Major African Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Lessons for South Sudanese Government and Civil Society

By Malith Jongkuch Kur, London Ontario, Canada

(Email: mkur@uwo.ca)

Abstract

July 8, 2016 (SSB) — The conflict in South Sudan which began in December 2013 has attracted international attention, particularly the regional and continental bodies—the AU and the IGAD nations. In fact, the South Sudanese conflict is not different from other crises that affected and continue to affect the African continent. Therefore, this paper has examined briefly the African transitional justice mechanisms of Rwanda, South Africa, and Sierra Leone to highlight important lessons in those mechanisms, which can possibly help both the government and civil society in South Sudan to work together for a sustainable peace and justice in the country. It offers general observations on the potential difficulties the agreement and the proposed transitional justice mechanism may face before the end of the interim period. The direct involvement of the AU and the IGAD nations in a search for a peaceful solution to the conflict in South Sudan has resulted in the signing of a shaky peace agreement to resolve the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015. Also, agencies related to the work of the United Nations are playing active parts in the process of protecting civilians, investigating human rights abuses, and helping to end the conflict that has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions more. The agreement has provided for the creation of Transitional Government of National Unity, the establishment of Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and National Healing, Compensation and Reparation Authority, and Hybrid Court for South Sudan. Those institutions have been proposed in the agreement to consolidate peace and deal with issues related to justice and accountability for the crimes committed in the course of the conflict.

Key words: South Sudan’s conflict, IGAD, transitional justice, African traditional justice

1. Introduction

The last hope for those who have gone through an immense suffering and destruction because of conflict is impartial justice when law and order have returned to their society. Yet, impartial justice is sometimes difficult to achieve in certain situations because there are always certain realities that can temper with it. The international community, for instance, initiated the transitional justice mechanisms at the end of the World Wars I & II and after the collapse of communism to bring to light the hidden truths about those conflicts and abuses under the communist dictatorships in Europe and elsewhere.[1]  But the international community knew that the principles which guide the transitional justice mechanisms would not necessarily guarantee impartiality in delivering justice to the victims of armed conflicts and dictatorships. Even in the most celebrated cases of transitional justice such as in South Africa, no one would be tempted to assert that impartial justice was achieved for all who had suffered from the Apartheid system. Neither were all who had committed crimes against humanity while protecting the system of racial segregation in South Africa received the harshest possible punishments for those crimes.

In principle, transitional justice is a form of justice that offers a breathing space for communities that have gone through a destructive violence to review their difficult past, recover from it, and move forward despite the horrors they have witnessed and atrocities committed against them. Transitional justice, in this case, is not a desired form of justice, but it provides communities, who have seen nothing for a long time but suffering, with some closure to come to terms with the past.

In many societies that have been affected by conflicts, the civil societies have played significant roles in the facilitation of transition from a state of chaos to a state of social reconstruction and peace building. This paper provides a brief review of the transitional justice mechanisms on South Africa, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, in which the civil societies played constructive roles in their planning, execution, and implantation, to draw the attention of South Sudanese government and civil society to important points in those transitional justice mechanisms in the facilitation of peace and reconciliation. It also offers a short overview of the history of the origin of transitional justice as articulated by Ruti Teitel and other scholars in the field.

The three African transitional justice mechanisms used various methods in the execution of the post-conflict justice. South Africa conducted a truth and reconciliation process by hearing testimonies from victims, perpetrators, and witnesses. Sierra Leonean TRC also collected testimonies from victims and ex-combatants from all sides involved in the war. Unlike South Africa, however, Sierra Leone had a special court to try war crimes suspects who were either Sierra Leonean citizens or aliens involved in the war.[2] In the Rwandan situation, a traditional justice system was introduced alongside the regular court system and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to speed up the trials of the genocide suspects. This paper proposes that the government and South Sudanese civil society need to consult and adapt some of the procedures used in those mechanisms for the consolidation of peace and justice in South Sudan.

Indeed, South Sudan has a growing civil society, which is representative of all the communities in the country. The South Sudanese civil society has a potential to be influential in discouraging unnecessary disputes between different communities in the world’s newest nation by fostering peaceful and constructive social networking among various communities.  It holds a strategic place in the society to help in the execution, planning, and implementation of transitional justice processes in the country to bring about social change that will eventually eliminate communal violence. But the South Sudanese civil society must remain a neutral agent of peace and social reconstruction without leaning toward certain political views to win the trust of all communities and political actors.

2. Origin of Transitional Justice

Scholars have defined transitional justice as a form of justice that deals or is connected with the past events related to human rights violations and abuses in the course of conflicts or under dictatorial rules.[3] Ruti Teitel has traced the roots of transitional justice, placing its origin in “three phases,” and according to Teitel, the initial phase of the transitional justice began with the events of post-World War I and extended to post-World War II and was dominated by establishing the legal basis to punish those who were considered to be on the guilty side.[4]  The victors in the war dictated the terms and conditions of this phase. For example, the Allies put in place the Nuremberg criminal tribunals against German officials involved in World War II.[5] Teitel further indicates that the onset of the Cold War after the end of World War II had a greater influence on the transitional justice and politics in the international diplomacy at this stage. The Cold War politics and diplomacy brought the international collaboration on matters related to transitional justice to a halt.[6] It seemed likely in this phase that the church was less involved in the promotion of transitional justice.

The second phase of transitional justice came into being after the end of Cold War and at the beginning of transitions to democratic rules in many parts of the world precipitated by the collapse of communism and the demise of its sponsor—the Soviet Union. Teitel has identified this phase as a chapter of the transitional justice concerned with “peace, reconciliation, and forgiveness.”[7] These principles dominated the truth commissions on South Africa, Chile, and other nations that had similar processes. In fact, “the balancing of peace, justice, and reconciliation” became prominent in the international justice system in this phase as a part of “restorative justice model.”[8]

An important aspect of this phase is that it has covered wider ground in terms of involving different social categories of the societies in transition in the process of rebuilding social order. Religious groups of this stage have emerged as a significant social force that could make a difference in the transition from the state of conflict to the state of peace and reconciliation.

Teitel has named the third phase as a “steady-state” to reflect the application of transitional justice mechanism to most of the conditions leading to minimal and “large-scale” troubles in the twentieth century.[9] But the steadiness of the transitional justice in phase three cannot be guaranteed because the international legal system that guides the implementation of the activities related to transitional justice mechanisms is sometimes influenced by the political interests in both powerful and weak states. It appears that if the application of the ideals of the transitional justice jurisprudence would continue to maintain its current state, the international reliance on this form of justice would increase. The weaker states that do not have established and stable legal system will, in many cases, fall under the jurisdiction of an internationally-sponsored transitional justice in the form of hybrid courts when conditions that require international legal intervention occur, such as the acute violation of human rights and humanitarian laws, which are the pillars or justifications for the international intervention in conflict situations.

Jon Elster, on the other hand, has argued that transitional justice is not necessarily a modern concept. To him, it goes back to instances of transitions that took place in Athens, which have continued to influence transitions in our modern time.[10] Elster effectively suggests that transitional justice has always been part of human civilization and modernity cannot lay claim to it. It has occurred at various stages of the human development and progress. Therefore, institutional change and a quest for justice in situations where there had been conflicts is not purely a modern idea. It has its roots in history, both ancient and modern.

Although Teitel and Elster have taken a historical tour to trace the origin of transitional justice, Paige Arthur contends that the concept was not well developed until recently. In his view, the concept of transitional justice emerged in the late 1980s. Even though he has given Teitel the credit for being the first scholar to use the term in its current sense, he insists that the emergence of the field of transitional justice belongs to the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union.[11] It is true that the field of transitional justice has witnessed a rapid growth since the Cold War ended in the late 198os. The field of transitional justice owes its rapid expansion to the involvement of different social agencies in its activities. The transitional justice is gaining recognition from different social categories because its programs affect all aspects of social lives in transitional societies.

The three phases of transition justice that Teitel has outlined suggest that the evolution of transitional justice will continue in the years to come. But the shape it will take in the future depends on the acceptance of this system of justice by the powerful states.

After this brief overview of the historical development of the transitional justice, we now turn to the three most famous African transitional justice mechanisms of South Africa, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.

In every transitional justice mechanism that has taken place in the world to date, there is in it a lesson to be learnt by those who are passing through similar experiences.  Hence, there are lessons for South Sudanese society to learn from the past experiences of transitional justice mechanisms in other situations. South Sudanese society can use those lessons for the benefit of peace building in the country. Here, we shall focus on the African transitional justice mechanisms because they can have direct cultural and social influences on South Sudan’s situation than the ones that have occurred in other parts of the world. The African transitional justice experiences may influence the South Sudanese situation more because the conflicts in Africa, in many cases, are influenced by ethnic politics and regional affiliations, and this is, in effect, what has happened in South Sudan. We shall begin with the Rwandan model of transitional justice mechanism.

3. Rwandan Transitional Justice Mechanism

The Rwandan transitional justice mechanism is quite unique in Africa and beyond. It is unique in a way it has addressed the complex social situation the genocide created in Rwanda in 1994.  It has set an example that has given the African traditional justice system a role in the international conflict resolution mechanisms and, in some ways, increased the grassroots participation in the social reconstruction of post-genocide Rwanda. This section offers a brief review of three components of the Rwandan transitional justice mechanisms that dealt, in a special way, with the cases of genocide. They include the post-genocide Rwanda Domestic Courts, Gacaca Courts, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  The roles these forms of justice have played in Rwanda in the execution of justice after the genocide of 1994 have shown that no one form of justice is adequate for addressing atrocities involving acute political crimes such as genocide in a particular way. In a similar way, a complex crisis involving violence requires good working relations between different segments of the society to find acceptable solutions.  Therefore, governments need to work with civil societies to ensure that all are on the same page when it comes to the provision of justice to the victims of armed conflicts.  Here, the social and legal modalities used in the Rwandan Domestic legal system, Gacaca Courts, and the ICTR to administer justice for the victims and the perpetrators of genocide are reviewed to see what lessons South Sudan’s civil society and government can learn from Rwanda’s experience in the execution of justice in the aftermath of massive killings in that country.

3.1. Rwanda Regular Courts and the Cases of Genocide

 For any country in the world, the most important way of dealing with complex criminal issues is to have in place a competent judicial system to ensure fairness in trying such cases. But that was not the case for Rwanda in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. The country had to deal with a broken justice system and a massive human tragedy in the modern history of Africa.

The first step that the post-genocide Rwandan regime took was the re-organization of the legal system in the country to enable it to deal with the challenges of the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. It was a good start for Rwanda to begin constructive reforms in the area of judiciary. Usta Kaitesi, Stef Vandeginste, and other scholars have indicated that the Rwandan Domestic judiciary system was re-organized to fight “impunity”, achieve justice for both the victims and the perpetrators of genocide, and promote the stability of social order in Rwanda.[12] The international community has witnessed Rwanda’s efforts in rebuilding its post-genocide legal system to propel the country toward social stability and rehabilitation of national administration and institutions.

Despite the new government’s achievements in reforming the legal system in the country, the post-genocide judiciary system in Rwanda was marred by many unfair practices including “one-sided investigation” as well as the intimidation of “defence witnesses”.[13] All of these weaknesses in the post-genocide Rwandan judiciary were definitely the results of the situation the large-scale mass atrocities had created in the country. The social fabric of the society was so damaged to the point that people who were suspected of having taken part in the genocide received less or no sympathy in the judicial circles. It did not matter whether they were, in fact, innocent or not.  All the accused were considered as dangerous criminals deserving nothing but harsh punishment.

But the Rwanda experience remains as a good lesson for African communities on how to rebuild a society ravaged by failed system of governance. It has shown that a society paralyzed by an extreme form of violence and destruction of human life and materials can emerge stronger if proper institutional reforms take place. Rwanda’s emergence from the ashes of genocide suggests that the best way for any nation facing social challenges to move forward is to redefine its destiny and make tough choices to reverse the situation. The judicial and administrative reforms that Rwanda had undergone after the genocide enabled the country to avoid reliance on the international assistance alone to settle the cases of mass killings in the country. Through the use of traditional and regular justice systems effectively, regardless of the shortcomings in their proceedings, Rwanda maintained its ability to make sovereign decisions without resorting to the international help as the only way forward. These steps ensured the legal and political stability of the country despite uncomfortable working relationships with the UN agencies. All in all, Rwanda domestic court system has helped the country established a strong central governance system to keep the society from descending further into anarchy and chaos. The following section discusses the contribution the Gacaca Courts have made in the deliverance of justice in post-genocide Rwanda.

3.2. Gacaca Courts and Post-genocide Justice in Rwanda

 Usta Kaiseti has informed us that the Gacaca Courts were put in place through the “Organic Law No. 40 in 2000” to facilitate “the persecution of genocide and other crimes committed in Rwanda between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994.”[14] The purpose of the Gacaca Courts included the “revelation of truth about what happened during the genocide, speeding up of the genocide trials, eradication of impunity, and the promotion of reconciliation of Rwandans and enforcing of unity”[15] of the country. It was not the preference of the Rwandan government to turn to the traditional justice system, but the situation was dictated by a large number of people accused to have committed genocidal crimes, who were languishing in jails without an adequate number of judges to try their cases.[16] Rwanda, in this case, had no choice but to turn to the traditional dispute resolution mechanism to alleviate the pressure on the domestic justice system and ensure, at least, that justice was served to prevent the repeat of the mass killings in the future. This is in essence what brought the Gacaca Courts to play a prominent role in the Rwandan trials related to the genocide of 1994.

Since the Gacaca Courts did not have recognized standards in the international justice system prior to genocide in Rwanda, they were subjected to criticisms from human rights groups, suggesting that those courts would simply execute “mob justice.”[17] However, these criticisms did not deter the Rwandan state to proceed with its plan of putting in place the new Gacaca Courts to try the cases of genocide in the country. The Rwandan government allowed the local communities in different regions of Rwanda “to elect” those who would form the bench of judges for the Gacaca Courts to conduct trials.[18] Therefore, in some sense, the Gacaca Courts’ authority to conduct trials came from the local people, but the political influence on them had the greater impact on their work than their traditional role of building bridges between members of the Rwandan communities.

As Paul Christoph Bornkamm has explained that the Gacaca Courts’ ability to speed up the trails of the cases of genocide in Rwanda and the promotion of “reconciliation” relied on the “active popular participation” in their proceedings.[19] In fact, the Gacaca Courts would have been more effective instruments of reconciliation in Rwanda had the participation of local people in their processes remained steady to the end. The Gacaca Courts legal “proceedings” initially galvanized the interests of the local communities because individuals and participants in their processes wanted to understand the ways in which those new traditional courts, inkiko gacaca, would work.[20] I believe many Rwandans were aware of the ways in which the old Gacaca Courts worked as part of their cultural life and the means of dealing with disputes at all levels in local communities. But the changes made to the Gacaca Courts system after the genocide and the influence exerted on them to conform to the new order lessened their ability to maintained popular interests in their processes and proceedings.[21]

Moreover, Bornkamm has noted that other weaknesses associated with the work of the Gacaca Courts stemmed from the fact that their judges were “unpaid” and “untrained” in taking care of difficult judicial matters.[22] In addition to those issues, the handling of cases was another problem. The accused persons did have legal representations and were not usually aware of the charges against them because they did not have “access to their cases files.”[23] Those difficulties with the work of the Gacaca Courts have their roots in the political decisions of the Rwandan government to deal with cases of genocide. The human rights components of the people suspected of having participated in the genocide received less attention from the government.

Further, Alexander Laban Hinton has asserted that the Gacaca Courts had inadvertently increased “tensions even in the communities” that had already reached a certain level of “reconciliation” in the country.[24] Hinton adds that the reason the Gacaca Courts were causing this problem was due to the fact that the government of Rwanda had “politicized” these courts, and it had also promoted one-sided “narrative” that the genocide was committed by Hutus against Tutsis, forgetting that moderate Hutus were subjected to killing and extermination as well.[25] The Rwandan government political influences on the Gacaca Courts do not in principle explain the weaknesses of the traditional justice system, but they indicate that any political interference with any form of justice system makes it less effective. The consequences for a less effective justice system are sometimes counterproductive to reconciliation when it comes to issues related to transitional justice practice. Therefore, the Gacaca Courts were less effective in promoting sustainable peace and reconciliation in some regions of Rwanda because some Rwandans would have believed that the outcomes of their proceedings would have been determined beforehand.

Despite those problems, the Gacaca Courts have taken a prominent place in the history of post-conflict resolution since it was the first time in Africa for such a loose system of justice of traditional nature to deal with the criminal trials of immense magnitudes. The Gacaca Courts normally deal with issues related to “land disputes, land rights, marriages, cattle, etc.”[26] It was then difficult for outsiders to conceive of such system that lacks any formal legal basis to render justice in a complex situation like that of genocide. But they have shown to the world that it is, in some sense, possible to render justice through African traditional judicial system.

In principle, the Gacaca Courts were part of an attempt by the Rwandan state to translate the foundations of transitional justice into the local dynamics, which scholars in the field of transitional justice refer to as the ‘vernacularization’ of transitional justice.[27] An important observation can be made here. Despite their weaknesses, the Gacaca Courts were another way of the Rwandan society telling its people that they were part of the solution in the facilitation of justice in the post-genocide Rwanda. The situation demanded the use of all available means including the transformation of the Gacaca system into, as Phil Clark has put it “ internal hybridity”[28] to ease pressure on the Rwandan domestic court system and the ICTR. It was crucial for ordinary Rwandans to participate in judging the crimes of genocide by hearing the testimonies of both the victims and those accused of the acts of genocide.  The Gacaca Courts would have become an effective way of reconciling and rehabilitating the country if post-genocide sentiments did not prevail on them.  They would have been understood as part of local community’s understanding of justice in Rwanda in determining the long-term reconciliatory mode for the country.

Finally, the traditional Rwandan Gacaca Courts have shown an important lesson to the world and to Africa in particular that the traditional African legal systems have useful roles to play in the international justice system. The Rwandan Gacaca Courts have proved that the African traditional justice system needs to be developed, studied, and promoted because it can be another judicial tool in the deliverance of justice in Africa. Although a number of shortcomings associated with the judicial processes of the Gacaca Courts were observed, the overall place these courts have secured in the international legal system should be acknowledged and celebrated.

As we shall see in the discussion about South African and Sierra Leonean transitional justice mechanisms, the traditional judicial system has not featured in their transitional justice processes. The reason the traditional judicial system did not work in the transitional justice mechanisms in South Africa and Sierra Lone lies in the social structures of the communities in those countries. For example, the western civilization and understanding of justice, brought about by European settlement and colonization of South Africa, have deep roots in South African society. Moreover, during the years of the Apartheid system, the African traditional understanding of justice was sidelined and restricted to the townships by the racial segregation laws.[29] Megan Shore argues that during the South African transition from Apartheid rule to democracy, the TRC “rejected the inclusion of the African traditional justice system” known as “ imbizo or people’s courts” in its processes on the “moral grounds” because these courts tend to favor “retributive justice,” which was not in line with the ideals of “restorative justice” advocated by the TRC.[30] But it remains true that the rejection of the imbizo or people’s courts by the TRC is not necessarily based on their support for retributive justice. In fact, it would have been difficult for the TRC to convince white South Africans to participate in those courts since they did not have a constitutional mandate to conduct hearings.

In Sierra Leone, there has not been a system of racial segregation; however, the westernized communities could have been less enthusiastic about the African traditional justice system playing a prominent role in the post-conflict justice. Those are the possibilities which could not allow the African traditional justice system to play a role in the post-conflict in South Africa and Sierra Leone.

3.3. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

As part of the international community’s reaction to the genocide, “the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 955 of November 1994 to render justice, make a contribution toward national reconciliation and restoration and maintenance of peace.”[31] It was a response that came too late for a close to a million Rwandans who died in the genocide. But the important thing was to render justice by punishing the war criminals and to ensure that those crimes were never committed again on the scale in which they happened in Rwanda in 1994.

Indeed, the assessment of the work of the ICTR by scholars and human rights activists has produced mix results. The ICTR has been criticized for “poor management” in its handling of cases under its jurisdiction.[32] Poor management, however, was not the only issue that raised the concerns of its critics. There are a number of problems associated with its mandate as well. The critics have pointed out that the court has not fully investigated and tried crimes of rape and gender-geared incidents of sexual violence during the genocide.[33] In addition, it did not deal with the crimes committed mainly by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) because its mandate did not include crimes against humanity committed after 1994.[34] The failure of the ICTR to investigate and try cases involving the Rwandan national army has undermined the legacy and credibility of the international justice system to deliver impartial justice and support all the victims of genocide and the victims of war crimes in post-genocide Rwanda.  Many Rwandans will continue to feel that the international community has failed them in many things. It failed to prevent the genocide. It has also failed to use its power to deliver impartial justice in dealing with all the crimes committed during and after the genocide.

4. South African Transitional Justice Mechanism

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission remains the most celebrated reconciliatory event of the 20^th century. It brought all branches of the South African society together for the purpose of rebuilding the country and consolidating the project of creating a rainbow nation. National unity of South Africa was the pillar of bridging and ending the ethnic and racial divide sponsored by the apartheid system in South Africa for a good number of years.

The church, other civil societies, and the state of South Africa all of them played crucial roles in the project of national unity. The involvement of all South Africans in the process that dismantled the system of racial segregation gave the South African TRC a unique place in the global peace building initiatives. The South African TRC has earned a prominent place in the world not because it was absolutely fair but because it stuck to the principle of creating a new order in South Africa. This part of the discussion explores and examines important elements of the South African TRC which can possibly be replicated in the transitional justice mechanism in South Sudan.

4.1. South African History and the TRC

The difficult historical journey South Africans of all races have travelled has shown both social weaknesses and strengths of the South African society. The weakest point in the history of South Africa is the introduction of the Apartheid system by the National Party in the 1950s. The regime of racial segregation drew a thick line of separation between the South African communities and made it a crime for people to interact in social spaces. It was a pure redefinition of the human race as we know it. However, most South Africans, particularly black communities in South Africa, did not sign up for the redefinition of the humanity on the basis of the skin color. They rejected the Apartheid outright. This rejection created the struggle that eventually led to the establishment of the South African TRC.

The point of strength South Africans have gained in their historical journey is their ability to find a way out of a racially-divided society to a formation of a pluralistic nation that upholds human dignity. The turnaround of South Arica to confront the legacy of Apartheid is a useful lesson for African societies. South Africans of all races showed the world that it is possible to face the past with dignity and move on to a new beginning.

The South African TRC came to being as a result of a complex process of negotiations between various stakeholders in South Africa. The TRC was given a legal mandate to investigate and document the horrendous human rights violation which occurred in and outside of the country since 1960-94.[35] The investigation of this nature was not an easy matter. It required the cooperation of those involved in the conflict with the officers of the TRC. Therefore, the success of the project of the national unity of South Africa depended on the establishment of a reliable truth about what took place in South Africa under the Apartheid system.

The mission of the South African TRC to find the truth concerning the conflict in South Africa was the cornerstone of building a new social order. The victims of the Apartheid system wanted to know the truth about what happened to their loved ones, who disappeared in the course of the conflict. Once they had known the truth, they would decide to forgive the other party that had wronged them. But without knowing the truth, there is no possibility of offering forgiveness to an unknown perpetrator. Consequently, the mission of the South African TRC was defined by the credibility of the truth it uncovered.

Moreover, truth is always the basis of reconciliation. It is not possible to reconcile people while nothing is known on why they should embark on reconciliation in the first place. Hence, the place of identifying the truth in the South African TRC was an essential element of moving the society past its difficult history. Knowing the truth was the basis for bringing the perpetrators and the victims to reconcile. It was also the basis of administering justice, compensations, and rehabilitation of individuals and communities affected by the conflict. It is not within the scope of this section to cover the vast history of the South African TRC, but I have selected specific achievements and areas of the TRC, which, I think, will possibly contribute to a plan transitional justice process in South Sudan.

4.2. Achievements of the South African TRC

The South African TRC has achieved a number of things in the social and political life of South Africans. It has ushered in a reign of peace and tranquility in the country. It offered the victims of political violence the opportunity to let the world know about what happened to them or their loved ones during the conflict and provided for the compensation of the victims of violence in the course of the conflict. All of these steps were put in place for the purpose of rebuilding a new South Africa, and the TRC’s contribution to the emergence of a reconciled South Africa is something that needs to be celebrated. It does not matter how limited the reconciliation process has reached its peak, the way remains open to the people of South Africa to travel safely. The following sections offer short discussion on three elements in the South African TRC, which have greatly influenced the creation of new South Africa.

4.3. Reconciliation

It was through the work of the TRC that South Africans of different backgrounds began to see things in a new way (novus via) of reconciliation, but not through an old way (via antique) characterized by racial animosities and contentions. The TRC guaranteed the democratic transition where the voice of the majority plays a significant role in designing of the future governance of South Africa. The new way of understanding and reconciliation opened different avenues for all races to practice freedom in South Africa.  The post TRC’s period in South Africa has now become associated with human dignity and respect for human rights.

The respect for human dignity in new South Africa has come as part of the project of national unity and reconciliation. Reconciliation in the context of South Africa does not suggest that everyone agrees with the whole process.  Reconciliation in this context was defined in terms of national interests. It is a lesson that other African communities or societies facing social challenges need to learn from South Africa. It entails that reconciliation needs to be defined in accordance with the social needs of the society that requires it.  In South Africa, reconciliation was defined in terms of forgiveness and recognition that it was a mistake to target people on the basis of race and beliefs. In this case, recognizing the mistake of the past would allow for the ability of the South African society to remain alerted and avoid repeating the problems that ignited the conflict in the country in the first place.

In South Africa, reconciliation is not just a gift of good will that is exchanged between the victims and the perpetrators of abuses during the conflict. It is a social fledge that individuals (victims and perpetrators) have made to the society in order to pave a way for a new beginning. In this new beginning, both victims of the conflict and the perpetrators must work hand in hand to facilitate the transition from the state of conflict to the condition of peace. The world has witnessed this kind of transition happening in South Africa. It did not come easily, but the stakeholders in South Africa recognized that it was what the country needed to rebuild a better future for its people.

4.4. Compensation

The South African TRC recommended to the government an introduction of a compensation process to consolidate reconciliation exercise in South Africa. The offering of compensation to victims and communities that bore the brunt of the suffering during the Apartheid rule in South Africa was an important part of the social rehabilitation of the society. Compensation came in different forms.  There were monetary and symbolic compensations for the victims of human rights violations in South Africa. The monetary or material compensations for some victims were meant to ensure the success of reintegration of victims into the society after the dismantling of the Apartheid state. South Africans, however, knew that the limited compensation offered to the victims would not change their lives for the better. In general, those compensations were part of an attempt the society was making to show to the victims that it shared their suffering and sorrows.

The symbolic compensations, on the other hand, played a role in enabling the victims to realize their personal contribution to South Africa’s social and political change. Through the work of the TRC, it became clear to them that their sacrifices were symbolically accepted as part of an official history of South Africa and that they became national symbols of unity and reconciliation. Therefore, compensations to the victims in the South African reconciliation process were indeed important, not for their material value but for their overall contribution to the confidence building and recognition of the victims.

4.5. Amnesty Process

The third important element of the South African TRC was the amnesty provision. The move by the South African political and civil society leaderships to support and facilitate the amnesty programs opened the way for the consolidation of the peace and reconciliation in the country. The offering of the amnesty to individuals suspected to have contributed to illegal disappearances of the opponents of the Apartheid regime was so “controversial” that it “provoked” major “debates”; some South Africans believed that amnesty undermines justice for the victims.[36]  However, a significant number of victims of racial segregation in South Africa supported the amnesty program as long as it would promote peace and national reconciliation in South Africa.  They understood the process as an important part of nation building. They supported it because it would help the country emerged united after long decades of conflict.

In fact, the amnesty program in South Africa encouraged a peaceful transfer of power from the Apartheid regime to the new regime of national unity for the purpose of consolidating peace and democratic rule. It partially addressed the issues related to justice and accountability; it was justice through voluntary confession.[37] In matters concerning justice and accountability in South Africa, the amnesty program opened the way for individuals involved in the human rights violation in the course of the conflict in the country to apply for a pardon. This process allowed them to avoid trails and convictions in a court of law. But it required the applicants to state the nature of their crimes and why they committed the crimes in which they were involved. The confessions of the perpetrators were treated as part of providing justice for the victims, even though those who confessed to having committed human rights violations did not go to jail.

In general, the success of the South African TRC is not based on achieving justice for the victims of Apartheid in South Africa. Its successes rest on the principle of social reconstruction of the society. The social reconstruction of South Africa required a number of things to happen in the country. It required truth-telling so that all South Africans knew what happened in their country during the conflict. Through the knowledge of the truth, the reconciliation would be possible. The truth allows people to move on and start a new way of coping with the things that had affected them in the past. The social reconstruction of South Africa also required the victims to offer forgiveness to those who hurt them and perpetrators’ acceptance of guilt for the crimes committed against innocent people. The processes of confession and forgiveness opened new ways for better social interactions between different communities in South Africa.

4.6. Challenges to Reconciliation in South Africa

Although the South African TRC has been acknowledged as the most successful reconciliation exercise of the twentieth century, a number of major challenges remain unchanged. The outstanding problem facing the reconciliation movement in South Africa is poverty, which defined the Apartheid era. The majority of poor people in South Africa are blacks. Black South Africans continue to face the legacy of racial segregation in the economic fields. In its survey of 2015, the South African Reconciliation Barometer indicates “the gap between rich and poor as the most divisive aspect of the society.”[38] Hence, the legacy of Apartheid has not completely gone but it has remained as part of the economic structure prevailing today in South Africa.

The grinding poverty affecting most South Africans, particularly black communities remains as one of the defining factors that policy makers must address for South Africa to achieve a total unity of its people. In short, new South Africa needs to work hard to do away with the economic Apartheid in order to achieve a genuine unity among its people.

The dismantling of the economic Apartheid is not going to be an easy one. It requires carefully designed economic empowerment of the poor black communities by providing them with better education opportunities and healthcare. I think the time has come for South Africa to stop talking about achieving reconciliation but to begin listening to the voices of those enduring poverty. This is where the real reconciliation will begin to take roots in the society. After this short  review of the South African TRC, we now turn to the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation process.

5. Sierra Leonean Transitional Justice Mechanism

The conflict in Sierra Leone that began in 1991 was one of the most brutal civil conflicts in Africa. It began in the east and spread to others of the country. Like many African conflicts, it was influenced in many ways by social, political, and economic realities of the Sierra Leonean society.[39] The roots of this conflict lie deep in the history and the subsequent failures of the political elite in the country to develop stable social structures in Sierra Leone. This section briefly reviews the realities that ignited the civil war in Sierra Leone and how the people of that country were able to bring it to an end. The lessons learnt through the Sierra Leonean conflict resolution mechanism are important for the world and Africa in particular. In the pursuit of stopping the civil war in Sierra Leone, the warring parties and other stakeholders in the region and in the international community initiated the process that resulted in the signing of Lome Agreement in July 1999.[40] The major product of that agreement was the establishment of a national government that was able to put in place the Sierra Leonean TRC with a specific mandate. We shall examine some elements of the Sierra Leonean TRC to understand its major achievements.

5.1. Sierra Leonean TRC

The Sierra Leonean TRC had a special mandate to examine the conditions that led to the brutal conflict in the country. The following principles guided its work:

The purpose of the TRC is to produce an accurate and fair historical record of the civil war and to foster national reconciliation and healing. It will do so by gathering information on the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Sierra Leone civil war from 1991 to signing of the Lome Peace Agreement in July 1999. It will give victims, perpetrators, and everyone affected by these atrocities the opportunity to tell what happened to them. Many victims want the nation to hear what they suffered and the TRC gives them the chance to be heard.[41]

The commissioners of the Sierra Leonean TRC had a responsibility to bring before the Sierra Leonean people reliable information related to the historical record of the conflict and damages the civil war had caused in the country. One of the most important elements of establishing peace and understanding between the conflicting parties in any conflict is to produce credible information about the things that took place in the course of the fighting. It was necessary for the Sierra Leonean TRC to reveal accurate records of the conflict because many people suffered the consequences of the civil war. The information the Sierra Leonean TRC gathered and presented to the world has revealed the extent of the damage the war had caused in that country.

The search for the truth of what happened to innocent people in the course of war in Sierra Leone remains the cornerstone of rebuilding trust, reconciliation and healing in the country. The Sierra Leonean TRC accomplished a difficult task of convincing individuals and groups to come forward with the information they knew about the atrocities committed during the war. The truth commission made it clear that it was not a “judiciary body,” but a body that was working to rebuild the broken relationships between the communities in the country because of the war.[42] One way of building the trust was to establish accurate records of the war. Accurate records would allow individual victims and their communities to know who was responsible for the crimes committed against them.

The Sierra Leonean TRC in its search for truth brought together the perpetrators and the victims of the civil war to talk about their experiences with the conflict. A short presentation by the American Institute for Justice and Peace shows that a good number of Sierra Leoneans adopted the attitudes of ‘forgive and forget’ for a number of reasons including “fear for retaliation from the perpetrators; fear of government reprisals; concerns arising from the concurrent operation of different transitional justice mechanisms such as the TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.”[43]

 Despite those fears, however, ex-combatants and victims were willing to participate in the process to testify and offer information about the incidents in which they were involved.[44] The victims wanted the whole world to understand their agony and unnecessary suffering that they went through because of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Their participation in the process made it possible for the Sierra Leone TRC to ascertain the realities of the conflict in the country. The participation of the victims and ex-combatants on both sides of the conflict provided the Sierra Leonean TRC with the information crucial for the process of national reconciliation and healing. Therefore, the Sierra Leonean TRC was able to build trust between its workers and the people of Sierra Leone to come forward with the required information for the success of the work of the TRC.

5.2. Sierra Leonean TRC and the Civil Society

The civil society in Sierra Leone was a major force in the process of establishing the TRC. It “participated” actively in the “national consultative conferences,” which put in place the terms and guiding principles for the work of the TRC. [45] The active participation of the Sierra Leonean civil society in the process of national reconciliation and healing was an essential part of rebuilding trust between the communities. The Sierra Leonean civil society remained a neutral body throughout the peace process and some of its members, later on, led the TRC and brought its work to a successful conclusion. The Sierra Leonean TRC was an “independent” body, free of political interference; it also had a “power to subpoena witnesses and people of interest” for the purpose of gathering accurate information.[46] The active participation of the Sierra Leonean church and other religious bodies in the work of the TRC ensured its neutrality and independence. Bishop Joseph C. Himper successfully led the TRC until it achieved its objectives of bringing healing, reconciliation and democratic transformation to Sierra Leone.

 One of the things that the Sierra Leonean TRC examined was the history of Sierra Leone. The examination of the Sierra Leonean historical records allowed the TRC’s investigations to go beyond 1991.[47]  The task of reconciling and healing the Sierra Leonean society required the examination of their history to understand what historical issues could have contributed to the dirty war in the country. The reviewing of the historical records by a neutral body was an important part of the work of the TRC to unearth all historical evidence that stands behind the bitterness seen in the conflict. At this point, we shall make a short tour of the Sierra Leonean history, as examined by the TRC and scholars on Sierra Leonean affairs, to understand the roots of the civil strife in that country.

5.3. Brief Review of the History of Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone as a nation has unusual historical realities. Its history was defined in a special way by the British colonial influences and interests. Looking at this history briefly will give us a hint about what precipitated the civil conflict many years after independence from Britain. According to David Harris, the historical, political, and social structures of Sierra Leone were greatly affected by the British colonial decision to resettle “freed slaves and free persons of color from Britain and America” in some parts of Africa.[48] Some of those communities were settled in the present day Sierra Leonean capital city, Freetown.[49] When they came to settle in their new communities, they brought with them the benefits of having been exposed to Western civilization. The settlers’ social progress in their new home was defined greatly by Western culture and way of life. Harris has indicated that they had the advantage of “education, trade, and dress.” [50] From these groups, the Krio communities emerged in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

In fact, these three things, learning, economic skills, and modern lifestyle, set the settlers apart from the indigenous communities of Sierra Leone. They became the pillars of their political, social, and economic power in the country. It is easily understandable how difficult it was for the indigenous communities to compete in an environment in which they did not have the skills and resources to match those of the settlers. What developed in that environment was a feeling of resentment and contention. The competition for power and resources on an unleveled plain field allowed friction to flourish in Sierra Leone over time. When the colonial authorities eventually handed over the reign of power to Sierra Leoneans, those with economic, political, and education advantages had the upper hand in taking over the reign of power in the country. The powerful elite that emerged after independence, that acquired the economic and political power in the country, had no appetite to build an inclusive society. They did not want to share power and resources with the rest of Sierra Leoneans. Consequently, many factors, which were the products of this unhealthy social environment, led to the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone in 1991. These factors include economic greed, unbalance social structure of the country, and regional influences. Now we shall briefly examine these factors.

5.4. An unbalance Social Structure

The freed and repatriated slaves brought to Sierra Leone in 1787 from British colonies created unbalance social structures in the country. In essence, the settlers had the advantages of getting and having access to colonial resources such as education facilities and other social skills. The gaps between them and the indigenous population widened and powerful elite emerged that would later control the affairs of the country. This reality brought to existence two social classes in Sierra Leone, which included the well-educated class of settlers, and those who had managed to join them and the indigenous Sierra Leoneans, who had little access to education and economic privileges in the country.

When the British left Sierra Leone in 1961, these social structures remained in place and continued to define social life in Sierra Leone long after independence.  The unhealthy social distinctions that developed in the country during the colonial period were aggravated by the mismanagement of the affairs of the country. The post-colonial administration of Sierra Leone did not create opportunities for all citizens to build balanced, stable communities. Harris has elaborated that the post-colonial administrations of Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and All People’s Congress (APC) initiated a personalized system of governance in which the national affairs of the country became part of the private personal matter.[51] The elites, instead of uniting Sierra Leoneans, continued to foster corrupt practices to enrich themselves through an illicit use of the national resources. Therefore, the majority of Sierra Leoneans became disillusioned with the post-colonial regimes and resentment against the political elite began to build up in the country up to the period leading to the civil war.

The personalization of the system of governance eroded the principles of good governance and allowed corruption to grow unchecked. For instance, Harris suggests that the “privatization and politicization of import-export licenses and access to foreign currency” became part of dealings between the ruling class and their allies in the private sector.[52] This atmosphere became presumably a fertile ground for unhealthy political competition. It led to the collapse of the system of governance and the rule of law.

The results of the mismanagement of human and material resources in Sierra Leone after independence alienated many youths, who became disfranchised and left with little or no opportunities for better education and economic survival. Those youths arguably became susceptible to political manipulation, which made it easy for politicians to turn them into instruments of war.

5.5. Economic Issues

Besides the unbalanced social structure in Sierra Leone, one of the factors many scholars and researchers agree on as a driving force that led to the civil war in 1991 was a “combination of poverty and injustice.”[53] The issues related to poverty and injustice came as a result of “declining economy” and rundown government services.[54] The government mismanagement of resources diminished the ability of the authorities to deliver services to different communities in the county. It also opened the way for corruption to grow. Since there was not an accountable system to control the Sierra Leonean resources for the benefit of the Sierra Leonean citizens, different competing groups in the country began to vie for the control of diamond fields. This competition over the control of diamond fields became a major contributor to the conflict.

While other factors played a significant role in the civil war in Sierra Leone, economic issues stand out in a special way. They made it easy for people who lived in poverty to join the war because they believed that the corrupt elite holding power in the country was taking away the resources without taking care of the rest of the population. In this context, the struggle over the control of diamond fields is an important part of this economic equation of the conflict in Sierra Leone.  But it does not necessarily override the importance of other social factors that fueled the conflict.

5.6. Outside Influence

The outside influence in the Sierra Leonean economic, social, and political life is not something new. It has its roots in the historical foundation of Sierra Leone when the British imperial authorities decided to resettle rescued and freed slaves from Europe and Americas in the country. But in the period leading to the civil war in 1991, the regional political and economic interests played major roles in the conflict. The notable beneficiary over the conflict in Sierra Leone was the former rebel leader in Liberia Charles Taylor, who later became the president of that country. Scholars and researchers on both Liberia and Sierra Leone have mentioned that Charles Taylor had ambitions to become a regional player; he also had economic interests in the diamond trade in Sierra Leone.[55] These factors probably allowed Charles Taylor’s support for, and finance of Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front. This support for the Sierra Leonean rebels led by Foday Sankoh sustained the rebels’ capability to pursue the war in Sierra Leone. In turn, Charles Taylor benefited from the illicit diamond trade from the fields that the rebels controlled in Sierra Leone.

 Furthermore, outside influence in the Sierra Leonean conflict came through the United Nations. After the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone signed a peace agreement in 1999, the United Nations deployed its forces in the country to boost the regional efforts to implement the agreement.[56] The United Nations later became an integral part of the peace process in Sierra Leone for a number of years. It encouraged the negotiated settlement of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The efforts of encouraging negotiation as a better means of conflict resolution in the country brought about the Lome Peace Accord, which ended the civil war. The UN mission in Sierra Leone ensured that the peace process was holding in the country and the parties to the conflict were meeting their obligations in peace building exercise.

It was after the signing of the Lome Peace Accord that things began to change in Sierra Leone. The accord ushered in a new era of peace and political understanding between different competing groups in the country. Although the Lome Peace Accord promised an end to the civil conflict in Sierra Leone, one of its provisions was not acceptable to the United Nations and the human rights advocates. The provision granted unconditional amnesty to Foday Sankoh and fighters of his Revolutionary United Front.[57] Despite this difficulty in some of the provisions of the peace process, the road was already cleared and the parties proceeded to the implementation of the agreement.

An important part of the final solution to the conflict in Sierra Leone emerged after the Sierra Leonean parliament enacted a law establishing the truth and reconciliation commission to bring to light the issues surrounding the civil war and the subsequent  human rights abuses. Equally important was “the creation of Special Court for Sierra Leone to try people who have the greatest responsibility for very serious crimes during the civil war.”[58] The Special Court for Sierra Leone has remained as an important symbol of justice and social stability in the country. It has shown that justice for both the victims and perpetrators of war crimes is an essential component in the consolidation of peace in a society ravaged by war.

The lessons learnt in the process of peace building efforts in South Africa, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone can offer invaluable opportunities to South Sudan to deal with its problems. The next section will highlight these lessons and suggest a possible way forward for South Sudanese stakeholders to use the lessons learnt from South Africa, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone for the benefit of the peace process in the country.

6. South Sudan and Transitional Justice Mechanisms of Rwanda, South Africa and Sierra Leone

The previous sections have briefly discussed the transitional justice mechanisms of South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. It is clear that the transitional justice mechanisms of those countries contain significant lessons that may help South Sudan deals with its political and social difficulties the war has brought into the social life of South Sudanese. But what will ultimately help South Sudan comes out of its predicaments are not political programs that will emerge from political parties but the ability of the civil society to unite the grassroots on the path to building South Sudanese nationalism.

The discussion of the conditions that led to conflicts in South Africa, Rwanda, and Sierra are many, but looking at their historical backgrounds reveals a number of issues. These issues include the social structures of those societies, economic disparities, and racial segregation in the case of South Africa. All these factors were identified by the truth and reconciliation processes in those countries as the sources of conflicts. They continue to affect the social life in all those nations; however, all those countries have made tremendous progress in the areas of education, healthcare, better economic opportunities for their citizens after the conflict resolutions in their societies. For instance, Rwanda has achieved enviable economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa after the genocide in 1994. Now Rwanda’s economy “ranks 71 globally” and “4^th in Sub-Saharan Africa.” [59] The ability of Rwandans not to allow the legacy of genocide to define them has paid off since the country has achieved some degree of political and economic stability. South Africa, on the other hand, has done away with racial segregation and the country is now building on the consolidation of the national reconciliation process. In the case of Sierra Leone, political stability has returned and the process of rebuilding the economy is underway. I think South Sudan needs the same political prudence to discredit the legacy of political violence and focus on ways to build stable social systems across the nation. The building of stable political and economic conditions in South Sudan will not come as a result of outside financial aid, but it will come as part of strengthening the internal cooperation and understanding to end corruption and ethnic politics.

Moreover, there are three useful processes in these famous African transitional mechanisms that South Sudan should examine to gain important lessons from them. First, the use of African traditional judicial system is one of them. After the genocide of 1994, the government of Rwanda and the international community responded differently to formulate ways to render justice to the victims of mass killings. Because of the sheer number of people involved in the mass atrocities, the government of Rwanda came up with the idea of using traditional justice mechanism to work parallel to the state judicial system and the ICTR to speed up the trials of those suspected of participating in the genocide. The introduction of the traditional conflict resolution methods to support the state judicial system encouraged the participation of local communities in the facilitation of justice.

 South Sudan needs to look into ways of making it possible for the local communities to become part of rendering justice to the victims of the atrocities committed in the current and the previous wars. Although the IGAD-Plus sponsored peace agreement has not clearly stated the role the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms may play in the upcoming transitional justice mechanism in South Sudan, it remains vitally important that the local communities participate in this process. They need to be fully represented in the judicial process. The full participation of local communities in the transitional justice mechanism will allow them to become the guardian of peace and stability in the country. It will help them understand better the issues that led to war in the first place and discover how politicians used local communities in the war for political gains.

 One of the proposed transitional justice institutions in the peace process in South Sudan in which the traditional judges in the local communities should play a major role is the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA).The local communities across the country can elect traditional judges who would form the national traditional judicial forum to deal with the issues related to compensation of the victims of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the conflicts. They can apply the traditional methods of compensation they use in their communities to settle disputes. The participation of the traditional judges in the compensation process is important because most of the atrocities were committed in the villages, and they can determine the best ways to compensate the victims of the war (see section 6.4 for my suggestions on how to deal with compensations). Therefore, South Sudan should follow in the footsteps of Rwanda in the use of traditional judicial mechanism—but without political interference— to settle problems related to the compensation of victims.

Furthermore, the empowerment of civil societies in South Africa and Sierra Leone made it possible for various peace and human rights activists to join hands with the governments of both countries in the planning and the designing of their truth commissions. The civil societies in South Sudan, which include churches and other groups, can form a useful part of the designing and the planning process for the overall peace building exercise. All member groups belonging to the civil society in South Sudan have been leading different initiatives to promote peace and reconciliation in the nation. They have the wealth of expertise in dealing with grassroots and communities across the country. The experiences the civil society has in the communities throughout South Sudan should be used to a full extent possible to promote peace, justice, reconciliation, and accountability.

A recent report by the United Nations Secretary- General before the Security Council indicates that the role of the civil society in the overall peace process in South Sudan is paramount and requires the cooperation of local and international actors to facilitate their work. The report suggests that the civil society in South Sudan can “provide an interface between the transitional justice stakeholders and official transitional justice processes in South Sudan.”[60] Indeed, the civil society groups are an important link between the grassroots and other agencies that are ready to offer assistance in the promotion of peace and accountability in South Sudan. It is the hope of all South Sudanese that the political actors will not interfere in the work of civil society in the country. It needs to be emphasized that the current political climate in the country requires a strong and neutral civil society to promote the peace process at the grassroots level of South Sudanese society.

6.1. General View on the IGAD-Plus Sponsored Peace Agreement

The IGAD-Plus sponsored peace agreement to end the conflict in South Sudan has introduced a framework to improve the balance of power between different organs of the Transitional Government of National Unity in the Republic of South Sudan. Chapter I of the accord outlines the relationship between the executive branches of the government.[61] For instance, the accord suggests that the top leaders will “regularly consult” on issues related to the smooth functioning of the governance during the transitional period to deliver better services to South Sudanese. These arrangements are good. They could be the blueprint for the future balance of power in South Sudan, but the realities of the political situation in South Sudan are not up to the task of establishing cooperation between different parties for the sake of nation building.

It is evident in the current situation that the relationship between the opposing parties that have formed the Government of National Unity is marked by confrontation. There are not real working relationships between the opposing parties that would enable them to make the day-to-day business of running the state easy. Both parties are on the collision course. We have seen this situation when the parties failed to amend the constitution to form the Transitional Government of National Unity early this year. The process stalled over the number of states in the country during the transitional period. Instead of getting bogged down on the number of states in the country, the parties should have focused their attention on the most important issues facing the nation.

The most important problems facing South Sudanese now is not how many states there are in the country. The most important thing South Sudanese want, as we speak, is to stop the lawlessness that has promoted banditry and insecurity across the country. Stopping the conflict would make it possible for the people to return to their homes and begin the process of rebuilding their lives. Furthermore, stopping the conflict would allow the international community to provide humanitarian aid to the war-affected communities. Both parties have sidelined these issues and focused instead on how to gain or maintain power, which is the main issue behind the opposing views on the number of states in the country.

It will be even more difficult for the Transitional Government of National Unity to function when the real politics begins. The real politics I am referring to here is the business of uniting the SPLM. The top position in the SPLM is the cause of all miseries the people of South Sudan are facing. The reason that makes the top position in the SPLM a source of troubles for South Sudan is one thing: it is associated with political power. It is as I have said elsewhere that the “SPLM in South Sudan has become like the ANC in South Africa.”[62] In new South Africa, it is very difficult for a politician outside the ANC to ascend to power. It will take a while before the political climate changes in South Africa for the opposition parties to defeat the ANC in an election. A similar condition is likely in South Sudan for the next 50 years.

The struggle for power in the SPLM hierarchy has made South Sudan’s historical party a hotbed of political troubles. The struggle for the top position in the SPLM caused its split into two factions in 1991. This split was later used to massacre civilians in Bor, who were seen loyal to John Garang. The same scenario occurred following the events of December 2013 when the political struggle within the SPLM became an ethnic struggle. The victims of this power struggle are people in the villages who have very limited influence on whoever holds the top position in the SPLM.

All in all, the Agreement to resolve the conflict in South Sudan stands on a shaky ground.  The political class in the country entered this agreement, not for the sake of peace but to prepare themselves for a big power struggle ahead. The provision that sets up the two rival armies[63] in the country for a period of two years is quite dangerous. Less than a year should have been an ideal time to reintegrate the rebel soldiers into the national army and create a non-politicized military command before the end of the interim period. The fear is that those who will lose an election at the end of the interim period may be tempted to use the soldiers loyal to their political agenda to repeat what happened in 2013. This scenario is likely to happen due to political and economic interests of neighboring countries in South Sudan.

 It is likely that IGAD and its partners in the mediation process have borrowed the concept of one government with two rival armies from the Comprehensive Peace Agree (CPA) of 2005.[64]  It is, however, an indication that the international community has either knowingly or unknowingly opened the gate for further conflict because what worked in the Sudan might not work in South Sudan. The only hope that would minimize the risk of the country slipping back to war is for the neighboring countries to stop interfering in the internal affairs of South Sudan. They also need to stop being the sanctuaries for the trouble makers in South Sudan and their illegally acquired assets.

Another useful step the international community can take to reduce the possibility of a return to war in South Sudan is to make the initiation of war a risky business for the warlords in the country. The politicians who are eager to ignite conflict for political gains must feel that they will face serious consequences from the international community should they cause troubles. These steps can act as deterrents for another war in South Sudan, but the most important step is the implementation of chapter V of the agreement, and the international community must take a lead in strengthening the institutions that will be established as soon as the Transitional Government of National Unity is in place. These institutions include the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS), Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and National Healing (CTRH), and Compensation and Reparation Authority (CTA).  The section that follows discusses the significance of these institutions as the basis for a lasting peace in South Sudan.

6.2. Hybrid Court of South Sudan (HCSS)

The Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan has provided for the establishment of the hybrid court to investigate and try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the war. The hybrid court is a step in the right direction. But for it to achieve its goals and deter the warlords from initiating another conflict, it must ensure that war criminals at the highest chain of leadership never escape justice.  They have to defend themselves in the hybrid court of South Sudan.  South Sudanese need to know and understand the roles the military and political leadership have played in the initiation of the conflict. They also need to know why they have to endure another war this time around. South Sudanese would like the hybrid court to perform a credible and transparent investigation to answer those questions satisfactorily.

Ensuring that criminal responsibility lies with those who had the power to prevent the country sliding into chaos but instead encouraged the violence to occur must account for their actions. If they do, it will be the best deterrent possible for future conflicts. It will make the warlords think twice before mobilizing children to wage illegal wars. There has to be an accountability for all the crimes committed in South Sudan before and beyond 2013. Only then will the genuine process of national healing begin.

The issues related to accountability and criminal responsibility are crucial for the reconstruction of social order in South Sudan. One of the things that have played an important part in the perpetuation of violence in South Sudan is the absence of the rule of law. In addition to that, the political and military elites in the country have set themselves above the law. They commit both political and economic crimes with impunity because nobody will hold them accountable for what they do. I think the hybrid court must act to set credible legal standards concerning criminal responsibility associated with political instability in South Sudan.

6.2.1. Hope for Justice

 The history of South Sudan is full of both external and internal violence and oppression. But what is unfortunate is that when the external oppression finally came to an end in 2011, no one considered the possibility that the internal oppression would continue. On the contrary, it has become severe.  The internal oppressors have increased, and the ungrateful elites have stepped up political and economic violence against South Sudanese. They have displaced millions of people and killed thousands of civilians just because of presumed support for the opponents.  In this context, South Sudanese expect the hybrid court to deliver justice, which is a necessary tool to confront the internal oppressions the political and military elites are unleashing on them.

What happened in Juba in 2013, two years after independence, was not coincident. The political elite and its military branch, shortly after the demise of John Garang and during the period leading to the independence in 2011, was busy stealing and staging away the country’s resources, leaving South Sudanese under abject poverty. Therefore, the massive corruption we have witnessed in the country after the death of John Garang is the major source of the current crisis. The corrupt leadership in the country is fighting for the chances to steal more. They are not fighting to rebuild the country.

We all know that those who are in the rebellion were an integral part of the government of South Sudan. For instance, Riek Machar, before Mr Kiir sacked him as Vice President, was virtually running the whole country. When he was a major player in the government, he neither spoke of any reforms nor initiated any process leading to genuine reforms in the country. Reforms became necessary only when he was no longer part of the regime. Hence, he has no moral ground to tell South Sudanese that Kiir’s government is corrupt. He is part of it. South Sudanese need concrete answers from them, not political rhetoric. It is the hope of South Sudanese that the Hybrid Court of South Sudan will establish beyond reasonable doubt the factors behind the violence in 2013.

Nonetheless, it has already appeared that the hope for justice in South Sudan is going to disappear unless the people demand accountability from the political and military leaders. A recent report by the New York Times suggests that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar are seeking “truth” without “trials” for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the war under their watch.[65]  It is an alliance against accountability. What is the value of a truth without accountability? In fact, South Sudanese need to know the truth, but once that truth has come to light, it must lead to criminal accountability for all the crimes committed in all the wars since 1991 until now. It would be an insult to the victims who have borne the burdens of destruction, looting, and death to see those who murdered their loved ones walking tall and holding influential positions in the government without answering to their crimes. Such a truth will not lead to reconciliation. It will not work. It is time for the civil society in South Sudan to take a stand against such proposal. If such a proposal is allowed to take roots, it will make it possible for the war criminals in the country to escape justice and in the process undermine reconciliation.

But the hope for justice in South Sudan should not be based on the HCSS alone. The national judiciary system has to be re-organized and enabled to deal with the crimes related to wars in the country. The re-organization and strengthening of the justice system in South Sudan will help the country make sovereign legal decisions instead of relying on legal assistance from AU, IGAD nations, and the UN. Reliance on those agencies for legal help undermines the building of an independent judicial system in the country. Further, the help that comes from those agencies usually allow them to make decisions on behalf of South Sudan; however, unrestrained outside influences will always become sources of instability in the country. To avoid outside interference in its internal affairs, South Sudan must work to build a legal system that meets the needs of its citizens. The re-organization of judiciary system after the war is something that South Sudan should learn from Rwanda to strengthen its legal system.

6.3. Truth, Reconciliation and National Healing

The Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and National Healing (CTRH) is a vital institution in the pursuit of a lasting peace in South Sudan. No doubt, this commission will play an essential role in the process of social reconstruction of the South Sudanese society. It will open the way for South Sudanese to see and understand things in a new way. It will allow them to understand that peace is always the best alternative for the society to make progress.

However, the CTRH will achieve meaningful results if it takes its mandates seriously and avoids relying on some made up stories that have emerged during the conflict. For instance, rape has been the weapon of choice to humiliate and punish opponents of either side in all the wars fought in South Sudan.  But recently there are reports that have emerged which make little sense at all. In 2016, a report attributed to the United Nations suggests that government soldiers were given a green light to rape women as a form of payment.[66] But most South Sudanese know that government soldiers or rebels have committed the acts of rape in the war regardless of those disputable claims. Such reports require rigorous scrutiny to establish their authenticity, or else they will undermine the credibility of achieving justice for the victims of rape in South Sudan.

 The situation in South Sudan requires the establishment of undisputed facts to dispel mistrust between different groups. The report that the African Union’s team of inquiry into the crisis in South Sudan has produced stands on a solid ground. It has documented the facts about the crimes both sides have committed in the war. Further, it has discredited the narrative of genocide in the country, something that the rebels used as a reason for waging the war.[67] Because of this report, we now know that the war is being fought for the purpose of gaining or maintaining power, and horrific crimes have been committed against civilians all over the country because of mismanagement of the functioning of the government and resources in the country. [68]

The African Union’s team of inquiry into the crisis in South Sudan has confirmed what we already knew that the war in South Sudan is “a crisis of weak governance, weak leadership and institutions, a conflation of personal, ethnic and national interests and the problematic nature of the transition instituted by the CPA.”[69] The weak leadership in South Sudan has allowed individuals to practice unrestrained corruption, impeded institutional development, and encouraged violent ethnic sentiments. To dismantle this unhealthy situation, South Sudanese need the truth to empower them to stand in solidarity against corrupt political practices, which produce wars and violence.

Moreover, South Sudanese would like to know whether there was an attempt to overthrow an elected government in 2013 or not. The CTRH has to establish the truth about what happened and why. Nothing but the whole truth needs to come to light. The knowledge of the truth will allow South Sudanese to understand why they were led into an unnecessary war. When the truth about the current political crisis in the country is established, it will dispel misunderstanding and empower the citizens to question misleading policies that cause wars should they arise again in the future.

Knowing the truth about the causes of the conflict in 2013 will encourage South Sudanese to enter into a genuine process of reconciliation. As Desmond Tutu has said, “Reconciliation is, not about being cozy; it is not about pretending that things were other than they were. Reconciliation based on falsehood, on not facing up to reality, is not true reconciliation and will not last.”[70] Therefore, a genuine reconciliation requires hard facts. Hard facts include justice for the victims of war crimes and acceptance of responsibility by those who have done harm to others for the sake of belonging to a particular group or political persuasion.

The establishment of an untainted truth could facilitate the unity of the country and bring all South Sudanese under the banner of one nation. The banner of South Sudanese unity is that we are all brothers and sisters who must work together to bring healing and understanding to our nation.

6.4. Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA)

The Compensation and Reparation Authority remains an important part of peace building exercise in South Sudan given the level of damage and destruction the war has caused in the country. Nonetheless, it is going to be a difficult exercise for a number of reasons. First, the destruction has touched every part of the country. Innocent civilians and their properties were destroyed and cities flattened to the ground by South Sudanese themselves as we have seen in Malakal.[71]  This truth begs the question, “who is going to compensate the victims of war in South Sudan?” The entire nation of South Sudan requires a compensation of one kind or another. But victims cannot compensate other victims.

Second, if cutoff date is introduced as proposed in the peace agreement, the process will actually open up old wounds. For instance, the victims of the past events are still here. Some of them have gone once more through the experience of violence in 2013. Therefore, a compensation based on the events that began in 2013 would be considered by the victims of the previous crimes as an unfair. Consequently, the compensation process can be a source of friction instead of promoting peace and harmony among the people of South Sudan.

Third, the country is already bankrupt without enough resources to pay the victims of war crimes should there be a compensation process. But no one expects the international community to compensate the victims of war in South Sudan. South Sudanese expect humanitarian help from the outside world but not individual compensation for the damages incurred in the war. The responsibility of compensating the victims of war crimes and crimes against in South Sudan is solely a responsibility of the national government. However, the major problem that faces the national government is how to raise funds to fulfill its obligation of compensating the people the war has affected. In fact, individual compensation is going to fail, and its failure will bring more problems than the ones it is trying to solve.

All in all, the principle of compensation or reparation is a noble one, which is based on the understanding that it might restore the victims to the state they were in should the abuse had not happened to them.[72]  But individual reparation will not achieve its objectives in South Sudan because of the economic and social realities facing the new nation in its phase of transition. What I suggest instead is a collective compensation.  Previously, I argued for “communal compensations.”[73] The communal compensations are going to be developmental in nature. They will enable the government to use the meager resources it has to build schools, hospitals, roads and upgrade farm lands for the communities to use. Directing money into the developmental project is far more useful than individual compensations. It will allow the whole community to benefit from the resources and support peace building efforts. We can take a brief look into the compensation scheme the TRC established in South Africa to see what South Sudan may learn in that process.

The South African TRC’s Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation established a possible payment scheme for the victims of human rights abuses in South Africa.[74] But the truth commissioners were mindful of the long-term needs of the society. So they included in the final report of the TRC a “development-centered reparation approach” to be implemented in post-Apartheid South Africa.[75]  The South African TRC long-term approach to reparation encourages rigorous participation of community members in the actives that will help them achieve reasonable degree of independence in supporting themselves and their communities. This approach is aimed at “empowering individuals and communities to take control of their lives” and design their future by offering them “sufficient knowledge and information about available resources and to help them utilize those resources to their maximum benefit.”[76]

But it remains true that the process of individual compensation and the development-centered approach to reparation have not achieved the desired results because a significant number of victims have not benefited from the compensation packages the South African TRC proposed.[77] South Africa has not paid in full the individual compensation packages as recommended by the TRC due to an unstable financial situation and the gap between the rich and the poor remains as wide as ever in the country. The situation in South Africa should act as a reminder for South Sudanese leaders not to embark on a scheme of reparation they will not be able to meet at all. If the reparation exercise would remain unfinished in South Africa for over twenty years after the end of Apartheid, it would take generations in South Sudan to put in place the resources to achieve the level of what South Africa has tried in terms of compensating individual victims.

For South Sudan to confront the difficulties in developing a reasonable policy concerning the future reparation packages to the victims of war crimes in the country, the process will require a strong and neutral civil society to study more the social needs of South Sudanese and assist the authorities and communities in making practical decisions on compensation schemes instead of the ones that will be difficult to achieve.

7. Conclusion

It is clear that there have been noticeable changes in economic, political freedom, education, and other areas of social life in South Africa, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone since the time when the transitional justice mechanisms occurred in those countries. It is an indication that whatever means they used to facilitate their transitions from the state of conflicts to the state of peace building is working, and their societies are willing to embrace the atmosphere of peace as a way forward for social reconstruction.

In fact, the major elements of their transitional justice mechanisms were reconciliation, justice, accountability, social rehabilitation or restorative justice, but they employed different means and methods of achieving those objectives. Rwanda, for example, did not constitute an official truth and reconciliation commission but put in place judicial mechanisms to conduct trails as a way to consolidate peace and security after the genocide.  South Africa and Sierra Leone, however, conducted truth commissions aimed at establishing justice and reconciliation. But they differ in that Sierra Leone had a Special Court to try cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the fighting while South Africa did not.

In all those countries, peace and stability are no longer a dream but a reality they are working on to maintain for their people to prosper in harmony. That is why it is necessary for South Sudanese stakeholders to examine the transitional justice mechanisms of those nations to learn from their successes and failures for the benefit of peace building across South Sudan. Had those countries tried to avoid facing up to the social realities brought about by the conflicts in their societies, it would have been hard for them to achieve any meaningful progress in peace building. Consequently, South Sudanese cannot contemplate or entertain the possibility of not holding accountable for their actions those who ignited wars for political gains. All options must be on the table including retributive justice against war criminals. Only then shall there be political stability and a lasting peace in South Sudan.

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—“Causes of Current War: Tribal Politics & Idea of Leadership in South Sudanese Society,” South Sudan Nation (SSN),  November 2014.

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[1]. Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16, 69(2003): 70-94.

[2]. Jamie O’Connell, Paul James-Allen and Sheku B.S. Lahai, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court: A Citizen’s Handbook (Freetown; New York, 2003), chapter 2.

[3]. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The New Landscape of Transitional Justice” in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice. Eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.

[4]. Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy.”

[5].Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York; Oxford: Oxford university Press, 200), 34.

[6]. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy.”

[7]. Ibid.

[8].  Ibid.

[9]. Ibid

[10].  Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3-76.

[11]. Paige Arthur, “How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly, 31 (2009):321-367.

[12] .Usta Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence: The Legacy of the ICTR, Rwanda’s Ordinary Courts and Gacaca Courts. Vol. 17;17.;. Cambridge (Intersentia: United Kingdom, 2014), 59; Stef Vandeginste, “Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Context of Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. Ed.Nigal Biggar.( Washington (Washington D.C University Press, 2001),231.

[13] . Stef, “Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Context of Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition” in Burying the Past, 235.

[14]. Kaiseti, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence, 64; Oldenburg, S. N.D. “Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence: The Legacy of the ICTR, Rwanda’s Ordinary Courts and Gacaca Courts.” African Affairs 453 (113): 620–21; Paul J.Magnarella, The Gacaca Courts, Post-genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyer (Vol. 29. Americus: Association of Third World Studies, Inc., 2012).

[15]. Kaiseti , Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence, 64.

[16]. Ibid

[17]. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2o12), 27; Benon Kabeera, and Vishanthie Sew Paul. Genocide and its aftermath: The case of Rwanda. International Social Work 51, 3(2008): 324-36.

[18]. Bert Ingelaere, “‘Does the truth pass across the fire without burning?’ Locating the Short Circuit in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 47, 4(2009): 507-28.

[19]. Paul Christoph Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, 39-40.

[20]. Ibid., 40

[21]. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation,40.

[22]. Ibid., 159.

[23]. Ibid.

[24].  Hinton, Transitional Justice, 12.

[25].  Ibid.

[26].  Nigel Biggar, Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict (Washington: Washington D.C University Press, 2001), 239.

[27].  Alexander Laban Hinton, Transitional Justice:  Global Mechanism and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence ( New Brins wick: Rutgers University Press, 2010)), 11; Augustine Brannigan, and Nicholas A. Jones. “Genocide and the Legal Process in Rwanda: From Genocide Amnesty to the New Rule of Law.” International Criminal Justice Review 19, 2(2009): 192-207.

[28].   Philip Clark, The gacaca courts, post-genocide justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without lawyers (Cambridge; New York;: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 48.

[29]. Megan Shore, and South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Burlington, VT;Farnham, England;: Ashgate Pub. Ltd, 2009), 150-4.

[30]. Shore, Religion and Conflict Resolution, 150-4.

[31].  Stef Vandeginste, “Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Context of Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict., 230; Ruvebana, E., and A. L. M. de Brouwer, “The Legacy of the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda: Survivors’ views.” International criminal law Review13,5(2013): 937; Susan Garnett Russell, “The role of education in promoting reconciliation and civic identity in Rwanda: Global, National, and School Contexts.” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2013; William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge; New York;: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[32] . Stef, “Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Context of Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict, 230-1.

[33].  Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence,52.

[34] . Stef, “Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Context of Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict, 231.

[35].  South Africa. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (V1. London; New York; Cape Town;: The Commission,1999).

[36].  Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio, eds.,The Provocation of Amnesty: Memory, Justice and Impunity (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003), xviii.

[37].  Erik Doxtader and Philippe-Joseph Slazar, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Fundamental Documents (Claremont; South Africa: New Africa Books, 2007), 259.

[38].  Ian Hofmeyr and Rajen Govender, South African Barometer Briefing Paper 2, Feb. 2016.

[39]. Laurel E. Fletcher, Harvey M. Weinstein and Jamie Rowen, “Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective,” Human Rights Quarterly, 31, 1(Feb. 2009), 188.

[40] . “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,” United States Institute of Peace, Lome, Togo, July 1999.

[41] . O’Connell, James-Allen and Lahai, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court, chapter 1.

[42] . Ibid.

[43] . Rosalind Shaw, “ Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone,” United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 2005.

[44].  Priscila Hayner, “The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Reviewing the First year.” International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 2004 ; Kilroy, Walt. Reintegration of ex-combatants after conflict: Participatory approaches in Sierra Leone and Liberia (New York, NY;Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire;: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[45]. Hayner, “The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Reviewing the First year.”

[46]. O’Connell, James-Allen and Lahai, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court.

[47]. William A. Schabas, “The Sierra Leone TRC” in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, 23

[48].  David Harris, Civil war and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution, Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Vol. 29.;29;. New York; London;: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 39.

[49].  Zubairu Wai, Epistemologies of African conflicts: Violence, evolutionism, and the war in sierra Leone (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 70-90.

[50].  Harris, Civil war and Democracy in West Africa, 39.

[51].  Harris, Civil war and Democracy in West Africa , 57.

[52].  Ibid, 56.

[53]. Harris, Civil war and Democracy in West Africa, 80.

[54].  Ibid

[55]. David Harris, Sierra Leone: A political history (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 82;  David J. Francis, and Economic Community of West African States. The politics of economic regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS ( Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001), 141; Colin M. Waugh, Charles Taylor and Liberia: Ambition and Atrocity in Africa’s Lone Star State (London: Zed, 2011), 130-2.

[56]. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1610, October 1999.

[57]. William A. Schabas, “Amnesty, The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court for Sierra Leone,” University of California, Davis 11, 145(2004): 146-169.

[58]. O’Connell, James-Allen and Lahai, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court, chapter 2.

[59]. Heritage Foundation, Rwanda Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2016/countries/rwanda.pdf.

[60].  United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the technical assistance provided to the African Union Commission and the Transitional Government of National for the implementation of chapter V of the agreement on the resolution of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.” Security Council, 7 April 2016.

[61]. Intergovernmental Authority on Development, “ Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.” Addis Ababa, 17 August 2015.

[62]. Malith Kur, “Causes of Current War: Tribal Politics & Idea of Leadership in South Sudanese Society,” South Sudan Nation (SSN),  November 2014.

[63] . Intergovernmental Authority on Development, “ Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.”

[64]. Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, IGAD’s mediation in the current south Sudan conflict: Prospects and challenges. African Security 8, 2(2015):120.

[65] Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, “ South Sudan Needs Truth not Trials,” New York Times, Juba, June 2016.

[66].  BBC World News, “South Sudan: Women Raped as Reward for Fighters,” BBC Worldservce for Africa, 11March 2016.

[67]. African Union, “Final Report of African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan,” Addis Ababa, (15 October 2014), 224. Justice Flieschner and Akshaya Kumar, “A Path to Peace in South Sudan: An Overview.” Enough Project, June 2014.

[68] . Ibid., 34.

[69] . African Union, “Final Report of African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”

[70].  South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and reconciliation commission of South Africa report Vol.1, 17.

[71].  Tim Franks,  “Malakal: The City that Vanished in South Sudan” BBC Ns, October 2015 http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-34571435.

[72] .Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Reparation Decisions and Dilemmas,” Hasting In’t & Comp. L. Rev. 27, 157(2003-2004), 158.

[73]. Malith Kur, “New Paradigm for South Sudan: The Christian Contribution to the South African TRC.” Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository, University of Western Ontario, 2015.http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/317.

[74]. Pablo De Greiff, and International Center for Transitional Justice. The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford England; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006),806.

[75] . Ibid, 800.

[76]. De Greiff, and International Center for Transitional Justice. The Handbook of Reparations, 800.

[77]. Pan-African Reparation Perspectives, “Reparation in South Africa: The Unfinished Business of the TRC,” Pan,-African Reparation Initiative 2 (July 2014).

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