South Sudan’s UN Penal of Experts Report

South Sudan panel of experts report-1 (Download the DPF)

The President of the Security Council presents his compliments to the members of the Council and has the honour to transmit herewith, for their information, a copy of a letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to
resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council, and its enclosures.

This letter and its enclosure will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2016/70.

22 January 2016
His Excellency
Mr. Elbio Rosselli
President of the Security Council
New York

1 POSTAL ADDRESS-ADRESSE POSTALE: UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017
CABLE ADDRESS -ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE: UNATIONS NEWYORK
REFERENCE: S/AC.57/2016/PE/OC.07
22 January 2016

Excellency,

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 18 (d) of resolution 2206 (2015), the final report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on 24 December 2015 and was considered by the Committee
on 14 January 2016.
The Panel would appreciate if this letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the
members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.
Payton Knopf
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on South Sudan established
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)
Andrews Atta-Asamoah Klem Ryan
Ann Oosterlinck Lucas van de Vondervoort
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
1
Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan
established pursuant to Security Council resolution
2206 (2015)
Summary
The civil war in South Sudan, which began as a political conflict between
elites, has evolved over the past two years in to a tribal war, reigniting historic
grievances and encouraging military opportunism and revenge. The war is now
perceived by many South Sudanese as a zero -sum struggle where the exclusion of
competing tribes from political power and the monopolization of resources for
personal gain have become the principal aims of the belligerents.
The President, Salva Kiir, and a narrow circle of senior individuals in the
military and security services, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, and the Director General of the National
Security Service’s Internal Security Bureau, Akol Koor, are waging an aggressive
war involving the targeting of civilians and extensive destruction of communities.
Meanwhile, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in
Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition), Riek Machar, continues to seek funding and
weapons to prosecute the war and to further his personal political ambitions at the
expense of peace.
The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan, which the Government and the SPLM/A in Opposition signed in August
2015, has failed to result in a meaningful reduction of violence. As at the time of
submission of the present report, in mid -December 2015, both parties were
consistently violating the “permanent ceasefire” set out in the peace agreement, with
particularly high levels of violence in Unity and Western Equatoria States. Civilians
continue to be targeted because of their tribal affiliation. Prog ress towards the
establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity envisaged in the
agreement has been minimal.
The relentless war has caused an ever-worsening humanitarian catastrophe.More than 2.3 million people have been displaced since December 2013, and the
most recent available data indicate that 3.9 million people are facing severe food
insecurity, an increase of 80 per cent over a 12 -month period. Obstruction of
humanitarian access is also widespread, with parts of Unity, Upper Nile and Western
Equatoria States, among others, entirely blocked to humanitarian relief.
The humanitarian situation in Unity State in particular reflects the devastating
results of the Government’s systematic attacks against its own citizens in order to
deny the opposition a support base, resulting in egregious human rights abuses,
including forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and conflict -related sexual
violence, massive population displacements, the destruction of livelihoods and food
crops and the raiding of cattle.
The security and humanitarian situation in the greater Equatoria region, in
particular Western Equatoria State, has also deteriorated significantly following
initial clashes in May and June 2015; tens of thousands have been displaced as a
result of the violence.
2
In Upper Nile State, the period between April and July 2015 was marked by a
surge in fighting. While the SPLA regained control of the state capital in July, the
current period of lower-scale fighting is tenuous, and grievanc es between
communities or tensions inside the SPLA could lead to a return to large-scale conflict
at any time.
The National Security Service and SPLA Military Intelligence have been
involved in the arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals suspected of supporting
the opposition. Initially, most of those arrested or detained were Nuer. In recent
months, however, Equatorians have increasingly become targets as political
opposition against the Government has grown in the greater Equatoria region.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) personnel are regularly
attacked, harassed, detained, intimidated and threatened. Since the adoption of
resolution 2206 (2015) on 3 March, the Government has committed at least
450 violations of the status-of-forces agreement, including assaults against United
Nations personnel and restrictions on the movement of peacekeeping patrols and
other UNMISS operations. The opposition and other anti -government groups have
committed several dozen more similar acts. As at the time of writing,
43 humanitarian workers had been killed since the war began, in December 2013.
Both sides have continued to acquire arms and military equipment, even after
the signing of the peace agreement in August and in the face of considerable
economic stress. The Government has at least three operational Mi -24 helicopters,
procured in 2014 at a total cost of nearly $43 million; they have been vital in
providing an important advantage in military operations, have facilitated the
expansion of the war and have emboldened those in the Government who are seeking
a military solution to the conflict at the expense of the peace process. As at mid –
September 2015, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs was requesting final
payment from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning for four additional
attack helicopters at a total cost in excess of $35 million and was actively pressing
the Ministry for the payment of at least two, and likely three, other contracts for
other military materiel and related equipment, totalling some $50 million.
Through the Office of the Chair, the SPLM/A in Opposition has also
continuously sought to procure and obtain arms from numerous sources, albeit with
comparatively limited success. The Panel has, however, confirmed that the SPLM/A
in Opposition has received ammunition and, to a lesser extent, arms, as well as other
items such as uniforms, from the Sudan.
To provide clear and convincing evidence relevant to the designation of
individuals engaged in actions or polici es threatening the peace, security and
stability of South Sudan, consistent with resolution 2206 (2015), the Panel has
provided a summary of its investigations into the command responsibility within the
belligerent parties to the war, details of the action s and policies resulting from
command decisions and a description of the linkage to the criteria for sanctions
designation established in the resolution.
The Panel has determined, on the basis of a preponderance of evidence, that
both President Kiir and Riek Machar maintain command responsibility for their
respective forces and that, since both the outbreak of the war, in December 2013, and
the subsequent adoption of resolution 2206 (2015), both sides have consistently
engaged in actions and policies meet ing all eight criteria described in the resolution
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as grounds for the imposition of targeted sanctions. The Panel has further
determined, on the basis of multiple, independent sources with first -hand knowledge,
that there is clear and convincing evidence t hat most of the acts of violence
committed during the war, including the targeting of civilians and violations of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, have been
directed by or undertaken with the knowledge of senior individual s at the highest
levels of the Government and within the opposition.
4
Contents
Page
I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Mandate and appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II. Evolution of the conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A. Tribal fissures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B. Narrowing freedoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C. Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan . . . . . . . . . 11
D. Economic crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
III. Propagation and conduct of the war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Definition of command responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Command responsibility of government forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C. Command responsibility of the SPLM/A in Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
D. Unity State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
E. Upper Nile State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
F. Western and Central Equatoria States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
IV. Procurement of arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A. Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B. Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
V. Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
VI. Threats to an inclusive and sustainable peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A. Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B. Implementation of the peace agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
VII. Violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B. Use and recruitment of children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
C. Conflict-related sexual violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
D. Arbitrary arrest and detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
VIII. Obstruction of and attacks against humanitarian and peacekeeping missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian workers . . . . . 45
B. Attacks on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
IX. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
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X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Annexes
I. Table of correspondences sent and received by the Panel from 18 May to 14 December 2015 50
II. Destruction of Shilluk areas of Upper Nile State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
III. Comparison of Ilyushin-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
IV. Letters of credit scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
V. Cattle as war currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
VI. Major General Johnson Olony and Child Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
VII. Response from the SPLM/A in Opposition to the 10 December 2015 Letter of the Panel . . . . 64
65
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I. Background
A. Mandate and appointment
1. By its resolution 2206 (2015), the Sec urity Council imposed a sanctions
regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan
and established a sanctions committee (Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan) . The Committee
designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015.
2. In establishing the sanctions regime, the Security Council decided that the
sanctions measures, consisting of a travel ban and an asset freeze, would apply to
individuals and/or entities designated by the Committee as responsible for or
complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies
threatening the peace, security or stability of South Sudan.
3. The Security Council also established a pane l of experts (Panel of Experts on
South Sudan) to provide information and analysis regarding the implementation of
the resolution. This includes information relevant to potential designations and
information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms a nd related materiel and
related military or other assistance, including through illicit trafficking networks, to
individuals and entities undermining political processes or violating international
human rights law or international humanitarian law.
4. On 27 April, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee,
appointed the five members of the Panel (see S/2015/287): a natural resources and
finance expert (Andrews Atta-Asamoah), a regional affairs expert (Payton Knopf), a
humanitarian affairs expert (Anna Oosterlinck), an arms expert (Lucas van de
Vondervoort) and an expert on armed groups (Vladimir Zhagora). The Panel began
its work in the last week of May. Klem Ryan subsequently replaced Mr. Zhagora as
the armed groups expert, beginning work with the Panel on 1 October (see
S/2015/631).
5. The Panel has maintained a more or less consistent presence in South Sudan
and the region and has engaged on a regular and sustained basis with the widest
range of stakeholders involved in or affected by the conflict, including senior
leaders of the Government of South Sudan, including the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA); the leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberat ion Movement/Army in
Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition); the G-10/“former detainees”;1 Governments of
countries in the region, including, in particular, those of Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan
and Uganda; displaced persons, including those in United Nations sit es for the
protection of civilians in South Sudan; civil society and community representatives;
tribal leaders; regional organizations, including the African Union Commission and
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the leadership of the
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); the Office of the Special Envoy
of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan; United Nations
humanitarian agencies; and international and national humanitarian and other
non-governmental organizations.
__________________
1 The G-10/“former detainees” are senior government officials arrested by the Government in
connection with the events in Juba on 15 December 2013 and subsequently released through the
intervention of the President of Kenya. They are Deng Alor, Pagan Amun, Oyay Deng, Cirino
Hiteng, John Luk Jok, Kosti Manibe, Gier Chuang Aluang, Madut Biar, Chol Tong Mayay and
Majak D’Agoot.
7
B. Methodology
6. While established by the Security Council, the Panel is an independent body
that operates in an objective, fact-based manner and safeguards its work against any
effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The full Panel
approved the text, conclusions and recommendations contained herein on the basis
of consensus.
7. The Panel has been fully committed to ensuring compliance with the standards
recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General
Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 ( S/2006/997). Those standards
call for reliance on verified, genuine documents, concrete evidence and on -site
observations by experts, including photographs wherever possible. The Panel has
corroborated all information contained in this report using multiple, independent
sources to appropriately meet the highest evidentiary standard, placing a higher
value on statements by principal actors and first -hand witnesses to events.
8. The Panel has conducted its work with the greatest transparency possible
while maintaining, when requested or when significant safety concerns exist, the
confidentiality of its sources. When a source is described as “confidentia l” or is not
named herein, the Panel has determined that disclosing the source’s identity would
present a credible threat to his or her safety. When a confidential military source is
referred to herein as a “senior” officer or commander in the SPLA or the SPLM/A in
Opposition, the source holds a rank between lieutenant colonel and brigadier
general. When a confidential military source is referred to as a “high -ranking”
officer or commander in the SPLA or the SPLM/A in Opposition, the source holds a
rank of major general or above. A document is described as confidential when its
disclosure could compromise the safety of the source; these confidential documents
are on file with the Secretariat and are available for viewing by the States members
of the Committee.
9. To gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or
transfer of arms and related materiel, as mandated in resolution 2206 (2015), the
Panel has used a combination of first-hand inspections of arms and equipment,
photographs, other visual evidence, assessments of documentation and numerous
stakeholder interviews. In the absence of an arms embargo, formal inspections of
stockpiles were not possible.
10. The Panel is committed to the highest degree of fairness and has given
relevant parties the opportunity, where appropriate and possible, to review and
respond to, within a specific period, any information in its report citing those
parties. The Panel provided the Government and the SPLM/A in Opposition with a
two-week period, consistent with the practice of other expert panels, to reply to the
Panel’s main findings herein. The SPLM/A in Opposition provided a written
response one day after the expiration o f the two-week period, which the Panel
subsequently circulated to the Committee and is attached as annex VII.
C. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders
11. While it operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions,
the Panel nonetheless expresses its sincere gratitude to the leadershi p and personnel
of UNMISS and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary -General for the
Sudan and South Sudan, together with other United Nations staff in Addis Ababa,
Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi, for their invaluable support.
8
12. As at mid-December 2015, the Panel had sent 62 items of official
correspondence to 34 States, organizations and other entities and had received
33 replies providing the information requested (see annex I).
II. Evolution of the conflict
13. As the Panel outlined in its interim report (S/2015/656), the war in South
Sudan has resulted in the systemic breakdown of South Sudanese society, reigniting
historic grievances, encouraging military opportunism and revenge and exacerba ting
inter-tribal and intra-tribal rivalries throughout the country. What began as a
political conflict between elites that exploited tribal tensions has evolved in the past
10 months into a zero-sum struggle where the exclusion of competing tribal groups
from political power has become a principal aim of many protagonists. The conflict
is therefore not a simple, binary competition between the Government and the
SPLM/A in Opposition and their respective tribal bases, but a multifaceted war
where allegiances shift rapidly depending on access to resources, unaddressed
grievances and the opportunity for individual politicians and military commanders
to exploit the situation to press for military and political advantage.
14. Notwithstanding the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan by the Government and SPLM/A in
Opposition in August, the war continues to pose a significant threat to regional
peace and security. Since the beginning of the war, 1.66 million peopl e have been
internally displaced, with the vast majority sheltering outside UNMISS sites for the
protection of civilians. 178,906 people were residing in the sites as at the beginning
of November (see S/2015/902). More than 646,000 people have taken refuge in
neighbouring States, an increase of 124,000 since late March 2015. 2 In September,
3.9 million people (more than 30 per cent of the population) were facing severe food
insecurity, an increase of 80 per cent o ver a 12-month period.3 In addition, in
November, 40,000 people in Unity State were considered to be at risk of famine if
urgent humanitarian assistance was not provided in the most affected areas by
December.4
15. In contrast to the first period of the war, the conflict is no longer limited to the
initial combat theatres of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States, to towns or to
fighting between government and opposition forces. Most of the acts of violence
committed since May 2015 have in fact been perpetrated at the local and communal
levels against civilians by government forces or government -affiliated armed groups
or, less frequently, by the opposition.
A. Tribal fissures
16. The war and deepening tribal fissures have had profound consequences beyon d
the widespread animosity among many Dinka towards the former Vice -President
__________________
2 See http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php.
3 See Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, South Sudan, “September 2015 food security
and nutrition analysis: key messages”. Available from www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
ipcinfo/docs/1_IPC%20South%20Sudan%20 -%20September%202015%20-FINAL.pdf.
4 See “Central and southern Unity verification mission report: final report”, Integrated Food
Security Phase Classification, 20 November 2015. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Reconnaissance%20Mission%20Report_Central%20and%20
Southern%20Unity_FINAL.pdf.
9
and leader of the SPLM/A in Opposition, Riek Machar, and the equally toxic view
of President Salva Kiir among the Nuer, the former because of mistrust stretching
back to Machar ’s responsibility for a massacre of an estimated 5,000 primarily
Dinka civilians in Bor, Jonglei State, in 1991 during a previous split within the
SPLM/A, and the latter because of the perception that President Kiir ordered the
murder of Nuer in Juba in the early days of the conflict.5
17. The leadership of the SPLA, SPLA Military Intelligence, the National Security
Service and other security organs is increasingly dominated by members of the
Dinka tribe. Over the course of the war, the members of a self-identified tribal
group, the Jieng (Dinka) Council of Elders, have become influential, unofficial
advisers to President Kiir.6 Concurrently, the Government has forged alliances to
exploit differences within other tribal groups, notably the Nuer (see sect. III ). Many
Equatorians feel more and more betrayed by a Government that they see as working
only on behalf of the interests of the Dinka community.
18. The Dinka are, however, also suffering severely from the war, primarily owing
to the interrelated economic and humanitarian crises in the country and the fact that
large numbers of young Dinka men have been mobilized by the Government to
fight. An estimated 70 per cent of the population in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, the
home state of SPLA Chief of General Staff Paul Malong, is facing severe food
insecurity,7 and the state has lost a large part of its population to fighting.8
B. Narrowing freedoms
19. As the war enters its third year and the functioning of the Government is
entirely oriented towards its prosecution, the environment for public debate has
narrowed.
20. The media have repeatedly faced intimidation, harassment and censorship,
primarily from the State security services. 9 In the past year, at least six journalists
have been killed, a number of others have been arrested and detained and the
National Security Service has forced the closure of several media outlets, including
__________________
5 In its final report, the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan asserted that the
killings in Juba in December 2013, which the Commission determined constituted war crimes
and some might amount to crimes against humanity, were c ommitted pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State policy (para. 812). See www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.final.report.pdf.
6 Panel assessment, based on multiple interviews in Juba, including meetings with the Jieng
Council of Elders in June and September .
7 A total of 370,000 people are classified to be in “crisis” and 135,000 in “emergency” (Integrated
Food Security Phase Classification 3 and 4, respectively), of an estimated total population of
721,000, meaning that the state is ranked fourth (immedia tely after the three greater Upper Nile
states) in all of South Sudan in terms of food insecurity. See Integrated Food Security Phase
Classification, South Sudan, “September 2015 food security and nutrition analysis: key
messages”, available from www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/
1_IPC%20South%20Sudan%20-%20September%202015%20-FINAL.pdf.
8 Interviews with UNMISS and United Nations humanitarian agency staff in Aweil and with a
senior local government official (August).
9 At the beginning of December, the European Union and Canada issued a statement in which they
expressed grave concern about increasing violations of media freedoms and arbitrary arrests,
largely on the part of the National Security Service. See “European Union accuses South Sudan
security service of violating media freedoms”, Radio Tamazuj, 10 December 2015, available
from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/eu -accuses-south-sudan-security-service-violatingmedia-
freedoms.
10
the Nation Mirror, The Citizen and Al Rai, and temporarily closed the Juba Monitor.
At an event marking World Press Freedom Day in May, the Minister of Information
and Broadcasting (and deputy negotiator for the peace process), Michael Makuei,
was widely quoted in the media as saying “up to now, we have not taken any
journalist to court but we will do so”. 10 He has also threatened to close down the
UNMISS radio station, Radio Miraya.11
21. On 16 August 2015, President Kiir was quoted by media gathered at the airport
in Juba as he was departing for peace talks in Ethiopia as saying “freedom of press
does not mean that you work against your country. And if anybody among them
[journalists] does not know this country has killed people, we will demonstrate it
one day on them”. Four days later, a journalist, Peter Moi, was killed in Juba; the
perpetrators remain unidentified. On 22 August, the Office of the President issued a
statement on the remarks, stating: “This was just a reminder to South Sudanese
journalists, not a threat … Nothing shall harm a journalist when he/she is going
about his/her journalistic professio n.”12
22. After the Director of the Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the
University of Juba, Luka Biong Deng, organized a forum on 8 October 2015 for the
public discussion of the controversial decree issued by President Kiir to increase the
number of states from 10 to 28 (see sect. VI), the Government ordered his dismissal
and prohibited future public lectures under the auspices of the Centre. At the event,
both government officials and other proponents of the decree, as well as its critics,
had been provided with a platform to express their views. Deng has since left the
country.13 The Dean of Applied and Industrial Sciences at the University of Juba
was also reportedly arrested by the National Security Service on 12 December. 14
The Panel has received numerous other first -hand reports of the arbitrary arrest and
detention of political activists by the National Security Service and SPLA Military
Intelligence, which are detailed in section VII.
23. On 30 November, the Chairs of five committees in the National Legislative
Assembly and two of their deputies were dismissed from their posts for boycotting
the amendment incorporating the 28-state order into the Constitution. Six of the
seven parliamentarians are from the greater Equatoria region.15
__________________
10 See “South Sudan official at press freedom eve nt lashes out at journalists”, Radio Tamazuj,
4 May 2015, available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/south -sudan-official-pressfreedom-
event-lashes-out-journalists.
11 On 16 February, Radio Miraya broadcast an interview with the widow of iconic i ndependence
leader John Garang, Rebecca Nyandeng, and, later that day, Makuei threatened to close it down.
12 See “Kiir threatens to kill journalists working against the country”, Radio Tamazuj, 17 August
2015, available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/a rticle/kiir-threatens-kill-journalists-workingagainst-
country; Philip Aleu, “South Sudan Government dials back Kiir threat against
journalists”, Voice of America, 24 August 2015, available from www.voanews.com/content/
south-sudan-media-journalism-threat-freedom-of-speech-peace-deal/2930469.html; “South
Sudan reporter killed days after President’s threat”, Al -Jazeera, 20 August 2015, available from
www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/sudan -reporter-killed-days-president-threat-
150820141803243.html.
13 Interviews with two individuals with first-hand knowledge of events in October and December.
14 See “Juba University dean detained by National Security”, Radio Tamazuj, 12 December 2015.
Available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/juba -university-dean-detained-nationalsecurity.
15 See “Five parliament committee Chairs dismissed for rejecting Kiir ’s 28 states”, Radio Tamazuj,
1 December 2015. Available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/5 -parliament-committeechairs-
dismissed-rejecting-kiirs-28-states.
11
C. Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of
South Sudan
24. On 17 August 2015, the SPLM/A in Opposition leader Machar, and Pagan
Amum, on behalf of the G-10/“former detainees”, signed the Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, mediated by IGAD.
President Kiir signed it on 26 August, under significant international pressure. As
noted in section VI, the peace agreement has failed to result in a meaningful
reduction of violence, and progress towards the establishment of the Transi tional
Government of National Unity has been minimal, largely owing to a lack of political
will by both parties.
D. Economic crisis
25. The prosecution of the war, the poor management of the country’s fiscal
resources and a drastic reduction in the Government’s main source of revenue — oil
sales16 — have resulted in a catastrophic economic situation. The Government’s
average monthly budget shortfall, at the time of submission of the present report,
was at least $220 million.17 The Government attempts to meet its budget
commitments, including payroll, through excessive borrowing from the central
bank, which has resulted in domestic debt of more than $4 billion. 18 External debt
continues to grow through a $100 million letters -of-credit facility from the Qatar
National Bank and forward sales of oil. The Panel received credible information,
from multiple sources, regarding loans extended to the Government by several
foreign oil companies. The Panel’s investigations into the reports are continuing.
26. As detailed in the Panel’s interim report, the Government continues to
prioritize allocation of resources to the defence and security sectors (see sect. IV)
and to the service of tribal patronage networks 19 at the expense of other sectors of
the economy. Management of the limited resources is concentrated around the
Office of the President, the central bank and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining,
and payments are often authorized directly from the central bank without passing
__________________
16 The revenue generated by oil has declined, both as a direct result of the war and of the global fall
in oil prices.
17 The figure of $220 million is based on the official exchange rate, which was fixed at 2.95 South
Sudanese pounds to the dollar until mid-December, when the central bank decided to float the
currency. Interviews with an SPLM official, Juba -based development worker and economist in
Juba in November. See also page 21 of the quarterly macroeconomic update, covering the fourth
quarter of the financial year 2014/15, prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning (November 2015), which presents the situation as it was in July 2015. By November,
the economic situation had deteriorated further.
18 As of March 2015, total government borrowing from the central bank was estimated at $2.2 billion. Based
on confidential interviews with government officials and South Sudanese analysts in the
economic and financial sector in Juba in November. See also the reporting figures of the Ministr y
of Finance and Economic Planning as at July 2015 in the quarterly macroeconomic update,
covering the fourth quarter of the financial year 2014/15, prepared by the Ministry (November
2015), pp. 22-24.
19 This refers to a network of largely Dinka elites who benefit enormously from their association
with and loyalty to the Kiir regime and in return remain loyal to the regime’s policies.
12
through the Ministry of Finance and Ec onomic Planning, which has enabled
corruption.20
III. Propagation and conduct of the war
27. As indicated in the Panel’s interim report, and to provide the Committee with
clear and convincing evidence relevant to the designation of individuals engaged in
actions or policies threatening the peace, security and stability of South Sudan, in
accordance with the Security Council’s sanctions criteria set out in resolution 2206
(2015), the Panel has investigated the command responsibility among the belligeren t
parties. Its analysis of command responsibility and the overall conduct of the war is
based on testimony by officials and senior military commanders affiliated with the
Government and with the SPLM/A in Opposition, as well as other sources.
28. As described below, the Panel has determined, on the basis of a preponderance
of evidence, that both President Kiir and the SPLM/A in Opposition leader Machar,
maintain command responsibility for their respective forces. The Panel presents
evidence-based assessments of the conduct of the war specifically in Unity, Upper
Nile and Central and Western Equatoria States, which it selected as the best
examples of the conduct of the war in general, and command responsibility in
particular, since the adoption of resolution 2206 (2015).
A. Definition of command responsibility
29. In attributing command responsibility for actions or policies meeting the
criteria for the imposition of sanctions described by the Security Council in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of its resolution 220 6 (2015), the Panel has followed the
understanding of command responsibility outlined in articles 86 and 87 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which South Sudan
acceded in July 2012.21 Article 86 states that, among other things, parties to the
Conventions are required to “repress grave breaches” of the Conventions.
Furthermore, according to article 86:
“The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed
by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors fro m penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he
was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take
all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach. ”
__________________
20 Interview with multiple sources, including a former official of the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning, Addis Ababa, August. See also “War economy: Kiir ’s office spends more
than budget of an entire state”, Radio Tamazuj, 28 March 2015, available from
https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/war -economy-kiirs-office-spends-more-budget-entire-state;
“Investigation into $800 million AWOL at the Presidency”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, 24 July
2015, available from www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics -power/2015/07/24/investigation –
into-dollars800%C2%A0million-awol-at-the-presidency,108085760-ART.
21 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “South Sudan: world’s newest country
signs up to the Geneva Conventions”, 19 July 2012. Available from www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/news-release/2012/south-sudan-news-2012-07-09.htm.
13
30. The essential elements for command responsibility therefore require that there
was a relationship, even if de facto, between a superior and a subordinate linking
those who committed the breach to the commander at the time of the commission of
the breach; that the superior had knowledge or had reason to know that his
subordinates had committed or were likely to commit the breach; and that there was
a failure on the part of the superior to take all necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent or to punish the breach.22
B. Command responsibility of government forces
31. As both the Head of State and the Commander -in-Chief of SPLA, President
Kiir holds the active military rank o f general and is formally the highest military
commander in the country, with the SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, the
Minister of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs, Kuol Manyang, and the Minister of
National Security, Obuto Mamur (who officially resi des in the Presidency),
reporting directly to him.
32. President Kiir, not the chief of general staff or the minister of defence and
Veterans’ Affairs, issues decrees to appoint and promote senior military officers,
which he did with the dismissal of Jame s Hoth Mai as chief of general staff in
March 2014 and the appointment of Paul Malong as his successor. On 23 September
2015, President Kiir appointed an ex-South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) officer,
Lieutenant General Bapiny Monytuil to the position of SPLA deputy chief of
general staff for moral orientation and James Gai Yoach to the rank of lieutenant
general, without a designated role. He also appointed David Yau Yau and two of his
deputies as lieutenant generals on 5 November 2015.23
33. There is clear and convincing evidence, described below, that President Kiir
also effectively holds de facto command responsibility over the diverse range of
armed groups used by the Government to wage the war in various theatres. 24 The
groups, in particular those operating in Unity and Upper Nile States and Central and
Western Equatoria States, are an amalgamation of military “regulars”, national
__________________
22 See “Command responsibility and failure to act”, Advisory Service on International
Humanitarian Law (ICRC, May 2014). Available from www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2014/
command-responsibility-icrc-eng.pdf.
23 See “South Sudan President assigns top allied military commander”, Sudan Tribune,
27 September 2015, available from www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56526.
24 In its resolution 2206 (2015), the Security Council expressed its intention to impose any
sanctions that might be appropriate so as to encourage the government and oppo sition forces to
form a transitional government of national unity, take effective and comprehensive steps to cause
forces under direct or indirect control to cease military operations, acts of violence and
violations of human rights, and enable full access for humanitarian assistance. Mention is made
in the resolution of both armed groups and national security forces as having been involved in
acts contravening international humanitarian law and other violations. For the purpose of its
mandate, the Panel considers armed groups to include all government armed forces, associated
militias, tribal “youth”, armed opposition forces and militias, in addition to foreign forces
involved in armed activities in South Sudan.
14
security officers, militiamen and tribal “youth”. 25 The leadership of those forces on
the ground often varies, with local political and military leaders working in unison
to bring together composite forces and resources for operations. 26 However,
specialized operations, such as those involving attack helicopters, are under the
direct control of SPLA headquarters and clearly coo rdinated with these groups. 27
During fighting, SPLA forces are frequently supplemented by National Security
Service forces, often consisting of Dinka recruited from Warrap and Northern Bahr
el Ghazal States, the home areas of President Kiir and Paul Malong, respectively.28
34. President Kiir and Paul Malong also recruited the militia known as the
“Mathiang Anyoor” that, according to the African Union Commission of Inquiry on
South Sudan29, was involved in many of the killings in Juba in 2013 .30 The militia
was trained at President Kiir ’s farm in Luri, Central Equatoria State, without the
approval of James Hoth Mai.31 The first four months of training of a subsequent
batch of more than 3,000 National Security Service officers also took place partially
__________________
25 Armed youth are a frequent component of military operations in South Sudan for both the
Government and the opposition. The groups, usually based on tribal identity, are primarily drawn
from specific geographical areas (e.g. the Mayom youth in Unity State comprise Bul Nuer men
and boys) and comprise individuals ranging in age from young teenagers to adult men. Youth
armed groups are frequently led and directed by local political and military figures, such as the
county commissioners of Koch and Leer, and coordinate with other military elements to e ngage
in attacks. Armed youth are also, in some instances, simultaneously members of organized
security services, such as SPLA or the national police.
26 The operational environment is complicated by the breakdown in the distinction between
political and military leadership at the field level, with many county officials in conflict -affected
states holding dual appointments and transitioning frequently between their civil and military
functions. Furthermore, these local leaders have been significantly invol ved in the mobilization
of local youth and militia elements, and the incorporation of those youth into the broader conflict
between the Government and the opposition, further spreading the war to civilians in conflict –
affected states. The environment thus often appears chaotic, with local rivalries, cattle -raiding
and revenge attacks creating an almost perpetual state of violence in some counties, such as
Koch and Leer in Unity State.
27 Interviews with two high-ranking SPLA field commanders (subsequently referred to herein as
E and F) during separate meetings in Upper Nile State and Juba in October and November, a
high-ranking SPLA officer (subsequently referred to as A) at SPLA headquarters in Juba in
August and former politician P in Juba in November.
28 Interviews with former politician P in Juba (November), officials of the IGAD Monitoring and
Verification Mechanism in Malakal (September), high -ranking SPLA officer A in Juba
(September), a former National Security Service trainee in Pagak (November) an d an Internetbased
interview with international expert on South Sudan M (October). Since December 2013,
there has been large-scale government recruitment throughout South Sudan, but predominantly in
Dinka-populated areas. Youth from Northern Bahr el Ghaza l and Warrap States have been
recruited in the largest numbers, and a significant number of them were trained and equipped
under the auspices of the National Security Service. South Sudanese usually describe these as
“new” Mathiang Anyoor.
29 http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final -report-of-the-african-union-commission-of-inquiry-on-south-sudan
30 Final report of the African Union Commissi on of Inquiry on South Sudan, paras. 53 -54
31 Final report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, paras 124 and 451;
See also, Radio Tamazuj, ‘Generals say Juba massacres done by private militia, not SPLA, which
quotes a number of senior officials and former officials:
https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/generals -say-juba-massacres-done-private-militia-not-spla;
Panel interviews.
15
in Luri before the trainees were moved to Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal State,
where they were trained for four more months and graduated in May. 32
Figure I
President addressing the nation, 16 December 2013
Source: Reuters.
35. The Panel has therefore determi ned, on the basis of multiple, independent
sources with first-hand knowledge, that there is clear and convincing evidence,
presented below, that most of the acts of violence committed during the war by the
Government or by government-affiliated forces, including the targeting of civilians
and violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law,
have been directed by or undertaken with the knowledge of senior individuals at the
highest levels of the Government, including President Kiir, Paul Malong and the
Director General of the National Security Service ’s Internal Security Bureau, Akol
Koor.
36. Military operations in the primary theatres of armed conflict show consistent
coordination with SPLA headquarters on logistics and the i ntegration of air assets
and heavy weapons, including artillery, barges, tanks and helicopters, with local
forces. The tactics employed during the operations vary by state, as described
below, but coordination between local forces and national -level authorities is
consistent. Two division commanders and a high -ranking field commander
interviewed by the Panel repeatedly indicated that they followed operational orders
from SPLA headquarters and that President Kiir occasionally received briefings
from operational commanders.33
37. Furthermore, at least three reports concerning serious violations of human
rights are with the Office of the President, awaiting President Kiir ’s action to hold
to account alleged perpetrators under his command. They include a report b y the
__________________
32 See “South Sudan graduates over 3,000 national security officers”, Sudan Tribune, 5 May 2015,
available from www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54865. Corroborated by Panel interviews
with one of the recruits in Pagak (November), civil society repre sentative K in Nairobi (October)
and high-ranking SPLA officer A in Juba (September).
33 Interview with Division III commander Santino Deng Wol in Wunjik (August), acting Division II
commander Ruei Phuot in Malakal (September) and high -ranking SPLA field commander GG in
South Sudan in September and October.
16
national police into the killings in Juba in December 2013 ; a report of 15 March
2014 by the South Sudan Human Rights Commission that was made public but the
recommendations of which were addressed to President Kiir; and a report by Jonglei
State officials into the attack on the UNMISS site for the protect ion of civilians in
April 2014.34
38. In addition, the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, who chaired
the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, presented President Kiir
with a copy of the Commission’s final report upon its completion in October 2014.
The report was released publicly by the African Union in October 2015 and
concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity :
“were committed pursuant to or in furtherance o f a State policy. Indeed, the
method under which these crimes were committed proves the ‘widespread or
systematic nature’ of the attacks. The evidence also shows that it was an
organized military operation that could not have been successful without
concerted efforts from various actors in the military and government circles.
Therefore the element of the existence of a State policy can be deduced
therefrom.”35
39. This conclusion did not lead to any investigations or action against individuals
specifically singled out in the report, such as the commander of the Presi dential
Guard, Marial Chanuong.36
C. Command responsibility of the SPLM/A in Opposition
40. Notwithstanding the diverse grouping of opposition forces and the largely
uncoordinated way in which they came together after the events in Juba in
December 2013, Machar continues to affirm in public, and to the Panel directly, his
leadership of the SPLM/A in Opposition and operational command over its forces.
As recently as November 2015, he convened a meeting of all senior opposition
commanders and political leaders in Pagak, Upper Nile State (the SPLM/A in
Opposition headquarters), during which senior commanders, including Lieutenant
General Johnson Olony, who currently heads the largest operational fighting force
of the SPLM/A in Opposition, confirmed to the Panel that they received their orders
from him. Machar is also recognized in the peace agreement as the Chair and
Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/A in Opposition.37
41. In addition, the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
considered the issue of command responsibility for opposition forces and concluded
in paragraphs 818 to 823 of its report that, on the basis of publicly available
statements, meetings with Machar and witness reports , Machar maintained
operational control of the opposition. The Panel found no evidence to contradict
__________________
34 For an UNMISS report, see https://unmiss.unmissions.org/Portals/unmiss/
Human%20Rights%20Reports/UNMISS%20Conflict%20in%20South%20Sudan%20 –
%20A%20Human%20Rights%20Report.pdf. For the report of the S outh Sudan Human Rights
Commission, see “Interim report on South Sudan internal conflict: 15 December 2013 -15 March
2014”, available from www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/rreport_on_conflicts_in_south_sudan.pdf.
35 Final report of the AU Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 812. See also paragraphs 806 to 812 and 1126 to 1131.
36 The Committee designated Chanuong, among others, on 1 July.
37 Interview with Olony in Pagak in November. Peter Gadet also confirmed in an interview with the
Panel in Khartoum in October that, before his defection from the SPLM/A in Opposition, he
would take operational orders from Machar.
17
those assessments, nor any evidence that command responsibility had shifted since
the completion of the Commission’s report in October 2014.
42. The Panel has therefore determined, on the basis of multiple, independent
sources with first-hand knowledge, that there is clear and convincing evidence,
presented below, that most of the acts of violence committed during the war by the
SPLM/A in Opposition, including violations of the ceasefire and violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, have been
directed by or undertaken with the knowledge of senior individuals at the highest
levels of the SPLM/A in Opposition, including Ma char.
43. The SPLM/A in Opposition has nonetheless faced significant military
challenges over the past year. The Government’s offensive in Unity State, the
opposition’s severe logistical shortages (both detailed below) and the absence of
both air and anti-air capability have led to a largely defensive posture in many
locations. As with the Government, opposition forces are composites of regular
force elements from the SPLA and other security services coupled with tribal youth
groups, including the “White Army” of primarily Lou Nuer, Gawaar Nuer and
Jikany Nuer youth and other local defence militias. 38 The Gawaar Nuer and Jikany
Nuer youth groups have increased in size as the result of (sometimes forced)
recruitment drives.
44. The opposition has also suffered deep political disagreements that resulted in
the withdrawal from active military operations of a group of senior commanders, led
by General Peter Gadet. The main grievances of the group centre around the fact
that the power-sharing formula put in place through the peace agreement of August
2015 restores the status quo ante, fails to address the underlying problems within
the SPLM and does not adequately provide for accountability for those responsible
for the killing of Nuer civilians in Juba in December 2013. Senior Nuer
commanders in the SPLM/A in Opposition expressed similar sentiments concerning
accountability during meetings with the Panel in Pagak, Upper Nile State, stressing
that they were pro-peace but had signed the agreement largely because of pr essure
from the international community.
45. Defections from the Government to the opposition in April and October 2015
by largely Shilluk SPLA forces in Upper Nile State somewhat mitigated the
withdrawal of Peter Gadet and led to the temporary seizure of Malakal by the
opposition in May. Nevertheless, the opposition has still not been able to mount any
sustained offensive in 2015 and, in December, was holding no major urban areas,
factors that undoubtedly contributed to Machar ’s signing of the peace agreem ent in
August.
D. Unity State
46. The conduct of the government offensive in Unity State, which began in April
2015 shortly after the adoption of resolution 2206 (2015) and was described in
detail in the Panel’s interim report, displays the features of command and control
__________________
38 On the composition of the White Army, see Brian Abeda, “Making sense of the White Army’s
return in South Sudan”, Centre for Security Governance Pape r, No. 1 (Ontario, Canada, February
2015). Available from www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp -content/uploads/2015/02/CSG-Paper-1-
Adeba-Feb-2015.pdf.
18
described above. The offensive was part of a larger strategy to drive out the
opposition from key areas of the country through a three -pronged attack.
Government forces from Bor, Jonglei State, moved east to take Akobo, the last
remaining sizeable town under the control of the SPLM/A in Opposition; forces
from Malakal, Upper Nile State, moved east to take Pagak; and forces from
Rubkona and Bentiu, Unity State, reinforced by troops from Lakes State and Bor,
moved into central and southern areas of Unity State, the Nuer heartland of the
state.39
47. The Panel has assessed, on the basis of multiple, independent, first -hand
accounts, including confidential interviews with several senior personnel in the
SPLA, that a group of senior security officials, including the Chief of General Staff,
Paul Malong, the Deputy Chief of General Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General
James Ajongo, the Deputy Chief of General Staff for Administration, Lieutenant
General Malual Ayom, the Deputy Chief of Gene ral Staff for Logistics, Lieutenant
General Malek Ruben, and the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau,
Akol Koor, planned the offensive beginning in January 2015 and subsequently
oversaw its execution from late April onwards, with ultimate comm and
responsibility remaining with Paul Malong.40
48. For the Unity prong of the offensive, the government strategy relied heavily on
the merging of SSLA, a predominantly Bul Nuer militia based in Mayom, Unity
State, with the remnants of SPLA Division IV, wh ich is headquartered in Rubkona,
Unity State. Division IV operated under the command of SPLA Major General
Thiab Gatluak Taitai, with operational leadership of the offensive largely delegated
to former SSLA officers led by Major General Matthew Puljang. 41 The latter was
aided by local government affiliates, including several county commissioners (John
Bol Mayak (Mayom), Gordon Koang Biel (Koch), Kor Gatmai Garang (Mayendit)
and Wai Yach Gatkouth (Leer)), supplemented by Justice and Equality Movement
forces from Darfur, which maintain bases in Unity State. 42 An SPLA deputy chief of
general staff told the Panel that the SPLA considered the former SSLA to be fully
integrated into its command structures, but the integration process had been rushed
owing to the war and therefore the SSLA members had not undergone the required
training in human rights and international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, SPLA
headquarters proceeded to deploy those troops during the offensive, instead of
deploying better-trained SPLA troops from other, then more stable locations.43
__________________
39 Panel interviews with two high-ranking SPLA officers A and B in Juba (August and October) and
Internet-based interview with international researcher M in July.
40 Panel official meeting with one of the individuals named HH (Juba, August); separate interviews
with two high-ranking SPLA officers and one senior SPLA officer with first -hand knowledge
based at SPLA headquarters in Juba (A, B, D) (August, September, November); Internet -based
call with international researcher on South Sudan N (July); interview with civil society
representative K in Nairobi (August).
41 Interview with former Unity State local governmen t official FF in Juba (October) and high –
ranking SPLA officer E and senior SPLA officer D in Juba (November). See also Human Rights
Watch, “They burned it all: destruction of villages, killings and sexual violence in Unity State
South Sudan”, 22 July 2015, available from www.hrw.org/report/2015/07/22/they -burned-itall/
destruction-villages-killings-and-sexual-violence-unity-state.
42 Information provided by the Panel of Experts on the Sudan and corroborated by sources in Unity
State. The Panel has also observed at first hand on a number of occasions the presence of
members of the Justice and Equality Movement in Unity State.
43 Panel official meeting with high-ranking SPLA officer HH (Juba, August).
19
49. The Government had begun arming Bul Nuer youth early in 2015 to facilitate
their participation in the offensive. Most Bul Nuer youth already had access to
AK-pattern automatic rifles (which are prolific throu ghout the state), but
ammunition was crucial to sustaining their operations. The Panel determined, on the
basis of a preponderance of evidence and testimony from military sources, that
ammunition was supplied to youth groups by SPLA headquarters specifically for the
offensive, initially through the Governor of Unity State, Joseph Monytuil (a Bul
Nuer), and the Mayom County Commissioner, John Bol Mayak, and later through
the Koch and Leer county commissioners when the Jagei Nuer attacked southern
Unity State.44
50. All senior operational commanders are equipped by the SPLA with satellite
phones for coordination with headquarters. Three independent sources reported to
the Panel that at least one meeting was held in Juba during the offensive between
Joseph Monytuil, Matthew Puljang and Paul Malong.45 Widespread destruction,
targeting of civilians, large population displacement and numerous human rights
abuses resulted from the offensive. Thousands of cattle were subseque ntly taken to
Bentiu and Mayom.46
51. The Government’s use of SSLA and Bul Nuer youth exploited intra -tribal
enmities and historic divisions between the Bul Nuer and other Nuer tribes in Unity
State, which are rooted in the tradition of cattle -raiding coupled with grievances
dating from the intra-Nuer conflicts during the civil war within the Sudan. That
legacy has been compounded by the decision of the Bul Nuer leaders to ally
themselves with the Government and the resulting atrocities committed by both
sides before the offensive. Numerous witnesses to the offensive and representatives
of international organizations working in Unity State pointed to the widespread
looting of cattle as having been licensed by the Government both to motivate the
attackers and to deprive the opposition of resources.47
52. Following the destruction of much of the southern and central parts of the
state, numerous media and humanitarian organizations, as well as UNMISS,
published reports about the scale of the human rights violations that were
perpetrated.48 Some of the violations were detailed in the Panel’s interim report. The
__________________
44 Interviews with high-ranking SPLA field commander E i n Juba (November), high-ranking SPLA
officer B and senior SPLA officer D in Juba (September), journalist S with knowledge of the area
in Juba (November) and a diplomat in Juba (November).
45 Interview with high-ranking SPLA officer A in Juba (November) an d two separate Internet-based
interviews with international researchers M and N with knowledge of the area (July).
46 The Panel viewed and photographed the government cattle camps in Bentiu and Rubkona.
47 Interview with former Unity State local governme nt official FF in Juba (October) and interviews
with UNMISS personnel in Unity State (November).
48 For some examples, see United Nations, “Flash human rights report on the escalation of fighting
in Greater Upper Nile: April/May 2015, 29 June 2015”, avail able from
http://unmiss.unmissions.org; Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan,
“The conflict in Unity State” (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 3 July 2015), available from
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/conflict-of-2013-14/the-conflict-inunity.
html#c1690; Abu-Bakarr Jalloh, “South Sudan spokesman: army didn ’t commit atrocities”,
Deutsche Welle, 22 July 2015, available from www.dw.com/en/south -sudan-spokesman-armydidnt-
commit-atrocities/a-18601282; Human Rights Watc h, “They burned it all: destruction of
villages, killings and sexual violence in Unity State South Sudan”, July 2015, available from
www.hrw.org/report/2015/07/22/they-burned-it-all/destruction-villages-killings-and-sexualviolence-
unity-state.
20
Government has continued to employ the same tactics for operations in progress as
at mid-December, resulting in the continuous targeting of civilians and violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law described in
section VII.49
53. The SPLA Deputy Chief of General Staff for Operations, James Ajongo, told
the Panel in August that the SPLA had established a commission to investigate
allegations of human rights violations in Unity State, but that it could not begin its
work in the absence of UNMISS representatives. When asked about the SPLA
investigation in August, the UNMISS Human Rights Division told the Panel that the
request had been referred to the Office of the United N ations High Commissioner
for Human Rights. There was, however, no plan for UNMISS to participate in a
joint investigation because there were concerns about the impartiality of a panel
convened by the SPLA and about the credibility of the SPLA investigation while the
offensive was continuing. As at mid-December, the Panel was not aware of any
further attempts by the SPLA to investigate the reports, nor had any senior
commander involved in the offensive been subject to disciplinary proceedings.
54. The government offensive, coupled with the limited resources of the SPLM/A
in Opposition, has largely placed the opposition on the defensive in Unity State. The
Panel is not aware of any significant offensive operations by the opposition in the
state since its interim report, with most reported opposition activities aimed at
defending communities from attacks or recovering lost territory and cattle. The
SPLM/A in Opposition forces in the state have, therefore, largely devolved into
local defence collectives, utilizing the limited organized forces that remain in the
state together with local armed youth.50
E. Upper Nile State
55. The war has followed a different pattern in Upper Nile State, with less direct
involvement of youth groups in large-scale operations. The state, with its stilloperational
oil fields in Paloich and associated infrastructure, the city of Malakal
and the River Nile ports, has numerous militarily significant locations. It has
consequently seen the deployment of large numbers of SPLA troops from
Divisions I, II, VI and VII, reinforced with Division II beginning in mid -2015,
bolstered by National Security Service combat forces. 51 In many areas, experienced
and senior SPLA commanders are in control. The SPLA has also maintained at least
__________________
49 The Panel received reports from both SPLA and United Nations sources on 2 December that Paul
Malong had restructured the SPLA command of Unity State, replacing the Division IV
commander with Major General Stephan Buoy and establishing a new command chain with
Major General Puljang reporting directly to Malong. Beginning with its first visit to South Sudan
in June, the Panel requested a meeting with Malong and Puljang on several occasions through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Panel’s focal point in the Mi nistry of Defence but never
received a reply.
50 The assessment was provided to the Panel by UNMISS military personnel and corroborated by
the Panel during its visit to Unity State in November. Also, Panel interview with a Nuer
community leader in Juba (November) and journalist S with knowledge of the area in Juba
(November).
51 The Panel has also received frequent reports of the involvement of the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement-North, a Sudanese opposition group that has bases in Upper Nile State, in fighting the
SPLM/A in Opposition, but has been unable to independently verify them.
21
one Mi-24 attack helicopter in Paloich in proximity to the oil fields. Operational
control of the helicopter is with SPLA headquarters in Juba.52
56. The Government has armed and used militias in Upper Nile State, most
notably the Shilluk Agwelek (until the defecti on of Major General Johnson Olony in
April 2015),53 the Maban Defence Forces and the Dinka Padang militias from
Akoka, Melut and Renk.54 The Panel has determined, on the basis of multiple,
independent sources with first-hand knowledge, that the arming of tho se
communities largely circumvented the SPLA weapon supply and accounting
mechanisms, with the Dinka Padang militias in particular receiving small arms and
ammunition directly through the Internal Security Bureau, headed by Akol K oor,
with financial authorization for the purchase and transfer provided through the Nile
Petroleum Corporation by a Dinka Padang and Minister of Petroleu m and Mining,
Stephen Dieu Dau.55
57. Since the Panel’s interim report, the Government has launched several attacks
on the western bank villages of Upper Nile State, mainly inhabited by Shilluk.
Throughout 2015, the Government has undertaken repeated air attacks with Mi -24
helicopters against Shilluk positions and captured territory on the western bank in
the vicinity of Malakal.56 During the attacks, there has been significant destruction,
as documented by satellite imagery of some of the locations (see annex II). The
defection of Major General Yohanis Okech, a Shilluk, from the Government to the
SPLM/A in Opposition in late October (during which an UNMISS barge and
__________________
52 Satellite imagery obtained by the Panel of the Paloich airfield on 31 October and 2, 9 and
14 November; interviews with high-ranking SPLA field commander E in Juba (N ovember),
high-ranking SPLA officer A in Juba (September) and the acting commander of Division II in
Malakal (September).
53 Well-armed Padang in Akoka have engaged in land disputes with the Shilluk, resulting in the
killing of Olony’s deputy, Major General James Bwogo Olew, in April. Internal power struggles
within SPLA headquarters then prevented adequate handling of the situation, culminating in
Olony’s subsequent defection with the loss of significant SPLA assets, including some 30 tanks,
and renewed fighting in Malakal. Since Olony’s defection, the Government has reinforced the
Dinka Padang and acceded to many of their demands, including the granting of traditionally
Shilluk land to Dinka-dominated areas under President Kiir ’s order to establish 28 states; the
appointment of a Padang governor, Chuol Tong; and in December the replacement of the
Division I commander in Renk, Stephen Buoys, a Nuer, by a Dinka general, David Manyok
Barac, following a disagreement over Dinka militias in Renk.
54 See “The conflict in Upper Nile State”, Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and
South Sudan (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, April 2015), available from
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/conflict-of-2013-14/the-conflict-inupper-
nile.html. Panel interview with Johnson Olony in Pagak (November), senior Shilluk
commander T in Nairobi (September), international expert O in Malakal (November), an
UNMISS local staff member in Malakal (November) and a Nuer community leader in Malakal
(November).
55 Interviews with high-ranking field commander E in Juba (November), former employee of the
Ministry of Petroleum and Mining U in Europe (September), employee of Dar Petroleum
Operating Company W in Juba (November), civil society representative K in Nairobi
(September), international expert O in Malakal (November) and Internet -based interview with
international expert on South Sudan M (December). K oor is also a board member of the Nile
Petroleum Corporation.
56 Interview with acting Division II commander in Malakal (September), who said that the SPLA
had crossed the Nile on the instructions of SPLA headquarters in order to safeguard the landing
of aeroplanes at the airport in Malakal and that the crossing had taken place with the support of
Mi-24 helicopters controlled by SPLA headquarters.
22
personnel were detained) was linked to, among other things, his dissatisfaction at
the Government’s targeting of Shilluk villages with helicopters.57
58. A number of individuals in Upper Nile State reported to the Panel tha t the
current period of lower-scale fighting was tenuous and that grievances between
communities or tensions inside the SPLA could lead to large-scale violence at any
time.58
F. Western and Central Equatoria States
59. Largely unaffected (outside Juba) for the first 14 months of the war, Western
and Central Equatoria States saw significant increases in fighting in the second half
of 2015, a result of tensions between Equatorian communities and Dinka
pastoralists. On 22 May, the Mundri West County Execu tive Director was killed in
front of the County Commissioner as they were investigating the killing of two
SPLA soldiers. Well-armed cattle herders, supplied with weapons by SPLA
commanders and politicians mostly from Lakes and Warrap States, confronted
community security forces in the greater Equatoria region, leading to a series of
reprisal attacks and an escalation of violence , widely reported in the media.59
60. Armed groups in the Equatorias have historically been local defence forces. In
Western Equatoria State, an armed community defence force known as the Arrow
Boys operated with the tacit approval of the Government to protect local
communities from attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army. As the fighting escalated
between Equatorian communities, Dinka cattle herders and the SPLA, however,
segments of the Arrow Boys became increasingly involved, engaging in attacks on
government forces on 29 May in Yambio. The Government then deployed additional
forces to the area, including the specialized commando unit dispatched from Juba in
June.60 The Government is reported to have suffered defections from the SPLA in
recent months, and new groups have announced their arme d opposition to the
Government.61
__________________
57 Okech stated this to UNMISS personnel and to the Panel in a meeting shortly after his defection.
He also cited dissatisfaction with the 28 -state order as the reason for his defection and the
formation of the “Tiger Faction New Forces”.
58 In a meeting with the Panel in November, Olony, for example, threatened to retake the entire
west bank of the Nile if the SPLA did not retreat. Also, Panel interview with UNMISS local and
international staff and internally displaced p ersons in Malakal (October and November) and with
international expert O in Malakal (November).
59 See “South Sudan army accused of killing top Western Equatoria official”, Sudan Tribune,
23 May 2015, available from www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55 076. Interview with a
group of Equatorian civil society activists in Juba (November), separate interviews with former
politicians P and Q in Juba (September and October), high -ranking SPLA officer B in Juba
(October), UNMISS officials in Juba (October) and two separate civil society representatives K
and V in Nairobi (July and November).
60 See the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affair ’s Initial Rapid Needs Assessment
(IRNA) on Maridi and Ibba counties, Western Equatoria State covering the pe riod from 2 to 5
July 2015, available from http://reliefweb.int/report/south -sudan/irna-report-maridi-and-ibbacounties-
western-equatoria-state-2nd-5th-july-2015.
61 See “Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation: new rebel group formed in South Sudan ”,
South Sudan Nation.com, 28 January 2015, available from www.southsudannation.com/
revolutionary-movement-for-national-salvation-remnasa-new-rebel-group-formed-in-southsudan/;
“Former Western Equatoria State’s minister joins rebellion, vows to topple Ki ir’s tribal
regime”, South Sudan News Agency, 24 November 2015, available from
www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/top -stories/former-western-equatoria-states-ministerjoins-
rebellion.
23
61. Media reporting of a heavy-handed government response to the rebellion, in
particular by the SPLA, has fuelled a perception among many Equatorians that the
conflict is escalating62 and has exacerbated grievances regarding political exclusion
and the increasing tribalism of the war. The dismissal and temporary detent ion in
August of the Governor of Western Equatoria State, Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro,
further reinforced that perception.
62. In September and October, fighting broke out in Maridi, Mundri West and
Mundri East counties in Western Equatoria State, where there has been further
proliferation of armed groups,63 with some declaring their affiliation with the
opposition. There has also been an intensification of government operations in
recent months, in particular with the deployment of helicopters. The SPLA has
persistently blocked the United Nations and the IGAD Monitoring and Verification
Mechanism from having access to the most conflict -affected areas of the state and
has explicitly threatened to shoot down any aircraft flying without the knowledge of
the Government.64 The SPLM/A in Opposition has claimed that two senior
opposition military figures were killed near Mundri in December, but the Panel is
unable to confirm this independently.65
63. While the grievances of many of the Equatorian armed groups are primaril y
local and centre on issues of tribal and political marginalization, land and conflicts
between pastoralists and farmers, some of the groups (the Revolutionary Movement
for National Salvation, under Wesley Waluba, and a faction of the Arrow Boys
under the former Western Equatoria State Minister of Information Charles Kisanga)
have begun to associate themselves with the SPLM/A in Opposition.66 After initially
failing to start his own movement in the Equatorias, Martin Kenji is now the senior
operational commander for the opposition for the greater Equatoria region and
attended the leadership conference in Pagak, Upper Nile State, conve ned by Machar
in November.67
64. In November and December, the SPLA concluded two “peace agreements”
with different communities in Mundri, Western Equatoria State, and Wonduraba,
__________________
62 See “SPLA chief of staff, Malong, orders shoot to kill in Yambio”, So uth Sudan Nation.com,
1 July 2015. Available from www.southsudannation.com/spla -chief-of-staff-malong-ordersshoot-
to-kill-in-yambio/.
63 See “Former Western Equatoria State’s minister joins rebellion, vows to topple Kiir ’s tribal
regime”, South Sudan News Agency, 24 November 2015. Available from
www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/top -stories/former-western-equatoria-states-ministerjoins-
rebellion.
64 See James Butty, “South Sudan military ordered to shoot down planes”, Voice of America,
14 December 2015. Available from www.voanews.com/content/south-sudan-military-ordered-toshoot-
down-planes/3101785.html.
65 See “SPLA-IO two top commanders killed by government forces in Mundri air raids”, Sudan
Tribune, 27 November 2015. Available from www.sudantribune.c om/spip.php?article57189.
66 For example, two armed groups, the Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation and the
South Sudan People’s Patriotic Front, announced in recent months their affiliation with the
opposition. See “South Sudan’s rebel Revoluti onary Movement for National Salvation merges
with SPLM-IO”, Sudan Tribune, 28 October 2015, available from www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article56873; “Former Western Equatoria State’s minister joins rebellion, vows to
topple Kiir’s tribal regime”, South Sudan News Agency, 24 November 2015, available from
www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/top -stories/former-western-equatoria-states-ministerjoins-
rebellion.
67 First-hand observation by the Panel during a visit to Pagak in November.
24
Central Equatoria State, illustrating the overtly political, rather than exclusively
military, role that the SPLA is playing in the region.
IV. Procurement of arms
65. In accordance with its mandate p ursuant to paragraph 18 (c) of resolution 2206
(2015),68 the Panel has investigated the flow of arms and ammunition, as well as
their subsequent end use within South Sudan. As noted in its interim report, in the
absence of an arms embargo, the acquisition o f arms or military materiel does not
contravene the provisions of the resolution, a point that the Panel emphasized in all
its official correspondence with Member States and entities under investigation.
66. Both sides have continued to seek to arm their f orces, even after the signing of
the peace agreement in August and in the face of considerable economic stress. The
continued influx of arms has had a devastating impact on civilians and on the
overall security situation in the country, as described elsewh ere herein and in the
Panel’s interim report. The facts provided below on the procurement and
distribution of arms also provide further corroborating evidence of the command
responsibility described in section III.
A. Government
67. The Government strategy, as outlined in section III, requires large quantities of
mostly small arms and light weapons, and ammunition, for distribution at the
community level. The practice is so pervasive that Equatorian leaders complained to
the Panel about the limited number of Equatorians in the senior ranks of the SPLA,
resulting in a comparative disadvantage in terms of materiel in their fi ght against
Dinka pastoralists.69
68. Before the outbreak of the war, the Government had limited knowledge of the
number of arms in its possession owing to a lack of proper registration and regular
cases of theft or diversion of arms from government stockpiles. 70 The war has
dramatically exacerbated the situation, up to the point that the Government does not
know how many men it either pays or effectively commands, or how many arms it
possesses.71 Consequently, the acquisition policy for small arms has been based on
the assumption that “more is always better”. In addition, senior government and
military officials have an interest in armi ng their own communities in order to allow
those groups to steal more cattle and win disputes over land, given that it increases
their status and political capital. The habit has proved particularly damaging in the
__________________
68 The Panel was mandated to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or
transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, including through
illicit trafficking networks, to individuals and entities undermining political p rocesses to reach a
final peace agreement or participating in acts that violated international human rights law or
international humanitarian law, as applicable.
69 Interviews with former politicians P and Q in Juba (October and November).
70 See Benjamin King, “Excess arms in South Sudan: security forces and surplus management”,
Small Arms Survey, issue brief, No. 6 (Geneva, April 2014). Available from
www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G -Issue-briefs/SAS-IB6-Excess-Arms-in-South-
Sudan.pdf.
71 Interviews with high-ranking SPLA officers A and B in Juba (August, September and
November), a senior government official in Juba (June) and former politician P in Juba
(September).
25
Dinka-dominated Warrap and Lakes States, leading to large-scale fighting between
Dinka clans.
69. The main focus of government acquisition has been relatively simple and often
antiquated equipment designed and usually manufactured in the former Warsaw Pact
countries or copies of such materiel. 72 The weapons can be operated by new recruits
without a great degree of training. Ukraine reported the export of 830 light machine
guns and 62 heavy machine guns to South Sudan in its 2014 arms export report. 73
The equipment procured from China North Industrie s Corporation (Norinco), about
which the Panel reported in its interim report, is another example.
70. The war has decisively reduced the number of individuals and institutions
involved in decision-making concerning the acquisition of arms and ammunition.
On the basis of a thorough review of documentation, supplemented by interviews
with multiple, independent sources with first -hand knowledge, the Panel has
determined that the key individuals involved in decisions concerning the acquisition
of arms are President Kiir, Minister of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs Kuol
Manyang, SPLA Chief of General Staff Paul Malong, Director General of the
Internal Security Bureau Akol Koor, Minister of Petroleum and Mining Stephen
Dieu Dau and, to a lesser extent, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, David
Deng Athorbei and Minister of National Security Obuto Mamur. They also represent
the few institutions within the Government that still have access to hard currency
obtained from petroleum sales. Given the relatively la rge sums and the extremely
limited number of individuals involved, together with the complete lack of oversight
over defence spending, the likelihood of corruption is high.74
71. The practice of bypassing accountability mechanisms to procure arms began
before the war. In 2013, Akol Koor bypassed the then-Minister of National Security,
Oyay Deng Ajak, and went straight to the Presidency to facilitate the acquisition of
the Israeli ACE rifles cited in the Panel’s interim report. 75 The rifles were handed
out to members of the Mathiang Anyoor from the presidential palace as they
targeted Nuer in Juba in December 2013. 76 The bypassing practice has increased in
frequency during the war, so that offices such as the SPLA procurement, supply and
training directorates and internal auditing mechanisms are routinely bypassed or
informed only after the purchase has been made.77
__________________
72 Confidential documentation obtained by the Panel.
73 See www.dsecu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article;jsessionid=39801E0E982121585786A851C4A4
D434?art_id=48545&cat_id=48544.
74 Documentation obtained by the Panel and interviews with high -ranking SPLA officers A and B,
senior SPLA officer D and Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs officials G and I in Juba
(September, October and November), supplemented by interviews with South Sudanese civil
society representatives in Juba (August and November), Malakal (October and November) and
Nairobi (October), the SPLM/A in Opposition in Pagak (November) and government official C in
Kampala (November).
75 End-user certificate seen by the Panel and interview with former senior South Sudanese
government officials AA and BB in Nairobi (November).
76 Panel interview with former National Security Service member H closely involved in the events
(Khartoum, August), as well as two South Sudanese eyewitnesses (Juba, September and
October). For a description of the events and the role of the Mathiang Anyoor, see the final
report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.
77 Panel interviews with high-ranking SPLA officers A and B and senior SPLA officer D in Juba
(September and November).
26
72. The situation, combined with a relatively limited range of choices available as
a result of the European Union arms embargoes and some UN Member States’
refusal to export to a Government fighting a war, leads to suboptimal acquisition
choices for the battlefield conditions or desired objectives, i.e. materiel is
sometimes considered insufficiently sturdy for the terrain (such as armoured
personnel carriers), to be lacking armour (such as the amphibious vehicles noted in
the Panel’s interim report) or not to be in keeping with existing battlefield tactics or
supply chains.
73. A case in point is the increasing presence of automatic rifles that fire th e
shorter 5.56×45 mm NATO cartridge, such as Chinese -produced CQ rifles and
Israeli Micro Galils. These weapons pose a logistical challenge because different
calibres from the standard 7.62 mm need to be provided to units on the battlefield. 78
Nevertheless, the Panel has observed that rifles firing that calibre are present in
larger numbers than before the outbreak of the conflict, especially in Upper Nile
State.79 The Panel has also inspected a wide array of auxiliary equipment in the
hands of the security services, including many forms of grenade launchers (under –
barrel launchers, automatic multi-barrel launchers and even riot guns).
74. Amid the multiple amorphous fighting forces that it has employed, the
Government has retained a basic capacity to strike a t targets considered to be of
high value with units that are better trained and equipped, mostly the National
Security Service, the Commando Division and Division I in Renk, although, as
noted in section III, the Government sometimes decides intentionally not to deploy
them. The Mi-24 attack helicopters cited in the Panel’s interim report are vital in
providing the Government with a decisive operational advantage, especially in the
defence of Juba and of the main oil installations in Paloich, Upper Nile Sta te.
75. As at mid-December, the Government had at least three operational Mi -24
helicopters and was awaiting the delivery of another, pending the finalization of
payment. The helicopters were procured from a private Ukrainian company, Motor
Sich, for $42.8 million.80 The Panel has consulted multiple aviation experts, who
have asserted that, even if the contract included fees for maintenance and
operations, the unit price for that type of aircraft was inflated. Payment was made in
two instalments, with the first, of $21 million, processed through the Ministry of
Petroleum and Mining.81 This was a clear violation of government procedures for
such transactions, which are supposed to pass through the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning. The Minister of Defe nce and Veterans’ Affairs then instructed
the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning on 15 September to pay the second
__________________
78 CQ rifles were present before December 2013, but were not in use by the government securi ty
services themselves but by various militia groups. See Emile LeBrun, ed., “Pendulum swings:
the rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan”, Human Security Baseline Assessment for
Sudan and South Sudan, issue brief, No. 22 (Geneva, Small Arms Su rvey, November 2013).
Available from www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue -briefs/HSBA-IB22-
Pendulum-Swings.pdf.
79 For a baseline, see Jonah Leff and Emile LeBrun, Following the Thread: Arms and Ammunition
Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan, Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South
Sudan Working Paper, No. 32 (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies, 2014). Available from www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/
docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP32-Arms-Tracing.pdf.
80 Confidential documentation obtained by the Panel and official correspondence from Ukraine to
the Panel. Motor Sich obtained the export licence on 18 September 2014.
81 Confidential documentation obtained by the Panel. The Panel was unable to trace the exact date
on which the first instalment was paid.
27
instalment, potentially indicating either a change in procedure or a lack of available
hard currency in the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining.82 The Ukrainian authorities
also indicated to the Panel that they had granted a licence for the export of Mi -24
helicopters to South Sudan from the State export authority, Promoboronexport, on
19 March, without specifying the number of aircraft invo lved in the transaction or
the delivery date.
Figure II
Crews servicing Mi-24 attack helicopters at the military airport in Juba
Source: Panel.
76. The helicopter contracts may include fees for service, maintenance and,
possibly, operations. The P anel has observed on multiple occasions the servicing of
the helicopters in Juba (see fig. II), with at least 10 Caucasian and three African
individuals present on one occasion (26 November) after the conclusion of
operations in Western Equatoria State. So me of the contractors wore military
fatigues, others civilian outfits and at least one overall bearing the name Motor
Sich.
77. The Panel has obtained evidence indicating that, as at mid -September, the
Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs was requesti ng final payment from the
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning for the purchase of four additional
attack helicopters through a company called Bosasy Logistics, based in Kampala, at
a total cost of $35.7 million.83 Bosasy Logistics is registered in Uga nda as a
company that provides security equipment. Its directors are closely connected to the
Ugandan security establishment.84
__________________
82 Confidential documentation obtained by the Panel.
83 Confidential documentation obtained by the Panel. Company records of Bosasy Logistics
obtained by the Panel.
84 Interviews with defence analyst Y and journalist X in Kampala (October) and a Ugandan national
in Juba (November), as well as a South Sudanese government official C in Kampala (November).
The Ukrainian authorities have indicated to the Panel that Motor Sich also ob tained a licence to
export helicopters to Uganda in October 2014, and Panel sources in Kampala indicated that they
were not aware of any additions of Mi -24 helicopters to the Ugandan air force fleet as at
28
Figure III
Diamond 42 intelligence surveillance reconnaissance aircraft stationed at the
military airport in Juba
Source: Panel.
78. Beginning in July, the Panel started to observe the presence of an Austrian –
produced Diamond 42 intelligence surveillance reconnaissance aircraft at the
military airport in Juba (see fig. III), providing advanced integrated aerial
reconnaissance and targeting capabilities for the Mi -24 helicopters and ground
forces. This form of integrated target acquisition will give the Government an even
greater strategic advantage over opposition and community defence forces.
79. In addition, the Government contracted Norwegian Development General
Trading, based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to construct two helicopter hangars
at a total cost of $16.4 million. The work was continuing in December and the
Minister of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs was request ing the Minister of Finance
and Economic Planning to make payment.85
80. Several independent sources in Kampala and Juba have told the Panel that
there is a standing unwritten agreement to supply the Government of South Sudan
with arms and ammunition throug h Uganda.86 According to that information,
Uganda either supplies South Sudan with its own stock or acquires the weapons and
then transfers them to South Sudan, without necessarily involving or obtaining the
__________________
November. However, the Panel cannot state with cert ainty that Bosasy Logistics is selling
helicopters from Motor Sich to South Sudan.
85 Confidential documentation obtained by the Panel.
86 Panel confidential interviews with high -ranking SPLA officer A, official in the Ministry of
Defence and Veterans’ Affairs in Juba I (October and November), South Sudanese government
official C in Kampala (November) and civil society representative K and former politician AA in
Nairobi (August).
29
consent of the primary seller. The attack helicop ters from Bosasy Logistics were
acquired under such an agreement.
81. The Panel has, in addition, identified Israeli Micro Galil rifles in Upper Nile
State, which were sold by the manufacturer to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda in
2007. The Panel has confirmed, on the basis of multiple, independent sources, that,
following the outbreak of the fighting, the weapons were transferred to the National
Security Service in 2014.87 According to the Government of Israel, Uganda did not
request permission for the transfer. Micro Galil rifles and IWI ACE rifles are
widespread in South Sudan, especially in Upper Nile State, and h ave become known
as “Galaxies”.88
82. In a letter dated 16 November, the Panel requested information from Uganda
on the weapon sales and transfers, but has received no response to date.
83. Several independent sources indicate that the Government of South Sudan is
facing severe difficulties in making payment for military materiel and related
support, in particular since the second half of 2015. A t the same time, the Panel has
obtained documentation from mid -September showing that the Ministry of Defence
and Veterans’ Affairs is actively pressing the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning for the payment of at least two, and likely three, contra cts for military
materiel and related equipment, totalling some $50 million, even after the signing of
the peace agreement in August and amid claims that it is unable to finance the
implementation of the agreement.89
84. With the economic crisis and the limited availability of hard currency, the
Government has sought alternative payment modes for its arms purchases, involving
the advance sale of oil. As recently as November, the Panel has been in touch with
two arms brokers contacted by third parties claimin g to act on behalf of the
Government and offering to pay for arms with South Sudanese crude.
85. Outside of State-to-State transactions, the Government has turned to numerous
private companies to satisfy its defence requirements and associated logistics. I t
uses private companies to fly arms, ammunition, troops, fuel and rations from Juba
to the front line. An Antonov 72-100 aircraft with Armenian registration number
EK-72928 unloaded arms and ammunition in Rubkona on multiple occasions in
November 2014 and April and May 2015 as part of the offensive in Unity State. 90
The aeroplane is officially operated by a Dubai -based company, Reliable Unique
__________________
87 Panel confidential interviews with government official in Kampala C (No vember), high-ranking
SPLA field commander E in Juba (November), official in the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’
Affairs I in Juba (November) and civil society representative K in Nairobi (October). The Panel
asked the sources to identify the arms while showing them pictures of numerous arms present in
South Sudan.
88 Panel interviews with officials of the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in Malakal
(October), UNMISS in Malakal (October) and confidential interviews with official in the
Ministry of Defence I in Juba (November), former official in the Ministry of Petroleum and
Mining U (September 2015) and SPLM/A in Opposition military officials in Pagak (November).
89 Confidential documentation on two separate cases demonstrating that individual s or companies
had not been paid, as well as an interview with security expert Y in Kampala (November), an
Internet-based interview with an international aviation and arms expert (November) and an
e-mail exchange with a United Arab Emirates -based business owner (December). See also “South
Sudan appeals for funds to implement peace agreement”, Sudan Tribune, 5 November 2015,
available from www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56958.
90 Confidential source and Panel observation in Rubkona (April and June).
30
Services Aviation,91 but is painted with the emblem of Golden Wings South Sudan,
an airline owned by Obac William Olawo, a Shilluk businessperson with close
connections to President Kiir.92 He is also the owner of Crown Automobiles, which
imported and continues to provide maintenance for 173 SPLA Cougar and Typhoontype
armoured personnel carriers that were procured in 2 014 from Streit Group, a
company based in the United Arab Emirates.93
86. The Government also uses other Armenian and Tajik -registered aircraft
operated by various companies for the transport of logistical supplies to its
operations in Upper Nile and Unity States. They include Skiva Air, an Armenian –
registered company that operated an Antonov -26B aircraft with registration number
EK-26310,94 which was seen unloading ammunition on multiple occasions in
Rubkona in April and supplying the SPLA forces conducting operations in Unity
State.
87. In August, the Government acquired from a private businessperson in the
Sudan an Ilyushin-76 aircraft that is used to transport troops, ammunition and other
equipment to Paloich and Malakal, Upper Nile State. 95 The aircraft was most
recently registered as ST-ALF and is now flying without a registration number.96
B. Opposition
88. The opposition has continuously sought to procure arms from numerous
sources, with relatively limited success, mainly owing to a combination of limited
funds, a limited number of potential sellers owing to the group’s status as a rebel
force and logistical constraints. In December 2014, Machar appointed a chief of
general staff and eight deputies, including a deputy for logistics, Major General
Garouth Gatkuoth.97 However, Machar always kept involvement in arms acquisition
limited within the opposition leadership and, when Gatkuoth was relieved of his
position and subsequently defected, he moved the position to his private office,
where Major General Karlo Kuol is the director for logistics, based out of
Khartoum.98 However, multiple sources indicate that the chief opposition negotiator,
Taban Deng Gai, is in reality in charge of procurement and has been actively
__________________
91 Panel communication with the Government of Armenia. In November 2014, the aeroplane was
operated by Air Armenia CJSC and flying without the Golden Wings emblem.
92 Interview with a Golden Wings employee in Juba (October), civil society representative K in
Nairobi (October) and SPLM/A in Opposition -affiliated commander T in Nairobi (September).
93 Correspondence received from the UAE authorities Confidential documentation obtained by the
Panel and Panel first-hand observation of armoured personnel carr iers at premises belonging to
Crown Automobiles. For a public source, see Arms Trade Treaty Monitor, “Arms transfers to
South Sudan”, case study 1 (New York, 2015), available from
http://armstreatymonitor.org/current/wp -content/uploads/2015/08/
ATT_ENGLISH_South-Sudan-Case-Study.pdf.
94 Panel communication with the Government of Armenia.
95 Interview with UNMISS in Malakal (October) and with high -ranking SPLA official B in Juba
(October).
96 The Panel observed the aircraft, including the overpainted regi stration, at the airport in Juba. See
annex III for a visual comparison.
97 See John Young, A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO (Geneva, Small Arms Survey,
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2015). Available from
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working -papers/HSBA-WP39-SPLM-SPLM/A
In Opposition.pdf.
98 Interviews with SPLM/A in Opposition in Pagak (November).
31
seeking to obtain weapons in, among ot hers, the United Arab Emirates.99 Gatkuoth
and Peter Gadet told the Panel that Machar and Taban Deng Gai managed
procurement directly but without much success.
89. The Panel has determined that Karlo Kuol is the focal point between the
SPLM/A in Opposition and the Sudanese authorities.100 The Sudan has been the
default arms supplier for the opposition. On the basis of independent testimony from
multiple SPLM/A in Opposition commanders and former commanders, the Panel
has confirmed that the SPLM/A in Opposition has received ammunition and, to a
lesser extent, arms and other items, including uniforms, from the Government of the
Sudan through its National Intelligence and Security Service. Many of the
commanders told the Panel that the supply was insufficient to meet their needs,
however.101 Former opposition members speculated that the Sudan intended to
supply sufficient ammunition to keep the opposition fighting, while not providing it
with either sufficient materiel or the kind of equipment (in particular surface -to-air
missiles) required to defeat the Government. 102 Before his defection from the
SPLM/A in Opposition and incorporation into the SPLA with the rank of lieutenant
general, James Gai Yoach also played a facilitation role with the National
Intelligence and Security Service.103
90. Whereas small arms are abundant in South Sudan, ammunition supply remains
problematic and tracing opposition supply routes is difficult. In September, the
Panel analysed 208 rounds of 12.7 mm heavy machine gun ammunition, a sample of
munitions captured by the SPLA from forces aligned with Johnson Olony. Although
more than 60 per cent of the ammunition examined in the sample was Chinesemanufactured,
it showed great variety in terms of the manufacturing plants and
years of production. The Chinese government subsequently informed the Panel that the
specific ammunition identified by the Panel was not exported to South Sudan.104. Other
ammunition inspected was from the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree,
manufactured in the Sudan. In addition, it remains unclear whether the ammunition
was provided directly to Olony’s forces or whether all or at least a portion of it was
recaptured from what he took with him after defecting from the SPLA in April.
91. The SPLM/A in Opposition has relied extensively on recruitment among Nuer
communities and has armed those communities to the greatest extent possible 105 in
__________________
99 Interviews with Garouth Gatkuoth and Gabriel Tang in Nairobi (November), Peter Gadet in
Khartoum (October) and SPLM/A in Opposition-affiliated commander T in Nairobi (September).
100 Telephone conversation with Karlo Kuol in Khartoum (October). A high -ranking SPLM/A in
Opposition commander confirmed Kuol’s role in an interview with the Panel.
101 Panel interview with senior SPLM/A in Opposition representative in Addis Ababa (July); Garouth
Gatkuoth, Gabriel Tang and Gabriel Changson in Nairobi (November); Gadet in Khartoum
(October); and an SPLM/A in Opposition-affiliated commander in Nairobi (September). The Panel
also performed visual comparisons between uniforms that it witnessed at first hand in Tonga,
Upper Nile State, and the uniforms of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces. A senior Sudanese
official explained to the Panel in July that there was a disa greement within the Government of the
Sudan between the military and security services, which were in favour of provoking unrest in
South Sudan through the continued supply of arms, and civilian leaders, who were more interested
in stabilizing the situation.
102 See previous footnote. Also, interviews with two diplomatic representatives in Juba in September.
103 Panel interviews with Garouth Gatkuoth and Gabriel Tang in Nairobi (November) and Peter
Gadet in Khartoum (October).
104 Official correspondence from the People’s Republic of China, 6 January 2016.
105 Panel interview with UNMISS in Malakal (November), a security and arms expert in Europe
(May) and officials of the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in Juba (September).
32
training camps located across the border in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States
in the Sudan, as well as through direct supply by a ir, most recently in September in
Din Din, a town in the vicinity of Leer, Unity State. 106 In addition, forces affiliated
to the SPLM/A in Opposition in Western Equatoria State externally obtained arms
and ammunition as recently as October, demonstrating new capacity to acquire arms
far outside the opposition strongholds in the greater Upper Nile region.107
92. The opposition is eager to find new supplies of weapons in anticipation of the
cantonment of forces and future integration stipulated in the peace agree ment. The
Panel finds it probable that opposition troop movements through the Maban area in
the direction of training camps in Blue Nile State, Sudan, consisted mostly of new
recruits, who would receive arms and possibly basic training there in order to
qualify as combatants.108
V. Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
93. In paragraph 7 (a) of its resolution 2206 (2015), the Security Council defined
actions or policies that threatened the peace, security and stability of South Sudan
as, inter alia, breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. UNMISS, the
IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and multiple other sources have
documented extensive, continuing violations by both parties on an almost daily
basis in multiple locations throughout the country of the Agreement and the
permanent ceasefire to which the parties committed themselves in the peace
agreement of August, with particularly high levels of continuing violence in Unity,
Central and Western Equatoria States as at mid -December.
VI. Threats to an inclusive and sustainable peace
94. The stated objective of resolution 2206 (2015) is to support the search for an
inclusive and sustainable peace, and, in paragraph 7 of the resolution, the Security
Council defined actions or policies that threatened the peace, security and stability
of South Sudan as, inter alia, actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of
expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan or obstructing reconciliation or
peace talks or processes, including breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement, and actions or policies that threatened transitional agreements or
undermined the political process in South Sudan.
95. Consistent with those provisions, the Panel has closely observed the parties’
participation in the IGAD-mediated peace process and the implementation of the
peace agreement.
A. Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace process
__________________
106 Interviews in Juba with a community member present at the site and journalist S (November), as
well as UNMISS source DD in Juba and communication with a Western intelligence source.
107 Panel’s confidential interview with journalist S in Juba (November), researcher on South Sudan
EE in Nairobi (2015) and officials of the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in Juba
in November. At the time of writing, the Panel had not established the exact transit and supply
route used.
108 Panel interviews with international and local UNMISS staff members in Malakal (September)
and UNMISS source DD in Juba (November).
33
96. On 6 March 2015, three days after the adoption of resolution 2206 (2015),
IGAD-mediated talks towards the peace agreement collapsed. After adjustments to
the mediation architecture to expand the involvement of regional States and the
broader international community, the IGAD mediation team, backed by the “IGAD
plus” group, presented the parties with a proposed compromise agreement on the
resolution of the conflict on 24 July. Consistent with the timeline established by the
mediation team, the parties reconvened in Addis Ababa early in August for talks on
that agreement.
97. On 17 August, Machar signed the agreement on behalf of the SPLM/A in
Opposition and Pagan Amum signed on behalf of the G -10/“former detainees”.
President Kiir did not initially sign the agreement and requested an additional 15
days for consultations, saying in an add ress on 15 September that he had refused to
sign “because it contained proposals which compromise the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of our country”.
98. Under significant pressure from the international community and
notwithstanding the resistance from within his own party and the Cabinet, President
Kiir ultimately signed the agreement in Juba on 26 August in the presence of the
Presidents of Kenya and Uganda, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the First Vice –
President of the Sudan. The Government of South Sudan concurrently circulated a
list of 16 reservations. While some of the reservations are procedural, several
express direct opposition to core provisions of the agreement, including the
demilitarization of Juba, the establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation
Commission, the power-sharing structure of the executive and the procedure for the
appointment of the Cabinet, the appointment of members of the opposition as the
governors of two states, the power-sharing ratios within the state councils of
ministers and the establishment of the economic and financial management
authority envisaged in the agreement. 109 IGAD has stated that the reservations have
no legal standing.
99. The Government’s subsequent public statements regarding the peace
agreement have been mixed. On 15 September, President Kiir addressed the nation
and characterized it as “the most divisive and unprecedented peace deal ever seen in
the history of our country and the continent of Africa at large”. He has since
affirmed a rhetorical commitment to implementation, including in an address to the
National Legislative Assembly on 18 November when he stated that he was ready to
implement the agreement in letter and in spirit.
B. Implementation of the peace agreement
100. On 2 October, President Kiir issued an order to increase the number of states
in South Sudan from 10 to 28, which IGAD characterized as contrary to the spirit
and letter of the peace agreement.110 The agreement states:
__________________
109 See https://paanluelwel.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/president -kiirs-reservation-to-the-igadpeace-
agreement.pdf.
110 The genesis of the order was a proposal by th e Jieng (Dinka) Council of Elders to increase the
number of states to 24, which was circulated in September. Federalism and the number of states
in South Sudan was a contentious issue during the IGAD negotiations; the SPLM/A in
Opposition advocated 21 stat es based on British colonial boundaries and the Government then
34
“Not later than one month of the commencement of the Transitional Period,
Transitional Governors of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states shall be
appointed for the duration of the Transition. For two of the Governors position
in Upper Nile and Unity States, the South Sudan Armed Opposition shall
nominate the candidates which the President shall appoint respectively. The
GRSS will nominate the Governor of Jonglei State. ”
101. According to the presidential order, Unity and Upper Nile States will each be
divided into three separate states, with the oil fields in Upper Nile State effectively
coming under the control of the Dinka. 111 On 19 November, the National Legislative
Assembly amended the Constitution to clear the way for the implementation of the
order. As at mid-December, the 10 states remained intact and no new governors had
been appointed.
102. The Panel is able to confirm that, according to the timeline to which the
parties committed themselves, the Government has fully acted upon three of the
more than 15 benchmarks established in the peace a greement for action to date and
the opposition has fully acted upon two. Under the agreement, the parties were to
establish the Transitional Government of National Unity at the end of November,
but it has yet to be constituted.
103. After initially failing to reach agreement on the transitional security
arrangements during a meeting held from 13 to 18 September in Addis Ababa, the
parties agreed on 3 November on security arrangements to allow for Machar ’s
return to Juba and the establishment of the Transiti onal Government of National
Unity. They further agreed that the advance teams from the opposition and the
G-10/“former detainees” would travel to Juba in mid -November to begin
preparations to establish the Transitional Government. The parties also acknowle dged
that the implementation of the peace agreement was behind schedule and that, in
particular, the delay in establishing a national constitutional amendment committee
and integrating the agreement into the Constitution made the agreed timeline for
implementation impossible.112 Consequently, they agreed to delay the establishment
of the Transitional Government until either between 15 December 2015 and
15 January 2016 or between 28 December 2015 and 27 January 2016.
104. Consistent with the understandings rea ched by the parties on 3 November, a
summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government was scheduled for the week of
__________________
expressed opposition to federalism. The peace agreement stipulates that federalism should be
discussed as part of the process for drafting and ratifying a permanent constitution during the
transitional period of the Transitional Government of National Unity rather than during the pre –
transitional period.
111 The Minister of Information and Broadcasting and deputy negotiator for the peace process,
Michael Makuei, has stated publicly that the opp osition will be granted the governorships of the
six new states derived from Upper Nile and Unity States. Control over the oil fields also implies
that the 2 per cent revenue that the Transitional Constitution endows on the state in which the oil
fields are located would go to the newly created state.
112 Seven of the nine members of the National Constitutional Amendment Committee, i.e. all
members except those from the Government, are opposed to the change in the number of states
outside the constitutional review process outlined in the peace agreement. When the Panel asked
both the acting chief negotiator of the Government and President Kiir ’s legal adviser how the
Government would address a likely effort by the Committee to nullify the 28 -state order, they
responded that the Government would never accept changes dictated by the Committee,
notwithstanding the Government’s ostensible commitment to the agreement.
35
16 November to announce the launch of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation
Commission and to welcome the advance teams of the opposition and the
G-10/“former detainees” to Juba to prepare for the establishment of the Transitional
Government. The Government postponed the meetings, however, citing the need for
more time to prepare security and housing for the teams. The Chair of the
Commission and former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, informed the parties
on 20 November that the first meeting of the Commission, which by necessity
should include the representatives of all the parties, would be held in Juba on
27 November. The SPLM/A in Opposition did not attend the first meeting, however,
and therefore the required quorum of South Sudanese participants was not met. 113 A
delegation of the G-10/“former detainees” did return to Juba to attend the meeting.
105. As at the time of submission of the pr esent report, in mid-December, the
deployment of the SPLM/A in Opposition advance team to Juba, a prerequisite for
establishing the Transitional Government, remained uncertain owing to a dispute
between the Government and the opposition over the size of th e team.
VII. Violations of international human rights and international
humanitarian law
106. In paragraph 7 of its resolution 2206 (2015), the Security Council defined
actions or policies that threatened the peace, security or stability of South Sud an as
including:
(a) Planning, directing or committing acts that violated applicable
international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that
constituted human rights abuses, in South Sudan;
(b) The targeting of civilians, includ ing women and children, through the
commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture or sexual
violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement or attacks on
schools, hospitals, religious sites or locations where civilia ns are seeking refuge, or
through conduct that would constitute a serious abuse of human rights or a violation
of international humanitarian law;
(c) The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in
the context of the armed conflict in South Sudan.
107. In its interim report, the Panel presented evidence of acts violating applicable
international human rights law or international humanitarian law committed by all
parties to the war. On the basis of site visits and interviews with vic tims, witnesses
and multiple independent sources with first -hand knowledge, supplemented by a
thorough review of documentation, the Panel has determined that, notwithstanding
the peace agreement of August, violations have continued unabated and with full
impunity. The Panel has found that the violations include extrajudicial killings,
torture, conflict-related sexual violence, extrajudicial arrest and detention,
abductions, forced displacement, the use and recruitment of children, beatings,
looting and the destruction of livelihoods and homes.
__________________
113 The opposition cited the 28-state order as the principal justification for its decision not t o attend.
Machar also demanded a bilateral meeting with President Kiir before he would return to Juba.
36
A. Targeting of civilians
108. Civilians, including young children and older persons, not taking an active
part in the hostilities have been deliberately targeted as part of military tactics. All
parties to the conflict have attacked civilians on the basis of their belonging or their
(perceived) allegiance to a competing tribal group. Civilians have been targeted
since the beginning of the war, in December 2013, up to the time of submission of
the present report, in mid-December 2015.
109. In its report, the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
described the gross violations of human rights committed against civilians,
concluding in paragraph 1135 that the crimes “were committed in a widespread or
systematic manner, and that evidence points to the existence of a state or
organizational policy to launch attacks against civilians based on their tribal or
political affiliation”. On the basis of its investigations as set out below, the Panel
has found that all parties to the conflict have continued and are continuing the se
practices.
Unity State
110. The Panel reported extensively in its interim report on the particularly brutal
violence systematically perpetrated as part of the government offensive in Unity
State, which began at the end of April. On the basis of the evidence collected, the
Panel concludes that the SPLA and its allied armed groups continue to implement
their scorched earth strategy, with egregious human rights abuses, massive forced
population displacements, the systematic destruction of livelihoods and food crops
and the raiding of cattle.
111. The ultimate objective of the government offensive appears to be to render
communal life unviable, leaving the population with nothing and forci ng their
displacement to the United Nations site for the protection of civilians in Bentiu or
other areas, thereby clearing the population from southern and central Unity State to
deny the SPLM/A in Opposition a support base.114 As at 9 November 2015, the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that at least 541,395
people had been displaced inside Unity State. 115 While tens of thousands have fled
to the protection of civilian site, where more than 106,000 people currently reside,
the vast majority of the displaced are hiding in swamps outside their destroyed
villages.116 The Panel has received reports from humanitarian actors that internally
displaced persons who fled to the site after their village was attacked then returned
to their villages in an effort to cultivate crops in order to feed their families, only to
__________________
114 As reported by the Panel in its interim report and corroborated by interviews with witnesses and
victims in Bentiu (July), as well as interviews with multiple, independent sources, including
UNMISS and humanitarian actors in Juba (July, August, October and November) and Bentiu
(July). Further confirmed through various reports by UNMISS, the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), Médecins sans frontières, ICRC and other humanitarian actors.
115 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: humanitarian snapshot
(as of 9 November 2015)”. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
South_Sudan_Humanitarian_Snapshot_09Nov2015.pdf.
116 See UNICEF, “South Sudan humanitarian situation report”, No. 73 (3 December 2015). Available
from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20South%20Sudan%20
SitRep%20No%2073%2C%203%20December%202015 .%20%282%29docx.pdf. Also, Panel
interviews with humanitarian actors in Bentiu (July) and Juba (August, October and November).
37
suffer further violence at the hands of another armed group that came to the village
in search of loot.117
112. If the members of the local community have anything left in terms of f ood,
cattle or crops following attacks by the SPLA or affiliated forces, they are often
pressured to hand those assets over to feed members of the SPLM/A in
Opposition.118
113. The Panel travelled to Bentiu in November and accompanied an UNMISS
patrol to villages in Rubkona County to investigate possible atrocities and meet
individuals who had witnessed the events at first hand as well as with local political
officials and military personnel. The Panel gathered and reviewed evidence of
forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, looting and cattle -raiding. In one
instance, the Panel located individuals displaced into the bush by an attack on a
small village in Rubkona County in late October, during which three men had been
killed by government-backed Mayom youth. In another incident, on or about 24
October, a group of some 50 men were taken by government -affiliated forces from
Adok, Leer County, to the town of Leer and subsequently killed. 119 Their bodies
were dumped by the roadside on the outskirts of the tow n.120 After being informed
of the killings by people in Adok, UNMISS personnel located and photographed the
bodies, already in an advanced state of decay, nine days later. 121 On the basis of
reports from more than 15 humanitarian actors in the state, the South Sudan
protection cluster122 concluded that in Leer County alone at least 80 civilians had
been killed over a three-week period between 4 and 22 October. Among those were
at least 57 children, 29 of whom drowned while fleeing attacks. The cluster further
noted: “Widespread use of sexual violence was also reported, with contacts on the
ground reporting over 50 cases of rape. IDPs further reported that Government
forces shot into swamps at fleeing civilians, burned houses, and abducted women
and children.”123
114. The devastating situation on the ground reflects the results of the Government
systematically attacking its own citizens. A team of government experts and
international specialists in food security and nutrition managed a rare visit to parts
of Guit, Mayendit and Koch counties in November 2015. They found a population
__________________
117 Interviews with UNMISS and humanitarian actors in Bentiu (July) and Juba (August and
October).
118 Interviews with UNMISS and humanitarian actors in Bentiu (July) and Juba (October).
119 Reports from first-hand witnesses, UNMISS personnel from the patrol that discovered the bodies
and the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism. Further investigations will be required to
establish individual responsibility.
120 Reports vary on the method of killing, but preliminary reports claimed that the men might have
been beaten to death. The advanced decay of the bodies and the predation by animals prevent
conclusions being drawn from the photographic evidence viewed by the Panel.
121 Confidential documentation, including photographs and a list with the names of the deceased, on
file with the Panel.
122 The South Sudan protection cluster coordinates humanitarian protection activities on co mmunity
protection, gender-based violence, child protection, protection of civilians, rule of law, mine
action and land issues across the 10 states of South Sudan. Based in Juba, it is coordinated by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for R efugees and the Norwegian Refugee
Council. See www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south -sudan/protection.
123 See South Sudan protection cluster; “Flash update: protection situation in southern and central
Unity (September-October 2015). Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/protection_cluster_flash_update_on_unity_23.10.2015_final.pdf.
38
mainly hiding in the bush or on islands in the swamp, living off water lilies and fish,
their livestock having been looted, their crops destroyed and markets disrupted. The
specialists estimated that 40,000 people in Unity State would experience a
“Catastrophe” (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 5) and that the
situation was likely to deteriorate into famine in the absence of urgent and
immediate humanitarian access.124 In January 2016, the dry season will begin, rivers
will dry up and fish and plants will become scarce. In addition, armed actors tend to
take advantage of the improved terrain conditions to launch new attacks, leading to
worsening insecurity. Unless the people of cen tral and southern Unity State receive
urgent food and livelihood assistance on a massive scale, humanitarian actors
anticipate famine early in 2016.125
Upper Nile State
115. In Upper Nile State, the period between April and July 2015 was marked by a
surge in fighting, with civilians targeted by all sides, usually on the basis of tribal
affiliation.126 Even before the war began, the state’s three major tribes were
competing for political representation, in addition to water and land rights, which
would sometimes lead to violent clashes. That dimension has without a doubt
aggravated the current conflict as armed groups, driven by their own tribal interests,
attacked civilians from other tribes. In May, the situation worsened when Johnson
Olony and his Shilluk troops broke away from the SPLA and joined the opposition,
while also capturing Malakal, the state capital.
116. On 6 July, the SPLA regained Malakal and has since retained control. Fighting
has continued in other parts of the state, however, including on the west bank of the
Nile, where, on 2 September 2015, the SPLA attacked the SPLM/A in Opposition
positions in Lelo Payam (see S/2015/902) and further north towards Melut and
Renk. The successive waves of fighting have caused thousands of civilians to flee
for safety to the United Nations sites for the protection of civilians in Malakal and
Melut and other camps for internally displaced persons in the state. With every
attack, civilians are killed when caught in the line of fire or deliberately attacked by
forces of the opposing tribal group, often accompanied by the abduction of women
and other conflict-related sexual violence, as well as the destruc tion of livelihoods
and houses.127
117. In November, the Panel travelled to Malakal town, the United Nations site for
the protection of civilians in Malakal, Wau Shilluk and Melut to investigate
allegations of human rights abuses (see the case study on humanitarian access to
__________________
124 See “Central and southern Unity verification mission report: final report”, Integrated Food
Security Phase Classification, 20 November 2015. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Reconnaissance%20Mission%20Report_Central%20and%20
Southern%20Unity_FINAL.pdf.
125 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin: South Sudan
(1 December 2015). Available from www.unocha.org/south -sudan/. Interviews with humanitarian
actors in Juba (November) and over the Internet (December). On the risk of famine, see also
“Two years of South Sudan war with peace on paper only”, Agence France-Presse, 15 December
2015. Available from http://reliefweb.int/report/south -sudan/two-years-south-sudan-war-peacepaper-
only.
126 Three major tribes (Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk) make up 90 per cent of the population of Upper
Nile State. The Maban and Koma tribes make up the remainder.
127 Interviews with internally displaced persons, UNMISS and humanitarian actors in Malakal
(November) and with humanitarian actors in Juba (July, October and November).
39
Malakal and Wau Shilluk below). In Malakal, t he Panel accompanied UNMISS on a
town patrol, where it observed the destruction of houses and public buildings,
including the Malakal teaching hospital. Many of the town’s residents now live
inside the United Nations site for the protection of civilians, g iven that they do not
feel safe living in the town. The Panel met the acting SPLA Division II commander,
Major General Puot, who expressed a commitment to living peacefully together
with the internally displaced persons and UNMISS but admitted that challen ges
needed to be addressed.128 At the Malakal site for the protection of civilians, the
Panel interviewed two groups of internally displaced persons whose stories reflected
how inter-communal tensions have affected people living at the sites. A female Nuer
community leader explained that Nuer internally displaced persons were staying
inside the camp as much as possible to avoid being targeted by Dinka soldiers. A
female Shilluk community leader told the Panel how her husband had been
murdered in his bed while convalescing at the Malakal teaching hospital when the
SPLM/A in Opposition had attacked Malakal in February 2014.
118. The Panel also has received reports from internally displaced persons and
humanitarian actors of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arr ests and detentions,
abductions and forced disappearances, beatings, looting and rapes immediately
outside the protection site. Through interviews with internally displaced persons and
UNMISS, the Panel learned that, on 31 October 2015, three boys with their nine
head of cattle were abducted by the SPLA not too far from the site; their
whereabouts remain unknown. Internally displaced persons also told the Panel about
three women who had left the site early in October to collect greens during the day,
whom they believed had been killed by SPLA soldiers.
119. The SPLM/A in Opposition is also targeting civilians in Upper Nile State,
albeit on a lesser scale. In Melut, the Panel visited the Detoma I camp for internally
displaced persons and interviewed five lead ers, including the deputy paramount
chief of a village in Balliet County (all Jikany Nuer). They asserted that their main
concern was insecurity and that they feared another attack from the SPLM/A in
Opposition. During the fighting in May, opposition shell ing had hit the camp,
killing an unspecified number of internally displaced persons and burning down
tukuls.
Western Equatoria State
120. As described in section III, the security and humanitarian situation in Western
Equatoria State has deteriorated significantly following initial clashes in May and
June, and violence is spreading across the state. The Panel has received reports of
extrajudicial killings, beatings, harassment, land -grabbing, cattle-raiding and
looting by various actors.129 As tensions between Equatorian farming communities
and Dinka pastoralists have escalated, the SPLA has attacked civilians, some of
whom then took up arms in self-defence.130 Many civilians now fear any uniformed
__________________
128 As at mid-December, the Division II commander, Major General Boutros Bol Bol, was back in
charge. See the case study below detailing his obstruction of humanitarian access to Malakal and
Wau Shilluk.
129 Sources include UNMISS, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, humanitarian
organizations, open sources, and confidential interviews, as specified in subsequent footnotes.
130 See the Islamic Republic News Agency report on Mundri West and East counties, Western
Equatoria State, covering the period 27 -30 October 2015, and interviews with UNMISS and
humanitarian workers in Juba (October and November 2015). The South Sudan Human Rights
40
personnel and flee when they see them, the violence having resulted in a complete
erosion of trust between the population and the SPLA.131
121. In Maridi County,132 growing tensions between local communities, Dinka
SPLA forces, and Dinka and Mundari migrant cattle -keepers led to clashes on
7 June in the town of Maridi, when cattle-keepers took revenge for the death of a
number of cows as a result of a hand grenade being thrown in their cattle camp. At
the end of June, more than 30 local young people were arbitrarily arrested by SPLA
forces, taken to Juba and detained t here until their release early in September.133
122. Clashes between SPLA forces and local groups in Mundri West and Mundri
East counties in September and October 2015 forced tens of thousands of people
from their homes. The South Sudan Relief and Rehabilita tion Commission reported
that an estimated 30,000 people had been displaced from Mundri in May 2015.134
By 9 November, an estimated 93,276 people had been displaced throughout the
state.135
123. As at the end of November, the situation in Ezo County had deteri orated and
fighting between SPLA forces and local groups had resulted in the destruction and
looting of shops, homes and humanitarian supplies, with people fleeing to the
neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic.
Fighting was also reported in Tambura County, triggering the displac ement of at
least 7,000 people.136
B. Use and recruitment of children
124. As part of its monitoring of grave violations against children, from 15 December
2013 to October 2015, the United Nations received verified and unverified reports
of incidents affecting 58,690 children. The reported incidents included the killing of
1,457 children, 278 incidents of recruitment affecting between 15,000 and 16,000
__________________
Society for Advocacy urged investigations into targeted killings of civilians by the SPLA in
Maridi. See “South Sudanese rights body urges investigation into Wonduruba and Maridi
killings”, Sudan Tribune, 20 October 2015, available from
www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56791.
131 See “Understanding new violence in South Sudan’s Western Equatoria”, Radio Tamazuj,
10 October 2015, available from https://radi otamazuj.org/en/article/understanding -new-violencesouth-
sudans-western-equatoria.
132 There are at least five tribal groups living in Maridi County who appeared to have joined forces
against the Dinka and Mundari pastoralists, many of whom are not locals but migrant cattlekeepers.
133 Interviews with UNMISS and humanitarian actors in Juba in October and November.
134 As reported to the Adventist Development and Relief Agency during its assessment mission, see
the Islamic Republic News Agency report on Mun dri West and East counties, Western Equatoria
State, covering the period 5-10 June 2015. Available from www.humanitarianresponse.info/
sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/2014_draft_irna_mundri_west_draft_
report.pdf.
135 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: humanitarian snapshot
(as of 9 November 2015)”.
136 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin: South Sudan
(1 December 2015).
41
children, the abduction of 1,592 childr en and sexual violence perpetrated against at
least 721 children.137
125. The reported number of children affected by recruitment jumped significantly
from 13,000 in May to around 16,000 in October. 138 However, both the SPLA and
the SPLM/A in Opposition officials have claimed that they no longer have child
soldiers in their ranks,139 even when various open sources suggest otherwise,
including the most recent reports of the Secretary -General (see S/2015/899, para.
14, and S/2015/902, para. 44). According to the Secretary-General in his report on
children and armed conflict covering the period from January to December 2014
(A/69/926-S/2015/409, annex I), for example, the SPLA, the SPLM/A in Opposition
and Nuer youth militia (the “White Army”) all recruited and used children
throughout 2014.
126. The Panel has received numerous independent and credible reports, in addition
to information uncovered through its own first-hand investigations, that indicate that
the Government, the SPLM/A in Opposition140 and their affiliated forces are
continuing the practice.141 During its visit to Upper Nile State in October 2015, the
Panel witnessed children carrying guns, presumably acting as bodyguards, at the
SPLA barracks in Malakal. During its visit to Unity State in November, the Panel
witnessed children carrying arms and participating in a military road checkpoint in
Rubkona County. The Panel spoke with the children, who identified themselves as
members of SPLA Division IV, which has its headquarters in Rubkona and was then
under the command of Major General Thiab Gatluak Taitai. The Panel received
additional reports of children fighting for both the Go vernment and opposition from
UNMISS and humanitarian actors, including in Koch County (see fig. IV). No
children have been formall y released since the war began.142
127. The practice is not restricted to the greater Upper Nile region. On 8 and 9 July,
UNMISS observed some 800 SPLA troops at Wau International Airport, Western
Bahr el Ghazal State. An estimated 50 per cent were children between 15 and
17 years of age, wearing SPLA Division III T -shirts.143 On 30 July, UNMISS
observed between 300 and 400 SPLA soldiers at the airport in Bor. Among them
were some 150 children between 14 and 17 years of age.144
__________________
137 See UNICEF, “Monitoring and rep orting mechanism”, briefing note (November 2015). Available
from www.childrenofsouthsudan.info/wp -content/uploads/2015/11/MRM-19-Nov.pdf.
138 See South Sudan protection cluster, “Protection trends: South Sudan, No. 6, July -September 2015
(November 2015). Available from www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/
files/protection_trends_paper_no_6_jul -sep_2015_final.pdf.
139 Panel’s interviews with SPLA and UNMISS officials.
140 See annex VI for a particular case relating to SPLM/A in Opposition commander Major General
Johnson Olony.
141 Interviews with UNMISS, humanitarian actors and researchers in Nairobi (June), Juba (July,
August, October), Malakal (November), Bentiu (July) and New York (September).
142 The exception is the 1,755 children rel eased by the Cobra faction of the South Sudan Democratic
Movement/Army early in 2015 as part of a demobilization process begun before the war. See
UNICEF, “Child protection”, briefing note (3 December 2015). Available from
http://www.childrenofsouthsudan.i nfo/unicef-south-sudan-briefing-notes/.
143 Under South Sudanese law, the legal age for conscription is 18 years.
144 UNMISS confidential sources, on file with the Panel.
42
Figure IV
Child with weapon and ammunition pouches, Koch County, Unity State,
October 2015
Source: Confidential.
C. Conflict-related sexual violence
128. Conflict-related sexual violence is a hallmark of the war in South Sudan, with
women and girls bearing the brunt of this degrading practice. 145 Almost every attack
on a village, whether perpetrated by the SPLA, the SPLM/A in Opposition or an
allied militia, is accompanied by the rape and abduction of women and girls. During
attacks, women and girls are often abducted to be forcibly taken as wives or for
other forms of sexual slavery.146 As described in its interim report, the Panel has
found that all parties deliberately use rape as a tactic of war, often in gruesome
incidents of gang rape.
129. In Unity State alone, humanitarian workers estimate that more than 1,300
women and girls were raped between April and September, with some incidents
resulting in loss of life.147 More recently, in the space of nine days in November
2015, at least four incidents of rape were perpetrated, illustrating how rampant
conflict-related sexual violence is in the state. All incidents except one pertain to
__________________
145 The Panel focused on sexual violence directly relating to the conflict and has no t yet investigated
other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, including forced marriage, domestic violence
or sexual violence by other uniformed personnel, such as the national police or the wildlife
police. UNMISS has reported to the Panel that it h as been collecting reports of sexual violence in
all 10 states.
146 Panel interviews with United Nations, humanitarian actors and internally displaced persons in
Juba (July, August, October and November), Bentiu (July), Malakal (October) and New York
(September).
147 See South Sudan protection cluster, “Protection situation update: southern and central Unity
(April-September 2015), briefing note (25 September 2015). Available from http://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/protection_cluster_ southern_unity_apr-sep_2015_final.pdf.
43
women who had already fled some type of violence at home and were making their
way to the United Nations site for the protection of civilians in Bentiu to seek
safety.
130. On or around 2 November, a woman originally from Leer County was gang –
raped by six men in her tukul. She had already been raped by an SPLA soldier
during an attack on her village in May. On 5 or 6 November, a woman travelling
with her family from Koch County was raped by five soldiers in Guit County. On or
around 10 November, a woman was raped by an SPLA soldier while travelling
through Koch County. On or around 11 November, a woman from Mayendit County
travelling with her 6-year-old son was raped by 12 SPLA soldiers by the roadside.148
131. The Panel received a report in Malakal of an incident on 31 August , when
three internally displaced Shilluk women were harassed and attacked by SPLA
soldiers while collecting firewood. In another incident in Central Equatoria State,
four Nuer women were abducted in the first days of the conflict in Juba by Dinka
SPLA soldiers and taken to Bor, Jonglei State, where they were kept in captivity in
harsh living conditions and subjected to sexual slavery. 149
132. Given the trauma and stigma attached to sexual and gender -based violence, the
limited services provided to survivors and the limited access of the United Nations
and humanitarian organizations to survivors and witnesses, there is no doubt that the
vast majority of violations go unreported. Nevertheless, the Panel collected specific
evidence of abuses as described above. The Panel has determined that the violence
has been perpetrated in a climate of complete impunity, given that it has found no
evidence of any investigations or trials of alleged perpetrators, except for one
instance where Major General Puot in Malakal inve stigated an alleged rape
committed by an SPLA soldier.150
D. Arbitrary arrest and detention
133. The National Security Service and SPLA Military Intelligence have been
involved in the arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals suspected of supportin g
the SPLM/A in Opposition.151 The Internal Security Bureau, under Akol Koor, was,
__________________
148 Confidential documentation provided to the Panel by three independent sources, on file with the
Panel.
149 Panel interview with UNMISS official in Juba (November).
150 When the Panel interviewed Major General Puot at the end of October, the SPLA soldier was
being held, awaiting court martial. At the time of writing, UNMISS reported that no further
action had been taken.
151 Panel interviews in Juba with two individuals held by the National Security Service (Novembe r);
in Europe with a South Sudanese individual who was subsequently released (September); in
Nairobi with an individual who escaped (September); with a former National Security Service
officer in Khartoum (July); with a senior SPLA officer (October); with former politician P in
Juba (November); and with a Western diplomat in Juba (November). For public sources, see the
following by Radio Tamazuj: “Prisoners: SPLA holding dozens of its own officers in ‘inhumane’
conditions”, 1 December 2015, available from h ttps://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/prisoners -splaholding-
dozens-its-own-officers-inhumane-conditions; “Military intelligence agents arrest two
people in Wau town”, 4 November 2015, available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/
military-intelligence-agents-arrest-two-people-wau-town; “Four abducted United Nations staff
still held in South Sudan”, 23 October 2014, available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/
four-abducted-un-staff-still-held-south-sudan. See also Jason Patinkin, “Radio -silenced in the
world’s newest country”, Foreign Policy, 26 August 2015, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/
2015/08/26/radio-silenced-in-the-worlds-newest-country-press-freedom-south-sudan/.
44
at the time of writing, holding at least 50 ind ividuals in a detention site at its
headquarters in Juba, together with an unknown number of suspects at a site located
close to the River Nile in Juba. Detainees are subjected to beatings and other forms
of inhuman or degrading treatment. 152 Military Intelligence, under the command of
Marial Nuor, has illegally held individuals at its Ghiyada barracks in Juba.
Detainees held by both institutions have never been charged, do not have access to
legal representation and in some cases have been held for at least a year without
appearing in court. The Panel has seen documentation proving that the Ugandan
authorities handed over at least one victim to the National Security Service. 153 The
Panel also finds it probable that the Service is responsible for setting up a de dicated
team that carries out targeted assassinations, mostly in Juba, who have become
widely known as the “unknown gunmen”.154
134. Initially, most arrests and detentions were of Nuer. In recent months, however,
Equatorians have increasingly become the targ ets of arrest by both the National
Security Service and Military Intelligence as the political opposition to the
Government has grown in the greater Equatoria region. 155 The Service’s ability to
identify and illegally apprehend individuals has been significa ntly enhanced since
the beginning of the conflict because it has acquired additional communications
interception equipment from Israel.156
VIII. Obstruction of and attacks against humanitarian and
peacekeeping missions
135. In paragraphs 7 (f) and (g) of resolution 2206 (2015), the Security Council
defined actions or policies that threatened the peace, security and stability of South
Sudan as, among other things, the obstruction of the activities of international
peacekeeping, diplomatic or humanitarian missions in South Sudan, including the
IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism or of the delivery or distribution of,
or access to, humanitarian assistance, and attacks against United Nations missions,
international security presences or other peacekee ping operations or humanitarian
personnel.
136. In its interim report, the Panel presented evidence of acts amounting to
obstruction of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian workers and
__________________
152 Panel interview in Pagak with a former National Security Service member who admitted to the
use of torture to extract confessions; two individuals held by the National Security Service
(November); a South Sudanese individual in Europe, who was subsequently released
(September); an individual in Nairobi who escaped (Sep tember); high-ranking SPLA officer A in
Juba (October); and former politician Q in Juba (November).
153 Confidential documentation seen by the Panel in Juba (October). This is in line with a practice
described to the Panel by a victim during a confidential interview in Nairobi (September).
154 Photographs of the group in training seen by the Panel (on file), interview with a former National
Security Service member in Pagak (November), a high -ranking SPLA officer in Juba
(September) and a former politician i n Juba (November).
155 Panel interviews in Juba with two individuals held by the National Security Service (November);
in Europe with a South Sudanese individual who was subsequently released (September); with
former politicians P and Q in Juba (October an d November); and with civil society activist L in
Nairobi (November).
156 Panel meeting with representatives of the Government of Israel in Jerusalem (October), two
separate diplomatic representatives in Juba (July and September) and a senior SPLA officer in
Juba (September).
45
UNMISS personnel. On the basis of site visits and i nterviews with multiple,
independent sources with first-hand knowledge, supplemented by a thorough review
of documentation, the Panel has determined that, notwithstanding the signing of the
peace agreement in August 2015, the obstruction of humanitarian assistance and
attacks against humanitarian workers and peacekeeping personnel have continued
unabated.
A. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance and attacks against
humanitarian workers
137. As at mid-December 2015, at least 43 humanitarian workers ha d been killed
since the beginning of the conflict in December 2013, 157 an increase of more than
25 per cent in the four months since the Panel’s interim report. The Panel also
received numerous reports of abduction, harassment, assault, forcible recruitment of
national staff, extrajudicial detention and sexual violence against humanitarian
workers, sometimes even targeting senior United Nations humanitarian officials.158
138. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
humanitarian actors reported 78 access-related incidents in October 2015 alone,
mainly pertaining to violence against humanitarian personnel and active hostilities
and insecurity. The actors reported the deaths of three humanitarian staff (all in
Unity State), six armed attacks, 32 attempted or completed lootings or robberies
(including 15 in Juba) and five cases of arrest and detention. Most of the incidents
occurred in Central Equatoria (25), Unity (16) and Western Equatoria (10) States. In
Lakes State, humanitarian actors reported seven incidents.159
139. With the exception of a dramatic spike in access -related incidents (to 134) in
May when the Government launched the military offensive in Unity State (as noted
in the Panel’s interim report), the number of such incidents has remained consistent
over the past 18 months of the war, with humanitarian agencies reporting
78 incidents in May 2014 and the same number in November 2015. The Panel
concludes that obstruction of humanitarian access has continued unabated. 160 In
addition, negotiations over access have become increasingly complex and
__________________
157 Panel correspondence with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Juba
(December).
158 Panel interviews with UNMISS, humanitarian actors and researchers in Juba (July, August,
October, November).
159 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: humanitarian access
situation snapshot — October 2015”. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/access_snapshot_20151113.pdf.
160 It should be noted that these reports represent only a fraction of the actual incidents occurring,
given that many humanitarian actors choose not to report access -related incidents owing to
concerns about the safety of their beneficiaries and their staff. See also South Sudan NGO
Forum, “NGOs concerned about deteriorating security situation in Juba”, 16 September 2015,
available from http://info.southsudanngoforum.org/dataset/ 33aeeaa8-b96f-4b4b-afd5-
1ce7af86ab4b/resource/1f725b54-d7a7-42cc-b646-612dc98b7864/download/
ngoforumstatementjubacompoundrobberies16092015.pdf; Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: humanitarian coordinator strongly condemns armed robbery
of Nile Hope compound in Juba”, 23 November 2015, available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/20151123_SS_PressRelease_HC_strongly_condemns_armed_
robbery_of_Nile_Hope_compound_in_Juba.pdf; Richard Nield, “South Sudan: the many barriers
to aid”, Al-Jazeera, 15 December 2015, available from www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/
2015/12/south-sudan-barriers-aid-151205114959758.html.
46
challenging for humanitarian actors in recent months as they are forced to negotiate
with local officials and armed groups in each county, whether they belong to the
SPLA, the SPLM/A in Opposition or other armed actors, to receive the required
safety assurances.161
Unity State
140. Humanitarian actors operating in Unity State told the Panel that there had been
no improvement in security in order to gain access to people in need since the
signing of the peace agreement in August 2015, as a direct result of the continuing
offensive by the SPLA and government-supported militias. On 2 and 3 October, the
Médecins Sans Frontières and International Committee of the Red Cross compounds
in Leer were both looted twice. Consequently, both organizations were forced to
suspend medical activities and evacuate their teams from Leer. 162 On 1 December
2015, some aid workers deployed back to the towns of Leer and Thonyor to re –
establish humanitarian operations and deliver relief to people in need who had been
cut off from assistance since October.163 The Panel assesses, however, that that
tentative return does not amount to the indication of a positive trend, and
humanitarian workers have expressed concern about the possibility of maintaining
the presence for a sustained period.
Western Equatoria State
141. As indicated above, humanitarian access has been problematic in parts of
Western Equatoria State. Access to Mundri West and East and Maridi counties in
particular has been difficult since May 2015 owing to continuing insecurity and
fighting. During an inter-agency United Nations assessment mission to Mundri West
and East counties from 27 to 30 October, humanitarian actors reported that
movement of humanitarian staff and supplies was at high risk and could be carried
out only with the use of UNMISS armed escorts. This often proved difficult,
however, given that UNMISS had only limited troops and logistics in place at the
time. Given the insecurity, internally disp laced persons often hid in hard-to-reach
areas outside towns, making access even more challenging.164
__________________
161 Interviews with multiple independent humanitarian actors and UNMISS in Juba (July, August,
October and November).
162 See Médecins sans frontières, “South Sudan: no medical assistance available in L eer, following
repeated lootings of Médecins sans frontières facility”, 6 October 2015, available from
www.msf.org/article/south-sudan-no-medical-assistance-available-leer-following-repeatedlootings-
msf-facility; ICRC, “South Sudan: ICRC forced to withdra w from Leer County
following threats and looting”, 5 October 2015, available from www.icrc.org/en/document/south –
sudan-conflict-leer-looting-icrc-forced-withdrawal.
163 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin: South S udan
(1 December 2015), and Panel’s correspondence with an official from the Office.
164 See the Islamic Republic News Agency report on Mundri East and West counties, Western
Equatoria State, covering the period from 27 to 30 October 2015.
47
Upper Nile State: denial of humanitarian access
When the Government launched its offensive in Upper Nile State early in
April, the large internally displaced persons settlement at Wau Shilluk, on the west
bank of the Nile, home to 38,500 internally displaced persons at the time, became
inaccessible to humanitarian actors due to the fighting. Consequently, the settlement
no longer had access to water, food or medical services. Given the resulting food
scarcity, many Shilluk made the perilous journey to the United Nations site for the
protection of civilians in Malakal to search for food.
After fig hting subsided in June, the SPLA refused to provide safety assurances
to UNMISS and humanitarian actors for boat travel from Malakal to Wau Shilluk to
deliver emergency assistance. In addition, it refused to allow internally displaced
Shilluk to return home to their children, whom they had left to seek food .
In July and August, the SPLA enforced restrictions on United Nations boats
travelling from Malakal to Wau Shilluk and regularly denied flight safety assurances
for United Nations aeroplanes into Malakal airport from Juba, thereby cutting off
the only supply line for essential foodstuffs and medicine to the site for the
protection of civilians and surrounding areas in Upper Nile State. The result was an
enormous influx of internally displaced persons into the site — 16,000 new
internally displaced persons arrived between mid-July and mid-August 2015.
On 10 A ugust, the SPLA belatedly permitted United Nations flights to resume
to and from the airport. Shortly thereafter, a number of high -level United Nations
and donor officials were threatened by the SPLA division commander in Malakal,
who said that he would fire on any humanitarian workers or UNMISS personnel
attempting to cross the river, including those carrying humanitarian supplies into
Wau Shilluk, if the workers and personnel did not obtain clea rance for passage
directly from Paul Malong.a On 26 August, the Government in Juba allowed the
United Nations to resume limited flights from Juba into Wau Shilluk to provide
urgent humanitarian assistance. During this period, the population in the site for the
protection of civilians rose from some 13,000 in March to more than 46,500 in
mid-August, although the site had initially been designed to accommodate just
18,000 people.b
a Interviews in Juba (August and October) with four sources, includi ng United Nations, donor
and humanitarian officials who were present in Malakal as part of the visit.
b See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin: South
Sudan — Bi-weekly Update (13 August 2015), available from https://docs.unocha.org/
sites/dms/SouthSudan/2015_SouthSudan/South_Sudan_13_August_2015_Humanitarian_
Bulletin_1.pdf. See also documentation provided by UNMISS in Malakal.
B. Attacks on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan
142. UNMISS personnel are regularly attacked, harassed, detained, intimidated and
threatened. According to the Mission, between the adoption of resolution 2206
(2015), in March and 30 November, the Government committed at least
450 violations of the status-of-forces agreement, including the assault, arrest and
detention of United Nations personnel and restrictions on the movement of
peacekeeping patrols and other UNMISS operations; the opposition and other
48
anti-government groups committed several dozen more equivalent acts. 165 The
cumulative effect of this relentless obstruction has been devastating for the
Mission’s operating environment and its ability to execute its mandate to protect
civilians under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
IX. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze
143. Two SPLM/A in Opposition commanders, James Koang and Simon Gatwech,
both of whom the Committee listed on 1 July, admitted to the Panel in November
that they had violated the travel ban by boarding flights to Addis Ababa to
participate in the workshops on the transitional security arrangements in October
and November. Both also told the Panel that they did not commit the acts leading to
their designation and claimed there had been no outreach to them by Security
Council members to explain the sanctions or the rationale for their designation.
144. The Panel has confirmed at first hand that Peter Gadet has visited the Sudan
on multiple occasions since the Committee listed him on 1 July.
145. The Panel obtained documentation indicating that Major General Marial
Chanuong Yol Mangok and Lieutenant General Gabriel Jok Riak were still
operating active bank accounts at the Kenya Commercial Bank in South Sudan in
the late summer of 2015.166
X. Recommendations
146. The Panel recommends:
(a) That, to achieve the Security Council’s stated objectives in resolution
2206 (2015), namely an inclusive and sustainable peace in South Sudan, the
Committee designate high-level decision makers responsible for the actions and
policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of the country, as defined in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the resolution, including those who are responsible for serious
crimes under international humanitarian and international human rights law and who
have the power and influence either to perpetuate or end the war. The Panel intends
to provide a confidential annex to the Committee with the names of such individuals
in January 2016;
(b) That, to prevent the further destabilization of the security situation in
South Sudan and in particular the continuing large -scale human rights violations
that the Panel has determined are directly related to the supply of arms and
ammunition to non-State actors and groups by all sides, as well as to prevent the
further transfer or use of heavy equipment, the Security Council impose an embargo
on the supply, sale or transfer to South Sudan, from or through the territories or by
the nationals of all Member States, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms
and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the
aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance
relating to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and
__________________
165 Documentation provided by UNMISS and analysed by and on file with the Panel.
166 Confidential documentation on file with the Panel.
49
related materiel, including the provision of any form of training by foreign forces or
armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories. The Panel
further maintains its recommendations for the mod alities for the implementation of
such an embargo as outlined in paragraphs 84 (d), (e) and (g) of its interim report;
(c) That the Committee call upon companies engaged in business activities
in South Sudan, especially in the oil and natural resource se ctors, to adhere to the
principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 167 and to abide by the
due diligence guidelines established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development168 in order to reinforce the implementation of the provisions of
chapter IV of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of
South Sudan, in particular those provisions regarding transparency;
(d) That, given the widespread nature of the use of children and of conflict –
related sexual violence in the war, the Committee encourage all relevant United
Nations agencies to continue monitoring and reporting on those practices.
Furthermore, the Panel recommends that the Committee encourage all humanitarian
actors participating in the Monitori ng and Reporting Mechanism and the Gender –
based Violence Information Management System in South Sudan to collaborate with
the Panel in order to identify perpetrators of violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law, including those involved in the use of children in
armed conflict and in conflict-related sexual violence, and whose acts, on the basis
of the Panel’s independent and confidential investigations, could be proposed for
sanctioning in line with the designation criteria set out in p aragraph 7 of resolution
2206 (2015).
__________________
167 See Sam Bartlett and Dyveke Rogan, eds., The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Standard (Oslo, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Standard secretariat, 2015).
Available from https://eiti.org/files/English_EITI_STANDARD.pdf.
168 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development provides a five -step framework
towards a conflict-free mineral supply chain: establish strong company management systems,
identify and assess risk in the supply chain, design and implement a strategy to respond to
identified risks, carry out independent third -party audit of supply chain due diligence at
identified points in the supply chain, and report on supply chain due diligence. See OECD,
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict –
Affected and High-Risk Areas, 2nd ed. (Paris, 2013). Available from www.oecd.org/corporate/
mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf.

South Sudan panel of experts report-1

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PaanLuel Wël

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PaanLuel Wël is the founder and editor-in-chief of PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd, a news website that covers news, opinions, analysis, history, culture and literature of South Sudan and the world. Founded in July 2011 by PaanLuel Wël to create a platform for free expression and constructive dialogue, the website features articles from various contributors, including columnists, commentators, poets, authors, activists and academics. PaanLuel Wël believes that media can play a vital role in informing, educating and empowering the people to participate in nation-building and social transformation. He also believes that media can foster a culture of dialogue, tolerance and diversity among different communities and groups, and hopes to inspire and mentor the next generation of South Sudanese writers and journalists.

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