Drivers of Ethnic Civil Wars in Africa
6 min readBy David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
June 2, 2016 (SSB) — The extracts bellow are from “House of War: Civil War and State Failure in Africa 2013, page 43-46.” I have reviewed some literature on how different socioeconomic and political stresses contribute to civil war in the continent, including internal factors as a history of revenge and counter revenge cycle as well as external stresses.
The existence of a history of vengeance among ethnic groups, according to the CH model, also captures another element that explains the root causes of ethnic civil wars in Africa. The CH model concludes that “once a conflict has occurred, it creates a legacy of hatred, and this hatred fuels further conflict…[hence] some societies are doomed to a cycle of repeated conflict”(p.15). In other words, despite the fact that ethnic wars are mainly triggered by a predisposition to control resources by tribal groups, they tend to go beyond resource conflicts into the realm of revenge and counter revenge. When ethnic conflicts reach that stage, reversing them becomes more difficult. Similarly, when one ethnic group or a regional coalition of ethnic groups is in control of state resources, cycles of violence turn to be between the state and an opposing tribe or tribal coalition.
After applying developed models to 161 countries covering a period of 39 years (1960-1999) for measuring the prevalence of civil wars, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) argue against a ‘popular belief’ that there is an inextricable causal relationship between state failure (endemic civil/ethnic wars) in Africa’s nation-states and their sociopolitical tribal structure. Such popular suppositions, they argue, are only derived from the observed demographic characteristics of rebellion in the region. They contend that civil war and state failure could not be attributed to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation characteristic of all African states or the existence of tribes as the basic sociopolitical components of the region’s nation-states, but, rather, they (civil war and state failure) stem from current failed economic and political institutions.
The best and fastest strategy to reduce the prevalence of civil war in Africa and prevent future civil wars is to institute democratic reforms that effectively manage the challenges facing Africa’s diverse societies. To promote inter-group cooperation in Africa, especially tailored political governance and economic management institutions are needed…We suggest that Africa’s ethnic diversity in fact helps…it does not impede…the emergence of stable development as it necessitate intergroup bargaining processes. These processes can be peaceful if ethnic groups feel adequately represented by their national political institutions and if the economy provides [them with] opportunity for productive activity (p.1).
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) elaborate on their argument by drawing a comparison between the social plurality in Africa and in other regions. They contend that “Africa’s high degree of ethnic diversity, which is widely blamed for causing violent conflict, is a source of safety for most heterogeneous countries” (p.10). This is because in highly heterogeneous societies sub-group rebellions are naturally confined to smaller territories and they can only spread as a result of failure by political institutions to contain them.
Therefore, regional coalitions of ethnic rebel groups occur when discontent with failed economic distribution of benefits and highly centralized political control increased the opportunity cost of taking control of one’s regional resources and political destiny. the risk of civil war declines as [relative] poverty levels also decline, since the opportunity costs of rebellion rise…[A]t very low and very high levels of income per capita, a strong parabolic relationship [exists]between [relative] GDP and probability of war…[Equitable] economic development therefore has a positive effect by reducing the risk of civil war, though that reduction is not as dramatic as that which [is] as a result of enhancing political freedom”(p.13). [Along similar lines, Sambanis (2001) further argues that] “If ethnic fragmentation is a proxy for the coordination and transaction costs that are associated with mounting a rebellion, then we would expect these costs to be lower or non-existent in rebellions that are mounted by a single ethnic group aimed at satisfying demands/grievances of that group (p.12).
Along the lines above, in an analysis of civil wars, political conflicts, and propensity of groups within nation-states to engage in violence, the World Bank’s World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development(p.73-84) attributes civil war and conflict in African states to multiple “stresses.” The report argues that intra-state group violence and civil wars are consequent to a set of external and internal stresses that operate simultaneously. It refers to “these triggers of violence as security, economic, and justice stresses… [That] rarely exist in isolation.” Past or present experience of persecution creates internal security stresses within groups that use violence as a means of protecting themselves against their common aggressors.
On economic stresses, the report emphasizes that “rebellion [is] perceived to offer economic rents to rebel leaders and a viable living to followers who have no other source of livelihood.” In this respect, an important dimension of political exclusion is premised on ethnic, religious, and geopolitical considerations of the excluded groups. Here, the report suggests that “countries with high political exclusion or ethnic exclusion are more likely to experience violent upheaval”. Table 1 below illustrates the components of the three aforementioned stresses.
In addition to his subscription to the sociopolitical dimension of civil war and state failure in Africa, Koffi Anan (2004) did also subscribe to the economic dimension above. He contends that external and economic causes of governance failure ought not to be overlooked. His “external factors” and “economic motives” are closely inter-linked.
With regard to external factors, Anan argues that “in the competition for oil and other precious resources in Africa, interests external to Africa continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing conflict and in sustaining it.” These groups seek to prolong conflict in the region through supporting one ethnic-based rebellion against another, so that they maintain hostility and continue exploitation of natural resources.
Anan (2004) emphasizes that “high on the list of those who profit from conflict in Africa are international arms merchants” (p.13). Without external ‘refueling’ by non-state corporate entities, some African conflicts and civil wars would have had shorter time spans, lesser casualties, and lower intensity. Hence, even though Anan recognizes internal structural causes of civil war, he also believes that external intervention plays a pivotal role in determining their dynamics.
Mayen Ayarbior has a Bachelor Degree in Economics and Political Science from Kampala International University (Uganda), Masters in International Security from JKSIS-University of Denver (USA), and Bachelor of Laws (LLB) from the University of London. He is the author of “House of War (Civil War and State Failure in Africa) 2013” and currently the Press Secretary/ Spokesperson in the Office of South Sudan’s Vice President, H.E. James Wani Igga. You can reach him via his email address: mayen.ayarbior@gmail.com.
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