South Sudan VIPs Series (Part II): Dr. Riek Machar’s Violent Quest for Power in South Sudan

By Malith Kur, Montreal, Canada

Friday, April 17, 2020 (PW) — In the first part of this series, I gave some background about the political journey of Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin. Now, I turn to Dr. Riek Machar Teny, Lam’s coauthor of South Sudan’s unending bloody troubles. I frequently mention their academic credentials because, apart from ethnic loyalty, the academic achievements of these individuals take precedent over their charisma or leadership qualities. As far as we know, they are weak leaders, but their academic credentials have often convinced some South Sudanese to follow them. I can say as an eyewitness that Riek Machar and Lam Akol have done nothing positive for South Sudan that give them political support among South Sudanese other than academic credentials. They will leave behind a legacy of betrayal. John Garang once said, Riek and Lam “will be remembered as people who stabbed the SPLM/A on the back” while the movement was at the point of victory.

Since 1991, Dr. Machar has exhibited poor leadership skills. Still, he can find a few troublemakers to cause problems in the country. It seems that having a Ph.D. guarantees your social importance for some people in South Sudan. I think that is why, in recent years, we have witnessed an unconventional Ph.D. rush among South Sudanese elites. Even those who do not meet a minimum requirement to pursue a Ph.D. want to have some association with it, for that may increase their political prestige in the country. They have failed to understand that one does not need a Ph.D. to become a good leader.  The best political and military leaders the world had ever known did not have Ph.Ds. All they had were reasonable instincts and abilities to lead in good and bad times.

In this discussion, we are sketching the evolution of the political and military leadership of Dr. Riek Machar over the last 36 years. Up to this point, we know that Dr. Riek has presided over the destruction of many South Sudanese lives since 1991 for what he suggests of being a search for democracy. However, we are aware that democracy builds. It does not destroy or kills innocent people. But killing and displacing innocent South Sudanese is what Riek Machar has been doing for a good thirty years. It is incumbent upon us to say to Riek Machar and his followers that what they have been doing to our country has nothing to do with democracy. That is what I am calling to your attention here.

Riek in the SPLM/A

The SPLM/A was founded in 1983 following the Bor Mutiny led by Karbino Kuanyin Bol and other Southern Sudanese military officers. Like any other new organization, the SPLM/A went through a complicated re-organization exercise. It faced issues related to a power struggle among its initial founders. A group calling itself Anya Nya Two was already living at Bilpam in the Gabella region of Ethiopia, which later became the headquarters of the SPLM/A. The Anya Nya Two at Bilpam was an armed gang of a few individuals who did not have any military significance on the ground in Sudan. The Government of Sudan did not take them seriously because they did not pose any military threats against the Sudanese army.

When the Bor mutineers arrived in the Gambella region of Ethiopia in the last quarter of 1983, they found Gordon Kong and his men at Bilpam. The two groups tried to negotiate ways to form a unified entity under the leadership of John Garang. However, the Anya Nya Two supporters were not in good terms with the Bor military mutineers. They rejected John Garang, Karbino Kuanyin Bol, and other army officers and joined hands with Gai Tut and Akuot Atem to claim the leadership of the new movement. But the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia did not see Anya Nya Two as a viable and credible group to lead an active resistance in Sudan. It had to intervene to support John Garang and his colleagues.  With the help of the Ethiopian Government, the SPLA forces drove away from Bilpam the Anya Nya Two and a group led by Gai Tut and Akuot Atem.

After the Bilpam incident, the supporters of Gai Tut and Akuot Atem fled to Sudan and began attacking the youths who were going to Bilpam to join the SPLM/A under John Garang. Some of them were killed, and the lucky ones escaped either to Ethiopia or returned home. Those tensions and events persisted throughout the war of liberation. Besides, they have continued to define politics in South Sudan for the last 37 years.That was the situation that Dr. Riek Machar found when he officially became a member of the SPLM/A in 1984. He did not join Gai Tut and Akuot Atem because the organization they were leading offered him minimal opportunities.

Riek embraced the SPLM/A under John Garang to raise his political and military profile. He underwent military training and became the SPLA commander in Western Upper Nile in 1986 and rose quickly to the SPLM/A high command. The membership in the SPLM/A political-military high command was very influential among Southern Sudanese and other marginalized communities in Sudan. Military and political figures who attained that position used it to promote themselves. Karbino Kuanyin Bol, Arok Thon, and William Nyuon made unsuccessful attempts to use their military and political profile to change the movement’s leadership. But the more damaging coup attempt against John Garang came from Riek Machar and Lam Akol in Nasir in 1991.

The Nasir Declaration

The Nasir Declaration was an expression of the political tension that prevailed within the SPLM/A political and military leadership. Although Riek Machar and Lam Akol would want us to believe otherwise, that tension had regional and ethnic dimensions. The ethnic dimension emerged in different forms a few months after the coup attempt. A significant number of SPLM/A officers who were in Nasir in 1991 but were neither Nuer nor Shilluk were summarily executed. Those activities and the subsequent attacks on civilian targets in many parts of the Upper Nile region invalidated the claim that the Nasir faction of the SPLM/A was seeking reforms in the movement.

Dr. Riek Machar, Dr. Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong, in the Nasir Declaration, expressed concerns about “the lack of human rights and democracy” within the movement. But strange enough, they killed officers and soldiers who had disagreed with them in Nasir. The coup leaders also expressed a demand for self-determination in the then Southern Sudan. These expressions were noble demands of all South Sudanese. Indeed, no South Sudanese would not have appreciated the respect for human rights and democratic practices in the SPLM/A. But the Nasir Declaration that demanded human rights and democracy as parts of its central policy soon degenerated into an instrument of tribal conflicts and revenge. That was what we saw in Bor a few months after the Nasir Declaration.

The Bor Massacre

The claim that Riek Machar and Lam Akol made that they were fighting for democracy and human rights was far from the truth. We have seen their political behaviors since 1991, and one of the incidents that continue to define their political intentions is the Bor Massacre. The naked reality here is that no human rights advocate who becomes a murderer. Riek Machar turned the machineguns intended for the defense of Southern Sudanese into instruments of looting and killing of innocent civilians in Bor. We are still asking whether democracy or human rights meant something different for Dr. Riek and Dr. Lam.

If they were attempting to reform the SPLM/A, why did they attack and destroy population centers in Bor? They should have chased away the real enemy in Malakal and other cities in the Upper Nile region instead. But they did not.The only crime that the Bor communities committed for Riek’s militias to attack them is that they are John Garang’s people. The destruction of Bor communities suggested that Riek Machar and Lam Akol were not fighting for human rights, democracy, or even self-determination for Southern Sudan. If they were, they should not have attacked the people in Bor, for they did not oppose any of these demands.

Furthermore, we have observed for three decades the political activities of Dr. Riek and his friend Lam Akol. Both men have led different movements since 1991. Still, none of them has ever allowed any form of election to confirm their efforts to promote and pursue democratic practices, which they demanded in the Nasir Declaration. In Lam’s admission (see Lam Akol, SPLM/A: The Nasir Declaration, 2003), they did not have any discussion about who was going to lead the Nasir faction of the SPLM/A. I do not understand this kind of democracy. Now, let us look at different movements that Dr. Riek has led since 1991 to trace democratic practices in the activities of these organizations.

The Nasir Faction of the SPLM/A

As we have already discussed early, the Nasir Declaration demanded democratic reforms within the SPLM/A. However, the entity that emerged out of it did not follow any democratic practices. Lam Akol and Gordon Kong simply presumed Riek Machar as a ringleader of the group. They never consulted anybody other than their trusted aides. That is not how democracy works.Another essential point to make here is that the Nasir faction did not fight against the Sudanese Government’s troops in the Upper Nile region, in which they were based.

The National Islamic Front forces began to move with a greater degree of freedom in the area. But Riek and his militias never lifted a finger to stop them. Instead, Riek and his forces were always ready to attack and loot non-Nuer population centers across Upper Nile. Those who claim that Turabi and Bashir played in part in the formation of the SPLM/A-Nasir have a point. They unofficially collaborated with the undemocratic regime in Khartoum and soon became part of it.

SPLM/A-United

But it was not long before the Nasir group changed its name to SPLM/A-United. Nothing indicates to us that the process of renaming the Nasir faction went through any democratic consultations. What we know so far is that Riek and Lam made the decision without involving their cadres, but differences between them emerged. Riek repudiated Lam soon after the formation of the SPLM/A-United. I do not know whether Lam was impeached or fired; however, the move to remove him from the SPLM/A-United had nothing to do with democratic discourse. It was a matter of power struggle between Lam and Riek.

Following the failed Nasir coup, the consultation we know of between Riek and a few of his supporters was at Akobo in 1994. They called it “Akobo Convention,” and Lam was invited to attend that meeting. At the Akobo Convention, the Nasir faction was renamed a second time. It became the South Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A), but the results of this convention did not amuse lam. He left Akobo in protest, and, at this point, the two factions, the SPLM/A-United and SSIM/A, remained as separate organizations. One led by Riek and another by Lam, respectively. Eventually, the two factions made different deals with the Khartoum-based National Islamic Front of Bashir and Turabi.

Khartoum Peace Agreement

Riek Machar attempts to claim the SPLM/A leadership did not yield any meaningful results for him and his followers. They had attacked and looted Bor, but that did not help them achieve the change they wanted.  Riek and his followers at the time had no option but to merge their organization with the Government of Sudan. Machar negotiated the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the NIF regime.The agreement recommended a four-year interim period, at the end of which a fictitious referendum was promised.  A Southern Sudan Coordinating Council was also established to run the South, but there was not any demand for democratic institutions across Sudan. Besides, none of the articles in the Khartoum Peace Agreement was ever implemented. The Khartoum Peace Agreement eventually found itself where it belongs, the garbage bin of history.

A Road back to the SPLM/A

In 2002 the reality dawned on Riek Machar and his followers. Machar was left with no options but to run back to SPLM/A. He returned to the movement with nothing but political embarrassment and confusion.The National Islamic Front in Khartoum was not ready to implement the clauses of the Khartoum Peace Agreement because there was no commitment on its part to consider the self-determination referendum in Southern Sudan. The provisions in the Khartoum Peace Agreement were good for nothing but political deceptions.

They were illusions that did not carry any value because it was not likely for Bashir and Turabi to allow a referendum to take place in Southern Sudan. But today, Riek Machar and his followers are trying to convince themselves that they are the ones who fought for the self-determination in Southern Sudan and hence brought about the 2011 independence. Give us a break, please. Lies and illusions do not have a place in history.

The reality that will always remain standing tall in the annals of South Sudan’s history is that the SPLM/A, which Riek Machar and his followers wanted to destroy, brought the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA guaranteed the referendum. It was neither the Khartoum nor the Fashoda Peace Agreement. Unlike the Khartoum Peace Agreement, the CPA established the fundamentals of political powers in Southern Sudan for the first time. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) was far more different from the 1972 self-government or the Coordinating Council of Khartoum Peace Agreement. The GOSS had political, security, and economic powers that did not depend on the Khartoum-based regime.

Moreover, the CPA brought democracy to Sudan. In 2010, a CPA-mandated election took place in Sudan under the supervision of the international community. These developments opened the path to a free and fair referendum in Southern Sudan in 2011. Now South Sudanese have a country they can call theirs. But Riek Machar has continued to rig havoc in the country. We saw this in the post-CPA SPLM Convention in 2013.

The Post-CPA SPLM Convention

The post-referendum SPLM Convention was supposed to be a forum in which the movement would cement its political history in the country by writing its basic party rules. However, Riek Machar and his followers stole that opportunity once more and turned it into another political nightmare for South Sudanese. The convention became a political graveyard in which the euphoria following the independence was hastily buried alive. A Nasir-style coup was set in motion once more in Juba in December 2013. The results were another devastation and a subsequent emergence in Nasir of another weird organization. South Sudan was turned back a hundred years economically and politically. I do not know whether if that is what democracy entails.

The SPLM-IO.

What happened in 1991 in Nasir following a failed coup against John Garang was repeated after the events of December 2013. Riek Machar was unable to overthrow President Kiir. He fled Juba to Bor, and once again, under his direct supervision, ferocious massacre, rape, looting, and destruction of properties were unleashed within and around Bor Town. They destroyed even the food that they could not finish eating. All these things were done in the name of democracy. Ironically, the people who did these things in Bor and other cities in December 2013 chose violence over the democratic process at the SPLM National Convention in Juba. Strange enough, another Sudan People’s Liberation Movement was born in Nasir. They called it “SPLM-IO” or SPLM-In Opposition. But it does not make political sense that same SPLM violently opposes itself. It seems to me that Riek Machar must be seeking South Sudanese elite democracy, not people democracy.

As far as I am concerned, the SPLM/A-IO is an organization established on false, fake, and corrupt principles. It does not have a clear political vision other than Riek’s nefarious quest for power. The only tool the SPLM-IO has in its arsenal is violence. Since it was established in 2014, its militias have carried out relentless disorder affecting different communities across the country. The region and the international community have been left bewildered by these developments. But South Sudanese will often appreciate IGAD and other international bodies for their efforts to bring peace to the country.

Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R)-ACRSS)

The ARCSS is not different from the Khartoum or Fashoda Peace Agreement that Riek and Lam negotiated with the NIF regime in Khartoum in the mid-1990s. Those agreements were instruments of little value to South Sudanese. The same thing is right about (R)-ARCSS.  The provisions stated in the ARCSS or its derivative do not deserve the blood of our people. For example, the current Government formed according to ARCSS or R-ARCSS’s provisions has nothing to do with democracy, reforms, or anything that would improve the lives of South Sudanese. We now have an expanded government, which leaves little room for service delivery. The main functions of this Government include the protection of the interests and feeding of the so-called VIPs. South Sudanese do not have something to gain in such a government, for it will not build even a single school or a health clinic, leave alone setting our economy on the right track.

What we may appreciate in (R)-ARCSS is that Riek Machar has reached the end of his political road because South Sudanese are tired of his violent politics. That will possibly relieve the country of this political maniac. He should enjoy well the next three years as First Vice President. It will be an uphill battle for him to convince South Sudanese to support his bid for the high office in the land. He had better chances in 2013 to win the hearts and minds of South Sudanese if he did not initiate political violence in the country. You do not need to be a political scientist to realize that SPLM-IO will not survive the wind of change because the ethnic sentiments it has exploited for the last seven years are dying down.

Other factors that will send the SPLM-IO to its deathbed include systematic nepotism and corruption. Riek once accused John Garang and Salva Kiir of being dictators, but now his supporters are leaving the SPLM-IO, accusing him of running the organization as “a family enterprise.” They point out that Riek has appointed his wife and son-in-law on the SPLM-IO ticket as ministers of defense and petroleum, respectively. That is naked nepotism, which has forced senior military and political figures to abandon the organization. South Sudanese should unite and work together to see the back of Riek Machar and other corrupt politicians. Only then should the country set a new plan for recovery and prosperity.

The author, Malith Kur, is a Ph.D. candidate at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His research focuses on the patterns of cooperation between the churches, African indigenous religious institutions, and the state for peacebuilding, reconciliation, and social reconstruction of South Sudan. Kur’s previous research examined the Christian contribution to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a possible model for peacebuilding in South Sudan. He can be reached @ malith.kur@mail.mcgill.ca.

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