South Sudan VIPs Series (Part VI): Kerbino Kuanyin & William Nyuon, the Controversial Giants of South Sudan’s Liberation Struggle

By Malith Kur, Montreal, Canada

Wednesday, July 08, 2020 (PW) — Kerbino Kuanyin Bol and William Nyuon Bany were quitesignificant and influential members of the SPLM/A. They have left behind lasting marks on South Sudan’s political and militaryhistory. Although they actively participated in the Anya Nya One Movement, South Sudanese will always remember them for their positive and the negative roles in the Second Sudanese Civil War. 

A good number of South Sudanese knew Kerbino Kuanyin Bol and William Nyuon Bany for their unusual behaviors, but William Nyuon was gentler than Kerbino Kuanyin. They werefascinating military figures. But at the same time, they were verycontroversial individuals with unstable personalities and leadership qualities.

This part of the South Sudan VIPs series provides a brief account of the controversial activities and contributions of these two individuals to the long march of South Sudanese to freedom. Talking about these individuals is essential; for any account about South Sudan’s history that does not reflect deeply on the contributions of Kerbino Kuanyin and William Nyuon to South Sudan’s independence would be a superficial narrative.

Kerbino Kuanyin and William Nyuon’s Membershipin the Anya Nya One Movement

Little information is in the public domain about the roles that Kerbino Kuanyin Bol and William Nyoun Bany played in the Anya Nya One Movement. What is known, however, is that they were excellent and brave Anya Nya soldiers. Although there are no records to confirm them, some anecdotes we have received from the former members of the Anya Nya One Movement indicate that Kerbino, along with a few other members of the Any Nya One, received military training in Israel in the late 1960s. That military training took place at the height of the Israeli-Arab conflict. One would assume that the Jewish state was not driven by support for South Sudan’s freedom but by the desire to reduce the severity of its enemies’ war machine.

We know that many South Sudanese died in the Israeli-Arab conflict. The Arabized Sudanese regime in Khartoumactively drafted South Sudanese, Darfuris, Nubians, and other African Sudanese into the army and sent them to fight against Israel in the 1960s and early 70s.

In this context, the limited assistance that the then Israeli Government offered to Anya Nya One was essential in two ways. First, it was a strategic move by the Jewish state to ensure that Sudan had enough troubles at its doorsteps to stop sending soldiers to fight Israel. Second, it created a positive domino effect on Sudanese internal politics. It compelled the Sudanese Government to negotiate in good faith with the Anya Nya One Movement to stop Israel establishing strong ties with South Sudanese. The peace negotiations that followed these developments produced the 1972 peace agreement in Addis Ababa.

But, likely, those ties did not end in 1972 but possibly remained dormant for the next ten years waiting for the next cycle of conflict to reactivate them. Israelis’ support for South Sudan came to light again in 2011 when President Kiir visited Jerusalem after a successful referendum vote for independence. Kiir thanked the Israeli Government not only for the assistance it offered to the SPLM/A but also for the help it gave the first South Sudanese liberation movement in the 1960s.

Kerbino’s military experiences in the bush of South Sudan and possibly in Israel during the Anya Nya movement opened the doors of progress for him in the Sudanese army when the Addis Ababa Peace Accord brought peace to Sudan in 1972. He and other colleagues, including William Nyuon, got an opportunity to become part of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Inthe next ten years (1972-1982), Kerbino rose to the rank of major in the Sudanese Armed Forces before launching a rebellion in Bor in 1983. 

Like Kerbino, William Nyoun Bany was a guerrilla soldier in the Anya Nya One Movement. Although he did not receive any military training beyond what he got in the bushes of South Sudan, Nyuon was a committed soldier. The commitment and bravery to serve as a good soldier in the Anya Nya continued after his absorption into the Sudanese Armed Forces. Although William Nyuon was illiterate because he never had a chance to learn to read or write, that did not stop him from building a stable military career. He had already risen to a rank of major in the Sudanese Armed Forces when he rebelled in Ayot in June1983.

Mutinies in Bor and Ayot, the Birth of the SPLM/A

The rebellion in Bor and Ayot in 1983 came after the Government in Khartoum had violated the terms of the Addis Ababa Accord and decided to transfer the Southern Command units of the army to the North. According to this arrangement, the central Government in Khartoum earmarked battalion 105 under the command of Major Kerbino Kuanyin Bol, battalion 104 under the control of William Nyuon in Ayot, among other units for immediate transfer. 

The Government in Khartoum wanted to begin its planned transfer with the battalion 105 in Bor, Pachalla, and other small cities in Jonglei Province. It ordered Kerbino and his unit in Borand other cities to prepare for a journey North. This order was not subject to negotiation because it came directly from Jaafar Nimeiri. At this point, Sudan had come under a military dictatorship in which decisions were in the hands of one man.

However, Major Kerbino and his soldiers in Bor, Pachalla, and Pibor were not ready to leave for the North. They refused.Sudan’s Government considered the refusal to obey orders as ablatant challenge to its absolute authority and declaration of rebellion. But its first move was to send Colonel John Garang to Bor to convince Kerbino to comply with orders to move northward with his military units.

But John Garang’s mission to persuade Kerbino failed. It failed because it later emerged that Kerbino Kuanyin, John Garang, William Nyuon, Arok Thon Arok, and other South Sudanese military officers were already having a secret plan. They wanted to overthrow the Government in Khartoum or capture the South militarily before the transfer of former Anya Nya soldiers to the North. But the country’s political events accelerated rapidly to a breaking point before they could execute this plan. 

The Government in Khartoum had already succeeded in dividing the Southern Sudanese political class, and regional politics guided by bitter tribal sentiments was causing problems in the region. These developments could not allow the former Anya Nya military officers to implement this plan. But Kerbino and his colleagues were adamant about resisting transfer to the North. They began training the police, Person guards, Wildlifeunits, and volunteer students in Bor and other cities to back them up should the standoff lead to active military confrontation. Thetraining of other organized forces and volunteer students proved crucial for Kerbino and his men during the battle in Bor. It helped them with combat and good intelligence gathering about the movement of the government security officers. 

​Garang’s failure to convince Kerbino to move north compelled the Government of Sudan to send army units to Bor. It became clear that war was inevitable as the government soldiers were already on their way from Juba to Bor town. In the early morning on May 16, 1983, the Sudanese military unitsreached Bor’s outskirts. At that point, there was little room for any discussion between the opposing groups. Kerbino knew that if he did not fight, his arrest was imminent with severe consequences to follow. Hence, he fired a fatal shot killing the commander of the government forces. It was the first bullet thattriggered the beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War, a war that has redefined the fate and political borders of the post-colonial Sudan. 

Subsequently, Major Kerbino Kuanyin Bol and his unit in Bor engaged the government soldiers in a ferocious, bloody battle around Bor for quite some time. Kerbino got injured in that battle, and his men eventually evacuated the city.  But because of the local support they enjoyed, Kerbino was transported to a remote island along the River Nile, and his soldier disappeared into the surrounding villages. 

At the same time, John Garang, who came to Bor on a mission to persuade Kerbino to accept a transfer to the North,did not return to Khartoum. He joined the rebel soldiers and went with them toward the Ethiopian border instead. The local people cared for Kerbino until he recovered. He then went to Ethiopia later in the year to form the SPLM/A with other comrades.

Following the event in Bor, the government soldiers of the battalion 104 in Ayot decided to join the rebellion. Major William Nyuon Bany led them out of Ayot in June 1983. The rebel soldiers in Ayot left the city on their own accord. Theywere not involved in direct combat with government troops.These military and political events led to the formation of the SPLM/A in 1983 and ushered in a period of bitter war. The warbrought down President Jaafar Nimeiri in 1985 and ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Kenya in 2005.

The First SPLA Units

The first SPLA military unit emerged from the Sudanese army battalions of 104 and 105 rebel soldiers from Bor, Ayot, and other cities in Jonglei Province. These two battalions could launch a successful rebellion under Kerbino and William’s commands because these two officers had a unique attachment to these military units. First, most of the soldiers who made up these battalions were drawn from the former members of the Anya Nya One Movement. 

At the time of rebellion in Bor and Ayot, the former Anya Nya soldiers continued to maintain a strong spirit of comradery they had established among themselves while in the bush. Second, Kerbino and William commanded respect among the soldiers of 104 and 105 battalions for their bravery. Third, trust between the Northern and Southern members of these battalions had broken down due to political developments in the country at that time. Those issues allowed Kerbino and William to plansome of their moves undetected by the Government’s security apparatus.  

Indeed, the battalions 105 and 104 became the nucleus of the SPLA. There is no question that Kerbino Kuanyin Bol and William Nyuon, because of their association with these units,were the clear leaders of the rebellion in the South. But John Garang later took over the reign of the movement from these two men for several factors. Garang’s military rank played asignificant role in his ascension to the helm of the SPLM/A. He was a colonel in the Sudanese Armed Forces, while the former were his juniors. Besides, Garang was well educated. He had a Ph.D. in agro economics from the prestigious University of Iowa in the USA. Because of his military and academic backgrounds, Garang had a clear advantage over Keribino and William. He also had guaranteed support from the Mengistu regime because the Ethiopian Government wanted an effective leadership to lead the new movement. The previous experiences with the Aya Nya Two, which turned into a band of highway robbers, did not impress the Mengistu regime. They wanted a new leadership that would have the commitment and knowledge to pursue specific political and military aims.

According to this new leadership structure, Kerbinobecame the Deputy Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A. William Nyuon assumed the position of the GeneralChief of Staff of the movement. 

After they had settled the leadership’s issue, the plan to execute the war began in earnest. The former soldiers of 105 and 104 were combined as one unit and underwent new military orientation and training to launch the war of liberation. They were placed under the command of Willian Nyuon Bany. Thestudents and other civilians who accompanied the rebel soldiers from Bor, Ayot, and other locations also received military training. They formed the Jamus Battalion, a second military unit of the SPLA. Kerbino Kuanyin became the commander of Jamus battalion.

Despite their privileged positions as senior members of the SPLM/A Political-Military High Command, Kerbino and William developed erratic behaviors. They would often feel paranoid toward students or civil servants who had joined the ranks of the movement since they had limited educationalbackgrounds. They could imprison and send individuals into battles in a harmful way to get rid of them. They also used intimidation against individuals they perceived to have the potential to challenge their positions or question their ability to lead. But the SPLM/A members continued to admire them for their courage to fight the enemy with zeal and determination.Kerbino was nicknamed “Maŋɔk, Mangook” to indicate that he could strike the enemy as hard as possible.

Kerbino in the SPLM/A Prison, Escape, and Subsequent Demise

​But a few years later, Kerbino Kuanyin became dissatisfied with the second position in the SPLM/A leadership hierarchyand wanted back the top place he conceded to John Garang in 1983. He began to build resentment against the leadership of Dr. John Garang. But his attempts to unseat John Garang as the leader of the movement were unsuccessful, and the SPLAarrested him in 1987. The SPLA security agents arrested Kerbino after his successful military campaign against the government army’s garrisons in the Blue Nile region. Heescaped from the SPLA prison with other political prisoners after the fall of the Mengistu regime in the early1990s.  

Following his escape for the SPLA prison, Kerbino decided to join the Sudanese Government. He went to Khartoum with Commander Arok Thon Arok and other senior military and political figures who fell out with John Garang. But his rebellious spirit persisted in Khartoum and could not maintain a good relationship with the Islamists regime under Omar al Bashir. 

Kerbino returned to Southern Sudan from Khartoum and went to his home State of Warap to strengthen his power base, but he got limited support from the local communities. Since he did not receive enough support from the local communities, he took some militias from his friend Paulino Matip Nhial, an ally of the Government in Unity State, to fight the SPLA forces and the local communities around Gogrial. 

Indeed, his forces devastated the area, but the SPLA’s collaborative efforts with the local youths eventually forced himto seek refuge at Government’s garrison inside Wau. Nonetheless, it was not long before he made a daring move andturned against his host in Wau. In 1998 his militias briefly took control of Wau town before the government forces expelled them. 

Kerbino’s military action in Wau opened the door for him to enter a negotiation with the SPLM/A. He requested to rejoin the movement. The movement welcomed him back. However, they assigned Kerbino to the SPLM/A Headquarters without active military duties. He found himself uncomfortable in that redundant position and sought collaboration with the government militias under Paulino Matip in Unity State. Matip accommodated him in the Bentiu area.

​As we have seen so far, the 1990s was a time of great political and military confusion in the then Southern Sudan.Different armed groups were operating in the oil-producing regions of the South. In Unity State, for example, several militias were present. Among them was a group under Peter Gatdet, a group that had broken away from Paulino Matip. This group did not have a good relationship with Kerbino.  

In the course of a power struggle between Gatdet and Matip in September 1999, Kerbino was caught and killed in mysterious circumstances. No one has explained to this day the conditionsunder which he was shot and killed. But his unexplained death carries with it the political signs of the Post-Nasir Declaration, under which Riek Machar got rid of non-Nuer commissioned and non-commissioned SPLA military officers under his command. 

William Nyuon Bany and Post-Nasir Declaration

Commander Kerbino Kuanyin Bol’s death came three years after William Nyuon Bany had died in 1996 in a battle with forces loyal to Riek Machar in the greater Upper Nile region. But prior to the Nasir Declaration in 1991, William Nyuon Bany had assumed the position of the Deputy Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A, replacing Kerbino Kuanyin. 

But the SPLM/A was in a weak position due to internal divisions, and things became more difficult militarily and politically for the movement to fight the enemy. As this realitydawned on the movement’s leadership, William Nyuon decided to leave the mainstream SPLM/A in 1992. He joined the newly formed SPLM/A-United led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol. However, he could not sit comfortably under the leadership of Machar and Lam. That situation forced him to abandon the SPLM/A-United in 1995. He returned to the mainstream SPLM/A following the Lafon Declaration.

Concluding Remarks

 ​As we have seen in this narrative, Kerbino Kuanyin Bol and William Nyuon Bany did many things and made controversial decisions during the Second Sudanese Civil War. A casual observation of their performances would suggest thatthose activities and decisions fall under two of the three political categories that Joseph Garang described in the 1960s, at the height of the first Sudanese civil strife. 

 ​Joseph U. Garang was a Southern Sudanese intellectual in the 1960s and a former member of the Sudan Communist Party. He published a pamphlet in 1961while the Anya Nya One war was gaining momentum in the South. He placed Southern Sudanese politicians into broad three categories, “the extreme right-wing, perplexed intellectuals, and the left.” The extreme right-wing took the race in its crudest form as an issue in post-colonial Sudanese politics. They did not want anything to do with the Arabized Northern political elites and wanted an independent South Sudan. But they did not know how to achieve that. The perplexed intellectuals were Southern Sudanese politicians caught in the middle. They could go wherever the wind of change was blowing. So, they were possibly vulnerable to political manipulation by whoever promised them something in return for their support.

When we come to the left where Joseph Garang belonged, the left stood for a united Sudan, but the unity of Sudan was possible only when what Garang called, “the South-North contradictions” were completely removed from the political scene. The South-North Contradictions included the forcefulpolicy of Arabization and Islamization of Sudan. They also included the deliberate marginalization and economic exploitation of the peripheries by the Northern “bourgeoisie or middle class.”

 ​Joseph Garang identified these political categories among Southern Sudanese politicians in the 1960s. But our discussion in this series shows that these categories have continued to exist in South Sudanese politics. They existed during the Second Sudanese Civil War. Now, they prevail in post-2011 South Sudanese political discourse. 

But today, the perplexed intellectuals dominate the political environment in post-2011 South Sudan. Some of them have taken up arms to fight for things they cannot explain. Others waste their precious time on social media claiming to be fighting for reforms. However, when asked to describe the social, political, and economic changes they are demanding, they do not have a clue whatsoever.

Kerbino Kuanyin Bol and William Nyuon Bany’s activities during the Second Sudanese Civil War suggest that theybelonged to the extreme right-wing and perplexed intellectualsgroupings among South Sudanese military and political elites. Like Riek Machar and Lam Akol, they wanted an independent South Sudan, but they did not know how to achieve it. As part of the perplexed political class, Kerbino and William got pushed from one extreme to another, and along the way, they caused unnecessary damage to society and themselves.

However, despite their shortcomings and controversial decision-making exercises during the Second Sudanese conflict, Kerbino Kuanyin and William Nyuon tried their best to fight for South Sudan’s independence. In spite of their controversial behaviors during the war, they have secured their places among the giants of South Sudan’s liberation struggle. They are by farbetter than the current corrupt armed opposition groups and perplexed social media warriors, who have freedom delivered to them on a silver plate, but they are working hard to destroy it.

The author, Malith Kur, is a Ph.D. candidate at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His research focuses on the patterns of cooperation between the churches, African indigenous religious institutions, and the state for peacebuilding, reconciliation, and social reconstruction of South Sudan. Kur’s previous research examined the Christian contribution to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a possible model for peacebuilding in South Sudan. He can be reached @ malith.kur@mail.mcgill.ca.

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