The Abyei Box: A Critical Analysis of Border Dynamics and Prospects for Peace

By Bek Dhuorjang Chol, Juba, South Sudan

Abstract

Sunday, 31 December 2023 (PW) — This analysis examines the complex dynamics in the Abyei Area, a region of significant geopolitical and cultural importance between South Sudan and Sudan. The paper traces the root causes of the conflict back to the colonial era and analyzes key events, agreements, and ongoing disputes, including those around the southern border of River Kiir between the Twic-Ngok Dinka. The paper highlights the importance of a multidimensional approach to peace that combines legal resolutions with culturally sensitive and community-based policies. It advocates for holistic dialogue and reconciliation processes that respect the cultural heritage and historical claims of the communities and transform the Abyei Box dispute into an opportunity for lasting peace, stability, and mutual prosperity for the people of South Sudan and their neighbouring communities.

Introduction

Abyei’s conflict can be traced back to the colonial times when the British colonial power drew arbitrary borders (from the point of Local Government organization) without regards for ethnic and cultural realities. The consequence of today political developments and conflicts are the lack of due consideration to tribal and racial boundaries and territorial associations at the point of creation local Rural District Councils (RDCs). The Abyei area, historically inhabited by the Ngok Dinka and periodically by the Misseriya, colonial and post-colonial policies have shaped its dynamics. The British redistricting of the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms into Kordofan in 1905 and the ambiguous status left at their departure in 1956 played a significant role in the later disputes [1] [2].

In the descriptive notes of Howell , 1951, on the Ngok Dinka of Western Kordofan, he wrote that; “The Ngork (Ngok) Dinka occupy an area along the middle reaches of the Bahr el Arab. They border the Ruweng Alor Dinka in the south-east and the Twij (Twic) Dinka to the south and with both of these peoples have close cultural affinities. To the south-west are the Malwal Dinka. North of the Ngork are the Baggara Arabs of the Misseria Homr with whom they have direct and seasonal contact and they are therefore on the most northerly extremities of the western Dinka block, lying between the Nilotics of the south and the Muslim people of the north”.

Furthermore, Howell outlined that, “the Ngork Dinka occupy the area between approximately Long. 27° and 50° and Long. 29° on the Bahr el Arab, extending northwards along the main watercourses of which the largest is the Ragaba Um Biero” [1].

This description can be subjected to different interpretations as this specific positioning indicates the Ngok Dinka settlement geographically along the northern courses of the Bahr el Arab/Kiir River which is a seasonal river flowing through the north-western part of South Sudan and serves as a vital geographical landmark or physical feature. As Howell noted, the Ngok Dinka’s permanent villages and cultivations are along the higher ground of the Bahr el Arab/Kiir River. There might have been a co-existence of a “host-guest” relationship with the communities along the southern border of the said river as part of the resettlement arrangement.

On December 20, 2023, Dr. Luka Biong Deng Kuol wrote and posted on his Facebook Account a question on “The Abyei Box: what do you know about it?“

This question ignited positive and negative reactions from those who shared, commented on, and liked it. As an intellectual, I want to share my view on the above question and try to answer it. I thank Dr. Biong for coming up with this discussion and accepting all reactions from the public, which might contribute to resolving the ongoing internal boundary dispute in Southern Kiir (Aneet and other areas). I encourage all the other politicians to follow the footsteps of Dr. Kuol to open up and spearhead the stoppage of conflict and move towards the process of peace and reconciliation.

Initially, I’m one of the people who have decided to remain in the middle-of-the-road on the said conflict and continue to ask the two parties to resolve the land dispute peacefully. I’m mindful of the Abyei Area and its cultural, historical, and economic persistent conflict with the north particularly Misseriya Arabs. The discussion surrounding the Abyei Box, as outlined by Dr. Luka Biong Deng, warrants a critical examination, particularly regarding the delineation of its borders and on special note the southern border.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

The Abyei Protocol of May 2004

The Abyei Protocol, signed in May 2004 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), aimed to address the Abyei Area conflict particularly with Misseriya Arabs along its northern and western borders. As part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), it sought to provide a framework for resolving the Abyei area dispute. This Protocol outlines provisions for the self-administration of Abyei during a six-year interim period (2005-2011), positioning it as a bridge between northern and southern Sudan and aimed to establish a special administrative status for the area [3].

However, the Protocol left many key issues needing to be solved, particularly concerning the exact demarcation of the Abyei boundaries. The other challenges include the disagreement over who qualified as a resident of Abyei to vote during the designated referendum. This disagreement resulted to the delay in conducting the said referendum. These limitations hindered the resolution of the conflict hence contributing to the ongoing conflict possibly ignited by the newly created term of the Abyei Box and probably might cause in the future similar scenario in the south-east or south-west neighbouring communities. Hence resolving it today is paramount.

The Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) 2005

In 2005, the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) was established under the Abyei Protocol by the Presidency of Sudan with a mandate “to define and demarcate the area of nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905”. The Government of Sudan was represented by five members and the same number for SPLM/A headed by Commander Deng Alor Kuol in addition to five external experts and four IGAD Secretariat members. After thorough research, including examination of historical documents (records) and maps, the ABC presented its findings.

The report clarified that there was no clear boundary demarcation of Abyei area in 1905 when it was transferred from Bahr el-Ghazal to Kordofan [4]. The ABC’s findings attempted to delineate the territory based on historical and environmental factors, granting the Ngok Dinka dominant rights to specific areas and sharing ownership with the Misseriya in the northern parts. However, the Misseriya and the Government of Sudan (GoS) rejected ABC’s conclusions, claiming the commission exceeded its mandate [5].

It is said that Twic, Ruweng, and other Jieng/Dinka groups had supported the Ngok Dinka’s position of their settlement north of the River Kiir to the Ngol area during the Abyei Boundary Commission fact findings.

The Role of International Arbitration

The Hague – Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 2009

Due to refusal of then-President of Sudan Field Marshall Omer El-Bashir and his regime to recognize the Abyei Boundaries Commission’s (ABC) report, this necessitated the need for international arbitration.

In July 2009, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague (Netherlands) issued a ruling that considerably reduced Abyei’s geographical size, moving important oil sites beyond its boundaries and addressed the boundary disputes between the Government of Sudan (State) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A, Political Party), focused significantly on the interpretation and implementation of the mandate given to the experts (ABC) who delineated the boundaries of Abyei. The Court (PCA) often resolves disputes between states, but the Abyei issue (intra-state settlement of conflict) was subject to its jurisdiction and expertise.

Dr. Riek Machar Teny, then Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS 2005-2011), and then SPLM Deputy Chairman, (currently the First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan and Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In-Opposition SPLM/A-IO) as Agent, and Dr. Luka Biong Deng, then Minister of Presidential Affairs, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), (currently Professor at the University of Juba) as Agent. Their roles were not as formal representatives of GoSS but as SPLM/A leaders mandated to speak on behalf of the Abyei people (Ngok Dinka – Agents).

The use of the name ‘SPLM/A’ in these international legal and diplomatic engagements indicates the political aspect of the representation, focusing on the party’s interests and perspectives, particularly concerning the Abyei Area.

The Tribunal on the Abyei Arbitration determined that the predominantly tribal interpretation of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) was reasonable and not an excess of mandate, particularly in delineating the northern boundary of the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms at 10º10’N, rejecting the Government of Sudan’s (GoS) claim for a more southerly boundary along the Bahr el Arab/Kiir River [6]. Juba and Khartoum accepted the PCA’s decision as “final and binding,” but this did not end the dispute over Abyei’s status.

“The ABC Experts’ Report provides that the southern boundary shall be the Kordofan-Bahr el-Ghazal-Upper Nile boundary, as it was defined on January 1, 1956. The southern boundary of the Abyei Area was clearly not the focus of a dispute between the Parties over the course of the ABC proceedings” (The Hague’s Final Award, 2009).

The Final Award in 2009 defined the Abyei Area boundaries, the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred from the Bahr el Ghazal province in Southern Sudan (Now the Republic of South Sudan) to the Kordofan province in Northern Sudan in 1905 [7]. This demarcation was ratified by both Sudan and South Sudan, as well as by international bodies like the United Nations and African Union. The Hague’s Final Award is central to the ongoing discussion.

This historical demarcation is significant as it situates the southern border of the Abyei Area north of the River Kiir [8]. The arbitration since the southern border wasn’t the focus of the dispute aimed to clarify the western, northern and eastern boundaries of the Abyei Area, a region of significant cultural, historical, and economic importance, particularly to the Ngok Dinka community.

The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, enacted in 2011 following the Independence, provides the legal and political framework for the governance of the country. It addresses various issues related to national identity, governance, and the rights of states and local government within its territories [9]. In Part One: Articles 1 (2) (a & b) define territories of the Republic of South Sudan, including recognition to Abyei Area, and granting it a special administrative status under the Office of the President of South Sudan Article 97 (4) (a) (b) (i) & (ii).

However, the Constitution does not specifically resolve the Abyei issue, which remains a significant source of conflict/contention between South Sudan and Sudan, indicating the need for further dialogue, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, or legal recourse to achieve a lasting resolution.

The Current Challenges and Developments

Following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, a series of Cooperation Agreements were signed between South Sudan and Sudan in September 2012. These agreements covered essential aspects such as oil transit, border issues, citizenship, and the division of debts and assets, etc. Notably, the Abyei issue was not directly addressed in these agreements.

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), is an agreement often involving third-party countries and entities, deals with different conditions and is not directly related to the bilateral agreements between South Sudan and Sudan or the Abyei issue. It is a formal agreement outlining the terms and conditions under which UNMISS operates within the South Sudan territories. This agreement typically covers various aspects, such as the legal status of UNMISS personnel in the country, the mandate and scope of the mission’s operations, logistics, and the use of resources.

On August 8, 2011, this agreement was signed by Hon. Deng Alor Kuol, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, on half of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (currently, Minister for East Africa Community Affairs), while Hilda Frafjord Johnson, then Special Representative of the Secretary-General, on behalf of the United Nations.

International Community and Governance Frameworks

The international community’s role in the Abyei dispute has been significant but controversial. For instance, the U.S. and the African Union prioritized the South Sudan self-determination referendum over resolving the Abyei issue [10]. This approach arguably led to a weakening commitment to a referendum in Abyei and has contributed to ongoing regional tensions and violence.

Dr. Douglas H. Johnson has critically analysed in his article entitled “The Road Back from Abyei” the role of international actors and provided an incisive critique of international diplomacy in the Abyei issue, particularly highlighting the U.S. stance. Johnson’s work underscores the complexities of international involvement in regional disputes, often shaped by broader geopolitical interests and priorities [11].

Unpacking the Controversy on “the Abyei Box”

Twic-Ngok Conflict

The Twic and Ngok Dinka were once transferred from Bahr el-Ghazal province to Kordofan in 1905 province, but the Twic Dinka were retransferred to Bahr el-Ghazal sometime around 1912 [12]. The Twic and Ngok Dinka communities have and share deeply rooted social, cultural, linguistic, and historical similarities and linkages and have lived peacefully for so long [1]. Anthropologists have provided stronger insights into this kind of relationship and connection central to their identity and livelihood.

The recent escalation of violence in 2022 has further exacerbated the region’s existing fragility [13]. The dispute primarily centered on land ownership (i.e. located south of Bahr el Arab/Kiir. Twic Dinka forms its northern boundary with the Abyei area, in which it disputes its north border with the Ngok Dinka on the lands south of River Kiir, believed to be the colonial boundary of January 1, 1956, and claiming that the territory has been annexed by Ngok elites who were powerful in the governments of Sudan and Southern Sudan and termed the territory recognized by the PCA as “the Abyei Box”. This part of the boundary became a dispute, which still needs to be resolved [14].

This conflict between Twic and Ngok Dinka has ripple effects in the wider Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile regions. Destabilization by the spillover of the conflict, the inter-communal social and border violence, and issues of cattle raiding, targeting, and revenge killing are mounting regional security threats and potential disruption of any peace processes [15]. This conflict underscores the fragility of peace in the region, hence hindering political progress and development, fuelling cycles of displacement, and creating a dire humanitarian catastrophe [16]. Similarly, the situation in the Abyei area with the north, particularly the Misseria Arabs, remains volatile and is a barometer of broader North-South relations between South Sudan and Sudan [17].

The status of Abyei remains a disputed area between South Sudan and Sudan, with its final status yet to be resolved. The area’s rich resources and strategic location make it a point of contention between the two countries. “The Abyei Box” has become a point of contention, particularly in its southern border, which remains unresolved as per the January 1, 1956, Kordofan-Bahr el Ghazal borderline [18]. It is reported that during the Abyei Community Referendum conducted in October 2013 is said to have lacked polling centers south of River Kiir. This was construed as being outside of Kordofan-Bahr el Ghazal province borders.

A Personal Evaluation of Dr. Francis Mading Deng’s Proposals for Resolution

Regarding Dr. Francis Mading Deng’s proposal on Abyei Area, the proposal offers valuable ideas for resolving the Abyei conflict [19]. However, it requires further fine-tuning and consideration of potential implications, especially concerning the borders with the Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile regions in case of “Self-Governing State” with its sovereignty. Any alterations in the Abyei’s status must be assessed comprehensively, as they could raise questions about the implications for South Sudanese and Sudanese citizenship laws. Clarity is needed on how this would work in practice, as the proposal is vague on this point.

International involvement in conflict resolution can be complex and may require extensive resources. The proposal doesn’t adequately address South Sudan’s interests in Abyei, and it may be viewed as leaning more toward maintaining the status quo with Sudan rather than considering the possibility of Abyei joining South Sudan. The emphasis is that there is going to be “no winner or loser,” which could be seen as disadvantaging Abyei citizens who wish to be part of South Sudan. The proposal mentions a future referendum, but it does not provide details on how it would be conducted or how the options (remaining with Sudan, joining South Sudan, or retaining self-governance) would be determined.

The proposal didn’t consider how to mitigate various concerns to gain broader acceptance. The proposal’s focus on providing security and autonomy to the Ngok Dinka might inadvertently lead to the displacement of the Missiriya and other Sudanese and South Sudanese residents. Although the proposal mentions assurances for the Missiriya’s and other Sudanese and South Sudanese access, theory can be different from practice. This could create a situation where the Ngok Dinka have disproportionate control over the region and may not ensure equal representation and participation for the South Sudanese citizens of the neighbouring communities e.g. the four fundamental rights mentioned in the proposal.

Creating an international mechanism to oversee peace, security and development in the Abyei area might involve a degree of loss of sovereignty for the host country (in this case, either Sudan or South Sudan). Both countries may resist the idea of ceding control over the Abyei area to either the UN (trusteeship) or an independent state, as it would impact their territorial integrity. International oversight raises sovereignty concerns (South Sudan) and adds a layer of complexity to an already sensitive situation.

The Way forward for Peace: Recommendations for Reconciliation

Efforts have been made to promote peace and coexistence between the Twic and Ngok communities. Peace Conferences were held in Aweil and Wau, and in March 2023, President Salva Kiir Mayardit met with five chiefs from the Ngok of Abyei Area and six from the Twic at his home village of Akon in Warrap State. During the meeting, they discussed the root cause of the conflict and devised ways to achieve lasting peace between the two communities [20].

Adhering to the President’s four points of stopping the killings, ceasing claims on contested lands paving way for demilitarized zone, all roads should be opened, and allied armed to return to their respective areas. The silence or limited action from the governments of Sudan and South Sudan might have also been attributed to the complexity of the issue, where political, ethnic, and resource-related factors intersect.

To resolve the Abyei Box (Aneet dispute and other areas within the Kordofan-Bahr el Ghazal 1956 border), a multifaceted approach is necessary, which includes legal resolutions and cultural sensitive, and community-based strategies.

Dialogue and Reconciliation are crucial in promoting mutual understanding between the Ngok and Twic communities.

The involvement of community leaders, like the recent initiative by President Salva Kiir, is central in this respect. Knowledge and expertise must be leveraged from all relevant stakeholders, such as the politicians, knowledgeable army generals (including retired), traditional authority leaders (chiefs), women and youth, civil authority leaders, the indigenous population of the area, and some well-informed witnesses from the neighbouring communities should be involved in open dialogue to explore viable and just solutions to this deeply rooted and politicized conflict.

This approach can lead to peace and stability, benefiting the immediate stakeholders (Ngok and Twic) and the broader population of South Sudan. Providing immediate humanitarian assistance to the affected communities, including support for displaced individuals, medical aid, and rehabilitation of destroyed infrastructure.

Equal political commitment is required from the governments of South Sudan, politicians from Ngok and Twic, and others to demonstrate a stronger commitment to resolving the Abyei box dispute, considering it not just a border issue but a matter of people’s lives. Twic and Ngok should consider the harmful impact that the ongoing violence is having on their lives, properties, relationships and culture. This destructive behaviour will only disadvantage them in the future.

As temporary guests on this earth, we must learn to coexist peacefully and respect each other’s rights. I advise them to remember that to remember that any land can accommodate us all as people, hence learning valuing human lives and that of future generations is only through peaceful mean, hence this violence must be brought to an end as soon as possible. You are not enemies to each other but rather brothers. Its time to revert to your togetherness to live in harmony and tranquillity.

The role of international bodies, such as the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), should remain nonaligned and switch to their mandates, and strengthen their presence in the Abyei territory (especially the border between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya to ensure safety and prevent conflict escalation, cattle raiding and encroachment.

If necessary, together with UNMISS, Troika, AU, etc. they should facilitate dialogue and support initiatives that promote peace and sustainable coexistence, respecting the communities’ cultural heritage and historical claims, and ensure that any political or legal solution does not undermine these essential aspects.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the legal and administrative significance of the Abyei Area cannot be understated, it is imperative to engage in a holistic dialogue that addresses the underlying issues associated with “The Abyei Box.” This includes a thorough examination of the southern border’s delineation to ensure a fair and lasting resolution for all parties involved.

The Abyei Box controversy is thought to be a modern geopolitical issue disregarding reflection of deep-rooted social, and cultural connections between the two communities. Through a coordinated and empathetic approach, there lies a potential to transform this dispute into an opportunity for peace, stability, and mutual prosperity for the people of South Sudan, and their neighbouring communities.

References

[1] P. Howell, “Notes On the Ngork Dinka of Western Kordofan,” vol. 32, no. 2, December 1951.
[2] F. Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial History,” vol. 99, no. 5, December 1994.
[3] A. Protocol, “Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict,” Sudan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Naivasha, Kenya, May 26th 2004.
[4] A. Report, “Abyei Boundary Commission Report,” Sudan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2005.
[5] F. M. Deng, “Abyei Boundary Report: Bounding by Conflict: Dilemmas of the Two Sudan,” 2016.
[6] A. F. Award, “Final Award in the Matter of an Arbitration between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army,” The Peace Palace, The Hague, 22 July 2009.
[7] Freya Baetens and Rumiana Yotova Goettingen, “The Abyei Arbitration: A model procedure for intra-state dispute settlement in Resource-Rich Conflcit Areas,” vol. 3, no. 1, 2011.
[8] [Online]. Available: https://dl.tufts.edu/downloads/rb68xq10d?filename=s4655s91f.pdf.
[9] “The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan,” South Sudan Ministry of Justice and Constituional Affairs, Juba, , 2011.
[10] D. J. Bederman, “International Decisions,” vol. 104, 2010.
[11] D. H. Johnson, “The Road from Abyei,” Unsolicited commentary, 14th January 2011.
[12] H. J. Douglas, “Southern Sudan Boundaries: Background Paper,” 27 August 2007.
[13] “acleddata.com-Sudan,” [Online]. Available: https://acleddata.com/2023/03/17/sudan-march-2023-situation-update-deadly-violence-in-the-disputed-abyei-area/).
[14] [Online]. Available: https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15278.doc.html.
[15] [Online]. Available: https://cityreviewss.com/bahr-el-ghazal-elders-must-be-tasked-to-end-dinka-ngok-and-twic-conflict/)]..
[16] Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal-Querol, “The Legacy of Historical Conflict: Evidence from Africa,” vol. 108, no. 2, May 2014.
[17] H. J. Douglas, “Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement?,” vol. 107, no. 426, 2008.
[18] “radiotamazug.org-opinion,” [Online]. Available: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/opinion-the-abyei-box-what-do-you-know-about-it.
[19] F. M. Deng, “A Proposal Framework for Abyei,” Juba, South Sudan, May 7th 2021.
[20] “Bahr el Ghazal elders must be tasked to end Dinka Ngok,” [Online]. Available: https://cityreviewss.com/bahr-el-ghazal-elders-must-be-tasked-to-end-dinka-ngok-and-twic-conflict/.

The author, Bek Dhuorjang Chol, is a lecturer at the University of Juba, a researcher in the areas of Conflict Management and Peace Building & currently a PhD candidate at HUST, China. He can be reached via his email address: bekchol2017@gmail.com

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