The role of the South Sudanese Civil Society in the Implementation of Peace Agreement
What the South Sudanese Civil Society can do in the Implementation Process of the CPA II
By Umba Peter Bosco
December 1, 2015 (SSB) —- Despite signing a peace deal, South Sudan still remains a fragile society. Violations against the agreement took place on day one of its signing. Many citizens including regional and international agencies have cast doubt over the sustainability of the agreement because of the fragile environment in which its implementation takes place. The Civil Society (CS) occupied a marginal space at the negotiation table but it seems also that the final peace document does not clearly articulate its role in the implementation process. Throughout the document, the CS is sandwiched between the key implementers of the agreement.
This news article is based on a critical analysis of the role of CS in Nepal by Rhoderick Chalmers in Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Most of the roles that I discuss in this paper are already being implemented by some Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in South Sudan. My hope is that this article will benefit, to a greater extent CSOs by grabbing the opportunities provided in the peace document and be able to contribute to the implementation process. I start by describing the political situation in South Sudan, identifying available opportunities and discuss six roles that the CS can play in the implementation process.
Before descending into Civil War in December 2013 caused by power struggle between President Kiir and his sacked deputy Dr. Machar, the Government of South Sudan had already polluted the political arena with security risks and threats making it difficult for the CS to do their work. Since then, vocal CS activists work under risk and sometimes receive threats or actual arrests and detention. Some of them including Peter Moi and Isaiah Abraham lost their lives for advocating for good governance, democracy and respect for human rights and freedoms. Deng Athui received gunshots but fortunately survived while Nhial Bol of Citizen Newspaper resigned following multiple threats. The fate of the NGOs Bill is probably in jeopardy and government incursion in the space of CS is indisputable. With the peace agreement signed in August 2015, it is important to examine the opportunities that exist for CS, and if any, what roles can the CS play in its implementation.
It is unfortunate that the peace document does not clearly define the role of the CS in the implementation process. However, narrow spaces exist in Chapters 2, 3, 6, and 7 especially in the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanisms (TSAMM), Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR); Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF); Constitution Making Process; and in the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). These four windows of opportunity motivate this article in which I exhaustively discuss six roles.
Protection of activities is one of CS’s fundamental roles in peacebuilding. By advocating for the establishment of United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the CS can effectively address unresolved injustices of the conflict period by following up cases of disappearances, pushing for legal changes to address impunity and ensure that the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) does not become a provider of blanket amnesty to those who committed grave violations of human rights. The mere presence of the Office of the High Commissioner in the country can help to deter government interference in the work of CS.
Human Rights Defenders (HRD) can monitor the human rights situation, write and submit reports about violations to international human rights organizations as well as the guarantors of the peace agreement. Such reports inform the international community and warn the government to cruise in the right direction so as to prevent conflict recurrence. Moreover, HRD can monitor the progress of ceasefire and transitional security arrangements and report it through the media.
To increase its peace and democracy efforts, the CS can organize the grassroots to protest peacefully against or petition the government in case of reluctance and lack of will to implement the agreement. Seeking redress for individual injustices by influencing the shape of the CTRH is another CS role. Much of these programs can be made possible through the media, street protests, popular music concerts, radio broadcasts etc. to reach out to the public. Such advocacy programs have high potential of influencing leaders to sign up to democratic and human rights norms while also indirectly helping the government to restore legitimacy.
The CS can further play the role of strengthening the in-group identity of marginalized ethnic, geographical, or caste groups. While strengthening the identities of in-groups, CS actors should try to inculcate peace values into the society as well as some specific interest groups. If possible, conflict resolution training projects should be designed to train local citizens how to resolve their own community conflicts and prevent escalation into manifest conflict.
The CS can negotiate for the release of political prisoners by informing government about the risks of continued detention particularly without charges. Although this seems to be risky, it is important that no one reminds behind bars when peace is signed. It is also important to note that, in some cases, CS needs to bypass some local authorities that are likely to refuse when asked for permission to allow CS to do its work especially political-like tasks.
The last and perhaps the most obvious role of the CS is that of service provision. I do not intend to discuss this role in detail because it is to a larger extent already being carried out by several CSOs in South Sudan. However, the emphasis should be on targeted populations so that services reach to those in real need. Where humanitarian work passes through long governmental bureaucracies, it is likely to miss the target population. Hence, CS needs to find alternative ways of delivering services to the needy in order to avoid wastage of resources.
In conclusion, the CS does not have to wait until things get worse before it starts to act. Neither does it have to seek permission when it is obvious that something has to be done not matter what. Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the peace agreement are important avenues where CS can claim its place and roles in the implementation process. Nevertheless, the CS will walk through a rough road before it can achieve these roles. By carefully choosing areas of intervention, the CS can address real concerns of the neediest people.
The author is a Master Student of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Sabanci University in Istanbul. He can be reached at umba.peter@yahoo.com.
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