The Basis of the Proposed International Intervention in South Sudan
By David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
July 15, 2016 (SSB) — The current security developments in Juba have created new dynamics which may infringe on the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. To so many neutrals a discussion on whether that infringement is positive or negative is immaterial since it is widely believed that it will lead to some sense of stabilization of the security situation. That may or may not be true, yet a deeper understanding of the security concepts involved is warranted as the government, analysts and citizens talk about what is ahead.
New security terminologies have appeared on the scene with embedded prospects for renegotiating (or merely signing) new annexes to the current IGAD mediated Security Arrangements. Moreover, these new security dynamics are also IGAD-led as they were part of a resolution of the regional block’s Foreign Ministers in Nairobi combined with those from AU Heads of State Summit in Kigali in the same week.
The new security terminologies are “intervention force” and “buffer zone.” The former has been proposed by IGAD and UN Security Council, while the latter is found in Dr. Riek’s conditions for coming back to Juba after what happened. Dr. Riek’s argument is that another fight might occur in Juba without a ‘buffer zone’ to separate the two belligerent forces.
With regard to that (buffer zone), it could be new in the sense that the IGAD-brokered agreement talked only of ‘cantonment’ of IO forces, believing that it would be sufficient. However, the recent fighting in Juba which included all kinds of weapons of modern warfare, including attack helicopters and heavy artillery, might prompt IGAD to at least consider Dr. Riek’s argument for a buffer zone.
But the question here is whether that ‘zone’ or ‘zones’ will be also in Juba too, not only in Upper Nile where IO forces actually control territory. Again, if Dr. Riek’s intention for having a force in Juba was to protect him and his Ministers, what is the logic behind having a third IGAD force to practically protect his ‘few’ forces? Will it be a force that will protect a protecting force?
Would it not be sufficient for IO Ministers to be personally protected by UNMISS in lieu of SPLA-IO troops in Juba? Again, if the purpose of protection of Minsters in Juba could be effective undertaken by a neutral force, then there would be no need for a force whose presence creates security tension in the capital city.
Not to be misunderstood, I strongly believe that like most leaders in the three SPLM factions Dr. Riek is a tested patriot who has an enormous intellectual capacity to help South Sudan transition into a prosperous country. I have no doubts – in fact I am not qualified and have no right to doubt his patriotism and intentions for his own country. To me, the major problem pulling our country down is structural rather than personal.
Having over 250,000 active service soldiers in a country of only 10 million is just a recipe for failure. A NATIONAL army made up of 45,000 – fifteen thousand (15,000) from each of the three greater regions is more than enough for South Sudan. Our security advisors and practitioners must know that military strength is no longer about numbers. Let these young men go to farming rather than fighting.
But that is beside the point. My concern on the issue of buffer zone is whether it would be structurally helpful to have numerous troops in Juba, knowing that such zones have often created worse security conditions than what is intended of them. A zone would entail partitioning the city, no matter how small a piece IO forces would want to have. It happened in Iraq and now the country is at risk of being divided into three countries to be carved out from Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni enclaves. In fact, Iraqi Kurdistan which enjoyed a ground and air buffer zone is now a virtual state, with an army and right to enter into international agreements.
Dr. Riek may say that it is not his intention to carve out a piece of Juba for his troops. Well, there is no other way to go around it. The issue is not about intentions; it is purely structural, as I still insist. His intentions aside, the fact that the concept of ‘buffer zones’ gets introduced into the already fragile security conundrum facing our beleaguered country is in itself a problem. History teaches us that once UN blue helmets are given a mandate to create buffer zones in a country, they will always create a situation on the ground to perpetuate risk perception in that country.
No organization would want create a peaceful situation to forfeit a budget of billions of dollars. Insecurity itself has become a trade to the UN and our country is potentially a new fertile ground for that trade to thrive. To the UN, one buffer zone will be followed by another and another, up to regional buffer zones “as the situation requires”.
Introduce new security concepts into the IGAD-plus security arrangements and lose control of the state, period! Even those IOs, FDs, DCs or IGs who have genuine ambitions to rule the country will have such aspirations frustrated. International arrest warrants and ‘local’ resistance will follow – and the real dog fight on the streets of our cities and guerrilla war we all hope to avoid shall be the new order (disorder, rather). UN intervention is like a one way traffic, no reverse.
With regard to the suggested international intervention force(s), there are generally two types of military intervention. One type is a force sanctioned by the UN Security Council (UNSC) under a Chapter Seven mandate, which has always been difficult to approve because of the veto power enjoyed by the five permanent member states – who seem to enjoy disagreeing for the sake disagreeing. Because of the difficulty with getting UNSC authorization, strong countries like the United States have created a short cut through introducing the concept of “humanitarian intervention,” which has done away with the need for UNSC authorization.
The difficulty with the two types of international military intervention is that both are recognized by international law. The first intervention (UNSC sanctioned) is sourced in international treaties and the second (humanitarian intervention) has founded its strong pillars in “customary international law.” The two sources (treaty and custom) are now being prepared to justify intervention in South Sudan after the recent unfortunate developments in Juba.
Furthermore, humanitarian intervention could also be exercised by different countries. For example, customary international law permits a neighboring country to have the right to ignore the concept of territorial integrity and intervene militarily to rescue its citizens who are being trapped in another country. We can see this at play as the U.S. has already sent 47 troops from its AFCOM base in Djibouti to protect its Juba Embassy, and Uganda’s big force which is currently securing the evacuation of Ugandan nationals.
In fact, intervention based on customary international law could even be motivated by a resolve to protect nationals of other countries or beleaguered citizens of the receiving country itself. For instance, in 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia to prevent the Cambodian government from murdering its own citizens. Let’s not even go far, in 1979 Julius Nyerere sent Tanzanian forces to Uganda where they ousted Idi Amin who was accused of heinous atrocities against Ugandan citizens.
Further afield, the U.S. has been in the habit of using “humanitarian intervention” to justify its regime change agenda’s worldwide. When they faced obstacles (unwillingness to cooperate) in securing a UNSC authorization, America has gone for what it termed as “coalitions of the willing,” where it ‘ganged up’ with its traditional European (NATO) allies against countries like Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, etc.
In Iraq (1991) the justification, inert alia, was to protect Turkish minorities from being massacred by Saddam and in Libya they said that Gadhafi (a dictator no doubt) – who had created one of the best functioning welfare states in the world- “was going” to massacre civilians in Benghazi. A buffer zone would have worked in that case, but they opted for humanitarian intervention instead. Like Iraq, Libya is now a collapsed state with no functioning central government as it has been partitioned by brigades.
The difficulty with humanitarian intervention is that it offsets and attenuates the concept of sovereignty in international security relations. And since sovereignty and territorial integrity are the most obvious pillars of international relations, humanitarian interventions have been strongly condemn by receiving countries and their allies as violations of international law. Moreover, since it depends on the military capacity of intervening countries or their ability to forge ‘coalitions of the willing,’ intervention is regarded by third world countries as an unlawful tool of western imperialism.
Because of talk about imperialism, African Union regional intervention forces have become more involved in stabilizing African states. ECOMOG in West Africa succeeded in pacifying Sierra Leon while East African forces have also done greatly in Somalia. Both regional intervention forces have received UNSC mandates and logistics. And with the current move by IGAD and AU, it would not be impossible for the region to present our case for the next intervention, even though such proposal was recently tabled against Burundi but failed.
All in all, it would seem that the more we fight against ourselves- no matter the justifications- the more we give the international community reasons (or pretexts) to use customary international law for justifying humanitarian intervention. A strong case for that is already being laid out in terms of a claim that UNMISS has prevented genocide through its PoC sites. They still contend that the lives of hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese continue to be at risk. Last year, a UNSC team has said to have documented cases of widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both forces in the civil war.
The President has made it clear that the twelve thousand UNMISS forces are enough. Indeed they are more than enough, considering our population size and their annual budget of $1 billion (with a B). But how do we convince the world and our region that they are enough? What should we do as South Sudanese to prevent imperial forces and companies take control of our resources? One answer is that we must urgently come together to set our house – not because of fear of foreign military intervention but for the sake of thousands of our children who are now orphaned and trapped in IDP and refugee camps.
Mayen Ayarbior has a Bachelor Degree in Economics and Political Science from Kampala International University (Uganda), Masters in International Security from JKSIS-University of Denver (USA), and Bachelor of Laws (LLB) from the University of London. He is the author of “House of War (Civil War and State Failure in Africa) 2013” and currently the Press Secretary/ Spokesperson in the Office of South Sudan’s Vice President, H.E. James Wani Igga. You can reach him via his email address: mayen.ayarbior@gmail.com.
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