PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd – South Sudan

"We the willing, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the ungrateful. We have done so much, with so little, for so long, we are now qualified to do anything, with nothing" By Konstantin Josef Jireček, a Czech historian, diplomat and slavist.

The Plan to Free South Sudan of Illegal Arms: A Road to Political and Economic Stability in the World’s Newest Nation

Malith Kur

Malith Kur

By Malith Kur, Montreal, Canada

Thursday, July 16, 2020 (PW) — President Kiir delivered a politically balanced address to the nation on the eve of the 9th anniversary of South Sudan’s independence. In that speech, the President announced steps to reduce inter and intra-communal violence in the country. He has outlined three crucial measures that the government must take to remove arms from civilians’ hands. They include:1. A full-scale disarmament campaign to collect illegal guns in the hands of civilians;  2. Inter and Intra-communal dialogue, reconciliation, healing, and grazing rights to address the causes behind therecurring conflicts in some parts of the country and;3. Strengthen law enforcement institutions, such as the police and the judiciary to deal with crimes in the country.

This announcement is quite significant if implemented in good faith. It can potentially reverse the current political anarchy, restore public trust in the government, and possibly pave the way to economic recovery in the world’s newest nation.But, sadly, it has come at a time in South Sudan’s history in which violence has become the source of political glory for many politicians. For this scheme to work, it will need proper planning, resources, guaranteed security for all communities, a sustained government’s commitment, and facilitation of better economic conditions in the country to render gun ownership unnecessary for some groups.

Some requirements listed here as a means for the success of this disarmament scheme are immediate. For instance, proper planning of the disarmament program, guaranteed security for all communities, a sustained government’s commitment to all its responsibilities, and resources to support those who will do the work should be in place immediately. The facilitation of better economic conditions could follow as part of the long-term national development plan. If the transitional regime of national unity follows these steps, it will succeed in reducing the volume of illegal arms and ammunition in the hands of civilians in the country.

The volume of Arms and Ammunition in the Hands of Civilians in South Sudan

Without a doubt, civilians illegally own a large volume of light weapons in South Sudan. Almost all male population of those living in South Sudan have guns in their hands. That makes disarming civilians a daunting task for the government.Civilians have acquired deadly light arms from government and rebel soldiers, who often sell them for food or money. They sell guns and ammunition to criminals or civilians because most of them do not have regular salaries.

All male adults in South Sudan want weapons because they are a guaranteed means of self-defense due to the absence of government authorities in rural areas. Guns are also essential for those who have established armed robbery as a way of life.Those are the conditions civilians’ full-scale disarmament exercise will face and deal with across South Sudan.

Under such conditions, it will be wise for the government to include the collection of guns in civilians’ hands and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of various armed rebels under one scheme. Let us call it “the Plan to Free South Sudan of Illegal Arms.” We can now examine this plan under two broad categories: full-scale disarmament of civilians and demobilization of ex-combatants belonging to different violent armed groups.

Full-Scale Disarmament of Civilians

Most communities in South Sudan would appreciate and welcome full-scale disarmament of civilians. But an objection to this program would come from a few communities who have practiced armed robbery for several decades and has become a way of life for them. Other communities, such as Toposa, Dinka Malual, and Ngok, who usually find themselves in a vulnerable position at volatile border regions, may prefer to keep their gunsfor self-defense against seasonal hostile border crossing armed robbery. However, their potential reluctance to give up arms would depend on the government’s little commitment to meet its responsibilities and protect them.

Illegal Arms in East Africa

But before moving forward with this discussion any further, it is good to make a general observation concerning illegal arms in the region. South Sudan is not the first country in East Africa to face disarmament’s challenges. Uganda and othercountries have had similar issues with illegal guns in the hands of civilians. It would be reasonable for South Sudan to follow the Ugandan lead because the groups associated with gun ownership, such as pastoralists, exist in both countries. Uganda often uses a professionally trained army to disarm its pastoralistcivilians. South Sudan may need to try that exercise too. But the policymakers in South Sudan will have to acknowledge thatcivilians’ disarmament will be complicated unless all the concerned parties are on the same page to settle the problem of illegal guns in the country. 

Here are more issues about why disarmament will be a challenging exercise in South Sudan. Since 1983, the flow of small arms into South Sudan has remained steady. Most of those weapons ended up in the hands of civilians. Now nobody knows the number of illegal guns that civilians own across the country.Another problem is that the national unity regime in Juba is weak and bankrupt to implement an effective disarmament program. Soldiers will collect guns and resell them to civilians or criminals when they need food and other necessities.

Besides, the authorities in South Sudan do not haveinformation about the people living in the country. There are noaddresses and no registration records that exist to identify each person to check whether they own a gun or not. A more challenging problem for the government is that the bulk of the weapons are in the hands of pastoralists who move from place to place without warning. This situation suggests that they can easily hide their guns only to use them again in committing more violent crimes. These are the social contours that authorities will have to negotiate to get where the weapons are in different areas of South Sudan.

Strategies to Disarm Civilians Across South Sudan

The government will have to do many things to implementa successful full-scale disarmament of civilians. There should be long and short-term strategies to collect all illegal guns amongmembers of different communities in the country. A short-termdisarmament strategy should focus on mobilizing and enlistingthe cooperation of chiefs and youth leaders in rural communities throughout the country. This strategy entails that the traditional and youth leaders should become essential elements of the local governments’ security management teams. 

​The chiefs and youth leaders know each member of their communities. They have information about who and who does not own a gun. But the chiefs and youth leaders’ cooperation in this context will not be forthcoming unless they know for sure that the government has a mechanism to address securityconcerns in the villages. The problems that compelled adult males to acquire weapons in the first place should have been solved by the time they are asked to give up guns. But if insecurity risks persist, it will be difficult for them to comply. 

The long-term strategy should address social and economic developments in rural South Sudan. In this case, the government should prioritize building a functional primary and secondary education system and introduce a reliable road network throughout the country. These steps would encourage the youth to embrace the modern economy instead of cattle rustling and armed robbery. Education will help the youths in building new skills to earn a living. The road networks will move goods and services, making resources accessible to people in different parts of South Sudan. 

Once the initial phase of disarmament has taken place, the system to collect guns should remain active to reduce the chances of people rearming themselves. Experience in Uganda shows that a single disarmament exercise is not enough. The government of Uganda recently disarmed Karamoja warriors to stop cattle rustling in the region bordering Kenya and South Sudan. Still, they rearm within a short time, compelling the chiefs to call for new disarmament measures (Uganda PML Daily News, Jan 11, 2020). The same scenario is likely to occur in South Sudan unless a sustained disarmament process remainsin place.

The disarmament exercise needs to remain active for at least ten years, but the authorities will need to pay attention to some regions. For example, disarmament in Jonglei areas requires special attention. The formula that the government used in 2012 did not work.  

Bor communities were fully disarmed, Lou Nuer partiallydisarmed, and Murle was never disarmed in 2012. People knowthat the Murle population was not disarmed because immediately following the disarmament exercise, Murle’s criminals attacked the neighboring communities in the region. Moreover, in 2016 they carried out massive cross-border cattle rustling and child abduction inside Ethiopia. That incident almost triggered a diplomatic row between the two countries as Ethiopia threatened to pursue Murle’s criminals inside South Sudan (see AfricaSource, 2016). Practically, that cycle of violence has not stopped ever since. 

Many initiatives to stop the violence have failed in Jonglei(see NSCC,  East Bank Reconciliation Conference, 2000). Cattle theft and child abductions involving Murle’s youth have continued in Bor areas, Lou Nuer, and other neighboring communities. So far, the youths from Nuer and Dinka only react to these developments. They are now acting in self-defense, forthe authorities have failed to rein in Murle criminals, who often use sophisticated weapons. 

For decades now, any peace agreement reached between Murle and its neighbors has never reduced cattle theft and child abduction. This reality makes it unlikely for Dinka and Nuer youths currently engaged in fighting with Murle’s youth to accept dialogue before certain conditions are met. A careful observation of the recent developments indicates that those conditions should happen in two phases. In phase one, DavidYau Yau’s Cobra militias must be disbanded and disarmed. This move will appease other communities because these militias access and use government resources to terrorize neighboring communities. Once Cobra militias are dismantled, and the rest of Murle civilians have undergone proper disarmament, genuinedialogue can begin. 

Verified disarmament of Murle’s criminals is necessary for peace to hold in the region. In the past, many agreements to stop intercommunal violence were reached, but Murle did not honor them. So, in phase two, the government should create a buffer zone and station an army barrack to ensure that no criminals are moving around to cause more harm to civilians in the region. The government will also need to establish a system that would track down criminals to identify those involved in illegal activities. These steps are necessary for long-term security to prevail for all communities in the Jonglei region.

Outside Jonglei, the government should replicate the measures describe above in Warap, the Lakes States, and perhaps between the Dinka and Nuer in Bahr el-Gazel and the Upper Nile regions. The intra-communal fighting has been going on in Warap and Lakes states for a long time. The cycle of revenge killing in these parts of the country has created deep-seated animosities among the communities, especially in the Lakes States. This situation requires active government, churches, and other civil society groups’ involvement to rebuild trust between communities in these two states. 

Fighting over cattle rustling and grazing rights between Dinka and Nuer west of the Nile has been on and off for quite some time. It is not as frequent as the one between the Dinka and Murle on the one hand and the Murle and Nuer in the Jonglei region. What is needed to resolve issues that trouble the relationship between the Dinka and Nuer in the west bank is a political will and government’s commitment to meet its security responsibilities toward the people living in the Upper Nile and Bahr el-Gazel regions.

But the process of reconciling and healing the families who have lost loved ones in Warap and the Lakes States will not be easy. Sometimes, the feuds in these regions are between families, and people know those who have shed their members’ blood. In such situations, reconciliation and healing will take a long time. Therefore, the government will have to develop a long-term security strategy for Warap and Lakes States to sustain peace and build trust at a micro-level of the communities in these regions. This strategy should include continued social and economic development to bring up a new generation that values peace and social progress.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-combatants (DDR)

DDR is an exercise that South Sudan must perform to achieve lasting peace throughout the country.  South Sudanese policymakers would need to understand the process of DDR thoroughly and do it right. If the DDR is done well, it will be easy for the country to avoid relapsing into violence.

Scholars define DDR as “a first step in the transition from war to peace” (see Waldemar Frey & Henri Boshoff, 2005). The DDR is a first step on the road to peace, but it is not a simpleexercise. A transition from war to peace is a complex process that requires expertise, resources, and commitment. It will require all ex-combatants of different armed groups in South Sudan to give up weapons in exchange for a new life as civilians or become members of the organized forces. The government needs to plan these steps and do them right. Luckily, the UN peacekeeping force is already in the country. It will possibly be willing to provide expertise and resources to help South Sudan in disarming various armed groups in the country.

The expertise that South Sudan needs to guide the implementation of a successful DDR program should have a significant local component. That means South Sudanese should take the lead in this exercise because they understand the social, political, and economic conditions of ex-combatants. The UN and other international partners could offer resources and advice to support the implementation of DDR.

The initial phase of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating militias belonging to SPLM-IO and other violent armed groups has already begun with the cantonment of forcesin various sites. Also, the selection and training of those who will become part of regular troops are now reaching the advanced stages. These developments are positive steps in the right direction. Nonetheless, those who will not meet the criteria to become part of the organized forces should not be left redundant. They should get a reasonable economic package to help them start a new life as civilians. For South Sudan’s government and its partners to guarantee financial security for the ex-combatants is the only way to discourage them fromresorting to violence in one form or another.

In the Jonglei region, for example, the former Cobra militiasof David Yau Yau continue to abduct children from neighboring communities and sell them to high bidders in villages around Pibor. They are committing these serious crimes because theyare redundant and have little options but to resort to their old trade of cattle theft and child abductions. These crimes against humanity will not stop unless those militias are properly demobilized and given alternative ways of life.

Finally, once the government has completed the disarmament of civilians and the DDR process, it should ensure that law enforcement institutions, such as the police and judiciary system, function throughout the country. They will need to be professionally ready to deal with criminal activities such as cattle theft, child abductions, and other serious crimes before the end of the transitional period. 

The author, Malith Kur, is a Ph.D. candidate at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His research focuses on the patterns of cooperation between the churches, African indigenous religious institutions, and the state for peacebuilding, reconciliation, and social reconstruction of South Sudan. Kur’s previous research examined the Christian contribution to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a possible model for peacebuilding in South Sudan. He can be reached @ malith.kur@mail.mcgill.ca.

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