Making Sense of the New IGAD’s Peace Proposal: Addis Ababa II or CPA II?
Making Sense of the New IGAD’s Peace Proposal: Is it Addis Ababa Agreement II or Comprehensive Peace Agreement II?
By PaanLuel Wël, Juba, South Sudan
June 15, 2015 (SSB) — One of the revolutionary songs during South Sudanese’ long liberationary struggle goes like this: “Acee luk bere luuk, Addis Ababa nimr eteneen, Addis Ababa nimr eteneen…” which, roughly speaking, translates to “our new revolutionary struggle is not gonna be negotiated into another hollow Addis Ababa Agreement II…” True to their bravado, the SPLM/A’s revolutionary war ended with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that, unlike the 1972 Addis Ababa accord, enshrined a secessionist clause and a standing army as guarantee against any violation of the agreement. The CPA-mandated plebiscite of 2011 led to the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011.
The CPA that resulted in the secession of South Sudan from Khartoum was negotiated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an eleven-member regional bloc formed in 1986 with the goal to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration among the countries of East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania), African Great Lakes (Rwanda, Burundi), Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia) and the Nile Valley (South Sudan, Sudan) with headquarters in Djibouti city. Thus, when civil war broke out in the infant nation of South Sudan, barely three years into its independence, it was natural that IGAD would be looked upon to bring about a speedy end to the raging conflict and to deliver peace and reconciliation to the suffering people of South Sudan.
Now, the IGAD mediators, after their long consultation, have unveiled new peace proposal to end the war in South Sudan. According to the new peace proposal, the leadership structure will have President Kiir as the executive president and head of government, Dr. Riek Machar as the first vice president, and James Wani Igga as the 2nd vice president—simply the status quo that existed prior to the sacking Dr. Riek Machar in July 2013. Juba, the capital city, would be demilitarized for a 90-day pre-interim period, purportedly to allow safe return of the rebel leaders back into the country.
In term of power sharing arrangements, IGAD has proposed that the government under President Kiir will have 53%, rebels under Dr. Riek Machar 33%, and other stakeholders including the G-10 under Pagan Amum 14% of the national government in Juba. At the state level, the government under President Kiir will take 100% of all states in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria regions while the rebels under Dr. Riek Machar will be given 53% in all states of the Greater Upper Nile region including the three Governors of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States who shall then form their cabinet, giving away only 33% to President Kiir and 14% to other stakeholders including the G-10 under Pagan Amum.
The national assembly in Juba will add additional 50 members for the rebels under Riek Machar and 16 members for other stakeholders including the G-10. At state level, 53% of the state legislative assembly will be given to the rebels, 33% to the government, and 14% to other stakeholders including the G-10 in the Greater Upper Nile region, while in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria regions, the government will take 53%, rebels 33%, and 14% to other stakeholders including the G-10.
The leadership structure and the power sharing ratios of 53% for the government, 33% for the rebels and 14% for other political parties is a reasonable proposal and should be acceptable to the warring parties. While the Dinka communities in the Greater Upper Nile—in the counties of Bor, Twic East, Duk and Pigi in Jonglei state; Abiemnhom and Panrieng in Unity state, and Renk, Baliet, and Melut in Upper Nile state—who bore the brunt of this war may find it unacceptable to be placed under the leadership of rebel governors appointed by Riek Machar, the fact of the matter is that the Nuer are the majority in the Greater Upper Nile region.
Of the total Greater Upper Nile region’s population of 2,908,756, the Nuer are 1,596,835, a whopping 54.89% of the region. The Dinka communities, at 805,569 in number, consist of just 27.69%. In fact, if IGAD proposal was to be exact, the rebels should have been given 54%, not 53%, of the Greater Upper Nile region. Under a free and fair democratic election, a Nuer will always be a governor in all the three states of the Greater Upper Nile region, as currently the case in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, allegiance notwithstanding.
However, the new peace proposal released by IGAD is anything but a peaceful settlement to the civil war in South Sudan. Surely, leadership structure is sensible and can break the political stalemate in Addis Ababa. Nonetheless, where IGAD proposal has fundamentally come short is the apparent, brazen division of South Sudan into two mini-states with President Kiir reigning in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria regions while Dr. Riek Machar assumed ownership of the Greater Upper Nile region, ostensibly, including the main oilfields of Paloch in northern Upper Nile state and Tharjath in Unity state where 98% of government revenue comes from.
Left unsaid, but discernibly explicit to all asunder, is the status of government troops in the Greater Upper Nile region assigned to the rebels of Riek Machar. Obviously, for Riek Machar to exercise full authority in the Greater Upper Nile region as stipulated in the new IGAD peace proposal, the government troops in the garrison towns of Bor, Ayod, Gadiang, Bentiu, Mayom, Malakal, Nasir, Renk, Paloch, Melut etc. will have to be withdrawn completely. All government soldiers would have to be evacuated from Greater Upper Nile and rebel troops from the Greater Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria regions, much the same way that Khartoum troops were removed from Southern Sudan after the CPA.
Technically speaking, for the 18 months that full integration between the government and rebel troops would be initiated and carried out, there could be one country, with two governments guaranteed by two separate armies. This would be like the six years of the interim period after the CPA, where there was a regional government in Juba with a standing army (SPLA) and a national government in Khartoum with the national army.
This is a typical copy-and-paste scenario of either the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that resulted in the Bor Uprising of 1983 or the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that led to the secession of South Sudan from Khartoum in July 2011. When Gen. Joseph Lagu signed the 1972 Addis Ababa accord with President Nimeiri, the Anyanya One freedom fighters were given an autonomous government to rule in Juba, Southern Sudan, and the post of second vice president in the national government in Khartoum. Meanwhile, President Nimeiri retained his executive powers as the overall President of the Sudan, in charge of all the national army. The Anyanya One soldiers were hurriedly integrated into the Sudan national army. The end result was the eruption of the second civil war on May 16th, 1983, in Bor, leading to the founding of the SPLM/A, and ultimately the secession of South Sudan.
The second scenario that is reminiscent of the new IGAD peace proposal, of course, is the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the SPLM/A under Dr. John Garang and the NCP of President Bashir. The CPA, just like the 1972 Addis Ababa accord, established a regional government in Juba under the stewardship of the SPLM/A in addition to the national government in Khartoum. But unlike the Anyanya One, the SPLM/A had a standing, separate army in the South and was given the post of first vice president—the first time that a Southerner occupied that position in the history of the Sudan. The CPA later ended with the secession of South Sudan from Khartoum.
Therefore, the question is whether, if adopted, the new IGAD peace proposal would end in a new civil war like the Addis Ababa accord of 1972 or with the secession of the Greater Upper Nile region from Juba like the CPA of 2005. In other words, if implemented, will the new IGAD peace proposal be the infamous “Addis Ababa nimr eteneen” cited in the SPLA revolutionary song or CPA II? Most likely, the next general election after the end of the interim period will be disputed: will the transitional set-up be the solution for future post-election violence? That is, does South Sudan run the risk of making permanent the transitional set-up of two mini-states with separate armies, in which Salva Kiir and Wani Igga are ruling the Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria regions while Riek Machar and Alfred Lado Gore reign in the Greater Upper Nile region?
The second pressing question is about the oil in the Greater Upper Nile region that provides over 98% of government revenue: will Riek Machar control it since it falls under his jurisdiction? Will it be under the control of the central government in Juba with government troops safeguarding it? How will the oil revenue be shared fairly between the Riek-led Upper Nile and Kiir-led Bahr-quatoria regions? What about the current governors, especially Joseph Monytuil of Unity state and Simon Kun Puoch of Upper Nile state who have their own private militias? What will prevent them from taking up arms to claim another peace deal similar to the new IGAD peace proposal? Lastly, will the Dinkas in the Upper Nile region accept the leadership of Riek Machar?
(Un)fortunately, in swift reactions to the new peace proposal from IGAD, the government under President Kiir and the rebels of Dr. Riek Machar have both come out against the new peace proposal. To the rebels, the IGAD proposal is a “piece meal” agreement that would encourage more rebellions in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria regions. To the government, the IGAD proposal is a blatant attempt to divide up the country into two min-states, which could later become a roadmap for the secession of the Greater Upper Nile region from Juba. To Juba, therefore, it is a non-starter.
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PaanLuel Wël, the Managing Editor of PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese Bloggers, is a South Sudanese national currently residing in Juba, South Sudan, where he works for one of the International NGOs. He graduated with a double major in Economics and Philosophy from The George Washington University, Washington D.C, USA. He is the author of “Return in Peace (R.I.P) Dr. John Garang” and the editor of the speeches of Dr. John Garang, published as “The Genius of Dr. John Garang, Vol. 1 &2“. He is currently working on two books to mark the 10th anniversary of the death of Dr. John Garang: Vol. 3 of “The Genius of Dr. John Garang” and “Who Killed Dr. John Garang“, an account of events and circumstances leading to the death of the late SPLM/A leader in July 2005. You can reach him through his email: paanluel2011@gmail.com
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