On the Oil Deadlock: Juba Plan C
6 min readBy Apee Jobi, Burnsville, MN USA
Many observers have offered interesting commentaries on the Addis Ababa agreement between Juba and Khartoum and on continued talks there. As things stand now, Khartoum seemed very determined to prevent any oil from flowing through its territory. Juba has very little leverage to force Khartoum to allow the oil through its territory. Khartoum seemed to have decided that with the little oil it has access to it can force Juba to make further concessions on SPLM-N, oil transfer fees or else can force the government to fall. Juba has, if any, a fewer options left to export oil and make it economically valuable. None of Juba two plans – Plan A to continue to transfer oil through Old Sudan and Plan B to dig a pipeline through Kenya while continues to use Old Sudan – work. What should Juba do now? Juba has the last card to play to withstand Khartoum determination to corner it.
That Juba plan C is: A) to find out from the company that took the contract for pipeline construction through Kenya how many months/years it takes to build the pipeline; B) Juba needs to use land transportation for immediate financial support; C); calculate the fund available for government spending during these months/years with enough cushions; and D) send its most able senior diplomats to D.C. and explain in frank terms to Washington that Khartoum is not willing to reopen the oil pipeline and even if it re-opens the pipeline it will subject Juba to blackmail, harassments and economic policy uncertainty. Khartoum will have the opportunity to each time decide whenever to blackmail, harass and create an economic uncertainty for Juba by using threats of closing oil pipeline as a stick to seek whatever Khartoum wants from Juba. Such positional weakness Juba desires to keep Khartoum busying with its foes as a way to keep it from destabilizing South Sudan and from expanding political Islam down to the dark Africa. Nairobi does not have such desires like Khartoum to force Juba to its liking other than its desire to participate in the economic opportunity that Juba offers.
To prevent this from ever happening, Juba needs Washington supports to get whatever the difference in loans from international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund or other international lending institutions to fill the budget gap until it is able to start transferring it oil through Kenya. Washington felt was not consulted during the last closure of oil pipeline and therefore it was a part of the group that pressured Juba to agree to the Addis Ababa Agreement. If consulted this time, Washington will stand with Juba to weather the pressures and stand ready to help Juba deal with some of its regular issues during the pipeline construction. This is the only road for Juba to strengthen its hands against Khartoum.
The Juba-Washington Relations
If approached, D.C. is likely to hear Juba’s call. Juba relationship with Washington is not just based on its humanitarian support it provided during the 21-year war but it’s based more mutual interests and strategic interests. Much of the firepower used against South in the initial war of liberation was Washington bullets. At the time Washington was trying to cultivate a relationship with Khartoum in the fight against communism given the fact both sides were against it and to make it’s a buffer zone for its struggle against political Islam that was starting to spillover to the political arena in most of the Middle East states.
However, Washington’s courtship with Khartoum was a short lived. Together they prevented communism from taking hold but, under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, political Islam that Washington was trying to contain took power in Khartoum in the 1989 coup. That political Islam that took power limited secular political space, put Washington on the defensive, created an Islamic police to enforce Islamic laws and declared a “holy” war against the South.
At the same time our movement courtship with the Soviet Union bloc was coming to an end with the breakup of the Eastern bloc and dominos effect on Ethiopia, our core ally in the struggle between liberalism and communism.
Our movement understanding with Washington in 1990s to build our relationship was based on the recognition by Washington and by our movement that we share the same interest in preventing political Islam from dominating the Sudan and spilling over to the wide East Africa.
In the eye of Washington, our role now is the same like the role South Korea, Japan, West Germany, Turkey and Israel played during the Soviet Union era. Washington values our alliance so much because it helps find a strategic military position in the heart of East Africa, a pivot point of, in words of Author Francis Deng and Author Ali Mazrui , the three competing/meeting heritages – African, Islamic and Western. We are fighting with the same militant forces of political Islam Washington is trying to contain to the Middle East.
More importantly, the support South Sudan gets, unlike Israel or other partners, comes from the four sectors of the U.S. Society: religious community, human rights community (this support is evading), security establishment and business community. Israel has lost the support of the human rights community in the 1960s and has not had the business community support, except from some powerful business leaders. It only supports come from the religious community and the security establishment. This does not mean South Sudan gets more support than Israel but it just gets its support from a wide society.
This is not the end of the story. Juba has to think about and manage the other elephant in the room: Beijing. Beijing is the key investor in the current oil pipeline and thus re-routing the oil pipeline through Nairobi’s territory directly affects it bottom line. In other word without some sort of accommodating it interest, Juba will be starving a lion that would work with Khartoum at UN where it has a veto power and at other international institutions that Juba may need their support later. The model of Addis Ababa under the previous administration where government there allowed Beijing to mine natural resources and allowed Washington to use its soldiers in the global war against terrorism in such places like Somali will be more suitable for Juba. That is allowing Beijing to continue participation oil business to deny Khartoum from using Beijing support to do some damages.
Implications
Juba Plan C strengthens its hands against Khartoum. If Juba is able to persuade Washington, which I believe is doable, to lend its support to Juba to negotiation with the international financial institutions, Juba will be in a better position to obtain necessary funds to fill whatever gaps it has for government spending during digging of pipeline through Kenya. When pipeline is done and operational, Khartoum power over Juba will disappear forever. Juba will pay back whatever it gets from the international financial institutions to avoid accumulating debt.
Juba rich in oil and soil will turn the balance of power in its favor against Khartoum in a very short time. Then Juba will be in a stronger position to exploit Khartoum weaknesses such its racial policies toward its non-Arab population as well support the secular forces to take power or at least balance the Islamic forces that have dominated politics in the Sudan for at least the last thirty years. This makes it easy for Juba to support its key allies during the war such Nubia, Southern Blue Nile, and Darfur political forces because it would no longer be constrained by fear that Khartoum may use the oil pipeline card.
You can Apee Jobi through his email address: pochalla@yahoo.com
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