A Critical Analysis of the Legal Procedure for Removing a Member of Parliament in South Sudan: Lessons from the Twic East Community Association (TECA) in South Sudan
By Dr. Deng Duot Bior-Barr (PhD), Brisbane, Australia
Wednesday, 14 January 2026 (PW) — The effort to remove Hon. Deng Dau Deng Malek Ayii (DDDMA) from the Reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Assembly, based on claims known to the leadership of the Twi East Community Association and the resulting withdrawal of confidence, does not follow the law and is unconstitutional. According to the documents presented by Solicitor Makwei Mabior Deng Garang-Atungdiak and Criminal Justice Investigator Deng Duot Deng D’Ajur, the Joint Statement reveals the underlying tensions within the Twi East community, both in Juba and globally.
The fundamental genesis of this tension originates within TECA in Juba and worldwide, stemming from a lack of a procedural approach. This absence contradicts South Sudan’s constitutional order and highlights the uneasy coexistence of constitutional legality, party politics, customary authority, and community-based democratic practices. Although the Twic Dinka community, primarily comprising members of TECA and a large general assembly, adhered to the law and Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan as permitted under Article 26, the legal procedure for removing elected members of Parliament was not followed correctly.
Although the right to participate in political issues, such as voting, was exercised as permitted by the Constitution, some individuals would argue that such an exemption is a basis for the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ involvement and experiences of constitutional rights. However, the more pressing issue is not whether citizens are unable to exercise their rights, but rather that withdrawing confidence from their local MP falls outside the established procedures.
Even if they can exercise rights as permitted by the Constitution, their complexity not only highlights significant legal ambiguities and procedural weaknesses in South Sudan’s organization but also raises questions about the framework for removing elected legislators recognized by the community in Sudan. This emphasizes that there must be reform due to the absence of procedures, the detrimental impact of poor leadership, and inadequate legal advice within TECA leadership and across South Sudan as a whole.
This rigorously evaluates the alignment of the described process with the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS), 2011 (as amended), parliamentary law and practice, and the overarching broader principles of the rule of law.
Constitutional Framework for Removal of MPs in South Sudan
The National Legislative Assembly derives its mandate from elections conducted under national electoral law and political party nominations, as outlined in the legal and political case overview of the Ruto v. Gachagua impeachment. Similarly, an approach would have been used if the Twi East MP DDDM were to be impeached, particularly in the SPLM-dominated transitional arrangements.
The Constitution does not recognize community impeachment, customary withdrawals of confidence, and civil society resolutions as legally binding mechanisms for vacating a parliamentary seat. The key provisions and articles that concern and define the members of Parliament (MPs) are in Article 56, which establishes the National Legislative Assembly (NLA). Article 57 outlines the mandates and functions of the assembly, including the role of its members. Article 61 outlines the eligibility criteria for a candidate to become a member of the National Legislative Assembly, which include being a South Sudanese citizen, being at least twenty-one years old, having a sound mind, and being literate.
Article 62: Lists the conditions under which an MP loses their membership (e.g., mental infirmity, conviction of an offense, change of political affiliation, or death). Article 82 discusses the power of the National Legislative Assembly or its committees to summon public officials (except the President) to testify or provide information.
Occasionally, a constitutional removal of an MP may occur only through loss of qualification (e.g., citizenship, age, or mental capacity) or when an area MP resigns, is recalled, or is expelled by the nominating political party, subject to party and parliamentarians; rises, is guilty and convicted of offences specified by law; or dissolution of the legislature.
The current Constitution never permits a CBO to cast a vote of no confidence or enact the impeachment protocol against an MP. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the current Constitution does not provide for the direct recall of MPs by their constituents, unlike some jurisdictions that permit voter-initiated recall mechanisms. This situation indicates that there is a structural omission, which is essential for understanding the legal fragility and the potential constitutional failure of the TECA impeachment process.
TECA is a community-based organization. Impeachment vs. Constitutional Legality
Even if the TECA approach was a consensus, as presented in the Joint Statement, it is important to note that this statement outlines a meticulously documented community process that was properly convened at the Twic Global Conference under the leadership of the late General Bior Ajang Duot Bior-Kweigak. The conference resulted in a strong slogan: Aci Twi luel. The approach was based on heredity and leadership acquired from his years of military service. During his service, Bior Ajang observed his boss generously, and after time out of service, he reflected on his own leadership experiences, including sitting alone and reflecting on his leadership under a tree at the house in Hia Amarat.
Late Bior Ajang drew on these experiences during his tenure and when planning the conference. He considered several key issues, including the participation of customary authorities, clergy, political leaders, and representatives from the diaspora, which led to his old-time slogan, “Aci Twi lueel.” This approach was based on years of experience and a cumulative, practical leadership approach learned from Dr. John Garang Mabior, his long-time leader.
His successor lacks these leadership skills. Recent fiascos provide justification and evidence. The recent vote of confidence highlighted the leadership vacuum and the lack of understanding of constitutional officeholders, resulting in an overwhelming decision to withdraw confidence in the MP.
Even though the documentation was signed by TECA leadership and the Paramount Chief, the procedure for calling a vote of confidence for the area MP is unprocedural due to poor leadership and a lack of consensus among the chiefs. Community-based organizations and political officeholders, as well as the legal advice they receive, demonstrate a lack of understanding of the Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. Consequently, the renowned lawyer Deng Akech-Ayang Ajak, the TECA legal advisor, should resign for misleading the community and for failing to speak up.
In fact, the approach taken by TECA can be viewed from both sociological and political legitimacy perspectives, although this process is robust and reflects popular sovereignty as understood within the Twice Dinka political culture. Despite aligning with democratic principles of accountability and representation, the process encounters significant challenges and viewpoints. However, from a strict constitutional law perspective, the process suffers from a fatal defect because it lacks extrajudicial reasoning, something that our renowned lawyer, Deng Akech-Ayang Ajak, could have better understood from the outset.
Again, no matter how inclusive, transparent, or representative the Assembly may have been, the resolution for withdrawal or a call for a vote of no confidence requires a parliamentary procedure. A CBO can never remove an MP from the RTNLA. If individuals wish to take a risk, the process should ideally resemble a political petition or a form of moral or political censure.
Parliamentary procedural approach has been used, and they do exist, as shown in Ruto vs. Gachagua, as a basis for party or presidential action, but not as a self-executing legal instrument. Another appeal could be what is well argued in paragraph 11 of the Joint Statement, by requesting the President to appoint a replacement. This approach would be inappropriate for the President because it would set a negative precedent. The President should implicitly acknowledge this constitutional reality, underscoring the discretionary rather than mandatory nature of executive action in such circumstances.
Role of Customary Authority: Legitimacy Without Jurisdiction
Our customary authority plays a clear role unless it receives misinformation. Many youths have questioned the controversy surrounding the Paramount Chief’s signature. The Joint Statement, which convincingly argues that the signature was not forged, has put such inquiries to rest. However, one of the more profound legal issues remains unanswered by Solicitor Makwei Mabior Deng Garang-Atungdiak and Criminal Justice Investigator Deng Duot Deng D’Ajur, which I may attempt to address here. Even if the signature is valid, what is its legal effect?
The essence of this question is whether the customary authorities in South Sudan possess social and moral authority. They play a significant role in local governance, particularly in areas such as dispute resolution, marriage, and land issues, due to their influence, wisdom, and knowledge. Nevertheless, they do not have constitutional jurisdiction over parliamentary tenure based on the social contract theory of government. Thus, the signature becomes invalid and irrelevant.
The issue of our traditional chief’s signature becoming invalid and irrelevant is because, according to social contract theory, society or individuals’ consent, either explicitly or tacitly, surrenders some freedoms to an authority (such as a government) in exchange for the protection of their remaining rights and the maintenance of social order. This originates from a hypothetical “state of nature” in which life is potentially chaotic and unpredictable.
The essence of social contract theory has been developed and argued by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argued that government legitimacy stems from rational consent and serves individual self-interest by preventing conflict and defining mutual rights and duties between citizens and rulers.
This context invalidates and renders the signature issue irrelevant to the contract. On the other hand, the application of the Social Contract theory is paramount. Therefore, I would advise my brother that relying on the Paramount Chief’s countersignature symbolically connects rural and urban constituencies (Koch Baai and Koch Rook) and should take precedence over the constitutional aspect. Their stand, though they face customary issues, still legally adds no enforceable weight to the impeachment of the area MP, regardless of the document signed.
Continuing to rely on their signature, as well as the TECA approach, would be a significant blunder. We should learn from this blunder because it has revealed a broader structural problem. This error may weaken the customary authority by allowing them to perform functions that are of constitutional order, of which they do not understand or have no clear role. Furthermore, continuing with such an approach would be a major mischief to the field. This approach will expose our chiefs to politicization and reputational risk, ultimately undermining the foundation of traditional Twi East leadership.
Due Process and the Rights of the MP
Once again, a renowned lawyer like my friend Deng Akech-Ayang Ajak thrives in court based on due process. He understands the rights of individuals, including those outlined in the MP and the Constitution, as well as the procedures. I don’t doubt his legal practice, but the way he advised the TECA. As far as I know, it is unthinkable for Deng Akech-Ayang Ajak to act in this manner. So, for the sake of our community and his students at the University of Juba School of Law, he should do this.
It is within this context that I argue that the procedure taken for calling for a vote of no confidence for the area MP DDDDM suffers seriously from a lack of legal procedure. The approach taken has several weaknesses. Essentially, my disagreement with Deng Akech-Ayang Ajak, the legal advisor, stems from the strategic approach. I am willing to acknowledge any disagreement with my stand or analytical approach, and I stand to be corrected from an academic standpoint.
The weakness in the TECA impeachment approach, also known as a vote of no confidence, is that it lacks established procedures. The approach to withdrawing the vote of no confidence against the area MP has not sufficiently relied on due process safeguards, as indicated by the Joint Statement. The attempts at mediation were disregarded, and the MP refused to sign a reconciliation communiqué, but these issues are vague.
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the MP was given a formal right to be heard before the impeachment vote and clear charges were framed in legal terms. Evidentiary standards were established, and an impartial body was appointed to adjudicate the allegations. These procedures must only be performed by the parliamentarian, not by the CBO member, as TECA is a CBO.
It would be difficult to disagree with the views of Solicitor Makwei Mabior Deng Garang-Atungdiak and Deng Duot Deng D’Ajur. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that the rule of law governs constitutional systems. Therefore, the removal of an elected representative—even politically—must respect the minimum standards of procedural fairness outlined in the Constitution.
Again, from this perspective, Deng Akech-Ayang Ajak failed to exercise due diligence or apply his legal knowledge properly, possibly due to the heat in Juba. I may be wrong. If I am right, then the absence of a codified recall or impeachment mechanism at the community level means that such safeguards are structurally underdeveloped, leaving the process vulnerable to claims of arbitrariness, even if it may appear politically justified at first glance.
The Politicization of Administrative Power: RRC and Retaliation
The politicization of the relief and rehabilitation commission in the aftermath of the impeachment effort further illustrates the institutional fragility of these issues. Hon. Deng Dau Deng Malek has made a political move that profoundly impacts the Late Bior Ajang Leadership orphanage. This one should not be ignored because someone may say, “loong, loong bul e Gak awiit.”
From a legal standpoint, the revocation of TECA-Juba’s registration by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) does not have legal bases. The RRC’s impartiality is in doubt if the affected MP allegedly coordinated with it.
The RRC should avoid becoming involved in these fiascos because if a case related to this issue is brought to court, it is likely to be ruled illegal. The RRC approach would eventually suffer from inadequate administrative discretion, abuse of power, and retaliatory governance. As well as the misuse of regulatory bodies to settle political disputes.
In addition, and from a moral standpoint, this response, although it is distinct from the MP’s removal, illustrates how poor leadership and a lack of procedural clarity regarding parliamentary accountability can escalate into broader institutional conflict. It also shows how a lack of procedure can lead to or undermine civil society and freedom of association.
Structural Lessons and Reform Imperatives
These fiascos offer numerous structural lessons. Reform is imperative and must occur sooner or later. It is worth it; eventually, these fiascos offer several structural lessons. The local political dispute has escalated to a serious level. TECA is now more politically influenced than the CBO, and while the RRC’s suspension of it may be justified, TECA could still fail if the necessary procedures are not followed. e.
The right procedure, such as a warning, was omitted. Even though TECA has become more involved in political issues due to a lack of competent governance, symptomatic failures, and deeper constitutional design flaws in the law, the procedure still needs to be followed. Still, the procedure must be followed.
Again, I must acknowledge that this dispute is more political in nature than any issue that the CBOs want to fight. As such, TECA must resolve these issues peacefully or wait for an election to vote him out as suggested by Aristotle. “If the government is not doing the will of the people, then they can vote them out.” TECA should wait for the election. Otherwise, DDDM is going nowhere.
Additionally, this dispute is not only politically motivated, but it has also highlighted the gap between popular accountability, formal representation, and how reform is imperative. It has, furthermore, revealed the need for imperative reform, the absence of a constituent recall mechanism, overreliance on executive discretion to resolve representative disputes, and dangerous politicisation of customary authority.
Consequently, this dispute should not be viewed as a dispute between TECA vs. DDDM, but rather as a matter of imperative reform by identifying what needs to be done for the benefit of South Sudan as a whole. From CBOs to the legal reform framework or approach. Additionally, this dispute should not be viewed solely in terms of TECA; instead, it should be considered a basis for introducing a clearly defined recall procedure for MPs with established thresholds, timelines, and judicial oversight.
It has provided a clear lesson and opportunity to clarify the role of community and civil society resolutions as advisory or triggering mechanisms, rather than substitutes for constitutional processes. It has also illustrated the need for having the reforms of regulatory bodies, such as the RRC, to limit themselves from being involved in partisan influence and to protect customary authorities from being drawn into legally indeterminate political battles.
Conclusion
According to the TECA allegation and meeting, as provided by Solicitor Makwei Mabior Deng Garang-Atungdiak and Criminal Justice Investigator Deng Duot Deng D’Ajur, has provided a clear note that TECA may have prima facie evidence. However, the compelled allegations must align with the constitutional approach and warrant a call for the withdrawal of confidence in the area MP.
It should also be noted that the procedure adopted by the TECA to remove the Hon. Deng Dau Deng Malek may have prima facie evidence. This has been done by demonstrating a strong democratic intent and moral legitimacy from a community-based leadership, something left by the Late Bior Ajang Duot Bior-Kweigak. Yet, it has suffered significantly due to unconstitutional enforcement and inadequate application of the rule of law.
The essence of process reflects a community’s effort to hold its representatives accountable in the absence of practical legal tools, as outlined in the Bior Ajang Leadership approach, “Aci Twi lueel.” However, under current South Sudanese law, the removal of an MP remains firmly within the purview of political parties, Parliament, and the President, rather than communities or customary authorities.
Until parliamentary elections are conducted, and consequently, until the Constitution is passed to allow MPs to be impeached by CBOS, or unless elections are held, South Sudan’s constitutional order will be contradicted, and laws will need to be reformed to reconcile popular sovereignty with legal certainty. If not, a similar conflict will recur—placing communities, chiefs, civil society leaders, and MPs in legally precarious and politically polarizing confrontations, to the detriment of democratic consolidation and the rule of law in South Sudan.
The way forward is for the community to decide on one of the following three options: First, present the paper to Parliament and follow the parliamentary procedure. Secondly, conduct a public demonstration on the street with a permit from the police and go home afterwards. Thirdly, wait for the election to vote Abe Gum E-lik out rather than taking other actions!
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