SPLM-North and the fate of the Sudans (Part 2)
By David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
September 14, 2016 (SSB) —- In part one of these notes on the topic under consideration I argued that it was time for SPLM-North to start packing up its guns and prepare for the political phase of their revolution. From the responses I got, there was strong disagreement from those gentlemen who strongly believe in the illusions of conquering Khartoum as the only end to a successful “armed struggle” in Sudan. Surely, disagreement is naturally expected in all such dialogues between those engaged in intellectual discourse involving the pursuit of social, economic and political justice, whether as leaders, followers, or mere subjects.
Those who strongly disagreed with the new policy statement carried to Khartoum by First VP Taban called it betrayal and surrender. They believed in the adage that when the goings get tough the tough gets going. In other words, South Sudan should continue to indulge in the affairs of Sudan because those affairs were part and parcel of the bigger revolutionary armed struggle which gave birth to our currently bleeding Republic.
They also imparted the same old history that South Sudan must continue to undertake its CPA-assigned role as a guarantor of the rights of the two areas of Nuba Mountains and Angassana Hills. Obviously, Khartoum’s deceitfulness in signing some CPA protocols has been unraveling since 2005 throughout the implementation process until today. As it currently stands, SPLM-N still demands for Popular Consultation as stipulated in the CPA and Juba continued to view itself as a guarantor of that demand just because the agreement was framed and signed by its historic leader, Dr. John Garang De’Mabior.
In Juba, there may be strong individuals who are strong supporters of SPLM/A-N and its call for either Popular Consultation or armed struggle. While so much water has gone under the bridge, making the CPA (minus Abyei) a practically dead agreement, Juba seemed to have continued to carry the cross of Khartoum’s deceit of the Nuba and Angassana.
Juba continues to blame itself for what has become of those areas after 2011. With the benefit of hindsight it became apparent that Khartoum wanted the South to secede and thereafter get enough space to deal with SPLM/A-N as an indigenous national group. Khartoum had known that whether SPLM/A-N was affiliated to the SPLM/A-South or not would be immaterial in the new context of two sovereign states.
The NCP (National Congress Party) understood the New World Order especially its long respected tenet that there is no such thing in international law as one nation state making itself a guarantor for the political rights and civil liberties of the citizens of another sovereign state. It is this context which Khartoum concealed at the back of its mind when it signed the protocols on the rights of the two territories. For NCP negotiators in Naivasha, there was no value in making written reservations on the issue because it would have unnecessarily dragged the negotiations further.
For SPLM negotiators led by South Sudan’s late icon, Dr. John Garang, the equation on the table might have been more complex than they would have wished it to be. Either they trusted the NCP on the commitments made or they did not pay full attention to the tenets of international legal framework which governed relations between sovereign states.
Knowing that the word trust was even not allowed into the negotiations, proven in having two armies as ‘guarantors,’ disregard for international law might explain why Juba insists on talking about the CPA even after 2011. For an emerging state disregard a system unto which it was born is perplexing to those who midwifed the country. This is not to say that South Sudan should fold its hands and look the other way when its former allies continued to suffer oppression across the border. It can surely play a leading role in bringing peace (not CPA) to Sudan through effective mediation between Khartoum and SPLM-N.
Hence, clinging to the CPA could only be explained by emotional rather than the legal realities brought by breaking away and forming an independent sovereign state. Once South Sudan became a sovereign state, it follows that it must respect the sovereign rights of all states in the world, including Sudan. The fact that Khartoum continues to oppress and marginalize our former allies does not justify an impoverished neighbor to disregard its international obligations of non-interference, if at all it is interfering.
Since the options available for SPLM-N are not do-or-die kind of options, especially when the people they claim to be liberating are largely mentally free, Juba must use its leverage on its former allies to convince them to make substantial compromises. Those who think that the word compromise is equal to surrender shall be warmongers and profiteers who do not care about the Nuba children who want schools and hospitals, no matter who builts them.
The SPLM-N must learn from history that Without Addis Ababa which provided a breathing space for new South Sudanese leaders to carry the torch of liberation through education, the country would not have become an independent state today. The SPLM-N must accept something closer to that agreement for the sake of their people and peace in the region.
Mayen Ayarbior is a Lawyer, Political Economist, and International Security specialist. He is the author of: House of War (Civil War and State Failure in Africa). He could be reached at mayen.ayarbior@gmail.com.
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