Is it Time for the Kigali Model of Economic Development and Social Prosperity?
Ethiopia, Rwanda give the lie to electoral democracy hype
By FREDERICK GOLOOBA-MUTEBI
It is over two decades now since single-party rule ended in Africa and military rule became something of a curiosity, so much so that today when soldiers take over a government no one expects them to hang around for long.
In place of the two, we got competitive multiparty politics. With a few exceptions such as Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta, Ivory Coast under Houphouet Boigny and Malawi under Kamuzu Banda, single-party rule had delivered little by way of prosperity. Military rule fared worse. Social services had collapsed. Infrastructure too. So did whole economies.
Multiparty politics therefore emerged with much promise. It would deliver good government, we were told. The idea was that periodic elections would enable us to remove unaccountable leaders and replace them with new ones who, fearing to suffer a similar fate, would behave better.
Quality of life would improve for all, as only serious people with serious agendas would be elected. There would be more freedom, as elected governments would have no choice but to allow it to thrive.
Party competition would, it was claimed, guarantee peaceful changes of government. That was because new leaders would emerge and incumbents would leave peacefully once people decided they no longer wanted them around.
A sense of expectation descended on Africa. In general terms, the Africa of today is very different from that of the pre-1989 period. The number of elected civilian governments is at an all-time high.
Some of the things we were promised, we have got: Freedom and civil liberties, prosperity, and a modicum of political accountability. This is all to be celebrated. However, there is a dark side to competitive politics, one which we do not talk enough about but which in some countries has undermined progress and bred disillusionment with politics altogether.
Consider the quality of elections and the integrity of the very machineries, known commonly as electoral commissions, that preside over them. One of the most predictable aspects of competitive elections in Africa are claims by losing parties that they have been rigged out. The effect has been to discourage large numbers of would-be voters from going out to vote, leaving otherwise unpopular and often unaccountable governments in power.
Who could have dreamt that democracy would fuel social tensions and conflict, and even trigger political violence? Since the 1990s serious conflict and violence have broken out after elections in Burundi, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Algeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Uganda. The argument here is not that violence is necessarily associated with competitive politics.
However, it does not necessarily rule it out or guarantee peaceful changes of government. Moreover, protracted conflict and violence breed the very elite fragmentation that often undermines national cohesion and the very political stability competition was meant to guarantee.
And competitive politics was supposed to deliver the good life, right? Well, for the most part it hasn’t. First, the potential for elite competition to translate into public services and improved quality of life on a sustainable basis has for the most part been undermined by what the experts call clientelism, the exchange of votes for material or financial handouts.
Leaders who buy their way into power have no incentive to make good on whatever promises they may have made while going through the motions of campaigning for office.
The connection between clientelism and financial corruption cannot be over-emphasised. Where voters are happy to sell their votes for money or material goods, aspiring leaders must find the necessary money. In the circumstances, the fight against financial malfeasance is lost before the votes are even cast.
You’re probably wondering where all this is leading. It leads to the inevitable question: If competitive politics has a dark side to it, so what? What is the alternative, or is there an alternative at all? Well, it seems there is.
Earlier this week I spent two days at an engaging seminar on Ethiopia and Rwanda. The two countries share peculiar characteristics. Besides the consistently high economic growth rates they have registered for well over a decade, the Ethiopian government and its Rwandan counterpart have exemplary records on service delivery and improvement in the quality of life of their citizens.
Both are ruled by political coalitions built on the basis of necessity rather than simple choice, bringing together several potentially antagonistic political organisations.
Working together rather than against each other is seen as the best guarantor of long-term stability and the foundation of much-needed prosperity. For the most part, these coalitions have diminished the scope for adversarial contestation, the kind that fuels the widespread diversion of state resources into funding clientelistic politics in conventional electoral democracies elsewhere on the continent.
Moreover, the elite cohesion arising out of these pacts has created the basis for broad consensus on policy choices, guaranteed the fast implementation of agreed policies, and produced outcomes that explain why the two countries are such high achievers.
Frederick Golooba-Mutebi is a Kampala- and Kigali-based researcher and writer on politics and public affairs. E-mail: fgmutebi@yahoo.com
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