The quagmire of counter-insurgency everywhere
5 min readBy David Mayen Ayarbior, Juba, South Sudan
July 4, 2016 (SSB) — A few years ago I had a great privilege to be generously sponsored as a ‘Sie Fellow’ in Denver (Colorado) where I attended the prestigious Joseph Korbel School of International Studies for an MA in International Security. The greatest aspect of that privilege was the ability to listen, learn and interact intellectually with great academics and Korbel alumni who had also been decision makers (practitioners) at the U.S. State Department and DoD (Department of Defense).
Such list of Korbel alumni included people like Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, Gen. George Casey Jr, Christopher Hill, among other academics. Over 90 percent of MA International Security students were either active U.S. army/air force/navy officers or FBI/ CIA overt and covert operatives. Most of them served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and few in Africa where they were involve in executing counter insurgency strategies, which they narrated in details with the students.
My sole motive behind giving the background above is to highlight a theoretical (and sometimes practical) backgrounds which permit analysts to write about general policy aspects of national/international security issues in general and those affecting our beleaguered country in particular. In fact, it would be sinful for one to self-sensor oneself when one acquires such analytical skillsets.
For some reason, there is sometimes fallacious assumptions in many countries that security analyses must be confidential, even when they are so general in nature. But generally, because security touches all other aspects of life, it remains commonplace in newspapers and magazines to find analyses and general policy advice that are actually encouraged by the state – as they positively inform policy making decisions.
One lesson I got from my two years at Korbel is an acknowledgment by almost all lectures and students that the U.S. has always found itself into quagmires after invading other countries. They have all confessed that invading countries was the simplest part of U.S. military operations, while the most challenging part was (is) holding territory and wining citizens’ support after the invasion.
The difficulty discussed had always been related to U.S. military capability to undertake successful “counter-insurgency” operations, including “winning hearts and minds” of hostile natives. After spending hundreds of billions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the emergence of Islamic State and resurgence of Taliban in both countries have proven that wars are not won through military operations alone, even if they (wars) were justified.
The adage above applies to our situation too, even if the contexts are very different. In our case of fighting Khartoum, our forces did not have a quarter of the weaponry possessed by SAF (Sudan Armed Forces). Yet our collective greatest strength as a people since 1820’s Ottoman invasion up to independence in 2011 had always been our sense of belonging to (and ownership of) the land.
The same sense of belonging made the Viet Cong defeat the mighty U.S. military in Vietnam and the great Ahmad Shah Masud defeat mighty Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It is what made David Yao Yao and the Arrow Boys seem elusive. It is what is making the Nuba, Fur, Bija, and Funj undefeatable. And it is what made signing peace with Dr. Riek a prudent decision indeed. To all intents and purposes, it is a weapon mightier than all other weapons.
Since the breakout of our senseless civil war in 2013 and despite forming the TGoNU, all signs are pointing to the fact that prospects for improving the security situation in South Sudan have been fluctuating at best. Two steps forward three steps backward, three steps forward two steps backward. Unfortunately, taking into account Khartoum’s readiness to intervene, every region in South Sudan is now amassing its own militia ready to confront the state.
Of course – context aside- like the U.S. military in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Iraq, the state in our case has also often managed to regain territory but holding them will always be challenging.
The latest operation in Wau has generated internal and external condemnation. Most were genuine concerns for the innocent citizens who needlessly lost their lives, but obviously, few with self-serving political motives which may encourage further rebellion rather than provide win-win security formulae. Fishing in dirty waters, as it were.
However, as a South Sudanese and moreover a native of Wau, born and bred in the town, and because of the fact that my close maternal uncles and aunts with whom I partially grew up are from Ndogo and Balanda, I felt sympathetic and empathetic about the dire humanitarian situation women and children have been forced to endure without food or shelter for days.
Naturally, I couldn’t help wondering whether that was inevitable and the force used was proportionate to the state’s deterrence objective or threat posed by the insurgents, given the operational circumstance.
Make no mistake, I am not implying that our gallant armed forces should sit back and relax when Khartoum supported rebellions are mushrooming everywhere in the country. Far from it. That would surely be an abdication of their constitutional responsibility which would accelerate further state collapse. I theoretically know and am a firm believer in the imperative of having an effective security sector, including a formidable military which is capable of deterring external invasion and internal rebellion.
But I am also a firm believer in the concept of ‘winning hearts and minds’ as the most effective concomitant strategy in counter-insurgency. We hope the new governor of Wau starts employing it immediately as citizens return to their houses.
Mayen Ayarbior has a Bachelor Degree in Economics and Political Science from Kampala International University (Uganda), Masters in International Security from JKSIS-University of Denver (USA), and Bachelor of Laws (LLB) from the University of London. He is the author of “House of War (Civil War and State Failure in Africa) 2013” and currently the Press Secretary/ Spokesperson in the Office of South Sudan’s Vice President, H.E. James Wani Igga. You can reach him via his email address: mayen.ayarbior@gmail.com.
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