Making Sense of the IGAD Peace Deal: Observations on the Signed IGAD-Plus Compromise Peace Agreement on South Sudan
5 min readBy Santino Ayuel Longar, Canada
August 27, 2015 (SSB) — Further to my comments earlier in the day, the comments below show why the so-called CPA-2 could be a loose cannon:
- First, the President has signed it with strong reservations. Reservations are official statements made by a state when signing, ratifying or acceding to an international treaty stating that certain provisions of that treaty or covenant will not have legal effect within its jurisdiction, hence inapplicable to that state. Reservations, therefore, do not apply to a domestic agreement. If Kiir insists on those reservations, then the agreement is as good as rejected. Should the international community impose sanctions as a result of these reservations, then both the rebels and government are likely to harden their positions. In the end, a weakened government suggests that every South Sudanese could ultimately resign to their ethnic bastions for security reasons, a Somalization, in other words. This could mean the taking over of South Sudan by the United Nations (something which, in no uncertain terms, would infringe the UN Charter Article 78). If that happens, what else could transpire thereafter is anyone’s intelligent guess. What is far from unclear is that a UN trusteeship is a powder keg on several levels (not discussed here). In fact, we should expect, as a consequence, clarion calls for separation from South Sudan by certain regions or communities. Such calls may ultimately breed balkanizing effects across our land.
- Second, this agreement was unarguably imposed, meaning that the warring parties did not reach it as a result of mutual compromises. What the international community has been oblivious to in so doing is that, a peace process is not just a legal documentation of good intentions. There must be an open dialogue wherein parties amicably build mutual trust and rapport. An existence of mutual trust and good intentions between parties to a conflict upon signing of a peace pact ensures that the former belligerents transition from “enemies” to compatriots. This important component is lacking in this agreement, making the agreement, in all important and practical respects, void ab initio (from the get go). That is, mutual trust, or pacto sunt servanda (the idea that parties freely intend to implement the contract in good faith) is very important, especially for the purposes of implementation.
- Third, perhaps the biggest impediment to the implementation of this agreement can be found in the “Unification of Forces Clause.” What this Clause implies is that there is not a single recognized standing army of South Sudan. This further suggests that a standing army will have to be re-constituted in the form of the suggested South Sudan Deference Force (SSDF). This is no small victory for the rebels but correspondingly a losing streak to the govt forces, the SPLA. Over all, when this Clause implemented, it could mean that equal units from both sides, Riek has argued, will be put together to constitute various military units from scratch. Already, the government is reportedly unhappy with that Clause, principally because, it tacitly means the resulting national army will be more than 50% one ethnic group, since the government forces are composed of all the 64 SS’s ethnic groups while the rebels is more than 90% one ethnic group. In this scenario, the rebels are likely to insist that if the govt takes the position of the Chief of Staff, then they are entitled, by right, to take up the deputy position, etc. In addition, the rebel officers who have reportedly inflated their ranks could also outnumber the SPLA in the officer corp. Unless the military leaders on both sides handle this with utmost caution, it is likely to tear this agreement asunder.
- Forth, if my opinion were consulted, a solution to the nagging problem in (3) could easily be found. That is, based on each of the 10 states’ population, each state should contribute a proportional percentage to the re-constitution of the SPLA as follows:
(1) Aweil State, 16%;
(2) Warrap State (including Abyei) 15%;
(3) Jonglei State (including GPAA), 16%;
(4) CE State, 10%;
(5) WE State, 8%;
(6) Lakes State, 8%;
(7) Upper Nile, 8%;
(8 WUN (Unity) State, 7%;
(9) Wau, 5%;
(10) EE State, 7%;
- Finally, assuming that this agreement holds–and we pray it does—my pearl of wisdom, if I have one, is that it is important for freewheeling political operatives to refrain from making irresponsible statements to the media, for bombastic comments of that nature could further exacerbate tensions leading to yet another bout of violence. We know what such ulterior statements (written or aired) did after December 15, 2013.
Conclusion: South Sudan can undoubtedly pull this off, for nothing is impossible to a willing heart. That is why all and sundry, whether one is a politician or a commoner, has been called upon to plant the tree so that the next generation gets the shade. So let’s take safety measures at this trying moment than be sorry tomorrow.
Peace and best of luck to the people of South Sudan.
Santino Ayuel Longar @2015
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