Broken Systems, Unbroken Hopes: The Fight for Good Governance in South Sudan

By Daniel Abuoi Jook Alith, Sydney, Australia
Introduction
Wednesday, 11 June 2025 (PW) – When South Sudan gained independence in July 2011, it became the world’s newest nation and the first African state to secede through a democratic referendum. The event was met with jubilation and hope among millions of South Sudanese citizens who longed for peace, freedom, and development after decades of marginalization and civil war under the Sudanese government. However, the high expectations of i2ndependence were quickly overshadowed by political instability, violent conflicts, corruption, and weak institutions. Governance structures collapsed almost as soon as they were established, and the rule of law became tenuous in the face of unchecked political power and militarized violence.
This article examines the state of governance, the rule of law, and institutional capacity in South Sudan. It evaluates the systemic challenges that undermine effective state-building and explores reform prospects that could foster peace, accountability, and democratic governance. The discussion is structured into four main thematic sections: the crisis of governance, erosion of the rule of law, institutional decay and prospects for reform, and recommendations for national and international actors seeking to support South Sudan’s long-term stability.
Crisis of Governance in Post-Independence South Sudan
Governance in South Sudan is characterized by authoritarian tendencies, ethnic favouritism, and a concentration of power in the executive branch. From the outset, state institutions were built on fragile foundations, largely driven by the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which had evolved from a liberation movement into a governing body. The lack of a robust political settlement beyond military victory left little room for inclusive dialogue or democratic institution-building. As a result, political decisions were often made unilaterally by the president, and institutions such as the National Legislative Assembly, the judiciary, and independent commissions remained subservient to the executive.
The first signs of state dysfunction emerged in the immediate post-independence period. Corruption quickly became endemic, with billions of dollars in oil revenues either misappropriated or mismanaged. Public services such as health, education, and infrastructure development were neglected, particularly in rural and conflict-affected areas. Political opposition was suppressed, and civil society actors faced threats and restrictions on their freedom of expression and assembly. Government appointments became tools for rewarding loyalty and ethnic patronage rather than competence or public service.
By December 2013, these governance failures exploded into a full-scale civil war following a political dispute between President Salva Kiir and his then Vice President Riek Machar. The conflict fractured the country along ethnic lines and led to massive displacement, widespread human rights abuses, and economic collapse. While several peace agreements, including the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) and the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), have sought to address these issues, the implementation has been slow and often undermined by political expediency.
The crisis of governance in South Sudan is thus not only a failure of leadership but also of institutional design and legitimacy. Public institutions are viewed as instruments of power and personal gain, not as mechanisms for delivering public goods or ensuring justice. Building a democratic, accountable state requires transforming this governance culture through a sustained process of reform and national reconciliation.
The Erosion of the Rule of Law
The rule of law in South Sudan is severely compromised by systemic impunity, politicization of the judiciary, and weak legal infrastructure. The judiciary, while formally established by the Transitional Constitution of 2011, lacks the independence, resources, and capacity to function effectively. Judges and magistrates are often appointed based on loyalty to the ruling elite, and judicial decisions can be overridden by executive orders or ignored altogether. There is little accountability for violations of the law, especially when committed by security forces or senior officials.
One of the most egregious manifestations of lawlessness is the arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists, activists, and political opponents. Laws governing freedom of speech, access to information, and assembly are either absent or selectively applied. Courts are unable to guarantee due process, and many citizens languish in pre-trial detention without legal representation or timely hearings. In many rural areas, formal courts do not exist at all, leaving customary courts as the only available recourse, despite their inconsistent procedures and potential for gender and age-based discrimination.
Moreover, security forces, including the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and various armed groups, frequently operate outside the legal framework. They have been implicated in extrajudicial killings, forced displacements, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The absence of civilian oversight and military justice mechanisms perpetuates a climate of fear and impunity. The rule of law is further undermined by endemic corruption within law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, making justice inaccessible to most of the population.
Re-establishing the rule of law in South Sudan will require not only legal reform but also political will to uphold judicial independence and accountability. It also necessitates a nationwide campaign to rebuild public trust in the legal system and provide access to justice for all citizens, including women, children, and marginalized communities.
Institutional Decay and the Urgent Need for Reform
The failure of governance and law enforcement in South Sudan is inextricably linked to institutional decay. State institutions such as the civil service, revenue authorities, public oversight bodies, and service delivery departments have been hollowed out by decades of conflict, patronage politics, and chronic capacity deficits. Most public institutions operate without adequate legal frameworks, operational guidelines, or human and financial resources. Civil servants are often underpaid or unpaid for months at a time, leading to low morale and poor service delivery.
Institutional reforms are urgently needed to build a state that can perform its basic functions. A starting point is the reform of the civil service. Recruitment, promotion, and deployment of public servants must be based on merit, qualifications, and performance, not on ethnic or political affiliations. Training and capacity-building programs should be implemented to ensure that public servants have the skills and knowledge required to carry out their duties effectively. Salary structures must be standardized, and financial systems strengthened to ensure timely and transparent payments.
Fiscal and public financial management institutions are also in need of urgent reform. South Sudan is heavily dependent on oil revenues, which account for over 90 percent of government income. However, these revenues are not managed transparently, and there is minimal parliamentary oversight over budget execution. The Ministry of Finance, the National Revenue Authority, and the Central Bank must be empowered to enforce fiscal discipline, curb leakages, and invest in non-oil sectors of the economy such as agriculture, education, and infrastructure. Strengthening the Auditor General’s Office and establishing an independent Anti-Corruption Commission can provide additional accountability mechanisms.
Decentralization is another critical area of reform. Currently, political and economic power is centralized in Juba, leaving state and local governments with minimal autonomy and resources. True federalism, as envisioned in the R-ARCSS, must be pursued to enable local communities to participate in governance and development decisions. This would reduce tensions between the centre and periphery and promote more equitable resource distribution.
Peacebuilding institutions such as the National Dialogue, the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH), and the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) are pivotal for national cohesion. However, these bodies must operate independently, inclusively, and transparently. Political interference in their work risks delegitimizing their findings and alienating victims of conflict.
The Role of Regional and International Actors
South Sudan’s reform efforts are significantly influenced by regional and international stakeholders. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a key mediating role in peace negotiations, while the African Union and United Nations have provided peacekeeping support, technical assistance, and humanitarian relief. Donor countries such as the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom have supported state-building projects, civil society initiatives, and infrastructure development.
However, international support must go beyond technical interventions. It should prioritize accountability, empower grassroots voices, and ensure that aid does not entrench elite capture or dependency. External actors must coordinate their efforts and support South Sudanese ownership of the reform agenda. The international community must also insist on the full and timely implementation of peace agreements, including the formation of transitional justice institutions, constitutional review, and credible elections.
Sanctions, travel bans, and asset freezes can be used judiciously to hold spoilers accountable. At the same time, constructive engagement and capacity-building should target reform-minded individuals and institutions to create pockets of excellence that can inspire broader change.
Conclusion: A Vision for the Future
The crisis facing South Sudan is not insurmountable, but it demands a collective commitment to good governance, the rule of law, and institutional transformation. This process will not be easy or quick. It requires national leadership with the courage to transcend ethnic and political divisions, prioritize the public interest, and build a state that serves all its citizens. It also requires the active participation of civil society, traditional leaders, women, youth, and the diaspora in shaping the country’s future.
South Sudan stands at a crossroads. It can continue along the path of conflict, repression, and state failure, or it can choose a new direction marked by accountability, justice, and inclusive development. The time to act is now. The hope of independence must be rekindled through tangible reforms that restore the dignity, rights, and aspirations of the South Sudanese people.
Table 1: Institutional Capacity Indicators in Key Government Sectors
Institution | Functional Status | Staffing Level | Major Challenges |
Judiciary | Partially Functional | Severely Understaffed | Lack of training, executive interference |
National Revenue Authority | Emerging | Moderate | Weak collection mechanisms, corruption |
Public Service Commission | Minimal Operations | Low | Political interference, limited autonomy |
Ministry of Finance | Core Functions Present | Inconsistent | Budget irregularities, opaque procurement |
Anti-Corruption Commission | Dormant | Very Low | Political co-option, no prosecutorial powers |
The public service lacks a merit-based recruitment system. Salaries are irregular, contributing to absenteeism and low productivity. Training programs are minimal, and there is little incentive for career development. Most ministries are staffed with SPLM loyalists or military appointees, reinforcing political rather than professional accountability.
Figure 1: Governance Indicators for South Sudan (2015–2023)
(World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators)
Year Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Control of Corruption
2015 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1
2017 -2.0 -2.1 -2.0
2019 -2.1 -2.2 -2.2
2021 -2.3 -2.2 -2.3
2023 -2.2 -2.3 -2.4
Note: Scores range from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best)
These declining indicators illustrate persistent deterioration in governance quality and rising corruption.
Reference List
African Union. (2014). Final report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan. Addis Ababa: African Union.
Government of South Sudan. (2011). Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. Juba.
International Crisis Group. (2019). Salvaging South Sudan’s Fragile Peace Deal. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org
Institute for Security Studies. (2020). South Sudan’s Elusive Peace: Shaping a Model for Reform. Pretoria.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan. (2021). Human Rights Reports 2020–2021. Retrieved from https://www.unmiss.unmissions.org
World Bank. (2023). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from https://databank.worldbank.o
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