War in the Sudan: Historical Fault Lines and Proxy Power Plays in Khartoum
Christopher Burke, Senior Advisor, WMC Africa
By Christopher Burke, Senior Advisor, WMC Africa
Friday, 15 November 2024 (PW) — Five months from now the devastating war in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) will be two years old with no end in sight. To grasp the complexity of this conflict we must examine Sudan’s history of authoritarian rule, the political influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the region’s power dynamics. The crisis has deep historical roots, layered with decades of exploitation, exclusion and failed political transitions. The current conflict is fueled by a larger proxy war drawing in regional players with vested interests. A genuinely inclusive peace process engaging all stakeholders–and ideally cognizant of the multiple factors–is the only hope for a peaceful transformation of the crisis.
The roots of Sudan’s turmoil reach back to the colonial and post-independence eras when power in Khartoum was consolidated in the center marginalizing peripheral regions. This structure resulted in a history of rebellion from the peripheries including the conflicts in Darfur and the south. Post-independence Sudan never fully unified the country’s diverse regions, ethnicities and religious groups resulting in a series of protracted conflicts. In 1989, a military-Islamist coalition under General Omar al-Bashir seized power only deepening the cycle of authoritarianism and oppression.
The military was buttressed by Islamic paramilitary forces including the Janjaweed militias in Darfur under Bashir. Utilizing these militias, Bashir’s regime maintained a stranglehold on power suppressing dissenting regions and people. This central-periphery divide worsened over the years ultimately resulting in South Sudan’s 2011 secession that cost the country Sudan 75 percent of its oil resources substantially weakening its economy.
The seeds of the current conflict were sown after Bashir’s fall in 2019 when competing factions within the Sudanese elite comprising the SAF led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, began vying for power with visions to establish an independent Ttawa State in western Sudan. The two factions represented distinct interests, united temporarily in a transitional council, but soon fractured as both sides jostled for dominance. This fracture erupted into full-scale conflict in April 2023 resulting from unresolved tensions between the central government and decentralized, militarized power bases.
The Muslim Brotherhood, through its Sudanese affiliate, the National Islamic Front (NIF), played a pivotal role in shaping Sudan’s authoritarian framework. When the NIF backed Bashir’s coup in 1989, it imposed a version of political Islam that sought to reshape Sudan into an Islamist state. This influence positioned Sudan as a springboard for Islamist political agendas with Islamist figures aligning Sudan with fundamentalist movements in the region and sheltering members of Al-Qaeda including Osama Bin Laden in the early 1990s. Prioritizing ideological vision over national unity; the NIF deepened divisions within Sudan with policies that alienated non-Arab and non-Muslim communities particularly in Darfur and South Sudan.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s influence created lasting political distortions including the consolidation of power within the military and security apparatus around military intelligence institutions. When Bashir fell in 2019, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and networks remained embedded within Sudan’s political and military elite, particularly the SAF. This created a complex and opaque web of alliances with Islamist factions within the SAF that resisted moves towards democratization and civilian governance.
In contrast, the RSF leader Hemedti opposed the Mulsim Brotherhood’s vision supporting more pragmatic, populist goals to garner support from marginalized groups. This difference in ideological orientation between the SAF and RSF presents another layer of complexity to the conflict with the SAF in part representing an Islamist legacy and the RSF aligned with alternative visions for Sudan’s future.
Sudan’s war is now a proxy battleground for competing regional interests. Given its size, natural resources and access to the Red Sea, neighboring countries and external powers see Sudan as a geostrategic asset. With deep historical ties to Sudan, Egypt supports the SAF and favors a military-led regime aligned with Cairo’s security interests especially the containment of Islamist influence and control over the Nile waters. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates perceive Sudan’s stability as essential to their regional security calculus. While both countries supported the transitional government, divergent interests among Sudanese factions have limited their influence.
On the other side, Hemedti’s RSF has ties to Gulf States particularly the UAE resulting from the deployment of Sudanese mercenaries to Yemen in support of the Saudi-led coalition. The RSF’s control over gold mines in Darfur make it a valuable asset for regional players that consider Sudan’s resources as lucrative. The RSF’s loose, decentralized command structure has encouraged regional actors to arm various factions within Sudan’s militia networks further escalating the conflict.
The involvement of these external players has intensified the war and complicated peace efforts. The myriad interests converging on Sudan turn each ceasefire attempt into a tug-of-war among stakeholders with conflicting aims. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have attempted to broker peace, but the lack of a unified approach among external powers has hindered their efforts.
Any sustainable solution will require the reframing of Sudan’s governance structure to address the legacy of centralization and military dominance. Peace efforts need to prioritize the voices of Sudan’s civil society that have demonstrated resilience and a genuine commitment to democratization. The 2019 protests that led to Bashir’s removal were driven by civilians comprising youth and women who demanded systemic change–a vision critical to lasting peace.
Successful international efforts must transcend ceasefires and target the structural issues fueling the conflict. Comprehensive security sector reform is essential to dismantle the military’s grip on Sudan’s politics. Integrating the RSF into a unified military force, while complex, could prevent future conflicts by reducing the autonomy of militias and enforcing a single command structure. This process should be accompanied by institutional reforms that ensure Sudan’s governance reflects the diversity of its people.
Regional actors must recognize that Sudan’s stability is mutually beneficial. Rather than competing for influence, a unified diplomatic front possibly led by the African Union with backing from the UN, could create the necessary pressure to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table. A joint peace initiative, reinforced by economic incentives and sanctions on parties obstructing peace might possibly shift the dynamics toward de-escalation.
For meaningful peace to take hold, Sudan must reach what William Zartman, Professor Emeritus at Johns Hopkins University, termed the ‘ripe moment,’ the point at which the warring factions recognize that the benefits of peace outweigh the costs of ongoing conflict. Only at this critical juncture can a genuinely inclusive peace process, engaging all stakeholders and addressing the multitude of factors at play provide a viable path toward a peaceful transformation of the crisis.
The war in Sudan is a manifestation of the country’s unresolved historical conflicts, ideological divides and regional entanglements. The future of Sudan teeters on a precipice with millions at risk of famine, violence and further displacement. The international community and regional actors must recognize the stakes and prioritize a coordinated, inclusive peace process that addresses both immediate and systemic issues.
The author, Christopher Burke, is a senior advisor at WMC Africa, a communications and advisory agency located in Kampala, Uganda. He was involved in the implementation of the 1999 Nairobi Peace Agreement between Sudan and Uganda and has travelled widely across Sudan and South Sudan including Darfur. With nearly 30 years of experience, Christopher has worked extensively on social, political and economic development issues focused on conflict transformation, advocacy, policy and peacebuilding in Asia and Africa and can be contacted through his email address: Christopher Burke <chris@wmcafrica.com>
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