Dr. Salman Mohammed Ahmad: Eulogy and Tribute to the Friend, the Late Revolutionary Edward Lino

Stations in the Life of Uncle Edward Lino Wuor Abyei

Foreword, by David Mayen Dengdit (April 19, 2020, Denver-Colorado)

Monday, April 19, 2020 (PW) — While trying to write a few words of my own experience with late Uncle Edward, I thought of translating from Arabic to English some written obituaries by some of his friends from Sudan. I agreed with Uncle Edward’s daughter, Villa, that we should at some point in future compile them into a booklet of remembrance of the life of one of the great human beings so many have known.

I will start with this piece from one of his colleagues at the University of Khartoum, Dr. Salman Mohammed Ahmad Suleiman- who was writing from Washington DC. The article was posted on Sudaneseonline, April 18, 2020. 

Being not a professional translator, in case of linguistic and translation errors on my side, the translations should, by no means, be taken by the original writers as intentional misrepresentations of their opinions, as they are surely capable of making their own English versions.

N,B. My only input into the piece is the headings, which I thought would improve the flow of reading and the readers’ enthusiasm to complete this amazing obituary and understand Uncle Edwards operational environment.

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Title: The Friend, the Late Revolutionary Edward Lino:

Original article by Dr. Salman Mohammed Ahmad Sulieman (April 18, 2020, Washington DC)

Translated by David Mayen Dengdit (April 19, 2020, Denver-Colorado).

1. Media house have posted news about the death of the Sudanese revolutionary, Edward Lino, at a hospital in Bangalore (India), after a long struggle with illness. The news made me very sad, as I have known the late as a colleague and friend since we first met in July 1967 as new/first year students at the College of Arts, University of Khartoum. We had since maintained communication with him, even after the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

From our first meeting, I became amused by his complete and deep belief in the possibility of having a vast nation, which could accommodate all of us, irrespective of our various cultures, ethnicities, religious beliefs, and languages. I was also amused by his fluent spoken Arabic language, as-well-as complete command of English, a language which we, as his colleagues, had difficulty speaking.

However, what amused me most and attracted me to him was his warmth, self-respect, and amazing discipline and closeness to all his colleges (boys and girls alike)- from both Southern and Northern Sudan. In addition, he had an ever-present wide smile, even during our usual tense discussions about the current affairs revolving around the North-South relations.

                                     Background

2. Those were difficult years in the North-South relations.  The year 1967, the same year we met, had witnessed the collapse of The Round Table Conference after rejection by all Northern political parties, without exception, of the demand for Federalism, which Mr. William Deng Nhial was trying to revive.

The Northern political parties had insisted on a centralized system with delegation of some responsibilities to the three Southern provinces. As a result, voices became louder in Khartoum and its universities as-well-as in the main Northern towns, chanting “No federation for one nation!”

To add fuel to the fire of rejecting Federalism, the Constitutional Review Committee, which had been constituted by the two ruling Northern parties, started to openly speak about an ongoing drafting of an Islamic Constitution for Sudan, in order for the country to become a centralized state under an Islamo-Arabic umbrella.

Consequently, most exiled Southern politicians who had returned to Khartoum to attend to the Round Table Conference were forced to return to exile once again. Two of them, Mr.  Agrey Jaden and Mr. Gordon Mortat declared that the failure of the Round Table Conference meant a failure of any peaceful resolution of the problem.

A twelve-member committee which had emerged from the Round Table Conference, continued its impotent attempt towards the question as to whether the South should be one province as demanded by the remaining southern politicians, or three regions as adamantly demanded by Northern politicians, and the extent of delegated powers under the umbrella of a centralized Arabo-Islamic state. Hence, the attempts by the Round Table Conference and the twelve- person committee were an absolute failure to reach an agreement on the “problem of the South.”

                        General University Activism

3. For the reasons above, in 1967 the situation at the University of Khartoum became very tense in relation to the “problem of the South”. That situation reflected into the consolidation of existing strong social and political isolationism and segregation between Southern and Northern students. The southern students belonged to their own political organization- The African National Front (ANF). Only a negligible couple of southerners were affiliated to northern parties.  

The political and social boycotting and isolationism by southern students encompassed all the socio-cultural and academic societies, including boycotting participation in Student’s Union elections. A vast North-South rift was visible, and it was clear that the South and North would never meet, whether within the compass or outside the university. 

North-South isolated groupings became characteristic of university life, making inter-student interaction among both groups very limited; only forced by attending the same joint lectures. Even seating arrangements at dining tables during mealtimes, which were three times a day, were segregated, with limited exceptions forced by specific circumstances for that specific day or meal. 

 Edward Lino’s Arrival (1967)

4. However, in 1967 Edward arrived in Khartoum and its University with a whole new spirit, a different flavor, and warmth of character with which he was able to shatter the thick segregation walls between the two student groups. There he was seen seated among Northern students (boys and girls) at discussion tables, speaking about the Northern-Southern problem in his characteristic calms spirit and voice, without anger and agitation, nor accusations that would usually lead to confrontations and ending of any form of individual relations between those involved. We would see him the next day seated among Southern students leading similar discussions. 

Because of his calm conversation style, great respect for those around him, and his amazing capacity to keep his personal connection and relations with both groups, our admiration of this new character increased day-by-day. 

We used to see him seated among Northern students during classical Arabic lectures, asking questions and making complex arguments in fluent and grammatically correct Arabic that amused Northern students as-well-as lecturers. We used to compete to sit close to Edward during mealtimes just to listen to his arguments and discuss with him about the relationship between the North and South, perspectives and views that were new to many of us. 

At the time, we as Northern students of the University of Khartoum were agitated and brainwashed from elementary school that the war in Southern Sudan was the only path to defeating neo-colonialism, imperialism, Christian crusaders and international Zionism which were said to be feeding and sponsoring a civil war against Islam and pan-Arabism; thereby making the war in Southern Sudan an imperative to keep Sudan united. 

Despite apparent contradictions in its components, that had become our core political belief and philosophy about the root causes of the civil war in Southern Sudan; irrespective of whether we belonged to the right, left, or center within the student bodies. However, with his calmness, depth of logic and arguments, and remarkable discipline, he had started to shake the foundations of such fallacious beliefs that were in the minds of so many of us.

5. In 1969, as part of a small group of students and after two years in the College of Arts and Economics, Edward and I transferred to the College of Law. That was what the system required. The number of students in the College of Law was not more than thirty, which made it possible for us to know ourselves and build stronger relations and friendships; especially as we lived at the same dormitory, ate in the same mess, and studied and carried out research at the same library. 

Col. Numeri and the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement:

6. A month before we transferred to the College of Law, the government of Col. Jafar Numeri –  a man who had come to power through a military coup on May 25, 1969, had made a declaration about the importance of a peaceful settlement of the problem of Southern Sudan. The declaration referred to a joint meeting between the Revolution’s Leadership Council and the Council of Ministers in which the “problem of the South” was calmly and deeply discussed. The declaration further clarified that the joint meeting had recognize the imperative of the right of self-governance for South Sudan within one country.

Furthermore, the declaration included a self-governance implementation program, including a general amnesty for all those involved in the armed conflict since the start of the civil war in 1955; in addition to a comprehensive plan for socio-cultural and economic development of the South; appointment of a Minister of Southern Affairs; Planning Council for the Development of the South with its concomitant special budget; Training of Southerners to participate management of their own local governments. The declaration concluded by calling on Southerners to put down their weapons and rejoin the process of peace building.

The declaration was full of leftist revolutionary slogans which attributed the war to imperialism and neo-colonialism; while, at the same time, it courageously acknowledged the country’s cultural, ethnic, religious, economic and historical diversities; and the imperative of a negotiated settlement of the problem.

The 1969 declaration led to complex and protracted negotiation with Southern leaders, culminating into signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972), which ended the first civil war and brought back peace to South Sudan, even though for just while.

7. Immediately after issuance of the June 9 declaration, most of the Northern student political organizations at the University of Khartoum decided to open communication channels with their Southern counterparts, and with the African National Front in particular, with the hope of including Southern student bodies in a national dialogue and participation in the political, cultural, and social activities within and outside the University. 

Based on the June 9 declaration, the main prerequisites for starting such a difficult and complex work was the presence of individuals who had necessary personal capacities and abilities to enable a fruitful dialogue and form a communication bridge between Northern and Southern students.

The search for such a person did not take long, for Edward was the man of the moment for that difficult and complex mission –  and I was a witness (given my close relationship with him) to the great and admirable role Edward Lino played. There was a consensus by everyone that the positive outcome of that endeavor could not be attained without Edward’s leadership role.

With his diplomacy, extensive relationships, and strong belief in the possibilities of a united country, Edward Lino had opened the door wide for a smooth communication between the two sides, leading to a resolution by the Southern groups to start participating in the political, cultural and social activities in the University. 

After the July 9 declaration, Edward himself became among the first Southern Sudanese students who decided to participate in political, intellectual, and social activism within the University. He participated in 1970 Law Society elections and he won that election. As his friend, I had the honor to work with him in a committee of the Law Society, and I closely got to know his political, intellectual, and organizational capacities.

                         Southern War of Independence

8. However, president Numeri decided not to be an exception to his predecessors from Northern politicians – both military and civilians- regarding the problem of Southern Sudan. He reneged on his promises to the South, and arrogantly squandered his own achievements, which would have set him apart from the other Northern politicians.

 Not long after, he started violating the Addis Ababa Agreement- provision after provision, divided the South into three regions, and declared the Sheria Islamic penal codes as the law of the land. He, in a clear violation of the Agreement, further involved himself in repulsive manner into appointments and firing of executive, legislative and military personnel in the Southern regions.

Such great violations of the Addis Ababa Agreement paved the way for the establishment of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/A (SPLM/A) and the start of the second civil war in 1983; which led to the Right of Self-determination (1992) and its re-confirmation in Machakos Protocols (2002), then Naivasha (2005), the Referendum) and secession of South Sudan in 2011.

9. Edward Lino was among the first Southerners who became involved in the formation of the SPLM/A in 1983. He was among the first few who drafted the SPLM Manifesto. There emerged a clear confluence between the SPLM manifesto and New Sudan vision and Edward Lino’s political thoughts and dreams of a vast country for all Sudanese with their cultural, ethnic, and religious diversities; a thought process which he shared with us way back in 1967.

He abandoned his life, family, personal ambitions, and got fully involved with all his capacities in the service of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). He climbed in the movement’s organization hierarchy, becoming a member of its National Liberation Council; Director for External Security, and in charge of the Abyei file. 

10. After a long separation, I met with Edward in Washington DC in the summer of 1991. At the time, he had been appointed as the SPLM Representative in the United States. But his stay in Washington was shortened as he was recalled back to Southern Sudan in the aftermath of a split in the SPLM/A in the latter half of 1991.

In Washington, we had a long conversation. I was extremely happy to talk to him again after a quarter century, since way back when we met as students at the University of Khartoum. I felt as if I travelled back in time to 1967, as I learned once again from his rich and tough political, military, and combat experiences.

 I listened to him once again as he talked to me, like he did in 1967, about what he termed “the art of the possibilities in the relations between the North and the South;” in spite of the destructive war of Islamic crusades that had been brought to the people of Southern Sudan by the Islamist regime ( after their military coup of June 30, 1989).

It was clear to me that his rich experience in the SPLM/A had enhanced his political and ideological beliefs, and his highly disciplined and respectful way of dealing with others. However, during that short encounter, the health impacts of military ground operations in the jungles of South Sudan were visible to me.

11. After the separation of South Sudan, Edward became the one responsible for the Abyei file and representative of South Sudan in the attempts to resolve it. In a short meeting with him after the independence of South Sudan, I asked him about the case of Abyei and his perspective on how the differences about its resolution could be bridged, especially after the failure of the Abyei referendum. 

He kept quiet for long, then told me: Why can’t we use Abyei as a bridge to restore some political relations between the two countries. I asked: Are you thinking about a confederation? He, this time, kept quiet for a longer period, then answered in a voice full of bitterness and sadness; as he tried to cover his answer within a rich work in national political activism that stretched over fifty years: “Let’s leave this option [of confederation] for future generations; our generation has failed in that.”

12. Rest in peace my friend Edward Abyei Lino Wuor Abyei, for you have fully completed your national duty and role with unmatched selflessness and commitment. 

For contact: Salmanmasalman@gmail.com; mayen.ayarbior@gmial.com 

http://www.salmanmasalman.org

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