South Sudan: A Nation with two Commanders-in-Chief
By Malith Kur, London, Canada
July 9, 2016 (SSB) — The clashes that have occurred in Juba this week have not come as a surprise to most South Sudanese. It was a matter of time before those clashes could take place. They are a result of the political and military experiment that the Troika countries and their passive partners represented by the IGAD nations and the AU are trying in South Sudan. The experiment to have two rival armies and two rival commanders-in-Chief in one country has no precedent in history. This arrangement was not designed to stabilize the situation in South Sudan, but it was designed in haste for a number of reasons.
First, the arrangement was planned to punish the government for expelling the UN envoy Hilde Johnson because of her open support to Mr Machar. Ms Johnson represented the interests of the Troika countries in South Sudan, not the interests of the UN. The Troika countries feel that they are the guardians of South Sudan’s independence because they supported and sponsored the peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A up to the declaration of independence on July 9, 2011. They are also the donors who support 90% of the developmental schemes and the humanitarian work in the country. For these reasons, they want to have a greater say in the political and military arrangements in the country.
As all of us followed the process of negotiations in Addis Ababa, the agreement was not a result of negotiations between the government of South Sudan and the rebels. The agreement was prepared and imposed on the country to counter the tendency from the political and military leaders in Kiir’s regime to ignore the interests of Troika countries.
Second, the Troika countries want to see a regime change in South Sudan. The clauses in this agreement have a potential to do just that. They want to install a government that listens and heeds their policies in the region. Since South Sudan emerged as an independent nation in 2011, the policy makers in Kiir’s government have been leaning towards China economically and perhaps politically. These moves have strained the good relationships that once existed between South Sudan and the United States during George Bush’s presidency.
Therefore, the Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan was designed to facilitate the Troika nations’ policy of regime change to reduce Chinese influence in the country. When Mr Kiir fired Riek Machar as Vice President, the Troika countries saw him as the perfect man to oust Kiir from power. But when the possibility of overthrowing Kiir from power through military means failed, the peace agreement was devised to make it difficult for Kiir to retain power.
Third, some IGAD nations, particularly Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya are silently working to facilitate regime change in South Sudan. These countries have diverse interests in South Sudan. Ethiopia, for instance, wants to please its Nuer’s population and keep their support in favor of the ruling party in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa has been the headquarters of Riek Machar for the last two years and has been providing refuge and training to the rebels. The Ethiopians are doing this work with the American approval.
Sudan, on the other hand, is a natural ally of Riek Machar. The alliance between the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum and Riek Machar dates back to the time when the SPLM/A split in 1991. This alliance allowed the government of Bashir to extract oil in the South during the war. In addition to this alliance, stable South Sudan is not in the interest of Sudan because of Abyei and other border issues. As a result, Bashir provides weapons and other logistics to the rebels led by Riek Machar to keep South Sudan unstable indefinitely.
As for Kenya, the regime led by Uhuru Kenyatta has territorial ambitions in South Sudan and has found Riek Machar as an ally who could fulfil these ambitions. Kenya, since the conflict began in 2013 in South Sudan, has been welcoming Riek Machar as if he were the president of South Sudan in waiting, and last year, on the eve of South Sudan’s independence, Riek Machar declared in Nairobi that Kiir’s government and all its institutions were null and void because its mandate had expired. Can Kenyan opposition parties do this in Juba without protest from the government of Kenya? Mr Kenyatta wants to squeeze the regime in Juba to allow the annexation of Ilemi Triangle to Kenya without opposition from South Sudan’s government.
Therefore, the agreement that was signed in August 2015 was a product of these competing interests, not for the interest of peace in South Sudan. Had the agreement been designed for the consolidation of peace in South Sudan, the provision that set up two rival armies and two rival commanders-in-chief in one country should have never been contemplated, leave alone being part of the accord. This accord is bound to fail and the Troika nations along with their partners in IGAD and the AU bear greater responsibility for trying something they cannot do in other countries in South Sudan.
Most South Sudanese do not support the existing side by side of two hostile forces in the country, but because of the regional and international competing interests in the Republic of South Sudan, public opinion has been ignored. The voice of the majority in the country is regarded by foreigners as a tribal agenda in order to weaken the authority of the government. This unrestrained outside interference in the political affairs of South Sudan has encouraged lawlessness and legitimized rebellion in the country.
But the government of South Sudan has its share in this game. The regime in Juba has squandered its legitimacy by allowing individual politicians a free rein to steal public resources without consequences. This practice has left the country bankrupt and dependent on aid. Now the economic situation in South Sudan has deteriorated to the point of uncertainty. The country has become the largest refugee camp on the global map. At this point, the UN and its agencies are now the de facto government because they are the ones meeting the daily needs of the population.
The only thing that will stop bloodshed is for the signatories of the Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan to return to the drawing board and establish a clear political roadmap to build peace across the country. The agreement in its current form—particularly the provision of having two rival commanders-in-chief and two rival armies in one country— will not work because it lacks popular support. The agreement needs to be reviewed for the interest of peace in South Sudan.
Malith Kur can be reached via his email: Malith_kur@yahoo.ca
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