is anybody best guess but the formation of an all-inclusive interim government has been the position of the IGAD leaders.
IGAD believes that the only way to solve the problem is to engage all South Sudanese political and military leaders, not just the two warring parties. Thus, the interim government may end up with members of the current government under President Kiir, rebel members of Riek Machar, former political detainees (SPLM Leaders as they called themselves), members of the opposition political parties and the civil society. In other words, the transitional government would be a reconstitution of the old failed government of the last nine years under the leadership of President Kiir, Dr. Riek Machar and the former political detainees since the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in 2005 after the promulgation of the CPA.
Because the next presidential election would be hotly contested and a close call, the government in Juba might eventually give in the proposed federation of South Sudan as a way to cut into rebel support among the Equatorians who have been at the forefront of federalism. President Kiir has not come out openly against the proposal and most of his supporters from Equatoria such as the current vice president, James Wani Igga, would persuade the party bigwigs to implement the federal system so as to deprive Riek Machar of vital political recruitment tool.
VI
The most daunting task for the IGAD (but most importantly for the warring parties) is striking the right balance (in term of ethnic and politico-military support) in the formation of the interim government. Many Nuers, for example, are holding very big positions in the government of President Kiir and there are many soldiers of Nuer ethnic group fighting on the government side. The same is not so true of Dinkas and Equatorians with Riek Machar. This would complicate the formation of the interim government because, for example, Nuer from the rebel side and those from the government (combined) would tantamount to Nuer dominating both the civilian government and the national army.
The Nuer are approximately 19% of the nation population but (before December 15th) made up about 70% of the nation army. The government would be keen to prevent such scenario from occurring again, as it is believe to have contributed to the outbreak of violence in December 2013. Because the Nuer dominated the army, the argument goes, they were likely to rebel because they reason they could easily take over the government by military means. Yet the presence of the white army on the rebel side would confound matters further because their full integration into the national army would overwhelm the army in favor of the Nuer. The government has, possibly in anticipation of such scenario, embarked on endorsing some tribal militias (in Upper Nile and Equatoria). But the country can’t sustain a bloated army in addition to a bloated government.
Solving that conundrum would require leadership on the part of President Kiir and Riek Machar. It would not be easy but they have little choice but to make some hard military and political compromises, not just now in Addis Ababa for themselves as principals but later in Juba for their diehard lieutenants—who are not that understandable but see everything in terms of life and death.
It is crystal clear that the current IGAD-led peace talks would not address the underlying causes of the conflict. It is simply a long-term ceasefire to allow conducive environment to emerge under which such deep rooted, contentious issues could be addressed. The hope is that the interim government will embark on the necessary political, military, social, economic and constitutional reforms that would address the most underlying causes of the crisis in South Sudan.
For the “the long-term ceasefire” to endure though, blanket amnesty may be necessary for all the parties to the conflict. While the call to bring the perpetrators of violent crime to account for their crimes is ideal, it might not be practical because the leaders who ignited this crisis are the very ones who would be counted upon to observe peace and order for the necessary reform to be formulated, passed and enacted and implemented.
Besides, nothing less than taking President Kiir to the ICC would count like true justice to the rebels whose relatives were killed in juba. And nothing less than taking Riek Machar to the ICC would count like justice to the people whose relatives were killed in the fighting, say in Bor, in 1991 and 2013.
Chances of President Kiir and Riek Machar ever facing the wrath of the law are very slim in South Sudan. Given the experiences of international community (the ICC) in Kenya and the Sudan, it may as well be plausible to bet that the perpetrators of violence crimes in South Sudan may never be held accountable for the war crimes and violations of human rights in South Sudan.
About Post Author
