An Excerpt from Gen. David Uziel’s New book “Mossad Agent in South Sudan, 1969”

The Regions of South Sudan – Geography and Ethnic Groups Ethnic Groups (at the time of the events described below).

As opposed to northern Sudan, the population of South Sudan is diverse. The inhabitants speak many languages, differ in appearance and have a range of historical origins. Anthropologists usually divide the population into three ethnic groups: The Nilotic peoples, including the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Anyuak tribes, most of which reside in the Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile regions. Each tribe is also divided into sub-groups. Some engage in agriculture and most raise cattle. Cattle supply milk, dung to fuel fires and meat, and are also used as bridewealth. Polygamy is common and accepted. The Dinka are considered the most sophisticated amongst the Nilotic tribes, and the Nuer are considered unrestrained.

Peace Agreement Talks Begin

“The Northern representatives hinted to Mullah that the Southerners ought to watch out for the Dinka from Bahr el-Ghazal, who would probably attempt to take all the senior positions offered by Khartoum for themselves. Which is why they ought to agree to autonomy – they would then be able to “supervise the Dinka.” At dinner that evening, I asked Lagu to clarify Mullah’s statements regarding the Dinka. Lagu explained that there had always been a rivalry between the Bahr el-Ghazal Dinka and the residents of Equatoria regarding political leadership. Abel Alier was also a Dinka, and one may assume that he would prefer educated men from his own tribe over leaders from Equatoria.

Lagu had several reasons for desiring to incorporate and integrate the Dinka into the armed struggle: first of all, the creation of a national front in which all three regions fight their common enemy; secondly, participation in the suffering and casualties, which would connect all Southerners in a type of common destiny, and later unify forces against the demands of the Northern government, with less regard for tribal and regional considerations; and lastly, unification would disperse the enemy’s war effort over a very large area.

I felt that Lagu ought to postpone the meeting with the Northerners from late January 1972 to June. I suggested that he hold the Kampala conference in February 1972 instead of in December and that during December 1971 and January 1972 he hold separate meetings with the leaders of each region in order to formulate a consensus before the conference with the North.”

Gen. David Uri Ben Uziel: The Israeli soldier who fought with the Anyanya One under the leadership of Gen. Joseph Lagu

The two delegations, the Northern and the Southern, eventually met in Addis Ababa in early February 1972, under the auspices of Haile Selassie. The delegations had to agree on a conference chairman acceptable to both; neither of them, however, was willing to accept the other’s recommendation. The Ethiopian government did not have a candidate of its own, although they did appoint an Ethiopian minister as an observer who would report to the emperor on the developments. The delegations finally agreed to request that Burgess Carr, General Secretary All Africa Council of Churches, serve as mediator during the peace talks.

The participation of the Southerner Abel Alier in the Northern delegation constituted a serious problem for the Southerners. Even worse, Alier was introduced as the head of the Northern delegation. In other words, a South Sudanese was heading an Arab delegation to talks regarding a peace agreement with his Southern brothers. The situation, which was extremely awkward, cast doubt on Khartoum’s intentions. It seemed also that Khartoum was attempting to promote inter-southern strife, a type of “divide and conquer” strategy. There was mention of the possibility that Khartoum would appoint Alier Prime Minister of the South once autonomy had been established.

Eventually, the Southerners decided to give the talks a chance, and see where things were headed as time went on. As soon as the talks began, there was a discussion of the “One Sudan” solution. Lagu, as head of the Southern delegation, requested that the concessions to the South be defined, rather than relying on terms such as federation, regional autonomy, self-rule etc. The Southerners requested that the issues of security and education be addressed as well. Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, a graduate of the Sorbonne, requested that financial aspects be discussed too, but the topic was never elaborated.

The Southern delegation suggested that Sudan be divided into four regions united in a federation, with the entire South constituting one region and the North divided into three regions. They demanded a separate army, a separate police force and that English be declared their official language. The Northerners rejected the idea of dividing Sudan into a federation of several regions, claiming that the ethnic groups in the North had not requested autonomy or federation. The Northerners reminded the Southern delegation that the conference was meant to propose a solution solely to the problem of South Sudan, and clarified Khartoum’s decision to allow self-government within the framework of “One Sudan.”

The Southerners agreed to the proposition and the discussions regarding practical details began. The Northerners agreed to the fact that cultural differences existed between the North and the South, but nonetheless, they tried to press the Southerners into agreeing that Arabic remain their official language. The Southerners objected, on the grounds that Arabic was the language of the Qur’an, and the fact that they were not Moslems prevented them from being appointed to senior government positions.

The most complex issue during the discussions’ initial stages was the question of defense, in all its aspects. The Southerners wanted a separate army, made up of Southern troops, to be stationed in South Sudan. They claimed that the army had a position of power in the North, that it had supported several coups, government takeovers and the suspension of the constitution. A Southern army would secure the South’s interest and uphold the peace agreement. As opposed to the situation in the North, an army in the South would prevent frequent coups. The Northerners rejected the idea of two armies in one nation, and the talks were called off.

When Haile Selassie heard that the talks had reached an impasse, he suggested a solution whereby half the Northern army be sent to the South and half the Southern army be sent to the North. The ethnic composition of each half would be identical. In addition, the police force would be comprised primarily of local residents. The emperor’s suggestion was accepted by both delegations.

Dispatching Delegations to South Sudan

Our support of South Sudan was one aspect of Israel’s ‘Alliance of the Periphery’ policy, as described above. As head of the delegations and as an organizational and military advisor to South Sudan, I acted to help the Southerners gain influence and develop the negotiation skills required to enhance their position in the African arena and on the world stage. We provided the tools and the training, and the Southerners did all the rest. The existence of a military entity backed their political activity and stressed the fact that the Southerners would now oppose oppression such as had occurred in the past and reject all attempts to subject them to Khartoum’s colonial rule.

Regarding the Anya-Nya commanders, as in any other military organization, there were better officers, who were usually the more experienced ones, and there were those who were less good and needed to acquire additional experience. Acquiring experience on the battlefield involves casualties, of which there were quite a few. The commanders I met and trained demonstrated a great desire to perform and fearlessly lead their men in the armed struggle with the North. The reports they submitted to Anya-Nya headquarters were accurate. They never tried to inflate the numbers of enemy casualties. We did not have an unlimited amount of time to train the forces. We had to take into account the fact that the info regarding the arrival of arms in the Anya-Nya camps and their ensuing battle-ready reorganization, would reach the North sooner or later, and probably sooner.

Therefore, at times, our practice runs were the real-time operations themselves. Personally, participating in the mission was an extraordinary experience. I believe that I utilized the African and military experience I’d accumulated in order to aid in the construction of the military infrastructure in South Sudan, and that I provided training in guerilla warfare methods in a region ideally suited to that type of operation. The operations were conducted under the orders of Golda Meir, who had stated specifically that “if and when the Southerners have a chance of reaching a peace agreement with the North, the state of Israel will not stand in their way.”

Quite a few Southerners, including some senior officials, believed that hostilities should have continued and that the agreement should not have been signed. These people were not aware of the fact that the offer of a peace agreement, according to Golda Meir’s guidelines, meant that we had to cease supplying arms. Without a continuous supply of arms, the fighting would dwindle away, as would international support of their cause. The State of Israel treated the Southerners fairly at all times and was respectful and sensitive to the needs of both civilians and troops.

‘Alliance of the Periphery’ policies come and go, but we provided aid to people in distress and did much more than policy demanded. The scope of our medical aid alone is witness to the fact that we were profoundly moved by the suffering of the South Sudanese people.

Our considerations when determining the period of time between delegations or how long they stayed in South Sudan was influenced by various factors. The plan was that each delegation would promote different fields of endeavor, with emphasis on training programs and providing the civilian population with medical care. Some parts of the officers’ training programs took place in Israel over a period of several months. The limitations existing in the field, which prevented extended training courses, were irrelevant in Israel. Our systematic training produced very positive results in terms of operational capabilities.

The second delegation was dispatched specifically in order to establish the rebel military forces, train them and provide them with arms and ammunition, and send the units on their first military operations. Other than that delegation, all of the other delegations were aimed at specialized training such as medics training, explosives, a command course, and artillery and heavy machine guns. Medical aid, which we considered of the utmost importance, was provided by all of the delegations. I headed five of the eight delegations, and I accompanied two others for periods of several weeks in order to train the delegation heads. Luntzi (Joseph Luntz, later a general), the radio officers and myself were the staff officers. The doctors, the instructors and the three additional delegation heads were all brought in from outside the Mossad system.

Mossad operations in South Sudan came to an end in late December 1971, for two reasons: first of all, the South Sudanese had been offered autonomy, which meant the end of hostilities; and secondly, following Idi Amin’s takeover of Uganda, in 1971, and Mua’mar Gaddafi’s demand that he expel the Israeli’s from South Sudan, we could no longer pass through Uganda to reach South Sudan.

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