War in South Sudan and the Failure of DDR’s International Partnership
By David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
June 30, 2015, (SSB) — The war our country is currently plunged into cannot be an exclusive responsibility of South Sudanese. An important angle into explaining the root causes of this senseless war implicates the international community for its failure to do its imperative part, especially in supporting an elaborate DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament, and Re-Integration) program in South Sudan.
In 2005, after the SPLA was forced by circumstances to absorb other armed forces with which it had bitterly fought for years, consequent security arrangement steps could not be logically done by South Sudanese alone. That surely was not because of lack of willingness among South Sudanese to own up to their responsibility, but simply for lack of capacity (both financial and technical) to gradually and effectively reduce the size of the so called “big tent government”.
Creating the ‘big tent government’ was indeed a case of a wrong step in the right direction, when the direction was more important than the step itself. It was a classic case of what was a necessary evil in the sense that the people of South Sudan valued the referendum more than anything else, and for the right reason. Without the big tent government South Sudan was not going to be able to have an environment conducive to holding a referendum and attaining its independence.
South Sudan was left with no option when its President initiated the process of creating a “big tent government,” a misnomer of what was exclusively a security arrangement measure of ‘bringing home’ all armed militia from the North. It wasn’t a government as such, but an imperative security arrangement measure which was included in the CPA Security Arrangement Protocol. In other words, President Kiir (and the SPLM) lived up to their side of the bargain and waited for the international community to do its part through DDR support, but the wait took too long until the big tent bubble exploded in 2013.
That big tent was built while South Sudan was conscious of the widely established fact that a huge standing army has always been a threat to democracy worldwide; yet we simply had no other options. Such a threat will always increase with lack of resources to cater for the wellbeing of generals and warlords. A smaller well-equipped army is always far much better for any country aiming at creating a welfare state.
Since a standing army is essentially a threat to democracy, the so called international ‘partners’ did not help South Sudan cut down the numbers of forces as they promised SPLM during CPA negotiation. They were supposed to partner with South Sudan in building a smaller and cohesive army (multi-tribal in composition) throughout the eight years before 15th December 2013.
These powerful partners include UNMIS, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, BICC (Bon International Center for Conversion), the Federal Cooperation of Germany, Pact Sudan, IOM (International Organization for Migration), UNFAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), the World Bank, Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and individual countries like the United States and Norway.
It is mind boggling to discover that the synergy, if any existed at all, of these powerful world bodies and states could not effectively help demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate 90 thousand mostly young men, which was the target set by our South Sudan DDR Commission. Whatever constraints were there on their part must only be in theory because these international (multi-state) organization are more than capable if they have the will. It was more of a case of lack of will, massive corruption, and lack of a plan on their part.
If UNMIS had used its twelve thousand strong to be exclusively deployed along the north-south (Sudan-South Sudan) border, that would have gone a long way in assuaging any lingering fear that South Sudan had towards any realistic scenario of an invasion from the North. In fact, that would have freed space even for South Sudan to start its own self-funded DDR program.
However, the fact on the ground was that UNMISS forces concentrated in the hinterlands of South Sudan, freely patrolling the roads of peaceful cities like Juba with tanks for fun or unnecessary posturing. Yet, their clear mandate related to CPA implementation and, in fact, checking possible northern aggression- which would plunge the country and region back to square one.
This failure to understand its own mandate, or deliberate unwillingness to enforce it, made UNMISS personnel so much involved in the day-to-day politics of South Sudan government. Instead of helping South Sudan develop a stable security sector under its security sector reform program, UN personnel became part and parcel of the intrigues that built up towards the December 15 explosion. Indeed, they engaged in a weapons transport grand scandal which was quickly swept under the rag.
Now that what we all dreaded has happened and almost all the warlords that were absorbed into the ‘big tent government’ have now rebelled against the system, South Sudan is facing an existential threat and the world continues to misdiagnose the problem as being only internal to the SPLM as a political party.
Since we are now already in square one, only a comprehensive DDR plan, which must be at the core of any peace agreement to be signed in Ethiopia by the two warring parties, will create trust among South Sudanese. Such an elaborate plan must be developed by IGAD-Plus in partnership with the UN Security Council which would enforce it under its Chapter VII mandate.
Attempts to create two standing armies with the aim to integrate them in future is indeed a malicious recipe for another bigger disaster if not placed within an internationally controlled elaborate context of DDR. International partners have failed us once, repeating that would be more than malicious.
While separation of forces for thirty odd months could be a necessary and standard step in conflict resolution theory, the willingness to disarm cannot be through an agreement signed by two men. It must be through an enforceable and attainable timeline for a feasible and comprehensive DDR program.
The IGAD-Plus must replace the current incompetent IGAD envoys with the mentality which recognizes the fact that what is at stake is higher than the SPLM and, dare I say President Kiir and Dr. Machar. Individuals are mortal, hence sustainable national arrangements must be made to outlive them.
Considering the observations above, we must agree that issues of governance such as federalism, ratio allocations, and so on and so forth, have no concrete relation to sustainable peace in South Sudan, even though they have been the preoccupation of IGAD envoys. They are simply not what the people of South Sudan are worried about, since services could be delivered through different local government arrangement, not only federalism.
It will be a disservice to South Sudan’s posterity for IGAD-Plus to waist valuable time talking about the position of Vice-President and Prime Minster when the crux of the conflict relates to the skewed post-CPA security arrangements and international failure to support DDR in South Sudan.
Mayen D.M.A. Ayarbior, Press Secretary in the Office H.E. the Vice President, James Wani Igga (dmayend@yahoo.com)
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