Why has land administration in South Sudan remain without a clear statutory basis?
Why has land administration in South Sudan subsequently remain largely without a clear statutory basis?
By Lino Lual Lual, Juba, South Sudan
July 5, 2016 (SSB) — Squatting and land-grabbing have become major issues after South Sudan got her Independent. The lack of a clear policy and legal framework on land issues under-resourced institutions and the lack of a systematic, transparent process for plot allocation have also meant that ordinary citizens find it increasingly difficult to access land within the towns of South Sudan. Corruption is rife and in practice only those with money or connections can obtain land.
The majority of Juba’s people live without secure land tenure and are hence under constant threat of their life and eviction from the opportunists. Many have experienced repeated demolitions of their homes and have in the process been relocated to the outskirts of the city of Juba. The SPLM frequently used the slogan ‘the land belongs to the people’, or community although this principle was never actually enshrined in the Interim Constitution and other constitutions of Southern Sudan. Nor does the Act spell out clearly enough the roles and responsibilities of the various levels of government in relation to land administration in the country.
In the absence of a clear legal and policy framework for land administration it has been difficult to engage in effective urban planning and policy-making. Work has however restarted on a new low-cost housing policy (a previous attempt to draft a housing policy in 2008 ended inconclusively). Tied closely to the concept of ‘taking the towns to the people’, this new policy aims at decongesting the towns and controlling the growth of informal settlements by building satellite towns near Juba and other cities, with fully serviced low-cost housing estates.
In conjunction with private investors, the government hopes to provide subsidized housing through project, rather than encouraging urban sprawl by continuing to give out land to people who cannot afford to build permanent structures.
As there is no proper framework in place, the expansion of Juba town is largely unmanaged and unplanned. Town planning has centred around simple processes such as land allocation, subdivision and determination of land use type and densities, rather than following comprehensive and more proactive management strategies.
Land transfers are managed through leaseholds which can last between 20 and 50 years, with tenure security increasing according to plot classification. Most Class 1 plots are concentrated in the Centre of town, in Juba payam. Kator and Munuki payams have recently been upgraded to Class 3, though they still host a number of undemarcated areas as well. Munuki is the most populous and fastest growing of the three payams, and is home to most of the town’s urban poor as well as returning refugees and IDPs.
Replanning and service expansion are mainly achieved by upgrading areas and displacing those inhabitants who do not have the financial means to comply with the new requirements. In the 1960s, for example, when Hai Malakal was upgraded to a Class 2 area, those who could not afford to stay were relocated to a new zone, which they soon named ‘Atlabara’ – literally ‘get out’ in Arabic.
Today, Atlabara is one of the more planned and settled neighborhoods for the middle classes. Upgrading parts of the town in this way often leaves the poorest people without access to land and encourages the creation of squatter areas and slums. This system also fails to tackle the complexity of urban problems in Juba.
While the government and local administrators are stressing the importance of having a formal town plan, a number of UN agencies and NGOs have raised concerns about the top-down approach being adopted and the lack of participatory planning.
The land administration in Juba was utterly unprepared to absorb large numbers of returnees after the Independent. While most returnees were expecting to be provided with land and services upon their arrival, the local authorities underestimated the range of land and property challenges they would confront. Local administrators also seem to have assumed that most would return to their places of origin.
Fifteen thousand plots were supposed to be ready and demarcated for the new arrivals, including a Class 1 area near the Jebel to attract well-educated and trained people from the diaspora. In the end, insecurity and heavy mining prevented expansion across the Nile, despite the demarcation of many new plots there. Another neglected aspect was planning for the accommodation of military personnel and their families.
While initially supposed to be distributed across three sites in Southern Sudan, it was later decided to establish the SPLA Headquarters in Juba. State officials’ claim that over (80%) of the land grabbing within Juba is done by soldiers, who are staying outside the barracks to be with their families. Many soldiers believe that they were promised compensation for their efforts during the war and are entitled to land in Juba.
If denied access, some take the land by force. Communities and local authorities alike judged the problem of land grabbing by soldiers to be much more serious than illegal squatter settlements as compromise is rare and most people end up having to give up their plot.
Those whose land has been occupied by others during their absence have had difficulty regaining access to their property. While the new Land Act establishes a process and framework for addressing restitution claims for land lost as a result of involuntary displacement, few people are aware of these provisions and current institutions lack the capacity to implement them.
Land in the communities surrounding Juba is still governed by customary law and a plot may be acquired through discussions with the traditional authorities and the local community.
In practice, the capacity for land administration in Juba is low and waiting times of years for the official surveyor to come and inspect plots and transfer ownership between individuals are common. Trained personnel to survey and gazette land in urban areas are scarce. The process is further complicated by a lack of information on which to base new land allocations and transfers as there are no public maps showing plot distribution and ownership within the city of Juba.
In practice, however, the process is highly untransparent and corruption is rampant, most of those with priority status never gain access to land. Instead, new land is allegedly given to the highest bidder or to the well-connected and powerful ones. For example, the newly demarcated area of Durupi, with around 3,000 plots, was initially meant as an area for people whose houses had been recently demolished.
However, most of these plots have reportedly been given to government ministers and MPs. Even if ordinary citizens could get access to new land, the official prices would be unaffordable for many of them with a Class 1 plot, Class 2 plot and Class 3 plot.
Land allocation procedures tend to favour men over women. Women are reportedly facing particular difficulties in accessing plots in the towns – both on the commercial market and through the official allocation process. People who are renting also facing rising prices day by day, especially in the Centre of town. Rent prices vary significantly according to location and type of structure of the houses.
The legal vacuum and lack of transparency surrounding land administration and allocation in Juba city have encouraged and entrenched corruption. Many people interviewed pointed to corrupt networks increasingly controlling access to land in the peri-urban perimeter of Juba.
Communities cite many examples of chiefs selling land to foreign investors or rich locals without their knowledge. Many interviewees commented on the growing gulf between communities and chiefs in peri-urban areas around Juba, chiefs are reported to have become extremely powerful because of their authority over customary land and are now working solely in their own interest.
Their authority is reportedly becoming increasingly difficult to challenge because of their connections with individuals in the government. Northern Bari payam reported receiving many more applications for land from individuals in the Government and the military than from genuine private investors.
These applications often purport to demand land for agricultural activities, but afterwards turn out to be for the benefit of one individual only. Repeated cases of this sort have made communities more suspicious and careful in negotiating access to land. In this way plots of land are sold on four or five times with forged land titles.
Land grabbing has become an increasingly well-organized and institutionalized activity in high-value Class 1 areas such as ThongPing.
Informal slum settlements do not exclusively comprise recent arrivals to the city, a significant number of residents who settled in Juba over 30 years ago are still living in undemarcated areas such as Lologo or Gumbo. Whereas many of these long-term squatters have often succeeded in entering into informal agreements with the owners of the land and are thus at less risk of immediate eviction than more recent arrivals, they have nevertheless lived in insecure land tenure for decades.
That said, recent arrivals often live in much more precarious conditions, they squat on empty spaces demarcated for roads or public services, settle in swampy areas which become flooded during the rainy season and even live in cemeteries. Others move out to the periphery of Juba in search of an empty plot. Most of these squatters live in very insecure conditions, face significant protection concerns and are under constant threat of eviction.
Residents of an area called Hai Miskin [also spelled Mashakin] (‘poor’ in Arabic) near Jebel Kujur, who have stayed in the area since 2005, recounted how they were informed overnight that the land they were staying on had been sold and that they would have to vacate the area. When they refused they were assaulted by the police and threatened with further violence if they did not quit the area immediately.
In desperation, several widows who had already been forcefully relocated a number of times decided to undress and throw themselves in front of the police to stop the eviction.
Poor urban dwellers are making significant contributions to the urban economy as casual labourers, consumers and small-scale entrepreneurs. Constant fears of relocation preclude engagement in more permanent livelihood strategies as well as the establishment of more stable living arrangements.
Many people become vulnerable to exploitation in the search for tenure security. In Gurei, for example, local chiefs and community representatives claiming to be in charge of the area have started to informally demarcate the land. Potential applicants reported paying money in exchange for a plot number and registration of their names.
The author is a master of strategic studies at the Centre for Peace and Development Studies University of Juba, He can be reached via Linolual69@yahoo.com
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