The Principle of Tribocracy (Part 2)

Power-Mapping of Ethnicity in the Republic South Sudan

By PaanLuel Wël, Juba, South Sudan

“In the life of every person there comes a point when he realizes that out of all the seemingly limitless possibilities of his youth he has in fact become one actuality. No longer is life a broad plain with forests and mountains beckoning all-around, but it becomes apparent that one’s journey across the meadows has indeed followed a regular path, that one can no longer go this way or that. The desire to reconcile an experience of freedom with a determined environment is the lament of poetry and the dilemma of philosophy.” – Opening Sentence, Henry Kissinger’s Undergraduate Thesis, Harvard University, 1949.

I

February 16, 2015 (SSB) — On 4 January 1934,[1] a young economist delivered a report to the US Congress that eight decades later still shapes the lives of everyone on this planet. His name was Simon Kuznets—a Belarusian-American Jew—and the report he delivered was entitled, “National Income, 1929-32”. Kuznets’ report is the foundation of how we judge the economic success of all countries in the world today, and is known as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP has defined and shaped our lives for the last 81 years.

For us to understand how the GDP came to dominate our lives, we must remember that Kuznets’ report was delivered at a moment of economic crisis. The US economy was plummeting into the Great Depression and the policy makers on Capitol Hill were struggling to respond to that crisis—struggling because they didn’t know what was going on. They didn’t have data and statistics on the US economy. Therefore, what Kuznets’ report gave them was reliable data on what the US economy was producing from 1929 to 1932. And armed with this information, policy makers at the US Congress were eventually able to find a way of out the Great Depression. And because Kuznets’ research and principle were found to be so useful, it quickly spread around the world and today every country produces its own GDP as a measurement of economic success.

Like the US at the height of the Great Depression, South Sudan (and much of the Sub-Saharan African region) is at a crossroad. It is in political turmoil. Democracy has failed. Economic development and social prosperity is a distant mirage. We live on a continent where the specter of civil strife haunts everyone from infancy to grave. The African race, marching to the drumbeat of self-destruction, has become an engine of misery and destitution unto itself. We need a better system of governance to manage our society: an inclusive and effective, fair and equitable system of governance based on the real sociopolitical and cultural context of real African people.

I believe we are living in a desperate era where we have nothing to lose by going back to our roots. We have tried alien religions such as Christianity and Islam and foreign political philosophies like democracy and socialism and communism. Nothing but sheer social depravity, political confusions and economic impoverishment have we gained from their full adoption and fervent espousal. By all the imaginable indexes of human social progress, the humble African graces the bottom of the human race.

II

In Part One of this article[2], I have defined tribocracy as a political system where representatives of a particular ethnic group hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group represents in order to promote and achieve fair and equitable political representation across all ethnic groups comprising that particular nation. In other words, tribocracy is a system of governance in which equality in political representation in the national government and/or at the state level is achieved through the principle of equitable and fair tribal representation.

If South Sudanese people can devise and institutionalize an inclusive system of governance, which, in word and practice, could be seen as fair, just and equitable for all the ethnic groups of South Sudan, then the fight against tribalism will be won and South Sudan will avoid the pitfalls of her fellow post-colonial African countries by becoming a successful, new, prosperous nation because a political system where representatives of a particular ethnic group hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group represents will promote and preserve peace and harmony among all the ethnic group of that nation.

In the second part of this article, I am going to use the blueprint of tribocracy to demonstrate, in a logical and effective way, how power-mapping of ethnicity in South Sudan can enable us to address the mortal threat of tribalism to our national existence. Hopefully, with more honest, constructive and reflective national discourse, we can put together a coherent leadership and unity framework to manage and achieve the proverbial “unity in diversity” across Africa.

Sadly, Africans have skirted around this issue of tribalism for decades, refusing to take the bull by the horns, but instead preferring to bury their head in the sand of complacency. Therefore, any argument about the elimination of tribalism in Africa, if it is to be honest and effective, must commence with tribocracy because nothing would make us more secure and stable than a fair and equitable sharing of power among different ethnic groups through a tribocratic system of governance.

III

According to the record of Hon. Isaiah Chol Aruai, the commissioner of the South Sudan’s National Bureau of Statistics and Census, the current population of the Republic of South Sudan, based on the May 2008 Sudan fifth population and housing census, stands at approximately 8.26 millions. In order to determine whether representatives of a particular ethnic group in South Sudan hold a number of governmental posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group represents, we must look at the available hard data for guidance.

But before scrutinizing the raw numbers per county, we must first clearly define some terminologies encompassing political forces prevailing in our republic. The first is political caucus—the dominant political force or group that inhabits that particular county, while the second one is political constituency—the sub-group of the dominant political force in that particular county. The third is Mukaji, an acronym for Murle, Kachipo and Jie, the ethnic communities that inhabit Greater Pibor area, currently known as the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) under the leadership of the renegade militia leader, David Yau-Yau of SSDM/A—Cobra Faction.

Secondly, the 2010 census was based on residency, not birth, and therefore does not reflect the exact numbers of political caucuses shown below. For example, Dinkas who were living abroad (USA, Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand etc.) or in the neighboring countries (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Khartoum etc.) or in cities (Juba, Malakal, Wau, Torit, Kapoeta) or in the various military barracks and displacement camps across South Sudan, were not counted and are consequently not reflected in the analysis of their respective political caucuses and constituencies. This picture is as true for the Nuers as it is for Equatorians and the Minority groups.

Lastly, there are few counties that are shared by more than one political caucus or constituent. The Rek Dinka (Wau-Makwei-Akech) and the Fertit/Luo communities, for instance, inhabit Jur-River County in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. In most counties, however, this is an exception rather than the rule.

Below is the comprehensive breakdown of the raw numbers by counties:

Table I: Raw Numbers per County

State	County	Political Caucus	Political Constituency	Population (2008 Census)	National Percentage
Jonglei	Twic East	Dinka	Boor Dinka	85,349	1.03%
Duk	Dinka	Boor Dinka	65,588	0.79%
Boor	Dinka	Boor Dinka	221,106	2.68%
Pigi	Dinka	Padaang Dinka	99,068	1.19%
Akobo	Nuer	Lou Nuer	136,210	1.65%
Ayod	Nuer	Phow Nuer	139,282	1.69%
Fangak	Nuer	Phow Nuer	110,130	1.33%
Nyirol	Nuer	Lou Nuer	108,674	1.32%
Pibor	Minority Group	Mukaji[3]	148,475	1.79%
Wuror	Nuer	Lou Nuer	178,519	2.16%
Pochalla	Minority Group	Anyuak	66,201	0.80%
Upper Nile	Baliet	Dinka	Padaang Dinka	48,010	0.58%
Kodok/Fashoda	Minority Group	Shilluk	36,518	0.44%
Longochuk	Nuer	Jikany Nuer	63,166	0.76%
Nasir/Luakpiny	Nuer	Jikany Nuer	210,002	2.54%
Maban	Minority Groups	Buny	45,238	0.55%
Maiwut	Nuer	Jikany Nuer	79,462	0.96%
Malakal	Minority Group	Shilluk	126,483	1.53%
Manyo	Minority Group	Shilluk	38,010	0.46%
Melut	Dinka	Padaang Dinka	49,242	0.59%
Panyikang	Minority Group	Shilluk	45,427	0.55%
Renk	Dinka	Padaang Dinka	137,751	1.67%
Ulang	Nuer	Jikany Nuer	85,044	1.03%
Unity	Abiemnhom	Dinka	Padaang Dinka	17,012	0.21%
Pariang	Dinka	Padaang Dinka	82,443	0.99%
Guit	Nuer	Liech Nuer	33,004	0.39%
Koch	Nuer	Liech Nuer	74,863	0.91%
Leer	Nuer	Liech Nuer	53,022	0.64%
Mayendit	Nuer	Liech Nuer	53,783	0.65%
Mayom	Nuer	Liech Nuer	120,715	1.46%
Panyijar	Nuer	Liech Nuer	50,723	0.61%
Rubkona	Nuer	Liech Nuer	100,236	1.21%
Lakes	Awerial	Dinka	Agaar Dinka	47,041	0.57%
Cueibet	Dinka	Agaar Dinka	117,755	1.43%
Rumbek Center	Dinka	Agaar Dinka	153,550	1.86%
Rumbek East	Dinka	Agaar Dinka	122,832	1.49%
Rumbek North	Dinka	Agaar Dinka	43,410	0.53%
Yirol East	Dinka	Agaar Dinka	67,402	0.82%
Yirol West	Dinka	Agaar Dinka	103,190	1.25%
Wulu	Minority Group	Jur-Bhel	40,550	0.49%
Warrap	Abyei	Dinka	Padaang Dinka	52,883	0.64%
Gogrial East	Dinka	Rek Dinka	103,283	1.25%
Gogrial West	Dinka	Rek Dinka	243,921	2.95%
Tonj East	Dinka	Rek Dinka	116,122	1.41%
Tonj North	Dinka	Rek Dinka-	165,222	2.00%
Tonj South	Dinka	Rek Dinka	86,592	1.05%
Twic	Dinka	Rek Dinka	204,905	2.48%
NBG[4]	Aweil Center	Dinka	Rek Dinka	41,827	0.51%
Aweil East	Dinka	Rek Dinka	309,921	3.75%
Aweil North	Dinka	Rek Dinka	129,127	1.56%
Aweil South	Dinka	Rek Dinka	73,806	0.89%
Aweil West	Dinka	Rek Dinka	166,217	2.01%
WBG[5]	Jur River[6]	Minority Group	Jur-Chol/Rek Dinka	127,771	1.55%
Raga	Minority Group	Jur-Chat, Fertit	54,340	0.66%
Wau	Minority Group	Fertit, Jur-Chol,	151,320	1.83%
WES[7]	Ezo	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	80,861	0.98%
Ibba	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	41,869	0.51%
Maridi	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	82,461	0.99%
Mundri East	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	48,318	0.59%
Mundri West	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	33,975	0.41%
Mvolo	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	48,134	0.58%
Nagero	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	10,077	0.12%
Nzara	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	65,712	0.79%
Tambura	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	55,365	0.67%
Yambio	Equatorian	Western Equatorians	152,257	1.84%
CES[8]	Juba	Equatorian	Central Equatorians	368,436	4.46%
Kajo-Keji	Equatorian	Central Equatorians	196,387	2.38%
Lainya	Equatorian	Central Equatorians	89,315	1.08%
Morobo	Equatorian	Central Equatorians	103,603	1.25%
Terekeka	Equatorian	Central Equatorians	144,373	1.75%
Yei	Equatorian	Central Equatorians	201,443	2.44%
EES[9]	Budi	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	99,234	1.20%
Ikotos	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	84,649	1.03%
Kapoeta East	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	163,997	1.99%
Kapoeta North	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	103,084	1.25%
Kapoeta South	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	79,470	0.96%
Lopa	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	106,161	1.29%
Magwi	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	169,826	2.06%
Torit	Equatorian	Eastern Equatorians	99,740	1.21%

–

We can infer, from Table I, the approximate percentage proportion of each of the reported 64 ethnic communities of South Sudan. For example, the Taposa tribe is about 4.20% of South Sudan’s national population; Shilluk about 2.98%; Rek Dinka about 19.86%; Nuer about 19.33%; Anyuak about 0.80% while Boor Dinka about 4.50%. What this means is that if government positions were to be allocated base on the percentage proportion of each tribe of South Sudan, then the Taposa ethnic group would receive 4.20% of the national government in Juba; Shilluk about 2.98%; Rek Dinka about 19.86%; Nuer about 19.33%; Anyuak about 0.80% while Boor Dinka about 4.50%, to mention but just a few.

Each representative of these particular ethnic groups in South Sudan would hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that each of these particular ethnic groups represent. Arguably, this would be a free and fair system of governance, and justice would be seen done because each ethnic group would be allocated nothing but its fair and rightful share in the national government as predetermined by their population size. In other words, no ethnic group would feel unjustly marginalized in the political, economic and social benefits accruable from being part and parcel of the national government. Political stability would ensue; peace and national development would flourish and the evil of tribalism that has been bedeviling Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region would be greatly blunted.

However, with about 64 ethnic groups in the Republic of South Sudan, it would be a daunting task to satisfy each and every tribe in the country with a seat at the national government. Therefore, taking ’64 tribe’ as the defining unit of tribocracy would render it impractical when it comes to actual implementation and governance. Although ethnicity is the strongest indicator of identity politics[10] in South Sudan, we must discard the concept of ‘64 tribes’ as the basis of power sharing in a tribocratic government because it is impractical and thus ineffective.

IV

If ‘64 tribes’ cannot function as an effective and useful basis for determining a power sharing formula in South Sudan, then it would be tempting to consider regionalism. Table II shows raw numbers and the proportionate percentage share of each region relative to national population according to the 2010 census.

Table II: Raw Numbers per Region

Code	Region	Capital City	Population (1983)	Population (2008)	National Percent (2010 Census)
01	Greater Upper Nile	Malakal	1,657,576	2,908,756	35.21%
02	Greater Bahr el Ghazal	Wau	2,265,510	2,722,987	32.96%
03	Greater Equatoria	Juba	1,006,181	2,628,747	31.82%
	TOTAL		4,929,267	8,260,490	100%

–

There are three major regions in the Republic of South Sudan, namely the Greater Upper Nile region—comprising the three states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile—with about 2.91 million people; the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, which is made up of the four states of Warrap, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Bahr el Ghazal, with around 2.72 million people, and the Greater Equatoria region, composed of the three states of Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria, which house about 2.63 million inhabitants.

Thus, from the total population of 8.26 million citizens of the Republic of South Sudan, 35.21% of them reside in the Greater Upper Nile region; 32.96% in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, while 31.82% live in the Greater Equatoria region. Tribocratically speaking, it means that in term of an equitable and fair political representation in the national government in Juba, the Greater Upper Nile region would get 35.21% share of the national government; the Greater Bahr el Ghazal would take home 32.96% share of the national government, while the Greater Equatoria region would pocket the remaining percentage of 31.82% of the national government.

Firstly, this would be free and fair, equitable sharing of the national cake. Justice would be done because each region has been allocated nothing but its fair and rightful share in the national government as predetermined by their proportionate population size. In other words, no region would feel unjustly marginalized in the political, economic and social benefits accruable from being part and parcel of the national government. Political stability would ensue; peace and national development would flourish and tribalism would be blunted.

Secondly, there is a perceptible association of regionalism with identity politics in South Sudan. During the regional government—the High Executive Council (HEC)—of Justice Abel Alier Kwai and Gen. Joseph Lagu Yang’a, regionalism was the game in town especially in the politics of Kokoraism championed by Gen. Joseph Lagu. Their self-defeating political tussling gave rise to the birth of the three greater regions of South Sudan—Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria, courtesy of President Gaafar Nimeiry.

Although regionalism was more pronounced in Equatoria than in Upper Nile or Bahr el Ghazal during the regional government of the 1980s, it later became handy to Commander Salva Kiir in 2002 when Riek Machar returned to the fold after his futile political adventures in Khartoum. When Riek Machar returned to the SPLM/A in 2002, the general understanding—dating back to the days of inter-factional peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, mediated by Church leaders—was that Dr. John Garang would retain his position as chairman and C-in-C of the SPLM/A while Riek Machar would become his deputy.

Commander Salva Kiir, however, successfully argued that both Garang and Riek hail from the Greater Upper Nile region and cannot therefore be allowed to occupy the two topmost positions of the Movement. The deadlock was broken when Commander James Wani Igga volunteered his number-three position to accommodate Riek Machar for the sake of unity and reconciliation among South Sudanese and for the cause of the marginalized people of South Sudan.

In the ongoing IGAD-led South Sudan’s peace talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, regionalism has once more become a handy tool for Riek Machar to push for the position of the first vice president over and above the current occupant, James Wani Igga. Riek Machar and his supporters assert that Equatoria, represented by its three states and governors, is not one tribe and that the Greater Upper Nile region where Riek Machar hails from is greater than the Greater Equatoria region that is purportedly represented by James Wani Igga.

Thus, one can reasonably advocate that regionalism can act as a blue print for power sharing in South Sudan not only because of its historical roots but also because of the emotional cord it invokes among the people of the Greater Equatoria region. However, regionalism is less of a political force in the Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal regions. Although Riek Machar may claim to represent the Greater Upper Nile region in his quest to unseat James Wani Igga, the non-Nuer ethnic communities of the Greater Upper Nile region such as the Dinka, Shilluk, Murle, Anyuak, etc. would undoubtedly contest such political characterization.

Hence, although regionalism is the strongest indicator of identity politics in the Greater Equatoria region, it is much less conspicuous in both the Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal regions. Therefore, we must abandon regionalism as the basis of power sharing in a tribocratic government because it is contested and thus ineffective.

V

If either ‘64 tribes’ or regionalism cannot function as an effective and useful basis for determining a power sharing formula in South Sudan, then it would be tempting to consider state-ism. In Table III below, we can see the population size of each of the ten states of South Sudan plus their proportionate percentage share relative to the national population according to the 2010 census.

Table III: Raw Numbers per State

Code	State	Capital City	Population (1983)	Population (2008)	National Percent (2008 Census)
01	Jonglei	Bor	797,251	1,358,602	16.45%
02	Upper Nile	Malakal	549,283	964,353	11.68%
03	Unity	Bentiu	311,042	585,801	7.09%
04	Lakes	Rumbek	504,468	695,730	8.43%
05	Warrap	Kuajok	794,231	972,928	11.78%
06	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Aweil	746,358	720,898	8.73%
07	Western Bahr el Ghazal	Wau	220,453	333,431	4.04%
08	Eastern Equatoria	Torit	81,683	906,161	10.97%
09	Central Equatoria	Juba	565,442	1,103,557	13.36%
10	Western Equatoria	Yambio	359,056	619,029	7.50%
	TOTAL		4,929,267	8,260,490	100%

–

There are 10 states in the Republic of South Sudan (see Table III above). What this means is that if cabinet and other high profile government positions were to be allocated based on the percentage proportion of each state, then Jonglei state would get about 16.45% of the national government; Central Equatoria state about 13.36%; Warrap state about 11.78%; Upper Nile about 11.68%; Eastern Equatoria state about 10.97%; Northern Bahr el Ghazal about 8.73%; Lakes state about 8.43%; Western Equatoria state about 7.50%; Unity state about 7.09% and Western Bahr el Ghazal with about 4.04%.

This would be a free and fair system of governance, and justice would be done because each state would be allocated nothing but its fair and rightful share in the national government as predetermined by their population size. In other words, no state would feel unjustly marginalized in the political, economic and social benefits accruable from being part and parcel of the national government. Political stability would ensue; peace and national development would flourish and tribalism would be blunted.

Nonetheless, state-ism is not a viable basis for power sharing in South Sudan because hardly any section of the South Sudanese society readily identifies with their state as much as they do with ethnicity across the nation or regionalism among the Equatorians. Therefore, we must reject state-ism as the basis for power sharing in a tribocratic government because it is irrelevant and thus ineffective.

VI

With ethnicity, regionalism and state-ism being no basis for an effective power sharing mechanism in South Sudan—either because they are impractical (ethnicity) or contested (regionalism) or irrelevant (state-ism)—there is an exigency to establish a new, effective and relevant basis to allocate and share power among our people. In my opinion, this should be what I called political caucus and constituency. A political caucus is the main dominant political group with the most influential political force in the country, while a political constituency is the sub-group of the main dominant political group with the most influential political force.

Therefore, in our case, political caucuses are the most influential political force in the Republic of South Sudan. On the one hand, there are four major political caucuses in South Sudan, namely the Dinka, the Equatorian, the Nuer and the Minority Group (see Table VI). On the other hand, there are about seventeen political constituencies (see Table V).

Table IV: Raw Numbers per County

Political Caucus	Political Constituency	Ethnic Group	County	Population 2008 Census	National Percentage
Dinka	Boor Dinka	Twic Mabioordit	Twic East	85,349	1.03%
Boor Dinka	Boor	Boor	221,106	2.68%
Boor Dinka	Nyarweng, Hol,	Duk	65,588	0.79%
Padaang Dinka	Paweny, Rut, Thoi, Luach	Pigi	99,068	1.19%
Padaang Dinka	Aloor,	Abiemnhom	17,012	0.21%
Padaang Dinka	Panaruu	Pariang	82,443	0.99%
Padaang Dinka	Abiliang, Dongjol	Renk	137,751	1.67%
Padaang Dinka	Ageer, Nyiel,	Melut	49,242	0.59%
Padaang Dinka	Ngok-Lual Yak	Baliet	48,010	0.58%
Padaang Dinka	Ngok Abyei (Jook)	Abyei	52,883	0.64%
Agaar Dinka	Aliab	Awerial	47,041	0.57%
Agaar Dinka	Gok	Cueibet	117,755	1.43%
Agaar Dinka	Agaar (Kwei, Ruup)	Rumbek Center	153,550	1.86%
Agaar Dinka	Agaar (Aliamtooch)	Rumbek East	122,832	1.49%
Agaar Dinka	Agaar (Pakam)	Rumbek North	43,410	0.53%
Agaar Dinka	Ciec	Yirol East	67,402	0.82%
Agaar Dinka	Atuot	Yirol West	103,190	1.25%
Rek Dinka	Apuk-Giir	Gogrial East	103,283	1.25%
Rek Dinka	Awan-Chan, Awan-Mou, Aguok, Kuach	Gogrial West	243,921	2.95%
Rek Dinka	Thiik, Luach-Jang, Luach-Koth, Akook, Jal-Wou,	Tonj East	116,122	1.41%
Rek Dinka	Konggoor, Noi, Atok, Abiem, Abuok, Nyang, Leer, Awan-Parek, Lou-Ariik, Lou-Paher, Apuk-Padoch	Tonj North	165,222	2.00%
Rek Dinka	Yaar, Thony, Apuk-Jurwiir, Muok,	Tonj South	86,592	1.05%
Rek Dinka	Twic Mayaardit	Twic	204,905	2.48%
Rek Dinka	Malual-Giernyang	Aweil Center	41,827	0.51%
Rek Dinka	Abiem	Aweil East	309,921	3.75%
Rek Dinka	Malual-Giernyang	Aweil North	129,127	1.56%
Rek Dinka	Ajak, Buoncuai, Kongdeer,	Aweil South	73,806	0.89%
Rek Dinka	Malual-Giernyang	Aweil West	166,217	2.01%
Equatorian	Western Equatorians	Zande	Ezo	80,861	0.98%
Western Equatorians	Zande	Ibba	41,869	0.51%
Western Equatorians	Moru, Avukaya, Mundu, Baka	Maridi	82,461	0.99%
Western Equatorians	Moru,	Mundri East	48,318	0.59%
Western Equatorians	Moru	Mundri West	33,975	0.41%
Western Equatorians	Jur-Bhel, Moru	Mvolo	48,134	0.58%
Western Equatorians	Zande, Balanda	Nagero	10,077	0.12%
Western Equatorians	Zande	Nzara	65,712	0.79%
Western Equatorians	Zande, Balanda	Tambura	55,365	0.67%
Western Equatorians	Zande	Yambio	152,257	1.84%
Central Equatorians	Bari, Nyangwara, Lokoya	Juba	368,436	4.46%
Central Equatorians	Kuku	Kajo-Keji	196,387	2.38%
Central Equatorians	Pajulu	Lainya	89,315	1.08%
Central Equatorians	Kakwa, Keliko	Morobo	103,603	1.25%
Central Equatorians	Mundari	Terekeka	144,373	1.75%
Central Equatorians	Kakwa, Pajulu, Avukaya,	Yei	201,443	2.44%
Eastern Equatorians	Buya, Didinga	Budi	99,234	1.20%
Eastern Equatorians	Lang’o, Logir, Dongotano	Ikotos	84,649	1.03%
Eastern Equatorians	Taposa, Nyangatom	Kapoeta East	163,997	1.99%
Eastern Equatorians	Taposa	Kapoeta North	103,084	1.25%
Eastern Equatorians	Taposa	Kapoeta South	79,470	0.96%
Eastern Equatorians	Lopit, Pari, Tenet	Lopa	106,161	1.29%
Eastern Equatorians	Madi, Acholi	Magwi	169,826	2.06%
Eastern Equatorians	Lotuho, Horiok	Torit	99,740	1.21%
Nuer	Lou Nuer	Chieng-Dak	Wuror	178,519	2.16%
Lou Nuer	Gatbaal	Nyirol	108,674	1.32%
Lou Nuer	Moor	Akobo	136,210	1.65%
Phow Nuer	Gawaar	Ayod	139,282	1.69%
Phow Nuer	Laak, Thiang	Fangak	110,130	1.33%
Jikany Nuer	Gajaak (Chieng-Wau)	Maiwut	79,462	0.96%
Jikany Nuer	Gajaak (Thiang)	Longochuk	63,166	0.76%
Jikany Nuer	Gajook (Chieng-Lang)	Ulang	85,044	1.03%
Jikany Nuer	Gajook (Chieng-Nyilieth), Gaguang	Nasir/Luakpiny	210,002	2.54%
Liech Nuer	Bul	Mayom	120,715	1.46%
Liech Nuer	Jangei	Koch	74,863	0.91%
Liech Nuer	Dok	Leer	53,022	0.64%
Liech Nuer	Hak	Mayendit	53,783	0.65%
Liech Nuer	Western Jikany	Guit	33,004	0.39%
Liech Nuer	Nyuong	Panyijar	50,723	0.61%
Liech Nuer	Leek	Rubkona	100,236	1.21%
Minority Group	Shilluk	Shilluk	Kodok/Fashoda	36,518	0.44%
Shilluk	Shilluk	Malakal	126,483	1.53%
Shilluk	Shilluk	Manyo	38,010	0.46%
Shilluk	Shilluk	Panyikang	45,427	0.55%
Buny	Buny	Maban	45,238	0.55%
Mukaji	Murle, Jie, Kachipo	Pibor	148,475	1.79%
Anyuak	Anyuak	Pochalla	66,201	0.80%
Luo	Jur-Bhel	Wulu	40,550	0.49%
Luo	Jur-Chol	Jur River[11]	127,771	1.55%
Fertit	Balanda, Jur-Chat	Raga	54,340	0.66%
Fertit	Balanda	Wau	151,320	1.83%
TOTAL				8,260,490	100%

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Table V: Raw Numbers per Political Constituency

Political Caucus	Political Constituency	Ethnic Group	Population (2008)	Political Caucus %	National % (2008)
Dinka	Rek Dinka	Tonj Dinka, Aweil Dinka, Gogrial Dinka	1,640,943	52.02%	19.86%
Agaar Dinka	Agaar, Aliab, Atuot, Ciec, Gok	655,180	20.76%	7.93%
Padaang Dinka	Panaruu, Thoi, Ngok Abyei, Luach, Ageer, Paweny, Rut, Aloor, Nyiel, Ngok-Lual Yak, Abiliang, Dongjol,	486,409	15.41%	5.88%
Boor Dinka	Bor, Hol, Nyarweng, Twic Mabioordit	372,043	11.79%	4.50%
Nuer	Liech Nuer	Leek, Nyuong, Dok, Bul, Hak, Jangei, Western Jikany	486,346	30.45%	5.87%
Jikany Nuer	Gajaak, Gajook, Gaguong	437,674	27.41%	5.29%
Lou Nuer	Moor, Chieng-Dak, Gatbaal	423,403	26.51%	5.13%
Phow Nuer	Laak, Gawaar, Thiang	249,412	15.61%	3.02%
Equatorian	Centralers	Bari, Mundari, Kuku, Pajulu, Kakwa, Keliko, Nyangwara, Lokoya	1,103,557	41.98%	13.36%
Easterners	Latuko, Buya, Taposa, Madi, Acholi, Lango, Didinga, Logir, Lopit, Pari, Tenet, Horiok, Nyangatom, Dongotano	906,161	34.47%	10.99%
Westerners	Zande, Mundu, Moru, Balanda, Baka, Jur-Bhel, Avukaya	619,029	23.54%	7.48%
Minority Group	Shilluk	Shilluk	246,438	27.99%	2.98%
Mukaji	Murle, Kachipo, Jie	148,475	16.86%	1.79%
Anyuak	Anyuak	66,201	7.52%	0.80%
Maban	Buny	45,238	5.14%	0.55%
Fertit	Balanda, Jur-Chat	205,660	23.36%	2.49%
Luo	Jur-Chol, Jur-Bhel	168,321	19.12%	2.04%
TOTAL			8,260,490	100%	100%

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Table VI: Raw Numbers per Political Caucus

Code	Political Caucus	Political Constituency	Population (2008)	National Percent (2008 Census)
01	Dinka	Boor, Agaar, Rek, Padaang	3,154,575	38.18%
02	Equatorian	Easterners, Centralers, Westerners	2,628,747	31.82%
03	Nuer	Lou, Jikany, Liech, Phow	1,596,835	19.33%
04	Minority Group	Shilluk, Fertit, Mukaji, Buny, Anyuak, Luo	880,333	10.65%
	TOTAL		8,260,490	100%

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Based on Table VI, I would argue that there are only four major tribes in South Sudan—Dinka, Equatorian, Nuer and Minority Group. The Dinka tribe is divided into four major political constituencies: Rek, Agaar, Boor and Padaang Dinkas. The Equatorian tribe is made up of the following political constituencies: Central, Eastern and Western Equatorians. The Nuer tribe consists of four major political constituencies, namely, the Lou, Jikany, Liech and Phow Nuers. The group of minority tribes is composed of the Shilluk, Fertit, Mukaji, Buny, Anyuak and the Luo.

Whereas a political caucus is a viable tool to share power horizontally among these four tribes of South Sudan, political constituent is an effective mechanism to allocate power vertically within those tribes. Using a political caucus as a defining unit of power sharing among the 64 tribes of South Sudan under a tribocratic dispensation, we can divine the approximate percentage proportion of each of the four political caucuses in South Sudan.

For example, the Dinka caucus is about 38.18% of South Sudan’s national population; the Equatorian caucus about 31.82%; the Nuer caucus about 19.33%, while the Minority Group is around 10.65%. What this means is that if government positions were to be allocated based on the percentage proportion of each political caucus of South Sudan, then the Dinka caucus would receive 38.18% of South Sudan’s national government in Juba; the Equatorian caucus about 31.82%; the Nuer caucus about 19.33%, and the Minority Group around 10.65%.

Again, using political constituency as a defining unit of power sharing within the four political caucuses under a tribocratic dispensation, we can divine the approximate percentage proportion of each of the seventeen political constituents in South Sudan. For example, within the Dinka caucus, the Rek Dinka would take about 52.02% of the 38.18% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 19.86% of the national government in Juba; the Agaar Dinka about 20.76% of the 38.18% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 7.93% of the national government in Juba; the Padaang Dinka about 15.41% of the 38.18% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 5.88% of the national government in Juba, and the Boor Dinka about 11.79% of the 38.18% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 4.50% of the national government in Juba.

Within the Equatorian caucus, the blue print of political constituency would guide us to arrive at the following conclusion: Western Equatorians would get roughly 23.54% of the 31.82% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 7.48% of the national government in Juba; Central Equatorians would get roughly 41.98% of the 31.82% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 13.36% of the national government in Juba, and Eastern Equatorians would get roughly 34.47% of the 31.82% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 10.99% of the national government in Juba.

For the Nuer caucus, the Lou Nuer would receive approximately 26.51% of the 19.33% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 5.13% of the national government in Juba; the Jikany Nuer would receive approximately 27.41% of the 19.33% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 5.29% of the national government in Juba; the Liech Nuer would receive approximately 30.45% of the 19.33% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 5.87% of the national government in Juba, and the Phow Nuer would receive approximately 15.61% of the 19.33% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 3.02% of the national government in Juba.

Lastly, within the Minority Group caucus, the Shilluk would get about 27.99% of the 10.65% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 2.98% of the national government in Juba; the Mukaji would get about 16.86% of the 10.65% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 1.79% of the national government in Juba; the Fertit would get about 23.36% of the 10.65% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 2.49% of the national government in Juba; the Anyuak would get about 7.52% of the 10.65% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 0.80% of the national government in Juba; the Luo would get about 19.12% of the 10.65% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 2.04% of the national government in Juba, and the Buny of Maban would get about 5.14% of the 10.65% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 0.55% of the national government in Juba;

The same process can be applied and used to allocate and share power within each and every ethnic group of the political caucus of South Sudan. For example, within the Boor Dinka ethnic community, which is composed of Boor, Twic Mabioordit, Hol and Nyarweng communities, we can further infer that the Boor Dinka community would get about 59.34%[12] of the 11.79%[13] of the 38.18%[14] of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 2.68% of the national government in Juba; the Twic-Mabioordit Dinka community would get about 22.94% of the 11.79% of the 38.18% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 1.03% of the national government in Juba, and the Nyarweng and Hol communities of Duk county would get about 17.62% of the 11.79% of the 38.18% of South Sudan’s national government, which is around 0.79% of the national government in Juba.

VII

What this mean is that each representative of the ‘64 tribes’ in South Sudan would hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that each of these particular ethnic groups represents. Arguably, this would be a free and fair system of governance, and justice would be done because each ethnic group would be allocated nothing but its fair and rightful share in the national government as predetermined by their population size. In other words, none of the 64 ethnic groups would feel unjustly marginalized in the political, economic and social benefits accruable from being part and parcel of the national government. Political stability would ensue; peace and national development would flourish and the evil of tribalism that has been bedeviling Sub-Saharan African region would be greatly blunted.

Most importantly, the four categories of political caucuses are integral part of identity politics in the Republic of South Sudan. It is not unusual to hear people talking of ‘Dinka domination’ of the national government in Juba, of the chronic ‘Nuer rebellion’ year in year out, of the pervasive neo-Kokoraism mindset among the Equatorians, and of the utter marginalization of the minority groups in South Sudan, the consequence of which was the recent establishment of the Greater Pibor Area Administration to address the purported marginalization of the Murle ethnic community in the administration of Jonglei state.

With political caucus as the formula for power allocation and sharing in South Sudan, the problem of Dinka domination, of Nuer rebellion, of Kokoraism sugarcoated as federalism among the Equatorians, and of political and economic marginalization of minority communities can be addressed and solved. Although there is no particular political group that advocates for the interest of the minority groups in South Sudan, it is the case that most South Sudanese readily identify with the Dinka, Equatorian, and Nuer identity politics.

Thus, we can proclaim that tribocracy would act as a blue print for power sharing in South Sudan because, with the help of the political caucus and constituency mechanism, we could reasonably satisfy each and every tribe in the country with a seat at the national government. Tribocratic dispensation is therefore a viable—practical, relevant and effective—basis for power allocation and sharing among the citizens of South Sudan in particular and Africa in general.

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PaanLuel Wël is the Managing Editor of PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese Bloggers (SSB). He can be reached through his Facebook page, Twitter account or email: paanluel2011@gmail.com

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[1] Michael Green’s TED Talk (2014), “What the Social Progress Index can reveal about your country.”

[2] PaanLuel Wël (2015), “The Principle of Tribocracy, Part One”.

[3] Mukaji is an acronym for Murle, Kachipo and Jie, the ethnic communities that inhabit Greater Pibor area, currently known as the Greater Pibor Administrative Area under the leadership of the renegade militia leader, David Yau-Yau

[4] NBG represents Northern Bahr el Ghazal state (Aweil)

[5] WBG represents Western Bahr el Ghazal state (Wau)

[6] Jur-River County in Western Bahr el Ghazal state is shared by the Rek Dinka (Wau-Makwei-Akech) and the Fertit/Luo communities.

[7] WES represents Western Equatoria state (Yambio)

[8] CES represents Central Equatoria state (Juba)

[9] EES represents Eastern Equatoria state (Torit)

[10] According to Rationalwiki.org, identity politics is a political style that focuses on the issues relevant to various groups defined by a wide variety of shared characteristics, including, but not limited to, race, social class, religion, sex, gender, ethnicity, ideology, nationality, sexual orientation, gender expression, culture, currency, shared history, medical conditions, profession, and other of the many ways in which people differ from each other, and into which they may be classified or classify themselves.

[11] Jur-River County in Western Bahr el Ghazal state is shared by the Rek Dinka (Wau-Makwei-Akech) and the Fertit/Luo (Jurchol) communities. For the sake of this study, I am going to allocate 100% of the population to Jurchol, just to simplify my calculations and to elucidate my point of argument. Interested parties should go to the ground to ascertain the official numbers for each of the two communities for themselves.

[12] 59.43% is the proportionate percentage of the Boor Dinka community within the three counties of the Greater Boor Dinka community: Boor, Twic East and Duk County.

[13] 11.79% is the proportionate percentage of the Greater Boor Dinka community within the entire Dinka community: Rek, Agaar, Boor and Padaang Dinka

[14] 38.18% is the proportionate percentage of the Dinka political caucus in the Republic of South Sudan

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