On the 30th Anniversary; Anatomy of SPLM phlegmatic disposition
12 min readBy Atem Agud’yar
Due Introduction;
The third Sudanese armed revolt against internally inflicted oppression was materialized earlier eighties in the form of the Sudan People’ Liberation Army and Movement aimed at the transformation of peoples’ anger into viable political resistance guided and logistically supported by socialism ideas then led into the continent by Mengistu Hilemariam of Ethiopia. Initially the objectives were stated clearly; as to wage a protracted war against Khartoum-based regime of Jaafer Nimeri to fulfill the strategy of change through dragging the whole country to the launching pad and subject the regime’ junta to resolve the issues of; system of governance, development, social justice and above all the dilemmas of identity which entails citizenship as a basis of peoples’ rights.
For better understanding of current development in the country politically, we ought to revisit history to appreciate how the SPLM evolved up to date and subsequently unmasked strategies and tactics used to stimulate current shape of the movement. Historically, prior to the Anyanya there was no unified political entity for the south that can present a kind of cohesion. In contrary people defined themselves with constructed administrative localities – for this matter the regional arrangements – best formed by the colonialists to serve their interests in the country and became internalized into the masses as a new identity. Regionalism; perceived as an identity became a challenge to the Anyanya in its pursuit for people’ rights. It was apparently observed in earlier formations of the movement; there were Anyanya(s) scattered all over the south under different leadership until Gen. Lagu had managed to convince the Israelis to provide support only then a sort of unity was created among the rebels and a great exodus occurred to the newly launched headquarters of the Anyanya at the aim to get armed not because a certain ideology was used. Nevertheless the Anyanya tried to make a difference but failed miserably when trapped by ethnic politics of early eighteens due to an ideological gap within the movement and between it and the people although Gen. Lagu had scored success at the militant angle to unify different factions to fight a common enemy.
For the secret cell of southern officers absorbed into the Sudan army, choices were limited to avert copying the Anyanya trial. And continues deliberations were available mechanisms, during underground moves, to outline most appropriate method for the inevitable armed struggle. So when the movement commenced it took a socialist side for two main reasons; one in pursuit of seeking allies through capitalizing of furious struggle for dominance between the west and the east. In this regard the Sudanese government, immediately after relinquishing its ties with the communist party, had got full support from the American consequently narrowing choices for the movement just to ally with the east. Secondly, the geopolitics of the region where Ethiopia is best situated as a model for the African unity and emancipation, its strategic location and importance to the region politics beside it is profound role in 1972 accord, as southerners perceived.
The SPLM diagnosed the problem of Sudan using socialism instruments modified to historical and contemporary’ diversities approaches, hence laid a solution by proposing sudanisim as an identity to all people inhabits the country and consider indigenous cultures sub-national and social factors any regime is obliged to protect. It is worth mentioning here that; without clear ideological backbone, people wouldn’t have dropped their sub-national affiliations and redirects enough zeal to struggle for the national program of liberation and accepted – willingly – ever sacrifice deems worthy.
To navigate through turmoil regional and international politics the movement had used successfully the fallout from Khartoum manufactured identity of islamo-arabisim, to mobilize or neutralize both regional and international powers and mere success was made on the domestic front. Hence the leadership of the movement had managed to transmit people’ aspiration to an ideology best configured in the form of New Sudan program that encompass an answer to the question; why people have to take arms? And successfully the movement had managed the task of manning marginalized people from and outside traditional war zone.
SPLM Dilemma
Many will agree that ensuing 2005 Naivasha peace deal, there were great shift occurred on how the SPLM were expected to perform, a perception emanated from people’ high expectations due to prolonged agony, a sentiment no one could denied and it is shared by majority of the movement’ cadres. Unfortunately many have shown dissatisfactory attitude toward the party’ performance, it even reached an extent – for some members – to dessert it or remain passive within modest way to protest the country situation apparently characterized by poor living conditions and total avert from the movement agenda.
I do believe that any proper scrutiny on how the movement evolved could lead to the reasons behind what happen. And I believe with no doubt that it is not solely an issue of leadership discourse as Dr. Peter Nyaba had said in his meritorious book; the politics of liberation. Rather SPLM deficiency can be attributed to agglomeration of multifarious happenstances as vindicated forthcoming. This does not rebuke the fact that leadership transformation did affect not only the movement but it spilt over to determine the feature of former Sudan.
Notwithstanding former institute for war studies that gave certificate at the level of diploma for SPLA’ officers but still the greater challenge stands amidst the movement pass to restore its reputation and deliver needed services to the people, is the immense presence of dilettantes cadres at all levels of both the party and the government which jeopardized any initiative of change and block any prospect for better performance. The worst scenario to occur is when disqualification became a merit to attain public offices, only then someone can say a noble dream was murdered in a day light.
I argue in the following that; there are other factors that hindered the movement pass to realize people aspirations beside the leadership discourse, which I gave a space in this document. First is the mobilization strategy constantly used to recruit people to the movement; it’s a policy of ethnic presentation in disregard to due transformation of cadres like what happened in other revolutionaries in the continent like Uganda and Mozambique. Second; the leadership transformation within the movement have had a continues impact on its political choice and strategies. It deeply rooted on personal ability and insight plus political awareness. It is worth mentioning the ideological difference between the late chairman and the current leader and assesses its impact on the running of a revolutionary movement. Thirdly; the change ensued the collapse of the Soviet Union had created a paradigm shift in international politics narrowing opportunities for third countries to seek alliance and consequently falling into the one polar hand; an awkward relation between the oppressed and the oppressor and subjection to single polar gravity. All those western power have inflict immense pressure on the country in pursuit of their interests subsequently leave a narrow avenue to the country to maneuver. Fourthly; the movement is falling hostage to the legacy of the past within itself. Members tend to recall past evidence of malpractices and wrong decision done by some members to determine their political fate. Hence grouping flourish without any political backbone and many parties were created within SPLM !
Accommodation strategies;
Although the movement started with clear objectives ought to be observed by new comers, but it did not happen this way simply because the movement had tried with great default to adjust its self for accommodating individuals and groups for the sake of sustenance rather than incarnating it is ideas into them. For instance ranking system was altered to absorb new coming officers whom happen to be senior to the new leadership in the movement for the sake of encouraging more people to join the struggle and no measures were laid to transform them ideologically and as a result many of them retains backward attitude of regionalism and ethnic politics. Expectedly they used the leadership positions avails to them to transmit those ideas to others within the movement hence dragged it back to the era prior to 1972 that characterized by politicization of ethnicity and ideological vacuum. Moreover some senior officers displayed military indiscipline bearing in their minds existing of loose system which lack punishing mechanisms or due to the system deficiency to vomit wrong elements. Hence their behaviors became a habit characterized the country military establishment that stands harder to relinquish from up to now when the army is undergoing transformation process.
Another aspect of the unsuccessful strategy – or lack of – to accommodate rivals is the emergence of a new idea of ethnic presentation – within the movement – first initiated when it sought reconciliation with other factions in total disregard to the essence of their varied thoughts and ideology on how the straggle would be geared. Secondly when the movement tried to integrate members of Anyanya (2) into its ranks first started with Gordon Kuong group in Yulang who accepted integration with no ideological preservation probably it was not on the both sides’ agenda. So the leadership council was augmented allowing diverted thoughts more power to be used later in 1991 and beyond when Naser faction used southerners’ sentiments toward northern elites to call for independence and subsequently no one can challenge the fact that the leaders of Naser faction would not had power and authority to mobilize southerners had they were not part of the High Command. Therefore nobody can assure – even him/her self – either it was a tactical measure or a strategy but the fact remain that it is detrimental impact still echoing within the SPLM rooms.
The funniest part in this tragedy is that some people within the movement are utters, extirpating responsibility from themselves and others, that accommodation of rivalries was a strategy know exclusively to the late chairman confirming indirectly Jallabas infamous belittling say;”Garang Movement” “Haraket Garang” .
I would say in conclusion; in away to expand the movement in number and substance, the SPLM had to choose between two options either to seek – unconditionally – participation of all communities through integrating whoever claim representing a particular group or put more emphasis on upgrading its performance by transforming members ideologically through building cadres regardless of where they came from as long as they fully committed to the cause which is people’ program. Nevertheless both strategies (accommodation and participation) have not gave fruits and the fact remain that whoever granted accommodation end up rebelled against the system and even it became a new business in the country with people come and go assured with the benefits at both sides.
Leadership traits;
A leader within African pretext is a member of a group who can be describe as brave, wise and able to command his people to achieve clear objective which in contemporary political science is defined as “leadership trait” or “charisma” both characteristics are to enable a leader to lead his subordinates toward achieving a pre-stated objective. A Sudanese columnist – Dhya El-Diin Bilal – wrote a book analyzing the personalities of late Dr. John Garang and current president Kiir, he concluded that they differ in how to handle issues. When the late is so swift in reacting to fallouts made by subordinates, the present leader tends always to delay reaction and give people time to rectify their own mistakes and many events which happened in post-leadership transformative era stood to confirm it a fact. Another trait kept distance between the two is the ideological backup. For the late chairman adaption of socialist tools of analyzing the country situation became an instrument in finding a solution to the conflict hence New Sudan as an ideology emerged out of the process of inferences and analysis. This ideological dimension is merely absent with the new leadership and the fact is that since the transformation there were no new term summarizing the regime’ program to be followed such as previous term of “Peace through development” “taking town to the people” and many other programs initiated with the presence of the late. Built on this assumption many officials have used this leadership deficiency to advance their greedy interests against people’ aspirations once by miss leading current leadership, capitalizing on his deficiency or perpetually act in defiant to whatever rules are in place knowing that they will not be account to whatever malpractices they committed.
External influence;
The major factor that ties the country with the outside world is oil which retain center in contemporary international politics, becoming more determinant in relations among nations due to the fact that industrial countries are in furious race to secure energy supply to fuel their ever-growing production and no doubt they seek to advance their interests in disregard to ours. Hence South Sudan is falling under great pressure from those powers that reached outside their natural boundaries to secure the flow of energy. This scenario is critical, but what complicates it further is the indifferent position of the country in regard to foreign policy, hence the Abyei episode stands firm to demonstrate the influence those foreign countries have on our internal affairs, and on other side expose our weak diplomacy abroad which failed miserably to neutralize any of the great power to our advantage.
The challenge now is previously stated by Dr. John Gai when he cautioned southerners that whenever a settlement reached to the Sudanese civil war in which southerners will have more legitimate authority to role themselves, hosted countries to the southerners refuges will come into the country to exploit its abundant resources as a payback for their “generous” hospitality during war time. Many instances can prove it right when we look critically to the way foreigners are conducting business in the country. They have a believe that a business will flourish in south Sudan if they established strong relation with “ONE” just one general who will stand to defend them and his interest too against his own regime he fought to bring to power.
The past is echoing;
This point is in reference to two existing realities, first; most of the current leadership were part of the Anyanya hence still possess most of it is political philosophy despite ideological differences between the Anyanya and the SPLM. They sees the country within the three fake identities of Bahr El-Gazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile, which mean they are trapped by granting participation a major role against performance eventually introduce weak cadres and subsequently reflects poor performance. Secondly; during liberation time the movement were grouped into many interests segments and many people now are preserving grievances toward each other. Unfortunately most of those groups were ethnically oriented without any political ideology. This fact jeopardized the regime action, for any group is trying with avails avenues to fail the other for the sake of scoring marks. It even reached to the extent that the movement cadres’ doest have either a political or social avenue to share people concerns.
It is ambiguous to differentiate aforementioned groups with the third group in this dilemma whom are the former NCP cadres. After they made their way to the SPLM, people had two ideas in regard to this move, advocates of “participation” were delighted to see their keens joining and some reached to the extent to persuade and beg them to accept positions in total disregard to their legacy of betrayal to the people’ cause thus it culminated into their ascendance to sensitive position in the regime. This is apparent evidence to how African and south Sudanese in particular views the state; it is to them an object to suck and benefit from and ideologies are luxurious acts of intellectuals. The second group “advocates of performance” has stuck at history recalling their dark past now and then in an implicit way of denial to their right in the new establishment.
Culmination;
In this modest trial I tried to shed extra light on the issue – to me – are responsible of current political stagnation the country is undergoing. In stating so we believe on continues dialogue among the movement cadres and it should spill over to reach other political stakeholder not based on individual entity’ interest but for the entire populace of the country whom are suppose to be the direct beneficial. If critically observe, some of the causes can be altered through inevitable force of nature which subject everything to change while other might change with a collective efforts which entail a foreign policy guided by a clear set of interests and threats.
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