The Question of South Sudan’s Accession to the East African Community (EAC)–Part 2
By David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
July 26, 2015 (SSB) —- In part one of this intended series of short articles on S. Sudan’s accession to EAC we have seen the basic elements of two key perspectives on whether South Sudan should or should not join the regional economic block. The group against accession argues from a market-access perspective, which holds that producers of goods invariably benefit more than consumers; while the group for accession argues from the trickle down effect perspective of economic growth, which holds that regional prosperity will surely engulf S. Sudan – “the rising tides of economic growth shall lift all boats.”
Weighing the merits and demerits of those two perspectives is informed by the fact that once S. Sudan joins EAC, there are implications which will continue even if it later decided to opt out, if not sent out. If it later finds out the hard way that the decision to accede to the regional market was hasty, there will be no Germany to keep on pumping billions of EAC shillings or U.S. dollars into the ‘blood streams’ of its collapsing or colonized economy. On its way out, it will either be given a golden coffin to carry home as royalty or, God forbid, sent out in that very coffin with the hope that, like Jesus, it finds its own way to resurrect and start again as an “independent” state with huge debts to pay and middle industrial class to create.
As scholars and practitioners continue examining (or rather arguing) the merits and demerits of accession to EAC, it is necessary to highlight from the outset that initial inclinations among S. Sudanese and EAC states’ politicians and citizens are for the country to first join the economic block, then make EAC related structural arrangements and national interest serving steps.
Necessarily, market integration structural arrangements related to state sovereignty invariably lead to sizable pies voluntarily handed over to “supranational” institutions. But for a country whose national institutions are relatively new and, thus, eccentrically inadequate even for creating workable internal markets, the status of such institutional inferiority might mean the expected trickle down could be random at best; unless structural channels and breaks are quickly established to control and channel that trickle down process.
Structural issues of sovereignty continue to be complex and sour pills to swallow for most European Union member states, and they are expected to be even more complex along the way for EAC member states, more so for S. Sudan, the ‘new kid on the block,’ as it were. The EU’s rosy picture aside, countries like United Kingdom and Greece are discussing opting out of the inter-state organization, while Germans are hurling abuse left and right for what they see as bailing out ‘lazy Greeks’.
Having full federalism as a short-term target, EAC is expeditiously working towards centralizing many economic governance laws and regulations into the hands of “supranational” bodies. Laws governing many aspects of trade involving community citizens such as in goods and services shall be passed by the EAC Legislature while national legislatures will have to legislate without violating EAC “superior” laws. EAC Court of Justice (EACCJ) shall be superior to S. Sudan’s High Court and Court of Appeal. And, at the end of the federalist road will stand a Commissioner, the EAC Commissioner, some kind of economic beast with longer and stronger economic claws than those of heads of state.
The UK, whose citizens continue to passionately decry what they claim to be a wide “democratic deficit ” in which “supranational” institutions pass and oversee implementation of laws governing almost every aspect of their lives, refused to accede to the single currency protocol. It still clings passionately to its Sterling Pound as a matter of a proud “British heritage”.
Drawing from those experiences, many similar areas of common jurisdiction and difficulty will appear as the EAC process of integration takes deeper roots and becomes more intricate to both member state governments and common institutions. To be a positive addition, S. Sudan is expected to not sit and wait for what shall trickle down to it, but effectively contribute solutions as EAC endeavors to manage those inevitable market governance intricacies for the benefit of all EAC citizens.
The other hitches with which S. Sudan is expected to cope may come from the fast pace of regional market integration Africa is currently undertaking. For instance, the EAC is no longer content with its economic stratosphere and has already joined hands with southern African countries with which they have now created an even bigger market, COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa).
The Northern Corridor project, which brings into the equation rising giants like Ethiopia, in addition to another bigger dream of continental integration of a Cape-to-Cairo magnitude (Tripartite Free Trade Area), which was first articulated by the Southern African colonialist Cecil Rhodes, are already underway. All these inter-state economic endeavors will have common (centralized) implementation arrangements whose operation S. Sudan needs to comprehend.
Hence, considering the current pace of integration undertaken by the region, S. Sudan might have to sense its forward steps carefully as it must plunge (or insists on plunging) into the mix. And being a new nation-state, the country has lost the chance to be part of the initial stages of functional integration Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have already gone through. Those stages, which were characterized by elaborate sector-to-sector and people-to-people controlled interaction were necessitate by the fact that the EAC had once failed after a decade of trying (1967-1977).
Now, irreversibly losing those stages, where S. Sudan could have contributed to shaping EAC’s institutional development, may either be a blessing or curse, depending on the country’s state of readiness to hit the ground running or jump into the mix.
But, one thing the country must bear in mind: dissecting a living-kicking beast is not a simple exercise to be undertaken by Catholic Sisters, with all due respect to the angles, as they are called. They will invariably need some help from capable men to first tie down the beast. S. Sudan’s benefiting from EAC accession will largely depend on the existence and work of a body that will be thoroughly examining and ‘intellectually’ debating the EAC in connection to the country’s potentialities, while continuously delivering superior policy recommendations to national implementing agencies.
David Mayen Ayarbior is the Press Secretary in the Office of H.E. the Vice President of South Sudan, James Wani Igga. He could be reached at dmayend@yahoo.com
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