How Dinka-Fertit Rivalry began in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal State, South Sudan
After reading all this sad story about the Dinka-Fertit Rivalry in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal State, remember that it is time to forgive and live in peace.
By Santino Madut Uchalla, Wau, South Sudan
Wednesday, 28 May 2025 (PW) — Wau has been an ethnically mixed town. Among the southern non-Arab groups of Wau town are the Fertit, the Dinka, and the Luo. Bahr El Ghazal region was populated by Dinka (From the northwest to southeast of Wau), Luo to the south and east of Wau, and Fertit from the west, centered on the town of Raga. The Fertit, a group of many small African tribes related to the Bantu of central Africa, traditionally have been ruled by Arabized Muslim families, including the Feroge family of Fartak. The Fertit are agriculturalists and most follow traditional African religions.
The Dinka are Africans living mostly in Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Lakes regions. Many live in Wau. As a result of the war and famines, many have migrated to urban areas of the north where there is no war.
The Luo (African) group from east and south of Wau are the origins of Bahr El Ghazal. They were forced westward in Bahr El Ghazal in the nineteenth century by the Dinka, who were in turn being pushed westward out of Western Upper Nile into Bahr El Ghazal by the expansionist Nuer. In the process, the Luo lost their cattle to the tsetse fly and became agriculturalists and blacksmiths. The Luo language is close to Acholi, Shilluk, Anyuak and Pari of Luo tribe that straddles the Sudan/Uganda border.
Wau also has a Fellata community of Muslim West Africans who migrated to Sudan following trade routes to Mecca; many northern Sudanese Arab traders, known as jellaba, also live in Wau.
The Arabized Baggara cattle nomads, whose militia is the muraheleen, live to the north of Bahr El Ghazal, in Darfur and Kordofan regions. They visit Wau en masse when they accompany the military train to Wau.
Wau has intermittently been the scene of fighting, often along ethnic lines. During the first civil war (1955-1972), in January 1964, the southern separatist guerrilla force called Anyanya attacked Wau. The attack failed. In July 1965, northern troops conducted mass killings of southerners in Wau, sparking an exodus of southerners into border states.
The ethnic, cultural, and political polarization of western Bahr El Ghazal including Wau was evident in the first civil war and increased in the current war. Some Arabized, Islamized people from western Bahr El Ghazal were attracted by the NIF=s militant Islam as a means of vindicating their role and presence in a sea of non-Arab non-Islamic southerners. The central government mobilized Muslim groups as well as the Fertit in Bahr El Ghazal against the SPLA which was viewed as a Dinka army arming the Fertit militia and exploiting historical animosities between the Fertit and the Dinka.
The Dinka and Luo were the primary victims of the 1988 famine in Bahr El Ghazal that was caused in large part by raids by government-backed muraheleen who stole cattle, burned huts and grain, and abducted women and children. In 1987 and 1988 Dinka famine victims streamed into Wau in search of food; their numbers reached almost 100,000. While some were able to draw on kinship ties to Dinka born in or earlier displaced to Wau, the many who were not able to do so remained at a great disadvantage. They were forced to sell their remaining assets, cattle cheaply, work for little or no pay, and made to live in camps. In part because of the suspicion of SPLA sympathies with which rural Dinka were viewed, they were prohibited from movement out of displaced peoples camps. The prohibition on movement outside the camps to cultivate, gather firewood, or to leave to find work in the north was tantamount to a sentence of death by starvation. Many did starve in Wau in 1988. After the famine subsided, many migrated north to work or, especially after 1993 when relief began to reach the rural areas, returned there to cultivate.
The SPLA strategy was to lay siege to garrison towns, cut off all means of transport, and force them to surrender. Wau was under siege by the SPLA since about 1986. In February 1992 the government forces opened an offensive from Wau to break the SPLA siege, but did not succeed. In April 1992, those war-displaced without relatives in Wau were relocated to two camps on the East Bank of the Jur River six kilometers east of Wau, and at Marial Ajith, ten kilometers to the north of Wau. They served to consolidate a security zone around Wau. The government military strategy for Wau, as for many garrison towns after 1992, involved relocating and settling the war-displaced into peace villages, and the separation of these displaced from other kinds of populations.
By 1996 many of the displaced in these camps had fled Kerubino’s attacks as well as muraheleen raids. Some ran from the SPLA. Following a flight ban by the government from April 23-May 15, 1997, the OLS found that the situation [in the camps] was indeed critical with little food and virtual lack of feeding center activities . . . malnutrition in the displaced camps is approaching 20 % . . . while efforts for cultivation are hampered due to insecurity. After food distributions, a nutritional survey in Wau town and the camps still showed moderate levels of malnutrition in under five years old. The U.N. projected Major food deficits for the displaced camps around Wau in 1998.
By 1998, two of three Wau camps for internally displaced were exclusively Dinka: Marial Ajith (population about 6,000) and Eastern Bank (about 6,200). The third camp was Moimoi, to the south, where about 3,000 Zande (a large Sudanese African ethnic group near the Uganda/Congo border) lived. At least two neighborhoods of Wau were heavily Dinka: Hilla Jedid (Der Akok in Dinka) and Nazareth. Hilla Jedid (Der Akok) had an estimated 8,700 people and was located in the northern part of Wau and just south of the Girinti army base where Dinka family members of the military (and families of SPLA defectors also lived. Nazareth in south central Wau had an estimated 21,000 population, 75 percent of which was said to be Dinka and the Luo community. By 1998 some estimated that 42,000 lived in Dinka neighborhoods and displaced camps and elsewhere in Wau, although numbers are notoriously unreliable.
The Fertit Militia and the Dinka Police.
The government formed and armed a Fertit militia in the mid-1980s. The relationship of the government with the Fertit militia, called of Jeish el-Salam (Peace Army), and Anyanya II, both known as friendly forces,was regulated through a charter that the newly elected parliament of Sudan adopted in a secret session in August 1987. The charter recognized a parallel set of military ranks for these militia, who were to participate in joint operations and convoys with the army, and supply it with intelligence. The Fertit militia was officially under the jurisdiction of the army=s military intelligence department, and like Anyanya II, they received training, arms, ammunition, uniforms, and other supplies from military intelligence.
The Fertit militia has been described as one of the clearest examples of a militia formed and developed as part of a deliberate [government] military strategy, by one authority. Their leader was Tom Al Nour, who as major general commanded them still in 1998.
The Fertit, like other less numerous southern peoples, feared the potential of the Dinka to dominate by virtue of their large population. In Wau the police force was predominately Dinka and the other government posts were precariously balanced between the Dinka and Fertit.
Initially the Fertit militia was intended to protect small Fertit towns from the SPLA. Many Fertit had been forced to flee to Wau to escape SPLA attacks around Wau in which Fertit civilians were deliberately killed by SPLA troops. In 1987 the SPLA attacked Khor Shammam (twelve kilometers from Raga), the home of the Fartak ruling family; the Fartak were considered an inveterate enemy of the SPLA.
The Fertit were divided among themselves, and most Fertit leaders distrusted those chosen to lead the Fertit militia. They regarded the militia as a dangerous escalation of the war, In 1987 the Fertit militia was withdrawn to Wau where it was coordinated by the army. This set the stage for ethnic clashes that claimed many civilian victims. As one report described Wau in 1987:
Three mutually antagonistic elements were prepared to loot and kill for food and vengeance: The army controlled the barracks, the railway depot, and the airport; the Fertit militia armed by the government, made up of the hodgepodge of Sudanic peoples, and in large part Muslim and committed to oppose Dinka expansion controlled half the city; and finally, the Dinka dominated the police force and the suq (market), markaz (administrative headquarters), and half of the residential area. In January [1987] the Fertit militia took advantage of food riots to kill their Dinka adversaries and burn their living quarters.
In July 1987, Major General Abu Gurun was appointed army commander in Wau and greatly exacerbated Fertit/Dinka tensions:
In summer 1987 Wau agony continued without surcease. . . . Wau Town had fallen into a state of veritable anarchy. Civilians disappeared at night and were found dead the next morning; corpses, many riddled with bullets and showing signs of torture, were dumped along the town perimeter. Armed by the government and led by Missiriya Baqqara, the Fertit needed little excuse to attack the Dinka, particularly the Dinka police. . . . Thanks to [Major General Abu] Gurun dispensation, the militia roamed through Wau, throwing grenades into Dinka huts and murdering Dinka civilians in the streets. In June a score of Dinka were killed and mutilated in the Lokoloko quarter; after a government [large cargo aircraft] C-130 was hit by an SPLA SAM-7 [anti-aircraft] missile over Wau airport on 3 August, General Abu Gurun supervised a search of the Dinka quarters that resulted in the deaths of more than 100 persons. . . . Later, in a single evening the Sudanese army lobbed nearly a dozen mortar shells into the Dinka quarter, creating confusion and death.
The Fertit militia, with the loan of army tanks, finally attacked the police headquarters, leaving twenty-five Dinka police dead in the heart of Wau on September 6, 1987. Army tanks attacked the Dinka sector of town and burned or destroyed nearly six hundred Dinka tukuls (huts), killing 300 civilians. The Dinka police fought back for three days, defeating the Fertit militia which then retreated to the Jebel Kher area three or four miles outside of Wau (“The Dinka do not go there.”). The transfer of Maj. Gen. Abu Gurun out of Wau at the end of 1987 eased the situation considerably, but a low level of killings continued.
Famine was also taking lives in Wau during the killings of 1987 and 1988. Thousands of displaced Dinka from Aweil and Gogrial, as well as Fertit and Luo from other areas, sought food and shelter at four camps the Roman Catholic Diocese created in June 1987. More than 200 people reportedly died in the camps by the end of August, in a situation that was described as increasingly desperate:
By September the markets in Wau were bare; the jallaba were escaping to Khartoum and those who remained sold sorghum on the black market for more than twenty times the prevailing price in Khartoum. . . .
In early October 1988, Angelo Beda, the chair of the government hapless Council for the South, visited Wau and informed the press that >62 people die daily of hunger. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced an airlift to Wau more than a year later, in 1989, but food conditions were not much improved, and security was also bad:
The Fertit militia was still active. It had attacked a displaced camp in January [1989] and the following month burned to the ground 300 huts in the Hay-Fellata quarter. Murder was a nightly pastime. Food relief trucks were habitually commandeered by the army, civil servants went unpaid, sugar was selling for the equivalent of $15 a pound, the hospital was low on medicines, and corruption was rampant.
After the coup d etat on June 30, 1989, the new NIF-military government began to impose stringent restrictions on the relief effort and on foreign eyewitnesses. Expatriates working in government garrison towns in Sudan, including religious personnel, frequently confronted the problem of travel permits. Often they would forego or delay taking leave for fear that they would not receive government permission to return, since even long residence did not and does not guarantee the right to return.
Although there were an estimated 70,000 displaced persons in Wau in September 1989, the head of military intelligence reportedly refused access to any foreigners without clearance from Khartoum. A rash of violence similar to that of 1987 again broke out in mid-1989, as Fertit militia and the military attacked Dinka civilians and Dinka police seeking to protect them:
On 18 July [1989] the tenuous peace was shattered when army soldiers ran amok after one of their comrades was badly injured by an antipersonnel mine planted two kilometers north of the Wau military base.
The massacre was conducted by soldiers in the 311th Field Artillery Battalion who rushed to the Zagalona neighborhood of Wau and there began an indiscriminate attack on the Dinka. They seemed to target the displaced, including women and children living in camps set up by the ICRC.
The Dinka police tried to intervene to stop the killing but the military stopped them and the police, outgunned, retreated. When the slaughter was over, one hundred Dinka civilians were dead and scores were badly injured. The soldiers collected the dead and the mortally wounded and dumped them down a well located northwest of the military post.
Justice was never done in this case; the authorities acted as if the massacre had never happened. Although its details were widely known inside Wau, neither the military nor the local government bothered to investigate or punish the guilty.
In 1991 the Fertit militia together with the muraheleen attacked Dinka civilians and police in Wau, according to one source. The Dinka police defeated them and captured muraheleen cattle. The Fertit then sought peace negotiations, mediated by then Governor (Major General) George Kongor Arop, a Dinka army officer who is now second vice president of Sudan. The agreement was signed by the Dinka police and the Fertit militia. There was no more fighting inside Wau until January 1998.
The economy of the garrison town of Wau was skewed by the war and dominated by a military/merchant cartel, according to a 1996 review of the OLS:
The formal economy of the region has collapsed, although the government has managed to keep some resources flowing into the town [of Wau] to support civilian and military administrations. [Land has been set aside for agricultural production but] the ability to derive a subsistence income from this production is undermined . . . by a cartel of traders and military officers who have combined to control the food market. With a monopoly on trucks and military protection, the cartel has been able to regulate the import of food to Wau. Seasonally, food prices are subject to the manipulation of the cartel, and since 1989 they have consistently been among the highest in Sudan.
When the south was administratively divided from three states to ten in 1994, Wau became the capital of Western Bahr El Ghazal, considered a Fertit area. The rest of Bahr El Ghazal was divided among Northern Bahr El Ghazal (Aweil), Warrap (Tonj and Gogrial), and Lakes (Yirol), all considered to be Dinka. Some Fertit were said to believe that the Dinka should move out of their town, Wau, into the Dinka areas. This did not happen until January 1998, and within months, about one-third of the Dinka who fled Wau returned, in desperate condition.
BRIEF HISTORY OF WAU COUNTY, WESTERN BAHR EL-GHAZAL STATE
DEMOGRAPHY
2008 NBS Census population: 151,320
2021 NBS PES population estimate: 208,487
2022 UN OCHA population estimate: 320,752
Ethnic groups: Balanda (Viri, Bor), other ‘Fertit’ groups, Luo, Rek Dinka
ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS
Wau County is located in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. It borders Raja County to the west and Jur River County to the east and North. It also borders Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State (Aweil Centre County) to the North West and Western Equatoria State (Tambura and Nagero counties) to the south.
The county falls within the western plains’ groundnuts, sesame and sorghum livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018). The FAO and WFP (2017) estimated that 57% of households in Wau relied on subsistence farming as their main livelihood activity in 2016, increasing to 65% by 2021. In 2021, gross cereal yields were estimated to be 1.35 tonnes per hectare, declining slightly to 1.3 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). Fishing and livestock rearing were also identified as key livelihoods within the county. The most popular crops are cassava and sorghum, closely followed by groundnuts. Vegetables, sesame (simsim), and maize are also cultivated to lesser degrees.
Other livelihoods activities include producing charcoal, and selling small goods such as second-hand clothes, cooking oil, salt and sugar. Imported goods from neighboring countries are also available, particularly from Sudan and Uganda, due to trade routes that run through the county. Wau town has a major market in the central area of town, as well as a number of smaller markets that serve the local population. It lies along historical trade and transportation routes, and as a result communities in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap rely on Wau town as a feeder market for goods.
Sustained insecurity around Wau County impacted the ability of farmers to maintain their crops, particularly during key planting and harvesting periods. As a result, this has led to a change in food insecurity levels in the county. The IPC projected the county as being at a crisis (IPC level 3) level of food insecurity in November 2022, with conditions projected to persist at the same level until at least July 2023.
INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES
The headquarters of Wau County is currently located in Baggari Payam, although Wau town is the capital of Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. As the state capital, Wau also hosts many government institutions that are critical for the functioning of the state. Although the county capital was moved from Wau to Baggari in late 2012, government institutions are still located in Wau town to maintain accessibility for the local population. The decision to move the county capital was highly contested and is discussed in the section on ‘conflict dynamics’ below.
The county has several churches and mosques present in the area, reflecting its mixed religious composition and historical linkages to Sudan. In addition to Wau Airport, one of only four tarmacked airstrips in the country, the town also contains hubs for inter-state public transport.
Wau County is home to thirty-four (34) Early Childhood Development centres, one hundred and twenty-three (123) primary schools and thirty-six (36) secondary schools (one of which is located in Baggari Payam, with the remainder located throughout Wau North and Wau South payams). Wau’s reputation as a centre of learning mean that its secondary schools and university draw students from across the county, state and country. Wau County is home to Mbili Girls National Teacher Training Institute located in Wau South Payam. The county also hosts the University of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, which is one of a handful of public higher education institutions in South Sudan.
Wau County was reported to have fifty-one (51) health facilities including thirty-seven (37) functional health facilities, among them nineteen (19) PHCUs, fourteen (14) PHCCs and four (4) hospitals in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 0.80 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.72 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. Wau Teaching Hospital and the Daniel Comboni Hospital were reported to be moderately functional, while the and the Wau Military and Police Hospitals were reported to be operating at limited functionality.
OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023 estimates that there are over 182,800 people with humanitarian needs in the county (down from 197,800 in 2021), which is equivalent to nearly 57% of the estimated population for Wau County reported in the HNO. Humanitarian need is particularly acute in the areas of protection, gender-based violence, child protection, shelter and non-food items.
The spread of conflict between government and opposition forces to Western Bahr el-Ghazal in 2016 led to a large number of IDPs fleeing to Wau Town. As a result of the insecurity and displacement, UNMISS created and supported a Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in Wau town. In September 2020 UNMISS began to progressively withdraw its troops and police from the Wau PoC site as part of a wider redesignation of PoC sites to become IDP camps under the jurisdiction and protection of the government. Assessments conducted in Wau PoC between 2015 and 2019 indicated that many people in the camp suffered from persistent experiences of cumulative distress, mourning and grieving of multiple losses, acculturative stress, loneliness, anxiety, loss of self-esteem, strain and fatigue from cognitive overload and perceptions of inability to function completely in current circumstances.
CONFLICT DYNAMICS
Within the context of the Sudanese and then South Sudanese civil wars, conflict in Wau County has come to centre on the balance of power between various communities based in the area. Deteriorations in community relations have tended to overlap with periods of political change or military contestation affecting the area, creating conditions for political disputes to assume an ethnic inflection. In recent decades, conflict has increasingly converged on claims relating to community representation or ownership of Wau town itself.
Despite indications of historical cooperation, contemporary tensions between parts of the Dinka and ‘Fertit’ communities in Wau are partly rooted in the distinctive experiences different communities faced during periods of colonial and post-colonial administration. These also stem from experiences dating to the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972) – which reverberated through Wau in the mid-1960s (Rone 1999) – alongside perceptions of unfavourable representation and employment prospects after the first civil war had ended. These tensions occurred in a context where ethnic politics had become more embedded in Southern Sudan, and would be exacerbated by administrative redivision during the inter-war years (Blocq 2014, pp.713-14; Thomas 2010, pp.106-7, 111, 115). Divisions were then further sharpened by co-occurring political polarisation and ethnicised violence during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), as is discussed further below.
Tensions have been exacerbated by the perceived affiliation of parts of the communities that have links to Wau with government and opposition forces active in the area during the various civil wars. Meanwhile, conflict and famine have also played important roles in driving patterns of displacement to and from Wau town. Population movements have at points altered the ethnic composition of the town, and contributed to fears of marginalisation on the parts of some communities (Rone 1999). Moreover, actual or proposed changes to political boundaries or the location of administrative headquarters have become flashpoint issues. In recent years, administrative changes have tended to be perceived to favour particular communities at the expense of others, reviving dormant tensions that have sometimes re-escalated into conflict (Thomas 2010, pp.105-7).
Conflict and peacemaking in Wau during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005)
During the second civil war, Wau served as a government garrison and a hub for pro-government militia forces, while also fulfilling an important function as a staging ground for military offensives into SPLM/A-held areas (HRW 1993). Due to the political and economic significance of the town and the concentration of military, opposition, and militia forces in the county, predation and attacks by armed groups in the Wau area were common during the conflict, and resulted in significant displacement (Koop 2001, p.31).
In the mid-1980s, SPLM/A activity around Wau – alongside attacks on ‘Fertit’ villages – prompted the formation of a ‘Fertit’ militia known as Jesh al-Salam (Africa Watch 1990, pp.100-101; Amnesty International 1989, p.6; Blocq 2014, p.716), that is sometimes referred to as Qwat Salam (Vuylsteke 2018, fn.22). Tensions and attacks were reported in and around Wau between parts of the Dinka and Luo communities (who were perceived to support the SPLM/A) and the ‘Fertit’ community (largely perceived as supporting the Sudan Armed Forces, SAF), escalating into a series of attacks across July and September 1987 that reportedly killed over 1,000 people.
During this period, alleged killings of Dinka and Luo civilians by ‘Fertit’ militia and SAF personnel alongside alleged killings of ‘Fertit’ civilians by other branches of the security services (including the predominantly Dinka police and wildlife forces) culminated in fighting in Wau town in September 1987 (Africa Watch 1990, pp.67-69, 157-58; Amnesty International 1989, p.6, 13, 26). In 1988, a local peace agreement was brokered, which included an amnesty for previous attacks, and steps to address perceived imbalances in the allocation of administrative positions (Blocq 2014, p.717).
Despite the agreement, periodic violence involving the SPLM/A, SAF, and affiliated militias continued over the following years (Amnesty International 1989, p.14, 26, 31), though the SPLM/A reportedly made inroads in building a support base among parts of the ‘Fertit’ community after 1991 (Vuylsteke 2018, p.6). Wau was besieged by the SPLM/A for much of the period between the mid-1980s and early 1998, when an unsuccessful SPLM/A operation to capture Wau and retaliatory attacks by the government and associated militia contributed to the displacement of many civilians (especially Dinka) and a significant change to the ethnic composition of the town (Rone 1999). Intermittent clashes between government and opposition forces would continue over the following years around Wau.
Wau during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and early independence years (2005-2011).
Following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a peace and reconciliation conference was held in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State to begin addressing outstanding tensions between the communities of the state, and legacies relating to the concentration of military and militia forces in and around Wau. In addition to encouraging forgiveness and a more optimistic vision for inter-ethnic co-operation in Wau, the conference sought to repair the economic damage wrought by the isolation of Wau town from its surroundings, and encourage the return of IDPs from Wau who had been displaced to Western Equatoria State (PACT Sudan 2006, p.182). Despite the conference being regarded as successful, the Small Arms Survey reported that some parts of the ‘Fertit’ community had concerns regarding their perceived lack of representation at the conference relative to some other communities (Vuylsteke 2018, p.6). Although tensions may have persisted, these did not deteriorate into violence during the CPA era, with Wau County being among the more stable areas of the country prior to independence in 2011.
In 2012, tensions would quickly escalate in Wau, drawing in various branches of the security sector. Following consultations in 2011, the governor of Western Bahr el-Ghazal decreed that the headquarters of Wau County would be relocated from Wau town to the village of Baggari in October 2012. Although the move was justified by the governor as being necessary to relieve the pressure on Wau’s administrative infrastructure (with the town serving as both the county headquarters and state capital) – while bringing development to the rural area of Baggari – the decision polarised relations between communities in Wau, and resulted in demonstrations and subsequent violence over the course of December 2012.
Amid reported politicisation of the issue, elements of the ‘Fertit’ community interpreted the move as a means of weakening ‘Fertit’ claims to Wau town relative to the Dinka community, through severing the connection between the ‘Fertit’ and Wau town (Amnesty International 2013, p.11; Jok 2012, pp.2-3; Vuylsteke 2018, pp.6-7). Protests against the relocation of the county headquarters took place in December 2012, with youth and politicians from the ‘Fertit’ community associated with the demonstrations (HRW 2013). As is detailed in a report by Amnesty International (2013, pp.6-13), demonstrations escalated following a number of interventions by security forces that resulted in several protesters being killed. Tensions further increased after reports emerged that several Dinka farm workers were allegedly killed at Farajallah village near Wau, resulting in reprisal attacks against members of the ‘Fertit’ community in Wau, and the torching of a significant number of dwellings. Following the violence, a number of arrests were made, with Human Rights Watch reporting that those arrested were largely from the ‘Fertit’ community (HRW 2013).
National conflict and R-ARCSS (2013-present)
Following the outbreak of the national conflict in December 2013, tensions gradually increased in Wau, with conflict occurring over several stages, and taking different forms. In particularly, localised conflicts relating to cattle became enmeshed in a brewing subnational conflict involving government and opposition forces, as increasingly sensitive issues relating to claims regarding ownership of Wau town were revived.
In April 2014, active conflict broke out between Nuer and Dinka soldiers and recruits at the SPLA training centre at Mapel in Jur River County in disputed circumstances, generating displacement to the Wau Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in the town (Small Arms Survey 2014). This was followed by a heightened security presence in Wau that resulted in a number of prominent ‘Fertit’ elites fleeing the town, including individuals linked to the ‘Fertit’ militia from the second civil war (Vuylsteke 2018, p.7). In 2015, the movement of mostly Dinka pastoralists into southern areas of Wau County contributed to violence between some pastoralist and agriculturalist communities (Vuylsteke 2018, p.8; Small Arms Survey 2023). Armed groups – some under the banner of the ‘Fertit Lions’ – aligned with the SPLA-IO, and recruited from some communities who had been affected by the clashes with pastoralists (Vuylsteke 2018, p.8).
In May 2015, clashes were reported between SPLA-IO and SPLA forces in the Bazia area south of Wau. Clashes reportedly continued following the signing of the 2015 peace agreement between the government and opposition (Radio Tamazuj 2015). Alongside these events, security forces increased their presence in affected rural areas, and also in Wau town itself. Human Rights Watch (2016) reported attacks by SPLA soldiers in rural areas south of Wau in late 2015 and early 2016, with attacks also reported in Wau town. In February 2016, tensions between parts of the Dinka and ‘Fertit’ communities escalated within Wau town, with the violence drawing in military personnel.
In June 2016, a series of attacks were reported against the ‘Fertit’ community in Wau town, alongside widespread looting. These attacks resulted in mass displacement to the PoC site and to church compounds, with others fleeing to SPLA-IO held areas in the south of the county (IOM 2016; HRW 2017; Vuylsteke 2018). This was followed by sporadic conflict between the SPLA-IO and SPLA, and further alleged attacks of civilians (HRW 2017). Defections from the opposition forces in 2017 and the subsequent proliferation of different armed factions operating in Wau County deepened instability.
Fighting between government and opposition forces intensified in mid- and late 2018, before and after the signing of the 2018 R-ARCSS, and was concentrated in the Mboro and Baggari areas. This led to the destruction of local markets and occupation of humanitarian infrastructure in the affected areas, and drove displacement to Wau town. Prolonged insecurity in Wau County has also contributed to increasing food insecurity in the area, particularly in the outlying payams. This was exacerbated by the inability of humanitarian organizations to access the impacted areas to conduct assessments and provide assistance.
The Small Arms Survey reports that the various waves of displacement have led to significant changes in the composition of Wau town and surrounding areas (Vuylsteke 2018, p.10). Additionally, land disputes have reportedly increased within Wau town (Saferworld 2021). Conflict in neighbouring Jur River and Raja counties has also impacted Wau County, with Wau often receiving significant number of IDPs from these areas (FSL Cluster 2019; REACH 2018; Saferworld 2019).
The security situation in Wau County stabilized in early 2019. Soldiers began moving into assigned cantonment sites in preparation for the formation of the new government, which contributed to the decrease in clashes. The cantonment process and defection of a prominent SPLA-IO General in February 2020 contributed to limited clashes and movement restrictions around Baggari. Although the new county headquarters at Baggari were inaugurated in 2014 (Eye Radio 2014), ongoing disputes between the government and SPLA-IO mean that Wau town continues to serve as the de facto county headquarters (Eye Radio 2022; Radio Tamazuj 2021; Radio Tamazuj 2023). Recent tensions within the SPLA-IO relating to resources – alongside defections from the SPLA-IO to the government – have also created insecurity in the Baggari area and the surrounding road network (Small Arms Survey 2023, pp.4-5).
Separately, in December 2016 the Marial Bai Agreement was reached between communities from Warrap and Western Bahr el-Ghazal states to reduce tensions and insecurity relating to cattle migration and grazing, with representatives from Wau being involved in some subsequent re-negotiations of the agreement. However, some communities from Wau County reportedly rejected the resolutions from the 2022 forum on the Marial Bai Agreement (Radio Tamazuj 2024). In April 2024, clashes involving pastoralists were reported in Besselia Payam, though accounts of the violence and the affected parties are currently disputed (Radio Tamazuj 2024).
ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS
Payams: Baggari (County Headquarters), Besselia, Kpaile, Wau North, Wau South.
Brief History of Raja County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal State
After going through this summary of the county, you will really understand why Raja County is vital economically, socially and politically among the rest of the counties in the state .
DEMOGRAPHY
2008 NBS Census population: 54,340
2021 NBS PES population estimate: 108,344
2022 UN OCHA population estimate: 59,638
Ethnic groups: Aja, Balanda, Banda, Binga, Buja, Feroghe, Indri, Kara, Kpala Naka, Kpala Hufra, Kresh/Gbaya, Mangayat, Ndogo, Ngulgule, Togoyo, Shat/Thuri, Woro, Yulu (many of these self-identify as ‘Fertit’).
ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS
Raja County (sometimes spelled Raga County) is located in the northwestern corner of South Sudan in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. It borders Wau County to the southeast, Aweil Centre, North and East counties of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State to the east, and a small part of Tambura County in Western Equatoria State to the far south. It also has long international borders with the Central African Republic to the west and Sudan to the north. Raja’s proximity to international borders with Sudan and the Central African Republic has made it a part of regional trade routes, when the security situation permits, for the transportation and trade of goods.
The county falls within the western plains groundnuts, sesame and sorghum livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018). The FAO and WFP (2018) estimate that 45% of households in Raja County engaged in farming, increasing to 55% by 2021. In 2021, gross cereal yields were estimated to be 1.3 tonnes per hectare, increasing to 1.4 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). Fishing is also considered to be a primary livelihood. The most popular crops were groundnut and cassava, followed by sesame (simsim), sorghum, maize and vegetables. Some farmers also cultivate millet and tobacco. Families keep small numbers of goats and poultry for household consumption. Collecting wild honey, shea nuts and thatching grass are also ways through which some residents supplement their income. The county is reportedly mineral rich. The disputed area of Kafia Kingi is well-known for the presence of copper, with groups in the area historically linked to iron working, though hard information regarding other mineral deposits is limited (Thomas 2010, p.12, 23-24). Meanwhile, increasing reports of gold mining in Raja County have emerged since 2023 (Hunter and Opala 2023, p.13; Small Arms Survey 2023, p.6), including in the Boro Medina area (Eye Radio 2023; Radio Tamazuj 2023).
Lack of equipment prevents some from profiting from forestry resources which are available in some parts of the county. During the dry season, residents have access to wild food sources such as mangoes, shea nuts and honey. Displacement due to conflict and violence to neighbouring countries and counties meant that farmers had to abandon their crops for indefinite periods of time, including during key planting and harvesting periods.
Food insecurity has increasingly become an issue in Raja County. The IPC projected the county as being at a crisis (IPC level 3) level of food insecurity in November 2022, with conditions projected to persist at the same level until at least July 2023.
INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES
The county’s headquarters are located in Raja town. Conflict and violence in the county since 2015 led to the increased destruction of property, farmland and basic infrastructure. Raja has very limited road infrastructure compared to the size of the county. However, as a result of British Colonial policy during the 1930s (which sought to create a sedentary and taxable population), much of the population of the county was resettled along the road between Boro Medina, Raja, and Wau towns, creating a distinctive social geography in present-day Raja County (Thomas 2010, p.14). Construction of a 500-km tarmacked road between Wau Town and Central African Republic that will run through Raja County was launched in 2021, though there have been no updates on the progress of construction since this time (Radio Tamazuj 2021). Rural areas of the county remain without cell service or telecoms service from any providers.
Raja County is home to nineteen (19) primary schools and two (2) secondary schools: Comboni Raja Secondary and Raja Secondary, both located in Raja Payam. There are currently no Early Childhood Development centres in the county.***
Raja County was reported to have nineteen (19) health facilities including seventeen (17) functional health facilities, among them eleven (11) PHCUs, five (5) PHCCs and one (1) hospital in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 2.27 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 3.36 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. Raja Hospital was reported to be moderately functional.
According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, over 34,200 people in the county are estimated to have humanitarian needs (a slight increase from 29,000 in 2021), over half of whom are returnees. This is equivalent to just under 50% of the projected population of the county reported in the HNO. Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan in April 2023, 8,529 people fleeing the conflict in Sudan registered in Raja County (256 at Timsah, 749 at Boro Medina, and 895 at Raja town) (UNHCR/IOM 2023).
CONFLICT DYNAMICS
Present-day Raja County was particularly exposed to the effects of slave raiding, displacement, and forcible population resettlement during various waves of colonisation (Sikainga 1989; Thomas 2010). Although relations between the ‘Fertit’** community and neighbouring groups from Darfur during these eras were often unequal, the close cultural and economic links between some ‘Fertit’ groups and communities in Darfur have endured, though have also contributed to a perceived sense of isolation among some ‘Fertit’ communities within Western Bahr el-Ghazal State (Schomerus and Allen 2010, pp.32-33).
In recent decades, violence in Raja has tended to escalate when political schisms involving militaries or opposition movements have aggravated divisions between ethnic groups within Raja and some neighbouring areas. Raja is notable for the mixture of various armed factions that have been based in the county (and the disputed Kafia Kingi area, see below), which have at points turned the area into a theatre for several proxy conflicts. These have included militaries, ethnically organised militias, and rebel groups of various nationalities. Reflecting the history of forcible population movements, Raja has also been vulnerable to displacement in recent decades, accelerating processes of urbanisation as displaced persons have been channelled towards the county’s towns or to the state capital of Wau (Thomas 2010).
Raja during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005)
Raja town served as an isolated military garrison during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), and was the subject of periodic SPLM/A guerrilla operations. The presence of armed groups in and around government garrisons resulted in increased civilian exposure to harassment and sexual violence (Koop 2001, p.41), though the alignment between some parts of the ‘Fertit’ community and the government limited raiding in the area from other pro-government militias. A focal point of insecurity was the road between southern Darfur and Wau that ran via Raja, with banditry common, and revenues gained from protecting convoys forming a critical part of the local war economy (Thomas 2010, p.125).
As is discussed in the profile for Wau County, the perceived association of the Dinka and Luo communities with the SPLM/A and much of the ‘Fertit’ community with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) drove ethnic polarisation in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. A number of ‘Fertit’ communities organised a resistance movement in parts of Raja County following reported SPLM/A attacks on villages in the mid-1980s, which would be variously known as Jesh al-Salam or Qwat Salam. However, parts of the Shat/Thuri community were also aligned with the SPLM/A, resulting in some intra-‘Fertit’ violence (Blocq 2014, p.716). As the 1980s progressed, conflict-affected areas of Raja County experienced significant displacement, as SPLM/A operations continued in Raja County. By 1987, many IDPs had congregated in Raja town, which was reportedly affected by growing tensions linked in part to the misappropriation and politicisation of food aid (Africa Watch 1990, pp.121-23; Burr and Collins 1995, pp.77-79).
In 1991, the SPLM/A began to make inroads into the ‘Fertit’ community (Vuylsteke 2018, p.6), though pro-government ‘Fertit’ militia continued to support the military in parts of Raja and provide protection along trade routes (ISS 2004, pp.12-13; Thomas 2010, p.92). The SPLM/A also attempted to transit through Raja in an ill-fated bid to expand their operations to Darfur in the early 1990s (Thomas 2010, pp.80, 122-23).
In May and June 2001, the SPLM/A advanced into Raja and Deim Zubeir towns (Africa Confidential 2001), resulting in renewed mass displacement (IRIN 2002). Some accounts suggest the SPLM/A rationale for seizing these areas was linked to a temporary alliance between the SPLM/A and former National Congress Party ideologue Hassan al-Turabi reached in early 2001, in the wake of the internal power struggle between al-Turabi and President al-Bashir (Johnson 2003, p.108). In this reading, the capture of Raja was intended to serve as a staging ground for al-Turabi to recruit forces that ultimately did not materialise. After several months of fighting, the SAF and allied Jesh al-Salam/Qwat Salam militia were able to recapture these areas, and retained control for the remainder of the war.
Raja during the CPA and early post-independence years (2005-13)
Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, the SPLA did not establish a presence in Raja town until 2007, while the area remained dependent on trade from Sudan (Schomerus and Allen 2010, pp.19, 31). In March 2005, the Wau Peace Initiative sought to address conflict between parts of the Luo and ‘Fertit’ communities, alongside adressing the origins of the Dinka-‘Fertit’ conflict, while promoting reconciliation and a more optimistic vision for inter-ethnic co-operation in Western Bahr el-Ghazal (PACT Sudan 2006, p.182). The security terrain in Raja remained ambiguous during the CPA era, with pro-SAF militia reportedly continuing to be based in the Raja and Kafia Kingi areas, while others were absorbed into the SPLA (Concordis International 2010, p.33; Thomas 2010, pp.126-27).
In the early years of the CPA period, Raja was particularly exposed to the fallout from the ongoing war in Darfur, resulting in conflict between parts of the Binga and Kara groups in 2006, which was brought to a close following a peace conference sponsored by Khartoum (Thomas 2010, pp.136-38). Meanwhile, security incidents were reported between the SPLA and some Rizeigat pastoralists in Raja – including a particularly serious clash in Balbala in the far north in 2010 – alongside occasional localised incidents also reported between some ‘Fertit’ groups and elements of the Mbororo-Fulani community who migrated with their cattle into the county (Concordis International 2010, pp.32-33; Thomas 2010, p.142).
The latter years of the CPA era and the years following independence were characterised by an increasing militarisation of Raja, in part due to the disputed status of Kafia Kingi. The area – which is sometimes known as Hofrat al-Nahas – was subject to a number of administrative boundary changes during the colonial and post-colonial eras (Thomas 2010: ch.6). Some of these changes, notably in 1960 and in the early 1980s, resulted in control of the area being consolidated by authorities in Darfur. The area experienced further depopulation in 1995 following the extension of the Radoum National Park from southern Darfur (Thomas 2010, p.84). However, under the CPA the 1956 boundaries are used as the basis for determining the north-south border, during which time Kafia Kingi was being administered as part of the south. Proposed moves to return the area to the south have been disputed by some groups in Darfur, who note the historical linkages between Darfur and Kafia Kingi.
The disputed status of the area has been leveraged by various parties, including armed groups seeking to minimise the risk of attack, as well as smugglers. At points, attempts by non-state groups to utilise the area has inadvertently increased interest by official security forces in Kafia Kingi. The Small Arms Survey reported the presence of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Darfurian opposition group in the disputed enclave (Small Arms Survey 2011; Craze 2014, pp.70-71), while in 2009 reports emerged of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) activity in western parts of Raja (Sudan Tribune 2009a; Sudan Tribune 2009b). Reports also indicated an the LRA established a presence in Kafia Kingi in around 2010 (Small Arms Survey 2013). The presence of the LRA resulted in the deployment of Ugandan forces to Raja (Thomas 2010, p.56), while reported Ugandan incursions into Kafia Kingi in turn increased the SAF presence in the disputed area (Small Arms Survey 2013). There have been regular reports indicating the presence of parts of the LRA leadership in Kafia Kingi since this time (Allen 2023, p.16; Okiror 2017).
Following independence, the SAF were alleged to have conducted a number of ground and air attacks on SPLA positions in Raja County (Radio Miraya 2011), particularly around Kitkit to the far north (Sudan Tribune 2012; Sudan Tribune 2013). Authorities in Raja County also reported incidents of bombings in 2014 and 2015 (IRNA 2015; Sudan Tribune 2014a), allegedly conducted by the Sudanese government to flush out Sudanese opposition movements based in the area. This contributed to displacement from the northern parts of the county to Raja town.
Impact of the national conflict (2013-2018) and R-ARCSS (2018-present) for Raja County
Raja was affected by the national conflict (2013-2018), particularly during its second half. After a group of soldiers defected to the SPLA-IO following fighting at Mapel in 2014 (discussed further in the profile for Jur River County), some of the defecting soldiers relocated to Raja County, contributing to tensions in the county (Saferworld 2021, p.1). Tensions were exacerbated by the shift from the 10 states system to the 28 states system in late 2015, which resulted in Raja County being merged with neighbouring Aweil North and Aweil West counties to form the new Lol State. This was contested by communities in both Raja and in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal (Vuylsteke 2018, p.9; Sudan Tribune 2015b): within Raja, the move revived memories of tensions between parts of the Dinka and ‘Fertit’ that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (see Thomas 2010, pp.106-11).
By early 2015, SPLA-IO activity was reported in Raja County and on the road between Raja and Wau, with a series of ambushes attributed to a group of allegedly Nuer soldiers who defected to the SPLA-IO (Sudan Tribune 2015a; UNSC 2015, p.5). Amid intermittent insecurity over the following year, conflict markedly escalated in June 2016 when SPLA-IO forces overran Raja town, resulting in the state governor fleeing the town (Radio Tamazuj 2016a; Vuylsteke 2018, p.9). JEM forces – who had been providing security support for the governor – were involved in the recapture of the town (Radio Tamazuj 2016b). JEM forces also supported the government during a subsequent SPLA-IO offensive near Raja town in December 2017 (UNSC 2018a, p.6). By 2018, the area had hosted both members of the SPLA-IO-affiliated ‘Fertit Lions’ as well as SPLA-IO soldiers from Western Equatoria (Vuylsteke 2018, p.10, fn.75). The conflict was also associated with tension between the local authorities and members of the education sector (Sudan Tribune 2014b; Sudan Tribune 2015c).
Although conflict increased in the spring of 2018 (UNSC 2018b, p.5), Raja has not been exposed to same levels of periodic violence that have affected other parts of Western Bahr el-Ghazal since the 2018 R-ARCSS. However, in 2019 clashes were reported between the SSPDF and the South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A) opposition group that was founded by the former army chief of staff, Paul Malong. In August 2019, much of the SSUF/A – who were stationed in Sudan’s West Kordofan and South Darfur states – were pushed out their bases by Sudanese security forces and allied militia (RVI 2019, p.3). The bulk of Malong’s forces were defeated later that month in fighting in Raja County, with many of the SSUF/A soldiers reportedly surrendering, and suffering from the effects of hunger (CTSAMVM 2019, p.15).
Since January 2023, multiple reports have emerged relating to tensions linked to gold mining in the Boro Medina area in western Raja County (Eye Radio 2023; Radio Tamazuj 2023), with the Small Arms Survey (2023, p.6) reporting the alleged involvement of a number of political and security actors in informal mining activity. Raja has also been exposed to the effects of the current war in Sudan, with reported insecurity along the road connecting Raja to South Darfur State (Majok 2024, p.16).
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