The UN flew Riek Machar to the DRC Congo, a Western diplomat said
The U.N.’s decision to help Mr. Machar could widen a rift between the government of South Sudan and the U.N. mission there ahead of the deployment of an additional 4,000 peacekeepers under the U.N. mission, which the government has called unnecessary and a violation of sovereignty.
The Western diplomat said the U.N. helped Mr. Machar because it believed it was very possible the South Sudanese army would eventually capture and kill him, a move it feared could restart the civil war, and not because of any desire to assist Mr. Machar personally.
South Sudan’s Former Vice President Flees Country
A spokesman for Riek Machar says his departure followed an assassination attempt
By NICHOLAS BARIYO
Updated Aug. 18, 2016 1:13 p.m. ET
KAMPALA, Uganda—South Sudan’s former vice president and longtime opposition leader has fled the country following what a spokesman for Riek Machar said was an assassination attempt by forces loyal to his longtime rival, President Salva Kiir.
The United Nations flew Mr. Machar to the Democratic Republic of Congo, a Western diplomat said. He arrived in Kinshasa on Wednesday, said Lambert Mende, Congo’s information minister. Mr. Machar’s aides said he is expected to stay for some days before traveling to Ethiopia.
Mr. Machar’s spokesman, James Dak, on Thursday offered no additional information on the alleged assassination attempt. Mr. Kiir’s office had no immediate response to the allegations.
The former vice president’s departure comes weeks after the collapse of an internationally brokered power-sharing deal aimed at calming the long-running feud between him and Mr. Kiir, a quarrel that has mired South Sudan in almost-constant conflict since it became an independent nation in 2011.
After Mr. Kiir accused Mr. Machar, his then-deputy, of plotting a coup in 2013, a civil war broke out that left an estimated 50,000 people dead. In April, Mr. Machar, accompanied by some 1,000 troops, returned to the capital Juba to resume his post as vice president, following last August’s signing of the power-sharing accord.
But less than three months later, fighting with Mr. Kiir’s forces forced him and some of the estimated 40,000 troops loyal to him to flee Juba and go into hiding.
The conflict in the world’s youngest nation has left nearly three million people homeless and forced one million to flee to neighboring countries. Oil production has dropped by half, to 120,000 barrels a day, leaving the crude-dependent nation struggling for revenue to pay troops and finance basic imports, including food.
The U.S. has spent $1.6 billion trying to quell the escalating violence, with little success.
The U.N.’s decision to help Mr. Machar could widen a rift between the government of South Sudan and the U.N. mission there ahead of the deployment of an additional 4,000 peacekeepers under the U.N. mission, which the government has called unnecessary and a violation of sovereignty.
The Western diplomat said the U.N. helped Mr. Machar because it believed it was very possible the South Sudanese army would eventually capture and kill him, a move it feared could restart the civil war, and not because of any desire to assist Mr. Machar personally.
The U.N. is bound by strict rules of impartiality and neutrality in conflict zones. Its mission in Juba declined to comment on whether it had any part in evacuating Mr. Machar, but the mission has maintained its full impartiality throughout the conflict.
This week, the U.S. envoy to the U.N., Samantha Power, called for an investigation into allegations that Sudanese troops gang-raped, beat and robbed aid workers during at attack on a hotel compound in Juba on July 11.
The U.N. on Tuesday said it was looking into accusations that U.N. peacekeepers had failed to respond to the attack.
Analysts were divided over how Mr. Machar’s exit from South Sudan would affect the country’s deteriorating security situation.
The International Crisis Group said it could lead to a partially implemented truce that favors Mr. Kiir’s government, which in turn could produce “relative stability” in Juba but “perpetual conflicts elsewhere” in the country.
John Prendergast, a South Sudan expert with the Enough Project, a U.S.-based campaign group, warned that Mr. Machar could use his exile to build up his arsenal.
Mr. Kiir, whose forces now fully control the capital, has sought to consolidate his power, replacing Mr. Machar with Taban Deng Gai and calling for early elections, despite pleas from the international community. Mr. Machar maintains he is still vice president.
A spokesman for the U.S. State Department on Wednesday said Mr. Kiir’s “unilateral actions are of great concern” to the U.S. and risk undermining the truce.
Write to Nicholas Bariyo at nicholas.bariyo@wsj.com and Matina Stevis at matina.stevis@wsj.com
JUBA, South Sudan — The South Sudanese opposition leader Riek Machar has fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo after being targeted by government troops, his spokesmen said on Thursday, as a fragile peace deal to end more than two years of civil war unravels in the world’s youngest country.
In accordance with the 2015 peace deal, which received international backing, Mr. Machar returned to Juba, the capital, in April to resume his post as deputy to his rival, President Salva Kiir. But clashes betweenfactions loyal to the men erupted months later. Mr. Machar’s residence was destroyed, and he and his troops were driven from the capital.
“He was being pursued constantly since he withdrew from Juba,” said an opposition spokesman, Mabior Garang de Mabior, adding that Mr. Machar would soon travel to the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
Peter Biar Ajak, a co-director for South Sudan at the International Growth Center, said Mr. Machar had no choice but to flee before his forces were decimated.
“Aside from avoiding capture, getting out of the country was the only way he could attempt to rebuild support within his constituency and remind the international community that he is still relevant to the peace process,” Mr. Ajak said from Cambridge, England.
A spokesman for the United Nations added a layer of intrigue on Thursday, asserting that the organization’s peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by its acronym Monusco, had assisted Mr. Machar, his wife and 10 others in safe travel once they had crossed into the country from South Sudan, which happened on Wednesday. The spokesman, Farhan Haq, also hinted that Mr. Machar had received medical attention from Monusco.
Mr. Haq told a regular briefing at the United Nations headquarters in New York that Mr. Machar was now at an unspecified location in the Democratic Republic of Congo, but declined to elaborate on why Mr. Machar had needed medical attention.
AFRICA 1:19
Machar Flees South Sudan, Replacement Speaks
The vice president of South Sudan, Taban Deng Gai, said that the opposition leader Riek Machar — who has fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo — should work for peace and wait for the election in 2018.
“We took him from one part of the D.R.C. to another,” Mr. Haq said. “Right now he’s in the hands of the authorities of the D.R.C.”
Tens of thousands of people died in a civil war that began in December 2013 and pitted troops loyal to Mr. Machar, a former vice president, against the forces of Mr. Kiir. Both sides are accused of committing atrocities against civilians.
Supporters of Mr. Machar cried foul when Mr. Kiir accepted the nomination last month of a new vice president, the former mining minister Taban Deng Gai, to replace Mr. Machar in the transitional government.
Mr. Kiir’s spokesman, Ateny Wek Ateny, said that Mr. Machar’s departure would have no effect on the peace process.
“He has not been in Juba for a long time,” he said. “So what difference would it make if he surfaces in another country?”
Many of Mr. Machar’s supporters have been sheltering in United Nations displacement camps since the war broke out, when members of Mr. Machar’s ethnic group, the Nuer, were targeted for attacks in the capital city.
Since the latest fighting, last month, the camps have grappled with food shortages, overcrowding and a series of brutal rapes just beyond their walls that are thought to have been mostly perpetrated by government soldiers.
A Nuer schoolteacher inside the camp, Yuanes Geng, 34, said he and his friends were not yet worried about Mr. Machar’s departure.
“If he has left the country, it’s O.K., as long as he has left with a diplomatic mission in mind,” Mr. Geng said. “If he doesn’t come back, that would be a problem. But I think he will come back very soon.”
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Reuters: South Sudan opposition leader Machar seeks safety in neighboring DRC
JUBA/NEW YORK Aug 18 (Reuters) – South Sudan’s opposition leader, Riek Machar, is in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Nations said on Thursday, several weeks after he withdrew from the capital, Juba, during fierce fighting with government troops.
The world body said its peacekeeping mission in the DRC became aware of Machar’s presence in the country on Monday and contacted the Congolese government, which then asked the mission to pick up Machar. That operation took place on Wednesday, U.N. spokesman Farhan Haq told reporters in New York.
“Riek Machar has been handed over to the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We’re not in a position to confirm his location,” Haq said.
A spokesman for the DRC government, Lambert Mende, denied it had been in touch with any party on helping the former South Sudanese vice president, but Haq said Machar was removed from an area close to the border with South Sudan.
“We can confirm that an operation was undertaken by MONUSCO (U.N. mission) on humanitarian grounds to facilitate the extraction of Riek Machar, his wife and 10 others from a location in the DRC in support of the DRC authorities,” Haq said, adding MONUSCO was considered the best-suited party to move Machar safely.
A statement issued by the leadership of the SPLA In Opposition (SPLA-IO) said he had left on Wednesday to a “safe country within the region”.
Machar led a two-year rebellion against forces loyal to his longtime rival, President Salva Kiir, before the two sides reached a peace deal in August 2015. Under the deal, Machar returned to Juba in April to resume his role as vice president.
But fighting flared last month, leading Machar to withdraw with his forces from Juba around mid-July.
Opposition spokesman James Gatdek Dak, writing on his Facebook page, said opposition fighters had “successfully relocated our leader to a neighboring country where he will now have unhindered access to the rest of the world and the media.”
Machar had sustained a leg injury from weeks of walking in the bush but not serious enough to require medical attention, Gatdek Dak said.
Since the July fighting, Kiir has sacked Machar from his post and appointed Taban Deng Gai, a former opposition negotiator who broke ranks with Machar, as vice president.
The United Nations told Kiir any political changes must be consistent with the peace deal, which stated that the vice president must be chosen by the South Sudan Armed Opposition.
(Additional reporting by Michelle Nichols in New York and Aaron Ross in Kinshasa; Writing by Edmund Blair and Duncan Miriri; Editing by Toby Chopra and Peter Cooney)
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VOA: South Sudan’s Machar Flees to DRC
South Sudan’s former first Vice President Riek Machar has fled to neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, where he may be ill or injured.
U.N. Spokesman Farhan Haq told reporters that Machar and a small group of people turned up in the DRC on Wednesday. The U.N. mission there, known as MONUSCO, was alerted to his presence and contacted the Congolese government. The government asked them to facilitate the group’s transfer from an area near the DRC-South Sudan border to a location inside Congo which the U.N. has not revealed.
“We can confirm that an operation was undertaken by MONUSCO on humanitarian grounds to facilitate the extraction of Riek Machar, his wife and 10 others from a location in the DRC in support of the DRC authorities,” Haq said.
He said the U.N. Mission in South Sudan played no part in Machar’s arrival in the DRC.
Asked whether Machar required medical care, Haq said “we have been providing him with whatever medical assistance he needs.”
Sources tell VOA that the former leader was either ill, injured or possibly both, when peacekeepers met him in DRC.
Peacekeepers retrieved Machar and his group from the town of Dungu, near to the border of South Sudan, sources told VOA’s South Sudan In Focus. They said he was suffering from exhaustion after having been on the move for weeks.
Machar has been in hiding since early July following clashes between his supporters and government troops in South Sudan’s capital, Juba that killed more than 300 people.
President Salva Kiir fired Machar as first vice president and replaced him with Taban Deng Gai, who was backed by a breakaway faction of Machar’s SPLM-IO movement.
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danese government have run into opposition both within the region and on the UN Security Council. This puts Juba’s supporters and those who propose measures that would have a negative effect on the government in increasingly polarised positions. Unlocking these complex geopolitical dynamics should be part and parcel of developing a political strategy that reduces regional tensions while bringing competing groups in South Sudan back into dialogue. Sudan and Uganda The outbreak of civil war in South Sudan in December 2013 brought long-standing tensions between Sudan and Uganda to the fore and caused many to fear a further regionalisation of the conflict. Yet through frequent meetings between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the two came to terms over South Sudan and took a series of steps towards a less confrontational relationship. The countries did not have long to settle into this posture before facing new challenges. July’s outbreak of conflict, subsequent discussions over an intervention or protection force, and SPLA-IO leader Riek Machar’s replacement as first vice president has placed the new relationship under an immediate stress test. Though both sides are taking actions to keep the peace, a renewed rift between Sudan and Uganda, with each side backing their favoured actor, could escalate conflict and further divide the region. Ethiopia and South Sudan At the civil war’s outset, Ethiopia hosted peace talks and tried to take a neutral position between the government and SPLM/A-IO, as well as with Sudan and Uganda. Ethiopia’s intention was to prevent South Sudan’s civil war from becoming a regional conflict. Still, South Sudan saw Ethiopia’s hosting of Machar, and even the peace talks, as being “unsupportive”, and viewed its close relationship with the U.S. – the main proponent of punitive measures against the government – as un-neighbourly. Following the tremendous pressure that Juba came under during negotiations to sign the ARCSS in August 2015, tensions continued to grow. The cold war between Addis and Juba is ever more apparent, and Juba’s belief that Addis is partial makes it increasingly difficult for Ethiopia to play a leading role in ARCSS implementation and potentially in the regional force. The two countries share a restive border and violent inter-communal clashes are common; conflict dynamics along the border will continue to be influenced by events in Addis and Juba. Eritrea and South Sudan Eritrea worked closely with the SPLA in the 1990s, particularly on its short-lived eastern front. During the period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005-2011), relations soured and Asmara was widely accused of providing material support to anti-SPLA groups. However, in 2014, the SPLM/A-IO was disappointed to discover that Eritrea would not provide them with support. As relations between Addis and Juba became increasingly complicated, Juba pursued a rapprochement with Asmara. With plans to strengthen ties, including the shipment of humanitarian assistance through Eritrea’s Massawa port, the restart of regular flights between the two countries and an increase in official bilateral activity, the relationship appears set to deepen. This sets off alarm bells in Addis and will further complicate the relationship between Ethiopia and South Sudan. Meanwhile, South Sudan may now provide an alternate stage for the projection of unresolved matters between Asmara and Addis. Ethiopia and Egypt Beyond the IGAD region, Egypt’s role in South Sudan has increased in importance, particularly following its ascension to a seat on the UN Security Council, where it generally takes a non-interventionist stance. Egypt is in a long-running dispute over Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. Egypt believes the dam will reduce the flow of the river, particularly as its reservoir fills, violating principles on preventing downstream harm (one reason the World Bank declined to support it) and treaties on Nile water usage. Other Nile basin countries have challenged the continuing validity of treaties created while most of these states did not exist and have proposed a new one, which Egypt rejects. The dam is anticipated to finish in 2017, and current negotiations focus on the timeline for filling the reservoir. Egypt has engaged South Sudan in talks on how to increase the water flow from the White Nile. This mutually beneficial relationship gives Juba a key ally on the Security Council at a time when it faces calls from other council members for further sanctions, arms embargos, demilitarisation of the capital and a regional force. Ethiopia, which does not always share the same approach to South Sudan as Egypt, will join the Security Council in 2017. Regional Protection Force Following July’s fighting, IGAD agreed to send a regional force to South Sudan. This was a revival of its 2014 proposal for a regional protection force, intended to put some weight behind the IGAD mediation, but it faltered in negotiations with the UN. The new force was subject to more than a month of debates over its mandate, composition and size. While the South Sudanese government consented in principle to the force, it strenuously objected to the mandate agreed on in UN Security Council Resolution 2304 on 12 August. The mandate calls for a force of 4,000 to protect civilians, UN and humanitarian personnel, and ceasefire and peace agreement monitors. Controversially, it also calls for the force to control the airport; secure entry and egress from Juba; “disarm” government security forces who threaten civilians or protected persons; and take action in extremis in Juba or elsewhere – security tasks the government believes violate their sovereignty. That the forces are regional does not ameliorate the government’s concerns, given the region’s vested interests in South Sudan (which are not always the same as Juba’s). Some Council members supported the mandate based on the belief that the SPLA-IO was capable of launching a large-scale attack against the capital, which it is not. After peacekeepers failed to respond to attacks on foreigners last month, many believed a stronger mission was necessary to prevent a repeat of these events. Rather, the previously Juba-based SPLA-IO forces’ destabilising presence in the Equatoria region is almost entirely unaddressed by the mandate. Many Council members who abstained were concerned about the mandate’s lack of focus on a political path forward and connection between the force and political objectives. Other diplomats and advocates questioned the utility of additional forces from regional countries that are already part of UNMISS and have a spotty record in discharging the pre-existing mandate. Senior UNMISS officials are concerned about the mission’s ability to absorb an additional 4,000 troops, as well as about the negative implications for the safety of mission staff and ability to carry out its core mandate to protect civilians. A 5 August IGAD communique laid out some of the controversial tasks that were included in the mandate and called for the next step to be a meeting (which Juba believed would be a negotiation) with South Sudan and the region’s military chiefs. This meeting had not happened by 12 August and the Council, having already delayed consideration once, voted on the mandate drafted by the U.S., the regular penholder on South Sudan on the Council. The debate was contentious and, though the mandate passed, four Council members, including Russia, China, Egypt and Venezuela, abstained. The absence of consensus on the Council and Juba’s objections to the resolution call into question whether the mandate will be implemented as intended. There is doubt as to whether a threatened arms embargo – conditions for which are spelt out in the resolution’s annex – is a realistic punitive measure. Several Council members are reluctant to impose an arms embargo, so it may not pass a vote – and, absent more unified Council support, may not be particularly effective regardless. Likewise, many non-Council members in the Ho
rn of Africa are experts at skirting arms embargos and restrictions on arms transfers. If they are not fully committed to implementation, this could also limit an embargo’s effectiveness. There are further questions about how an effective arms embargo would impact Juba’s ability to provide border security or address internal rule of law challenges – which include rebel groups other than the SPLA-IO. Juba has already expressed its displeasure and is likely to seek to make the peacekeeping mission’s operations even more difficult – including through limitations and delays on movement and clearances of personnel, and harassment of UN staff – as it negotiates over the new force. Routine and pre-agreed unit changeovers may be subject to delays given suspicions that the UN will use these changes to surreptitiously increase the force size. Next Steps At this juncture, the transitional government, with Taban as the first vice president, appears set to use a combination of carrots and sticks to implement the ARCSS – along lines far more favourable to the wartime government than originally envisioned by IGAD-PLUS. Deals on armed group integration – within or outside the parameters of ARCSS – could significantly reduce tensions between Khartoum, Juba and Kampala, break apart Machar’s fragile coalition and maintain Taban as the first vice president. Such a situation could result in stability in Juba and in many parts of the country, while leaving other areas still in conflict. Juba is unlikely to accept another mediation in an international forum as it did in 2014-2015, choosing to manage the ongoing conflict on its own, with its closest neighbours remaining deeply involved. Discussions within IGAD, the African Union and Security Council over a regional force have sent the relationship between South Sudan and the west, particularly the U.S., into a downward spiral – benefiting no one. The government is now seeking to make clear through restrictions on the UN inside South Sudan that it is not possible to send in a 4,000-strong force without consent. Additional negotiations with the UN, IGAD and regional participants in the force are likely to continue to occupy key actors at the expense of engagement on a political resolution to the conflict. The UN should be cautious about the use of force without clear political objectives, and it should work with other IGAD-PLUS members to re-assess how the ARCSS can be realistically implemented in a manner that increases stability given the shift in dynamics in-country. Juba has succeeded in clawing back from its position a year ago when it signed the ARCSS with significant reservations. At this stage, a partially implemented agreement favouring the government and presenting no threat to Kiir’s presidency is the most likely outcome of the past month’s tumult. This would mean relative stability in Juba and much of the country, with perpetual conflicts elsewhere. Divisions within the international community, and IGAD-PLUS in particular, are likely to inhibit the formation of an overarching political strategy to address ongoing conflict and governance challenges. Instead, the South Sudanese will seek to shape the country’s future trajectory, with regional influences – whether Juba welcomes these influences or not. Yet, a key aspect of the ARCSS is the devolution of power, some of which is still possible. IGAD-PLUS should coordinate its efforts with the transitional government to devolve power in line with the agreement’s power-sharing ratios to disaffected groups and communities who hoped to benefit from the agreement.