The Principles of Tribocracy (Part 7)
The current state of affairs in South Sudan
Past Governments of President Kiir: The Dynamic Interplay Between Power Politics and Ethnicity in the Republic of South Sudan under a Tribocratic Paradigm (Part 3)
In this article, my contention is that all past governments of President Kiir, from the post-CPA government in 2005 to the post-July 8th government in 2016, have violated the principle of Tribocracy because the president has marginalized the Equatorians (-5.86%) and Nuer (-2.62%) while over-representing the Dinka (+4.75%) and Minority Group (+3.75%). Of the 389 political positions of President Kiir’s past governments, the Dinka should have been given 148 positions; the Equatorians 124 positions; the Nuer 74 positions and the Minority Group 43 positions, which translates to a tribocratic equilibrium of 38%, 32%, 19% and 11% of the government respectively.
By PaanLuel Wël, Juba, South Sudan
I: General Introduction
August 19, 2017 (SSB) — In his much-publicized resignation letter of February 11, 2017, the former SPLA Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics, Gen. Thomas Cirilo Swaka, writes that President Kiir, instead of developing the country and professionalizing the national army, has “concentrated on coordinating and planning for establishing and entrenching Dinka ethnic domination, and pursuing a strategy of turning the SPLA and other organized forces into brutal tribal forces that serve as instruments of control and clinging to power.”
In what amount to a manifesto of his National Salvation Front (NAS), “South Sudan: The Compelling Case for Change, How, and Towards What Outcomes,” which was released on March 6th, 2017, Gen. Thomas Cirillo rubbishes the essence of the national constitution by accusing the president of being the primary author and principal beneficiary of the transitional constitution of the Republic of South Sudan.
In principle, Gen. Thomas Cirilo contention is that the national army and the transitional constitution of South Sudan are being systematically deployed by the president to protect, consolidate and perpetuate the economic interests, political domination and security guarantees of the Dinka tribe—a group of people whose loyalty to their group is greater than which they demonstrate towards the nation of which they are part of, according to a quote by Gen. Thomas Cirilo.
The premise of Gen. Thomas Cirilo’s argument is the domination of the army and government by the Dinka community, the result of which is the marginalization of other communities as the Dinka-controlled government and Dinka-dominated army cater exclusively to the political, security and economic interest of the Dinka people.
The resolution of the national conflict, according to Gen. Thomas Cirilo, will not just be the dethronement of President Kiir, but also the institutionalization of a national policy framework to address Dinka ethnic hegemony, and marginalization of other communities in all its forms in the entire public and private sectors of the Republic of South Sudan.
There are two fundamental problems with the premise advanced by Gen. Thomas Cirilo. First, he has no figures whatsoever to substantiate his assertion of ethnic domination and marginalization; secondly, there is no clear definition of—criteria to delineate—ethnic domination in South Sudan. For example, what qualifies as an ethnic domination of a government and army in a multi-ethnic country like South Sudan? Is it the absolute share or the proportionate share of the national government and army?
If, for instance, the Chollo community is 45% of the national population and control 30% of the national government and army, while the Zande community is 5% of the national population and control 15% of the national government and army. Between the Chollo and Zande community, who is dominating the government and army, and who is being marginalized, in this particular binary case?
On the one hand, it is true that the Chollo community holds the largest share of the national government while the Zande community occupies the smallest share. Therefore, by absolute share hypothesis, the Chollo community dominates the national government and army. On the other hand, it is also true that the Zande community’s share of the national government (15%) is three times that of their national population (5%), while the percentage share of the national government by the Chollo community is 15% less than that of their national population. Thus, by proportionate share hypothesis, the Zande community is dominating the national government and army, while the Chollo community is being systematically marginalized and repressed.
Both supposition, however, can’t be true under the same circumstance; it is either the case that the Chollo community dominates and Zande community is being methodically marginalized or the Chollo community is being marginalized while the Zande community is exercising ethnic hegemony over the national government and army. When Gen. Thomas Cirilo asserts that President Kiir is systematically promoting and entrenching Dinka ethnic domination of the national army and government, it is not evidently clear whether he was talking about absolute or proportionate share of the national government and army.
Gen. Thomas Cirilo might have meant that the Dinka community, like the Zande community above, holds more than their fair share of the national government proportionate to their percentage share of the national population; alternatively, he could have had in mind a scenario where the Dinka community, like the Chollo community above, simply has more representatives in the national government and army without due consideration of their percentage share of the national population.
Obviously, Gen. Thomas Cirilo lacks an analytical framework to probe the evidence, and evaluate the extent, of the alleged Dinka ethnic hegemony in South Sudan. Secondly, he has no guiding principle to frame and ground the institutionalization of a national policy to counter the supposedly Dinka ethnic domination of the national government and army.
Therefore, in the absence of any analytical framework and guiding principle to diagnose and ascertain the question of ethnic hegemony in South Sudan, Gen. Thomas Cirilo is merely trafficking in the pedestrian conception of ethnic domination, which is symptomatically reflective of the national perception of ethnic domination, marginalization and neglect. More often than not, a perfect recipe for political instability occurs when perception overtakes reality as it is currently the case in South Sudan.
Thus, his proposed national policy framework to address Dinka ethnic hegemony, were it to succeed, would amount to nothing more than our-turn-to-dominate-and-eat case scenario. This is why it is so daunting for warring parties to devise any feasible solution to the current ongoing conflict in South Sudan within the prevailing political dispensation and mindset.
For South Sudanese people, of myriad ethnic backgrounds and conflicting political predilections, to live in peace and dignity in a socially harmonious, politically stable and economically prosperous South Sudan, they must confront the challenge of fair and just, representative governance, one that is reflective of the four political tribes of South Sudan. This is why South Sudanese people should advocate for, embrace and institutionalize tribocracy.
If South Sudanese people can devise and institutionalize an inclusive system of governance, which, in perception and practice, could be seen as fair, just and equitable for all the political tribes of South Sudan, then the fight against tribalism will be won and South Sudan will avoid the pitfalls of her fellow post-colonial African countries by becoming a successful, new, prosperous nation because a political system where representatives of a particular ethnic group hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group represents will promote and preserve peace and harmony among all the political groups of South Sudan.
II: The Essence of Tribocracy
In Part One (1) of this article, The Principles of Tribocracy, I have argued that the most coherent and effective method to achieve an equitable, fair and just system of governance in South Sudan in particular and Africa, in general, is to adopt and institutionalize tribocracy. I defined tribocracy as a political system where representatives of a particular ethnic group hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group represents in order to promote and achieve fair and equitable political representation across all ethnic groups comprising that particular nation. In other words, tribocracy is a system of governance in which equality in political representation in the national government and/or at the state level is achieved through the principle of equitable and fair tribal representation.
As revealed in Part Two (2)—power-mapping of ethnicity in the Republic South Sudan—of this article, under a tribocratic system, South Sudan would be divided into four major political tribes, namely the Dinka who are about 38.18% of South Sudan’s national population; the Equatorian who are around 31.82%; the Nuer who are approximately 19.33% and the Minority Group who are roughly 10.65%. In this second part, I used the blueprint of tribocracy to demonstrate, in a logical and effective way, how power-mapping of ethnicity in South Sudan could enable us to address the mortal threat of tribalism to our national existence. I argued that with more honest, constructive and reflective national discourse, we can put together a coherent leadership and logical framework to manage and achieve the proverbial “unity in diversity” across Sub-Saharan Africa.
Part Three (3) of this article is about the application of tribocratic dispensation to the then hurting stalemate of the South Sudanese’ peace talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. My contention was, and still is, that tribocracy is the most equitable and effective way to allocate power in a power-sharing transitional government because each representative of the Dinka, the Equatorian, the Nuer and the Minority Group would hold a number of interim government posts—political, economic and military ones—proportionate to the percentage of the total population that each of these particular four political tribes represents in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. My conclusion was that an interim government in which the Dinka represent 38.18%, Equatorian 31.82%, Nuer 19.33% and the Minority Group 10.65%—both politically, economically and militarily—would truly be a transitional government of national unity.
In Part Four (4) of this article, I provided a tribocratic analysis of the 7th Government of President Kiir—the KIIR-RIEK’s Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU) established after the signing and promulgation of the Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS). My argument was that the then formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU) had violated the principle of Tribocracy because President Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar had marginalized the Dinka (-4%), Equatorians (-3%) and Nuer (-2%) while over-representing the Minority Group (+9%). My conclusion was that the Dinka should have been offered 16 positions; the Equatorians 13 positions; the Nuer 8 positions and the Minority Group 4 positions, which would have translated to 38%, 32%, 19% and 11% of the cabinet respectively.
Part Five (5) and Six (6) of this article are an in-depth compilation, tabulation, representation and analysis of all President Kiir’s past governments since the advent of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). While, Part Five (5) tabularizes the names, positions and counties of the entire national government from October 2005 to July 2016, Part Six (6), on the other hand, provides a comprehensive tribocratic analysis of all President Kiir’s past governments based on the political caucuses, constituencies, sections, the old ten states, the new 32 states, the old 72 counties, of the Republic of South Sudan. With the help of the data tabulated in Part Five (5), and the analysis presented in Part Six (6), any interested party can corroboratively bolster or refute the assertions advanced by Gen. Thomas Cirilo in his resignation letter in relation to the alleged ethnic domination, marginalization and neglect, in the Republic of South Sudan.
In this Part Seven (7) of The Principle of Tribocracy, I am going to use the refined data and analysis of the past governments of President Kiir to demonstrate the dynamic interplay between power politics and ethnicity in the Republic of South Sudan under a tribocratic paradigm. With the help of the compiled data from the May 2008 “Southern Sudan Counts: Tables from the 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census,” it is possible to definitively clarify, through illustration, the recurrent question of alleged ethnic domination, marginalization and neglect, in the Republic of South Sudan.
By so doing, I hope to provide a concrete basis, with verifiable cold, hard data, for any South Sudanese to judiciously partake in the national discourse in relation to the question of ethnic domination, marginalization, and neglect in the Republic of South Sudan. Rather than relying on the hopeless sectional perception to make wild claims that can’t be substantiated, a student of Tribocracy should be able to base his/her argument on solid foundation of tribocratic paradigm—with verifiable data, analytical framework and guiding principle—to diagnose and ascertain the question of ethnic hegemony and marginalization in South Sudan.
Tribocracy is a system of government in which each and every political tribe is fairly and justly represented. With each of the four political tribes holding a number of government positions proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular political tribe in question represents, the government should be seen as “ours” by those to whom justice has been done by a tribocratic system that enshrines fair and equitable political representation across all political ethnic groups comprising that particular country.
In a fair and just system of governance in which representatives of a particular political tribe hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group represents, the Dinka would take 38.18% of the national government, the Equatorian 31.82%, the Nuer 19.33% and the Minority Group 10.65%. Rather than arbitrary presidential decrees, the appointment of political leaders—access to national resources and monopoly over national security—should be encoded by the tyranny of numbers, just as it is for the elections of the president, state governors, national and state members of parliament (MPs) etc. This is the principle of tribocracy.
Holistically speaking, each of the four political tribes would represent its fair and just share of the national government, politically, economically and militarily. Hence, the alleged question of Dinka domination, the perceived threat of Nuer rebellion, the rumored resurgence of Equatorian neo-kokora-ism, and the supposed marginalization of Minority Group would be resolved, once and for all. Surely, a national government in which the Dinka represent 38.18%, Equatorian 31.82%, Nuer 19.33% and the Minority Group 10.65%—both politically, economically and militarily—is truly a national government of all South Sudanese, by all South Sudanese and for all South Sudanese people.
Naturally, this would be a free and fair system of power sharing. Justice would be done because each political tribe would be allocated its fair and rightful share in the national and state government as predetermined by their population size. No political group would feel unjustly marginalized or neglected in the political, economic and security aspects of the government.
Thus, through tribocratic dispensation, the South Sudan people can amicably and satisfactorily unravel the lingering perception of and claim about ethnic hegemony, marginalization and neglect in South Sudan. Because tribocracy works like a machine, power politics will be predictable and preordained. Political stability would ensue; peace and national development would flourish and the evils of the tribalized power struggle that have been battering South Sudan would be greatly blunted—and rendered irrelevant in the long run.
III. Of Political Caucus, Constituency and Section
The political caucus is the dominant, the most influential, political force or group in the country, while political constituency is the sub-group of that dominant political force. A section is the sub-set of the political constituency. Whereas political caucus is much more pronounced at the national level, a political constituency and section are mostly dominant at the state and county levels respectively. Under a tribocratic dispensation, there are four (4) political caucuses, thirteen (13) political constituencies and one hundred and thirty-five (135) political sections in the Republic of South Sudan.
The four (4) political caucuses are the Dinka, Nuer, Equatorian and the Minority Group. The Minority Group are those ethnic communities that are not Dinka, not Nuer and not Equatorian, such as the Shilluk, Balanda, Murle, Burun, Fertit, Anyuak, Berta, Luo, Jie, Kachipo, Bongo etc. The thirteen (13) political constituencies in South Sudan are: the Rek Dinka, Agaar Dinka, Padang Dinka and Bor Dinka for the Dinka political caucus; the Western, Central and Eastern Equatorians for the Equatorian political caucus; the Lou Nuer, the Jikany Nuer, the Liech Nuer and the Phow Nuer for the Nuer political caucus, and lastly, the Eastern and Western Minorities for the Minority Group political caucus.
Rather than the so-called sixty-four (64) tribes, there are actually one hundred and thirty-five (135) political sections in South Sudan: Twic; Bor; Nyarweng; Hol; Paweny; Rut; Thoi; Luach-Pigi; Aloor; Panaruu; Abiliang; Dongjol; Ageer; Nyiel; Ngok-Lual Yak; Jook (Ngok Abyei); Aliab; Gok; Agaar; Chiech; Atuot (Reel); Apuk-Giir; Awan-Chan; Awan-Mou; Aguok; Kuach-Ayok; Thiik; Luach-Jang; Luach-Koth; Akook; Jal-Wou; Konggoor; Noi; Atok; Abiem-Tonj; Abuok; Nyang; Leer; Awan-Parek; Lou-Ariik; Lou-Paher; Apuk-Padoch; Yaar; Thony; Apuk-Jurwiir; Muok; Twic Mayaardit; Malual-Giernyang; Abiem-Aweil; Ajak; Buonchuai; Kongdeer; Mundu; Avukaya; Baka; Moro; Jur-Bhel; Moro Kodo; Zande; Balanda; Bari; Nyangwara; Lokoya; Kuku; Pojullu; Makaraka (Adio); Kakwa; Keliko; Lugbwara; Mundari; Didinga; Buya (Larim); Lango; Logir; Dongotano; Imatong; Taposa ; Nyangatom; Tid; Lopit; Pari; Tenet; Madi; Acholi; Otuho; Lolubo; Ifoto; Gon; Moor; Gawaar; Laak; Thiang; Gajaak; Gajook; Gaguang; Bul; Jagei; Dok; Hak; Western Jikany; Nyuong; Ador; Leek; Shilluk (Chollo); Burun (Chai); Berta; Koma; Uduk (Gomus); Murle; Jie (Jiye); Kachipo (Suri/Ngalam); Anyuak; Bongo; Jur-Modo; Jur Man-Anger; Jur-Chol; Balanda-Bor; Banda; Sere; Aja; Binga; Feroghe (Kaligi); Indri; Kara; Mangayat (Bugwa); Ngulgule; Shatt (Thuri); Yulu; Woro (Orlo); Balanda-Bagari; Balanda-Boor; Balanda-Bviri; Gollo; Bai, and Ndogo.
Table 1: Power-Mapping of Ethnicity in the Republic of South Sudan under Tribocratic Paradigm
| Political Caucus | Political Constituency | Political Section | County | Population 2008 Census | National Percentage |
| Dinka | Bor Dinka | Twic | Twic East | 85,349 | 1.03% |
| Bor | Boor | 221,106 | 2.68% | ||
| Nyarweng, Hol, | Duk | 65,588 | 0.79% | ||
| Padang Dinka | Paweny, Rut, Thoi, Luach | Pigi | 99,068 | 1.19% | |
| Aloor | Abiemnhom | 17,012 | 0.21% | ||
| Panaruu | Panriang | 82,443 | 0.99% | ||
| Abiliang, Dongjol | Renk | 137,751 | 1.67% | ||
| Ageer, Nyiel, | Melut | 49,242 | 0.59% | ||
| Ngok-Lual Yak | Baliet | 48,010 | 0.58% | ||
| Jook (Ngok Abyei) | Abyei | 52,883 | 0.64% | ||
| Agaar Dinka | Aliab | Awerial | 47,041 | 0.57% | |
| Gok | Cueibet | 117,755 | 1.43% | ||
| Agaar (Kwei, Ruup) | Rumbek Center | 153,550 | 1.86% | ||
| Agaar (Aliamtooch) | Rumbek East | 122,832 | 1.49% | ||
| Agaar (Pakam) | Rumbek North | 43,410 | 0.53% | ||
| Chiech | Yirol East | 67,402 | 0.82% | ||
| Atuot (Reel) | Yirol West | 103,190 | 1.25% | ||
| Rek Dinka | Apuk-Giir, Jur Man-Anger | Gogrial East | 103,283 | 1.25% | |
| Awan-Chan, Awan-Mou, Aguok, Kuach-Ayok | Gogrial West | 243,921 | 2.95% | ||
| Thiik, Luach-Jang, Luach-Koth, Akook, Jal-Wou, | Tonj East | 116,122 | 1.41% | ||
| Konggoor, Noi, Atok, Abiem, Abuok, Nyang, Leer, Awan-Parek, Lou-Ariik, Lou-Paher, Apuk-Padoch | Tonj North | 165,222 | 2.00% | ||
| Yaar, Thony, Apuk-Jurwiir, Muok, Bongo | Tonj South | 86,592 | 1.05% | ||
| Twic Mayaardit | Twic | 204,905 | 2.48% | ||
| Malual-Giernyang | Aweil Center | 41,827 | 0.51% | ||
| Abiem | Aweil East | 309,921 | 3.75% | ||
| Malual-Giernyang | Aweil North | 129,127 | 1.56% | ||
| Ajak, Buoncuai, Kongdeer, | Aweil South | 73,806 | 0.89% | ||
| Malual-Giernyang | Aweil West | 166,217 | 2.01% | ||
| Equatorian | Western Equatorians | Zande | Ezo | 80,861 | 0.98% |
| Zande, Mundu | Ibba | 41,869 | 0.51% | ||
| Moru, Avukaya, Mundu, Baka | Maridi | 82,461 | 0.99% | ||
| Moro, | Mundri East | 48,318 | 0.59% | ||
| Moro, Moro Kodo | Mundri West | 33,975 | 0.41% | ||
| Jur-Bhel, Moro | Mvolo | 48,134 | 0.58% | ||
| Zande, Balanda | Nagero | 10,077 | 0.12% | ||
| Zande | Nzara | 65,712 | 0.79% | ||
| Zande, Balanda | Tambura | 55,365 | 0.67% | ||
| Zande | Yambio | 152,257 | 1.84% | ||
| Central Equatorians | Bari, Nyangwara, Lokoya | Juba | 368,436 | 4.46% | |
| Kuku | Kajo-Keji | 196,387 | 2.38% | ||
| Pajulu, Makaraka (Adio) | Lainya | 89,315 | 1.08% | ||
| Kakwa, Keliko, Lugbwara | Morobo | 103,603 | 1.25% | ||
| Mundari | Terekeka | 144,373 | 1.75% | ||
| Kakwa, Pajulu, Avukaya, | Yei | 201,443 | 2.44% | ||
| Eastern Equatorians | Didinga, Buya (Larim) | Budi | 99,234 | 1.20% | |
| Lango, Logir, Dongotano, Imatong | Ikotos | 84,649 | 1.03% | ||
| Taposa, Nyangatom | Kapoeta East | 163,997 | 1.99% | ||
| Taposa | Kapoeta North | 103,084 | 1.25% | ||
| Taposa, Tid | Kapoeta South | 79,470 | 0.96% | ||
| Lopit, Pari, Tenet | Lopa | 106,161 | 1.29% | ||
| Madi, Acholi | Magwi | 169,826 | 2.06% | ||
| Otuho, Lolubo, Ifoto | Torit | 99,740 | 1.21% | ||
| Nuer | Lou Nuer | Gon (Chieng-Dak) | Wuror | 178,519 | 2.16% |
| Gon (Gatbaal) | Nyirol | 108,674 | 1.32% | ||
| Moor | Akobo | 136,210 | 1.65% | ||
| Phow Nuer | Gawaar | Ayod | 139,282 | 1.69% | |
| Laak, Thiang | Fangak | 110,130 | 1.33% | ||
| Jikany Nuer | Gajaak (Chieng-Wau) | Maiwut | 79,462 | 0.96% | |
| Gajaak (Thiang) | Longochuk | 63,166 | 0.76% | ||
| Gajook (Chieng-Lang) | Ulang | 85,044 | 1.03% | ||
| Gajook (Chieng-Nyilieth), Gaguang | Nasir/Luakpiny | 210,002 | 2.54% | ||
| Liech Nuer | Bul | Mayom | 120,715 | 1.46% | |
| Jangei | Koch | 74,863 | 0.91% | ||
| Dok | Leer | 53,022 | 0.64% | ||
| Hak | Mayendit | 53,783 | 0.65% | ||
| Western Jikany | Guit | 33,004 | 0.39% | ||
| Nyuong, Ador | Panyijar | 50,723 | 0.61% | ||
| Leek | Rubkona | 100,236 | 1.21% | ||
| Minority Group | Eastern Minorities | Shilluk (Chollo) | Kodok/Fashoda | 36,518 | 0.44% |
| Shilluk (Chollo) | Malakal | 126,483 | 1.53% | ||
| Shilluk (Chollo) | Manyo | 38,010 | 0.46% | ||
| Shilluk (Chollo) | Panyikang | 45,427 | 0.55% | ||
| Burun (Chai), Berta, Koma, Uduk (Gomus), | Maban | 45,238 | 0.55% | ||
| Murle, Jie, Kachipo (Suri or Ngalam) | Pibor | 148,475 | 1.79% | ||
| Anyuak | Pochalla | 66,201 | 0.80% | ||
| Western Minorities | Jur-Bhel, Bongo, Jur-Modo | Wulu | 40,550 | 0.49% | |
| Jur-Chol, Balanda-Bor | Jur River | 127,771 | 1.55% | ||
| Banda, Sere, Aja, Binga, Feroghe (Kaligi), Indri, Kara, Mangayat (Bugwa), Ngulgule, Shatt (Thuri), Yulu, Woro (Orlo) | Raja | 54,340 | 0.66% | ||
| Balanda-Bagari, Balanda-Boor, Balanda-Bviri, Bongo, Gollo, Jur-chol, Bai, Ndogo, | Wau | 151,320 | 1.83% | ||
| TOTAL | Political Constituency | Political Section | County | 8,260,490 | 100% |
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Based on the May 2008 “Southern Sudan Counts: Tables from the 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census,” the Dinka political caucus represent about 38% of the national population; the Equatorian 32%; the Nuer 19%, and the Minority Group 11%.
For the political constituencies within the Dinka political caucus, the Agaar Dinka (Aliab, Atuot, Agaar, Chiech and Gok) represents about 7.93% of the national population; the Padang Dinka (Panaruu, Thoi, Abyei, Luach-Pigi, Ageer, Paweny, Rut, Aloor, Nyiel, Abiliang, Dongjol and Ngok Lual-Yak) represents 5.88%; the Bor Dinka (Nyarweng, Hol, Bor, and Twic) represents 4.50%, and the Rek Dinka (Gogrial, Tonj and Aweil) represents 19.86%.
Within the Rek Dinka constituency, Gogrial Dinka represents the Dinka communities of Awan-Chan, Awan-Mou, Aguok, Apuk-Giir, Twic Mayaardit and Kuach-Ayok; Aweil Dinka represents the Dinka communities of Abiem-Aweil, Malual-Giernyang, Ajak, Buonchuai, and Kongdeer, while Tonj Dinka represents the Dinka communities of Thiik, Luach-Jang, Luach-Koth, Akook, Jal-Wou, Konggoor, Noi, Atok, Abiem-Tonj, Abuok, Nyang, Leer, Awan-Parek, Lou-Ariik, Lou-Paher, Apuk-Padoch, Yaar, Thony, Apuk-Jurwiir, and Muok.
For the political constituencies within the Nuer political caucus, the Liech Nuer (Leek, Nyuong, Dok, Bul, Hak, Jagei, and Western Jikany) represent about 5.87% of the national population; the Jikany Nuer (Gajaak, Gajook and Gaguang) represent 5.29%; the Lou Nuer (Moor and Gon) represent 5.13%, and the Phow Nuer (Gawaar, Laak and Thiang) represent 3.02%.
For the political constituencies within the Equatorian political caucus, the Central Equatorians (Bari, Mundari, Kuku, Pajulu, Kakwa, Lokoya, Nyangwara, Lugbwara, Keliko etc.) represent about 13.36% of the national population; the Eastern Equatorians (Lotuho, Buya, Taposa, Madi, Acholi, Lango, Didinga, Logir Lopit, Pari, Lolubo, Tenet, Horiok, Nyagatom, Dongotano etc.) represent 10.99%, and the Western Equatorians (Zande, Mundu, Moru, Balanda, Baka, Avukaya, Jur-Bhel etc.) represent 7.48%.
For the political constituencies within the Minority Group political caucus, the Eastern Minorities (Shilluk, Murle, Anyuak, Burun, Kachipo, Jie, Berta etc.) represent about 6.12% of the national population, while the Western Minorities (Fertit, Luo, Bongo, Balanda etc.) represent 4.53%.
What this entails in theory and practice is that a fair and just government in the Republic of South Sudan should be shared equitably accordingly to the proportionate percentages of the political caucuses, constituencies and sections under tribocratic paradigm.
For example, if the Nuer political caucus is 19.33% of South Sudan population and the Rek Dinka political constituency is 19.86%, then, under tribocratic dispensation, it is fair and just to allocate 19.86% of the national government to the Rek Dinka and 19.33% to the Nuer although, by South Sudanese standard, the Nuer is a nation, while the Rek Dinka are a subset of the Dinka nation. Similarly, the Lou Nuer (5.13%) would claim more of the national government than the entire Chollo kingdom (2.98%) under tribocracy.
When this doctrine is applied to the political mindset of a typical South Sudanese that habitually swings between “our government” versus “their government”, it portends a revolutionary impact. Were this idea to be taken to its logical conclusion, it means that a tribocratic government will be seen—reality and perception alike—by all South Sudanese as “their” government, rather than a government of the Dinka, of the Nuer, of the Equatorian or of the Minority Group.
To put it differently, a national government in Juba should be 38.18% Dinka, 31.82% Equatorian, 19.33% Nuer and 10.65% Minority Group, both politically, economically and militarily.
IV. The Interplay between Power Politics and Ethnicity in South Sudan under a Tribocratic Paradigm
Table 1 above denotes a power-mapping of ethnicity in the Republic of South Sudan according to the analysis of the May 2008 “Southern Sudan Counts: Tables from the 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census.” Using the cold, hard data from table 1, combined with the tribocratic examination of all past governments of President Kiir, from the post-CPA government in 2005 to the post-July 8th government in 2016, as presented in Part 5 and Part 6 of The Principle of Tribocracy, we can derive and make sense of the analysis presented from table 2 to table 9 in this article.
Table 2: Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Government According to the Prevailing Political Forces in South Sudan
| S/No | Political Force | 1st gov’t | 2nd gov’t | 3rd gov’t | 4th gov’t | 5th gov’t | 6th gov’t | 7th gov’t | 8th gov’t | Number in the gov’t | % of the gov’t | % of the national population | Dominating, Marginalized |
| Part A: Political Caucuses | |||||||||||||
| 1 | Dinka | 28 | 17 | 27 | 26 | 17 | 20 | 17 | 15 | 167 | 42.93% | 38.18% | 4.75% |
| 2 | Equatoria | 13 | 10 | 16 | 16 | 11 | 9 | 13 | 13 | 101 | 25.96% | 31.82% | -5.86% |
| 3 | Nuer | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 65 | 16.71% | 19.33% | -2.62% |
| 4 | Minority Group | 7 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 56 | 14.40% | 10.65% | 3.75% |
| SUB-TOTAL | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100.00% | 99.98% | 0.02% | |
| Part B: Political Constituencies | |||||||||||||
| 1 | Rek Dinka | 10 | 6 | 12 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 73 | 18.77% | 19.86% | -1.09% |
| 2 | Bor Dinka | 9 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 30 | 7.71% | 4.50% | 3.21% |
| 3 | Agaar Dinka | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 33 | 8.48% | 7.93% | 0.55% |
| 4 | Padang Dinka | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 31 | 7.97% | 5.88% | 2.09% |
| 5 | Western Equatorian | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 31 | 7.97% | 7.48% | 0.49% |
| 6 | Central Equatorian | 9 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 46 | 11.83% | 13.36% | -1.53% |
| 7 | Eastern Equatorian | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 24 | 6.17% | 10.99% | -4.82% |
| 8 | Lou Nuer | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 22 | 5.66% | 5.13% | 0.53% |
| 9 | Liech Nuer | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 20 | 5.14% | 5.87% | -0.73% |
| 10 | Jikany Nuer | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 3.08% | 5.29% | -2.21% |
| 11 | Phow Nuer | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 3.02% | -0.19% |
| 12 | Eastern Minorities | 5 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 31 | 7.97% | 6.12% | 1.85% |
| 13 | Western Minorities | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 6.43% | 4.53% | 1.90% |
| SUB-TOTAL | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100.00% | 99.96% | 0.04% | |
| Part C: Political Sections | |||||||||||||
| 1 | Twic Dinka (Jonglei) | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.03% | 2.57% |
| 2 | Nyarweng Dinka | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.35% | -0.09% |
| 3 | Bor Dinka | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 3.86% | 2.68% | 1.18% |
| Total Bor Dinka | 9 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 30 | 7.71% | 4.50% | 3.21% | |
| 4 | Agaar Dinka | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 4.63% | 3.88% | 0.75% |
| 5 | Chiech Dinka | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.54% | 0.82% | 0.72% |
| 6 | Atuot Dinka | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.25% | 0.81% |
| 7 | Gok Dinka | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.43% | -1.17% |
| Total Agaar Dinka | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 33 | 8.48% | 7.93% | 0.55% | |
| 8 | Jok Dinka (Abyei) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.31% | 0.64% | 1.67% |
| 9 | Paweny Dinka (Pigi) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.37% | 0.66% |
| 10 | Nyiel Dinka (Melut) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.25% | 1.81% |
| 11 | Panaruu Dinka | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 0.99% | 1.58% |
| Total Padang Dinka | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 31 | 7.97% | 5.88% | 2.09% | |
| 12 | Gogrial Dinka | 4 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 36 | 9.26% | 6.68% | 2.58% |
| 13 | Aweil Dinka | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 20 | 5.14% | 8.72% | -3.58% |
| 14 | Tonj Dinka | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 4.37% | 4.46% | -0.09% |
| Total Rek Dinka | 10 | 6 | 12 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 73 | 18.77% | 19.86% | -1.09% | |
| 15 | Dok Nuer | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.64% | 1.42% |
| 16 | Western Jikany Nuer | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.39% | 0.38% |
| 17 | Jagei Nuer | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.91% | -0.14% |
| 18 | Bul Nuer | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0.51% | 1.46% | -0.95% |
| 19 | Nyuong Nuer | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.61% | 0.42% |
| Total Liech Nuer | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 20 | 5.14% | 5.87% | -0.73% | |
| 20 | Gon Nuer (Lou) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 3.48% | -0.91% |
| 21 | Moor Nuer (Lou) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 3.08% | 1.65% | 1.43% |
| Total Lou Nuer | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 22 | 5.66% | 5.13% | 0.53% | |
| 22 | Laak Nuer | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.68% | 0.35% |
| 23 | Thiang Nuer | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.65% | -0.39% |
| 24 | Gawaar Nuer | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.69% | -0.15% |
| Total Phow Nuer | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 3.02% | -0.19% | |
| 25 | Gajaak Nuer (Jikany) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.51% | 1.72% | -1.21% |
| 26 | Gajook Nuer (Jikany) | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 3.57% | -1.00% |
| Total Jikany Nuer | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 3.08% | 5.29% | -2.21% | |
| 27 | Zande | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 19 | 4.88% | 4.79% | 0.09% |
| 28 | Moru | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.54% | 0.52% |
| 29 | Baka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.33% | 0.70% |
| Total Western Equatorian | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 31 | 7.97% | 7.48% | 0.49% | |
| 30 | Pojullu | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.89% | 1.71% |
| 31 | Kuku | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.38% | -0.58% |
| 32 | Lokoya | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.79% | -0.53% |
| 33 | Kakwa | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 1.07% | -0.56% |
| 34 | Bari | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 22 | 5.66% | 3.23% | 2.43% |
| Total Central Equatorian | 9 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 46 | 11.83% | 13.36% | -1.53% | |
| 35 | Otuho | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.21% | 1.62% |
| 36 | Madi | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 1.03% | -0.52% |
| 37 | Acholi | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.03% | 0.00% |
| 38 | Taposa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1.03% | 3.21% | -2.18% |
| 39 | Buya | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.57% | -0.06% |
| 40 | Didinga | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.63% | -0.37% |
| Total Eastern Equatorian | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 24 | 6.17% | 10.99% | -4.82% | |
| 41 | Luo | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 2.04% | 0.79% |
| 42 | Fertit | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 2.49% | 1.11% |
| Total Western Minorities | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 6.43% | 4.53% | 1.90% | |
| 43 | Shilluk | 5 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 23 | 5.91% | 2.98% | 2.93% |
| 44 | Murle | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.78% | -0.24% |
| 45 | Maban | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.55% | -0.04% |
| Total Eastern Minorities | 5 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 31 | 7.97% | 6.12% | 1.85% | |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100% | 100% | 0% |
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Table 2 above presents all the past governments of President Kiir, from the post-CPA government in 2005 to the post-July 8th government in 2016—a total of 389 political positions, comprising of ministers, deputy ministers, collegiate presidency, speakers of parliament, SPLM secretary generals, chief justices, chiefs of general staffs, governors of central bank, and inspector generals of police—according to their respective political caucuses, constituencies and sections.
Table 3: A Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Governments According to Political Caucuses of South Sudan
| S/no | Political Caucus | Number in the gov’t | % of the gov’t | % of the national population | Dominating, Marginalized nationally |
| 1. | Dinka | 167 | 43% | 38% | 4.75% |
| 2. | Equatorian | 101 | 26% | 32% | -5.86% |
| 3. | Nuer | 65 | 17% | 19% | -2.62% |
| 4. | Minority Group | 56 | 14% | 11% | 3.75% |
| Total | 389 | 100% | 100% | 0.02% | |
| – |
–
From Table 2 and 3 above, we can deduce that, of the 389 political positions of all President Kiir’s past governments, 167 are from the Dinka political caucus; 101 from the Equatorian; 65 from the Nuer and 56 from the Minority Group. To put it differently, 43% of the cabinet is Dinka; 26% Equatorian; 17% Nuer and 14% Minority Group. Given the fact that the Dinka political caucus is 38% of the national population, it means that the Dinka political caucus, which occupies 43% of the government, is over-represented by +4.75%. Similarly, the Equatorian political caucus, which is about 32% of the national population but only takes 26% of the government, is disadvantaged by -5.86%, while the Nuer political caucus, at 19% of the national population but only 17% of the government, is under-represented by -2.62%. Lastly, the Minority Group political caucus, which is about 11% of the national population but takes 14% of the government, is over-represented by +3.75%.
The reason why the Equatorian and Nuer political caucuses are under-represented (marginalized) is because the Dinka and Minority Group political caucuses, which are only about 49% of the national population but represent around 57% of all President Kiir’s past governments, are overrepresented by 8.5%. In order to achieve tribocratic equilibrium—a fair, equal and just distribution of political positions, access to national resources and national security—the presidency should have given each and every political caucus their proportionate share according to the national population. In other words, of the 389 political positions, the Dinka political caucus should have been given 148 positions; the Equatorian political caucus 124 positions; the Nuer political caucus 74 positions and the Minority Group political caucus 43 positions, which translates to 38%, 32%, 19% and 11% of the national government respectively. This would be a tribocratic equilibrium—fair, equal and just—for all the political caucuses of the Republic of South Sudan since it would reflect their respective shares of the national population.
Table 4 below shows a summary of tribocratic analysis of President Kiir’s past governments according to each of the 13 political constituencies of South Sudan.
Table 4: A Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Governments According to Political Constituencies of South Sudan
| Political Caucus | Political Constituency | % within political Caucus | % of the national population | Number in the gov’t | % of the gov’t within the caucus | % of the gov’t nationally | Dominating, marginalized within the caucus | Dominating, marginalized, nationally |
| Dinka | Rek Dinka | 52.02% | 19.86% | 73 | 43.71% | 18.77% | -8.31% | -1.09% |
| Agaar Dinka | 20.76% | 7.93% | 33 | 19.76% | 8.48% | -1.00% | 0.55% | |
| Padang Dinka | 15.41% | 5.88% | 31 | 18.56% | 7.97% | 3.15% | 2.09% | |
| Bor Dinka | 11.79% | 4.50% | 30 | 17.96% | 7.71% | 6.17% | 3.21% | |
| Nuer | Liech Nuer | 30.45% | 5.87% | 20 | 30.77% | 5.14% | 0.32% | -0.73% |
| Jikany Nuer | 27.41% | 5.29% | 12 | 18.46% | 3.08% | -8.95% | -2.21% | |
| Lou Nuer | 26.51% | 5.13% | 22 | 33.85% | 5.66% | 7.34% | 0.53% | |
| Phow Nuer | 15.61% | 3.02% | 11 | 16.92% | 2.83% | 1.31% | -0.19% | |
| Equatorian | Central Equatorian | 41.98% | 13.36% | 46 | 45.54% | 11.83% | 3.56% | -1.53% |
| Eastern Equatorian | 34.47% | 10.99% | 24 | 23.76% | 6.17% | -10.71% | -4.82% | |
| Western Equatorian | 23.54% | 7.48% | 31 | 30.69% | 7.97% | 7.15% | 0.49% | |
| Minority Group | Eastern Minorities | 57.52% | 6.12% | 31 | 55.36% | 7.97% | -2.16% | 1.85% |
| Western Minorities | 42.48% | 4.53% | 25 | 44.64% | 6.43% | 2.16% | 1.90% | |
| Sub-Total, political constituencies | 100% | 99.96% | 389 | 100.00% | 100.00% | 0.01% | 0.04% |
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For example, the Dinka political caucus has 167 positions to be shared among the four political constituencies: Rek, Agaar, Padang and Bor. The Rek Dinka political constituency, which is about 52.02% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus and 19.86% of the national population, has 73 positions, which translate roughly to 43.71% of the Dinka political caucus and about 18.77% of the entire national government. Thus, tribocratically speaking, the Rek Dinka constituency is marginalized by about -8.29% within the Dinka political caucus and by -1.09% at the national government in Juba.
Within the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Gogrial Dinka political section, which is about 33.65% of the total population of Rek Dinka political constituency, 17.50% of the total population of Dinka political caucus, and 6.68% of the national population, has 36 positions, which translates to 49.32% of the Rek Dinka political constituency, 21.56% of the Dinka political caucus and 9.25% of the national government in Juba. Thus, the Gogrial Dinka political section has been over-represented by +15.67% within the Rek Dinka political constituency, +4.06% within the Dinka political caucus, and +2.57% at the national government in Juba.
The Tonj Dinka political section, which is 22.42% of the total population of Rek Dinka political constituency, 11.66% of the total population of Dinka political caucus, and 4.46% of the national population, has 17 positions which translates to 23.29% of the Rek Dinka political constituency, 10.18% of the Dinka political caucus and 4.37% of the national government in Juba. Therefore, the Tonj Dinka political section has been over-represented by +0.87% within the Rek Dinka political constituency, under-represented by -1.48% within the Dinka political caucus, and marginalized by -0.09% at the national government in Juba.
The Aweil Dinka political section, which is about 43.93% of the total population of Rek Dinka political constituency, 22.85% of the total population of Dinka political caucus, and 8.72% of the national population, has 20 positions, which translates to 27.40% of the Rek Dinka political constituency, 11.98% of the Dinka political caucus and 5.14% of the national government in Juba. This means that the Aweil Dinka political section has been under-represented by -16.53% within the Rek Dinka political constituency, -10.87% within the Dinka political caucus, and marginalized by -3.58% at the national government in Juba.
The Agaar Dinka political constituency, which is about 20.76% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus and 7.93% of the total population of South Sudan, has 33 political positions, which translates to 19.76% of the Dinka political caucus and 8.48% of the national government in Juba. It is therefore under-represented by about -1.00% within the Dinka political caucus but over-represented by +0.55% at the national government in Juba.
Among the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Atuot Dinka political section, which is about 15.75% of the total population of the Agaar political constituency, 3.27% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 1.25% of the national population, has 8 positions, which translates to 24.24% of the Agaar Dinka political constituency, 4.79% of the Dinka political caucus, and 2.06% of the national government. Thus, the Atuot Dinka political section is over-represented by +8.49% within the Agaar Dinka political constituency, +1.52% within the Dinka political caucus, and +0.81% at the national government in Juba.
The Chiech Dinka political section, which is about 10.29% of the total population of the Agaar political constituency, 2.14% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.82% of the national population, has 6 positions, which translates to 18.18% of the Agaar Dinka political constituency, 3.59% of the Dinka political caucus, and 1.54% of the national government. Thus, the Chiech Dinka political section is over-represented by +7.89% within the Agaar Dinka political constituency, +1.45% within the Dinka political caucus, and +0.72% at the national government in Juba.
The Agaar Dinka political section, which is about 48.81% of the total population of the Agaar political constituency, 10.14% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 3.88% of the national population, has 18 positions, which translates to 54.55% of the Agaar Dinka political constituency, 10.78% of the Dinka political caucus, and 4.63% of the national government. Thus, the Agaar Dinka political section is over-represented by +5.74% within the Agaar Dinka political constituency, +0.64% within the Dinka political caucus, and +0.75% at the national government in Juba.
The Gok Dinka political section, which is about 17.97% of the total population of the Agaar political constituency, 3.73% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 1.43% of the national population, has 1 position, which translates to 3.03% of the Agaar Dinka political constituency, 0.60% of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.26% of the national government. Thus, the Gok Dinka political section is under-represented by -14.94% within the Agaar Dinka political constituency, -3.13% within the Dinka political caucus, and -1.17% at the national government in Juba.
The Aliab Dinka political section has been totally neglected, with no position offered to them at the national government in Juba, since the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in October 2005.
The Padang Dinka political constituency, which is about 15.41% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus and 5.88% of the national population, has 31 political positions, which is equal to 18.56% of the Dinka political caucus and 7.97% of the national government. Thus, the Padang Dinka political constituency is over-represented by +3.15% within the Dinka political caucus and +2.09 at the national government in Juba.
Among the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Abyei Dinka political section, which is about 10.87% of the total population of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 1.68% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.64% of the national population, has 9 positions, which translates to 29.03% of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 5.39% of the Dinka political caucus, and 2.31% of the national government. Thus, the Abyei Dinka political section is over-represented by +18.16% within the Padang Dinka political constituency, +3.71% within the Dinka political caucus, and +1.67% at the national government in Juba.
The Paweny Dinka political section, which is about 20.37% of the total population of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 1.05% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.37% of the national population, has 4 positions, which translates to 12.90% of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 2.40% of the Dinka political caucus, and 1.03% of the national government. Thus, the Paweny Dinka political section is under-represented by -7.47% within the Padang Dinka political constituency, over-represented by +1.35% within the Dinka political caucus, and +0.66% at the national government in Juba.
The Nyiel Dinka political section, which is about 10.12% of the total population of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 0.78% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.25% of the national population, has 8 positions, which translates to 25.81% of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 4.79% of the Dinka political caucus, and 2.06% of the national government. Thus, the Nyiel Dinka political section is over-represented by +15.69% within the Padang Dinka political constituency, +4.01% within the Dinka political caucus, and +1.81% at the national government in Juba.
The Panaruu Dinka political section, which is about 16.95% of the total population of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 2.61% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.99% of the national population, has 10 positions, which translates to 32.26% of the Padang Dinka political constituency, 5.99% of the Dinka political caucus, and 2.57% of the national government. Thus, the Panaruu Dinka political section is over-represented by +15.31% within the Padang Dinka political constituency, +3.38% within the Dinka political caucus, and +1.58% at the national government in Juba.
The rest of the political sections within the Padang Dinka constituency—Thoi, Luach, Ageer, Rut, Aloor, Ngok-Lual Yak, Abiliang, and Dongjol—have been systematically neglected since the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in October 2005.
The Bor Dinka political constituency, which is around 11.79% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus and 4.50% of national population, has 30 political positions, which is equal to 17.96% of the Dinka political caucus and 7.71% of the national government. Thus, the Bor Dinka political constituency is over-represented by +6.17% within the Dinka political caucus and +3.21 at the national government in Juba.
Of the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Twic Dinka political section, which is about 22.94% of the total population of the Bor Dinka political constituency, 2.71% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 1.03% of the national population, has 14 positions, which translates to 46.67% of the Bor Dinka political constituency, 8.38% of the Dinka political caucus, and 3.60% of the national government. Thus, the Twic Dinka political section is over-represented by +23.73% within the Bor Dinka political constituency, +5.67% within the Dinka political caucus, and +2.57% at the national government in Juba.
The Bor Dinka political section, which is about 59.43% of the total population of the Bor Dinka political constituency, 7.01% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 2.68% of the national population, has 15 positions, which translates to 50.00% of the Bor Dinka political constituency, 8.98% of the Dinka political caucus, and 3.86% of the national government. Thus, the Bor Dinka political section is under-represented by -9.43% within the Bor Dinka political constituency, but over-represented by +1.97% within the Dinka political caucus, and +1.18% at the national government in Juba.
The Nyarweng Dinka political section, which is about 8.80% of the total population of the Bor Dinka political constituency, 1.04% of the total population of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.35% of the national population, has 1 position, which translates to 3.33% of the Bor Dinka political constituency, 0.60% of the Dinka political caucus, and 0.26% of the national government. Thus, the Nyarweng Dinka political section is under-represented by -5.47% within the Bor Dinka political constituency, -0.44% within the Dinka political caucus, and -0.09% at the national government in Juba.
The Hol Dinka political section has been thoroughly neglected, with no position offered to them at the national government in Juba, since the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in October 2005.
The Equatorian political caucus has 101 political positions to be shared among the three political constituencies—the Central Equatorian, Eastern Equatorian and Western Equatorian. The Central Equatorian political constituency, which is about 41.98% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus and 13.36% of the national population, has 46 political positions, which translates roughly to 45.54% of the Equatorian political caucus and about 11.83% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Central Equatorian political constituency is over-represented by about +3.56% within the Equatorian political caucus but under-represented by -1.53% at the national government in Juba.
Among the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Bari political section, which is about 21.63% of the total population of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 9.08% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 3.23% of the national population, has 22 positions, which translates to 47.83% of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 21.78% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 5.66% of the national government. Thus, the Bari political section is over-represented by +26.20% within the Central Equatorian political constituency, +12.70% within the Equatorian political caucus, and +2.43% at the national government in Juba.
The Pojullu political section, which is about 14.16% of the total population of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 5.95% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.89% of the national population, has 14 positions, which translates to 30.43% of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 13.86% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 3.60% of the national government. Thus, the Pojullu political section is over-represented by +16.27% within the Central Equatorian political constituency, +7.91% within the Equatorian political caucus, and +1.71% at the national government in Juba.
The Kuku political section, which is about 17.80% of the total population of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 7.47% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 2.38% of the national population, has 7 positions, which translates to 15.22% of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 6.93% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.80% of the national government. Thus, the Kuku political section is under-represented by -2.58% within the Central Equatorian political constituency, -0.54% within the Equatorian political caucus, and -0.58% at the national government in Juba.
The Kakwa political section, which is about 8.04% of the total population of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 3.37% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.07% of the national population, has 2 positions, which translates to 4.35% of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 1.98% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.51% of the national government. Thus, the Kakwa political section is under-represented by -3.69% within the Central Equatorian political constituency, -1.39% within the Equatorian political caucus, and -0.56% at the national government in Juba.
The Lokoya political section, which is about 5.91% of the total population of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 2.48% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.79% of the national population, has 1 position, which translates to 2.17% of the Central Equatorian political constituency, 0.99% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.26% of the national government. Thus, the Lokoya political section is under-represented by -3.74% within the Central Equatorian political constituency, -1.49% within the Equatorian political caucus, and -0.53% at the national government in Juba.
The rest of the political sections within the Central Equatorian political constituency— Mundari, Nyangwara, Makaraka, Lugbwara, Avukaya and Keliko—have been systematically neglected since the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in October 2005.
The Eastern Equatorian political constituency, which is about 34.47% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus and 10.99% of the national population, has 24 political positions, which translates to 23.76% of the Equatorian political caucus and about 6.17% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Eastern Equatorian political constituency is overwhelmingly under-represented by -10.71% within the Equatorian political caucus and by -4.82% at the national government in Juba.
Within the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Otuho political section, which is about 11.01% of the total population of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 3.79% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.21% of the national population, has 11 positions, which translates to 45.83% of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 10.89% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 2.83% of the national government. Thus, the Otuho political section is over-represented by +34.82% within the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, +7.10% within the Equatorian political caucus, and +1.62% at the national government in Juba.
The Madi political section, which is about 9.37% of the total population of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 3.23% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.03% of the national population, has 2 positions, which translates to 8.33% of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 1.98% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.51% of the national government. Thus, the Madi political section is under-represented by -1.04% within the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, -1.25% within the Equatorian political caucus, and -0.52% at the national government in Juba.
The Taposa political section, which is about 29.26% of the total population of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 10.09% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 3.21% of the national population, has 4 positions, which translates to 16.67% of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 3.96% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.03% of the national government. Thus, the Taposa political section is under-represented by -12.59% within the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, -6.13% within the Equatorian political caucus, and -2.18% at the national government in Juba.
The Didinga political section, which is about 5.74% of the total population of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 1.98% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.63% of the national population, has 1 position, which translates to 4.17% of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 0.99% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.26% of the national government. Thus, the Didinga political section is under-represented by -1.57% within the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, -0.99% within the Equatorian political caucus, and -0.37% at the national government in Juba.
The Buya political section, which is about 5.21% of the total population of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 1.80% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.57% of the national population, has 2 positions, which translates to 8.33% of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 1.98% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.51% of the national government. Thus, the Buya political section is over-represented by +3.21% within the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, +0.18% within the Equatorian political caucus, but under-represented by -0.06% at the national government in Juba.
The Acholi political section, which is about 9.37% of the total population of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 3.23% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.03% of the national population, has 4 positions, which translates to 16.67% of the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, 3.96% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.03% of the national government. Thus, the Acholi political section is over-represented by +7.30% within the Eastern Equatorian political constituency, +0.73% within the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.0% at the national government in Juba. Therefore, the Acholi political section has achieved tribocratic equilibrium—neither dominating nor marginalized—at the national government in Juba.
The political sections that have been methodically neglected within the Eastern Equatorian political constituency since the advent of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) are: Lango, Logir, Lopit, Tenet, Horiok, Nyagatom, Lolubo, and Dongotano. No single national position has been offered to them since the formation of the first government of President Kiir in October 2005.
The Western Equatorian political constituency, which is about 23.54% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus and 7.48% of the national population, has 31 political positions, which translates to 30.69% of the Equatorian political caucus and about 7.97% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Western Equatorian political constituency is over-represented by +7.15% within the Equatorian political caucus and by +0.49% at the national government in Juba.
Within the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Zande political section, which is about 63.92% of the total population of the Western Equatorian political constituency, 15.05% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 4.79% of the national population, has 19 positions, which translates to 61.29% of the Western Equatorian political constituency, 18.81% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 4.88% of the national government. Thus, the Zande political section is under-represented by -2.63% within the Western Equatorian political constituency, but over-represented by +3.76% within the Equatorian political caucus, and +0.09% at the national government in Juba.
The Moru political section, which is about 20.55% of the total population of the Western Equatorian political constituency, 4.84% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.54% of the national population, has 8 positions, which translates to 25.81% of the Western Equatorian political constituency, 7.92% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 2.06% of the national government. Thus, the Moru political section is over-represented by +5.26% within the Western Equatorian political constituency, +3.08% within the Equatorian political caucus, and +0.52% at the national government in Juba.
The Baka political section, which is about 3.33% of the total population of the Western Equatorian political constituency, 0.78% of the total population of the Equatorian political caucus, and 0.33% of the national population, has 4 positions, which translates to 12.90% of the Western Equatorian political constituency, 3.96% of the Equatorian political caucus, and 1.03% of the national government. Thus, the Baka political section is over-represented by +9.57% within the Western Equatorian political constituency, +3.18% within the Equatorian political caucus, and +0.70% at the national government in Juba.
The political sections that have been methodically neglected within the Western Equatorian political constituency are: Mundu, Balanda, Avukaya, and Jur-Bhel. No single national position has been offered to them since the formation of the first government of President Kiir in October 2005.
The Nuer political caucus has 65 political positions to be shared among the four political constituencies of Liech, Jikany, Lou and Phow. The Liech Nuer political constituency, which is about 30.45% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus and 5.87% of the national population, has 20 positions, which translates roughly to 30.77% of the Nuer political caucus and about 5.14% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Liech Nuer political constituency is over-represented by about +0.32% within the Nuer political caucus but under-represented by -0.73% at the national government in Juba.
Of the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Dok Nuer political section, which is about 10.90% of the total population of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 3.32% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.64% of the national population, has 8 positions, which translates to 40.00% of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 12.31% of the Nuer political caucus, and 2.06% of the national government. Thus, the Dok Nuer political section is over-represented by +29.10% within the Liech Nuer political constituency, +8.99% within the Nuer political caucus, and +1.42% at the national government in Juba.
The Bul Nuer political section, which is about 24.82% of the total population of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 7.56% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 1.46% of the national population, has 2 positions, which translates to 10.00% of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 3.08% of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.51% of the national government. Thus, the Bul Nuer political section is under-represented by -14.82% within the Liech Nuer political constituency, -4.48% within the Nuer political caucus, and -0.95% at the national government in Juba.
The Western Jikany Nuer political section, which is about 6.79% of the total population of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 2.07% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.39% of the national population, has 3 positions, which translates to 15.00% of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 4.62% of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.77% of the national government. Thus, the Western Jikany Nuer political section is over-represented by +8.21% within the Liech Nuer political constituency, +2.55% within the Nuer political caucus, and +0.38% at the national government in Juba.
The Jagei Nuer political section, which is about 15.39% of the total population of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 4.69% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.91% of the national population, has 3 positions, which translates to 15.00% of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 4.62% of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.77% of the national government. Thus, the Jagei Nuer political section is under-represented by -0.39% within the Liech Nuer political constituency, -0.07% within the Nuer political caucus, and -0.14% at the national government in Juba.
The Nyuong Nuer political section, which is about 10.43% of the total population of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 3.18% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.61% of the national population, has 4 positions, which translates to 20.00% of the Liech Nuer political constituency, 6.15% of the Nuer political caucus, and 1.03% of the national government. Thus, the Nyuong Nuer political section is over-represented by +9.57% within the Liech Nuer political constituency, +2.97% within the Nuer political caucus, and +0.42% at the national government in Juba.
The following Nuer political sections within the Liech Nuer political constituency—Leek, Hak, and Ador—have been systematically neglected, with no single political positions offered to them, since the formation of the first government in October 2005.
The Jikany Nuer political constituency, with about 27.41% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus and 5.29% of the national population, has 12 political positions, which translates to 18.46% of the Nuer political caucus and about 3.08% of the entire national government. The Jikany Nuer political constituency is therefore disadvantaged by -8.95% within the Nuer political caucus and -2.21% at the national government in Juba.
Among the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Gajaak Nuer political section, which is about 32.59% of the total population of the Jikany Nuer political constituency, 8.93% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 1.72% of the national population, has 2 positions, which translates to 16.67% of the Jikany Nuer political constituency, 3.08% of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.51% of the national government. Thus, the Gajaak Nuer political section is under-represented by -15.92% within the Jikany Nuer political constituency, -5.85% within the Nuer political caucus, and -1.21% at the national government in Juba.
The Gajook Nuer political section, which is about 67.41% of the total population of the Jikany Nuer political constituency, 18.48% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 3.57% of the national population, has 10 positions, which translates to 83.33% of the Jikany Nuer political constituency, 15.38% of the Nuer political caucus, and 2.57% of the national government. Thus, the Gajook Nuer political section is over-represented by +15.92% within the Jikany Nuer political constituency, but under-represented by -3.10% within the Nuer political caucus, and -1.00% at the national government in Juba.
The Gaguang Nuer political section of the Jikany Nuer political constituency has been methodically neglected, with no single political positions awarded to them, since the formation of the first government of President Kiir in October 2005.
The Lou Nuer political constituency, with about 26.51% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus and 5.13% of the national population, has 22 positions, which translates to 33.85% of the Nuer political caucus and about 5.66% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Lou Nuer political constituency is over-represented by +7.34% within the Nuer political caucus and +0.53% at the national government in Juba.
Within the Lou Nuer political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Moor Nuer political section, which is about 32.17% of the total population of the Lou Nuer political constituency, 8.53% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 1.65% of the national population, has 12 positions, which translates to 54.55% of the Lou Nuer political constituency, 18.46% of the Nuer political caucus, and 3.08% of the national government. Thus, the Moor Nuer political section is over-represented by +22.38% within the Lou Nuer political constituency, +9.93% within the Nuer political caucus, and +1.43% at the national government in Juba.
The Gon Nuer political section, which is about 67.83% of the total population of the Lou Nuer political constituency, 17.99% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 3.48% of the national population, has 10 positions, which translates to 45.45% of the Lou Nuer political constituency, 15.38% of the Nuer political caucus, and 2.57% of the national government. Thus, the Gon Nuer political section is under-represented by -22.38% within the Lou Nuer political constituency, -2.61% within the Nuer political caucus, and -0.91% at the national government in Juba. No single political section of the Lou Nuer political constituency has been neglected since the first post-CPA government of 2005.
The Phow Nuer political constituency, with about 15.61% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus and 3.02% of the national population, has 11 positions, which translates to 16.92% of the Nuer political caucus and about 2.83% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Phow Nuer political constituency is over-represented by +1.31% within the Nuer political caucus but under-represented by -0.19% at the national government in Juba.
Within the Phow Nuer political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Gawaar Nuer political section, which is about 55.84% of the total population of the Phow Nuer political constituency, 8.72% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 1.69% of the national population, has 6 positions, which translates to 54.55% of the Phow Nuer political constituency, 9.23% of the Nuer political caucus, and 1.54% of the national government. Thus, the Gawaar Nuer political section is under-represented by -1.29% within the Phow Nuer political constituency, over-represented by +0.51% within the Nuer political caucus, and under-represented by -0.15% at the national government in Juba.
The Laak Nuer political section, which is about 22.52% of the total population of the Phow Nuer political constituency, 3.52% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.68% of the national population, has 4 positions, which translates to 36.36% of the Phow Nuer political constituency, 6.15% of the Nuer political caucus, and 1.03% of the national government. Thus, the Laak Nuer political section is over-represented by +13.84% within the Phow Nuer political constituency, +2.63% within the Nuer political caucus, and +0.35% at the national government in Juba.
The Thiang Nuer political section, which is about 21.63% of the total population of the Phow Nuer political constituency, 3.38% of the total population of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.65% of the national population, has 1 position, which translates to 9.09% of the Phow Nuer political constituency, 1.54% of the Nuer political caucus, and 0.26% of the national government. Thus, the Thiang Nuer political section is under-represented by -12.54% within the Phow Nuer political constituency, -1.84% within the Nuer political caucus, and -0.39% at the national government in Juba. No political section of the Phow Nuer political constituency has been neglected since the first post-CPA government of 2005.
The Minority Group political caucus has 56 political positions to be shared among the two political constituencies of Eastern and Western Minorities. The Eastern Minorities political constituency, which is about 57.52% of the Minority Group political caucus and 6.12% of the national population, has 31 positions, which translates roughly to 55.36% of the Minority Group political caucus and about 7.97% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Eastern Minorities political constituency is under-represented by about -2.16% within the Minority Group political caucus but over-represented by +1.85% at the national government in Juba.
Within the political sections as presented in Table 5 below, the Shilluk political section, which is about 48.67% of the total population of the Eastern Minorities political constituency, 27.99% of the total population of the Minority Group political caucus, and 2.98% of the national population, has 23 position, which translates to 74.19% of the Eastern Minorities political constituency, 41.07% of the Minority Group political caucus, and 5.91% of the national government. Thus, the Shilluk political section is over-represented by +25.52% within the Eastern Minorities political constituency, +13.08% within the Minority Group political caucus, and +2.93% at the national government in Juba.
The Murle political section, which is about 27.07% of the total population of the Eastern Minorities political constituency, 16.72% of the total population of the Minority Group political caucus, and 1.78% of the national population, has 6 positions, which translates to 19.35% of the Eastern Minorities political constituency, 10.71% of the Minority Group political caucus, and 1.54% of the national government. Thus, the Murle political section is under-represented by -9.72% within the Eastern Minorities political constituency, -6.01% within the Minority Group political caucus, and -0.24% at the national government in Juba.
The Maban political section, which is about 8.93% of the total population of the Eastern Minorities political constituency, 5.14% of the total population of the Minority Group political caucus, and 0.55% of the national population, has 2 positions, which translates to 6.45% of the Eastern Minorities political constituency, 3.57% of the Minority Group political caucus, and 0.51% of the national government. Thus, the Maban political section is under-represented by -2.48% within the Eastern Minorities political constituency, -1.57% within the Minority Group political caucus, and -0.04% at the national government in Juba.
Of the Eastern Minorities, the Anyuak, Kachipo, Jie etc. political sections have been politically neglected, as no single position has been offered to them, since the establishment of the first government in October 2005.
The Western Minorities political constituency, which is about 42.48% of the Minority Group political caucus and 4.53% of the national population, has 25 positions, which translates roughly to 44.64% of the Minority Group political caucus and about 6.43% of the entire national government. Therefore, the Western Minorities political constituency is over-represented by about +2.16% within the Minority Group political caucus and +1.90% at the national government in Juba.
Among the political section as presented in Table 5 below, the Fertit political section, which is about 54.99% of the total population of the Western Minorities political constituency, 23.36% of the total population of the Minority Group political caucus, and 2.49% of the national population, has 14 positions, which translates to 56.00% of the Western Minorities political constituency, 25.00% of the Minority Group political caucus, and 3.60% of the national government. Thus, the Fertit political section is over-represented by +1.01% within the Western Minorities political constituency, +1.64% within the Minority Group political caucus, and +1.11% at the national government in Juba.
The Luo political section, which is about 45.01% of the total population of the Western Minorities political constituency, 19.12% of the total population of the Minority Group political caucus, and 2.04% of the national population, has 11 positions, which translates to 44.00% of the Western Minorities political constituency, 19.64% of the Minority Group political caucus, and 2.83% of the national government. Thus, the Luo political section is under-represented by -1.01% within the Western Minorities political constituency, but over-represented by +0.52% within the Minority Group political caucus, and +0.79% at the national government in Juba.
Table 5 below presents a summary of the tribocratic analysis of President Kiir’s past governments according to the political sections of the Republic of South Sudan.
Table 5: A Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Governments According to Political Sections of South Sudan
| Political constituency | Political section | % within political constituency | % within political Caucus | % of the national population | Positions in the gov’t | % of the gov’t within constituency | % of the gov’t within the caucus | % of the gov’t nationally | Dominating, marginalized within constituency | Dominating, marginalized within the caucus | Dominating, marginalized, nationally | |
| Rek Dinka | Gogrial Dinka | 33.65% | 17.50% | 6.68% | 36 | 49.32% | 21.56% | 9.25% | 15.67% | 4.06% | 2.57% | |
| Aweil Dinka | 43.93% | 22.85% | 8.72% | 20 | 27.40% | 11.98% | 5.14% | -16.53% | -10.87% | -3.58% | ||
| Tonj Dinka | 22.42% | 11.66% | 4.46% | 17 | 23.29% | 10.18% | 4.37% | 0.87% | -1.48% | -0.09% | ||
| Total Rek Dinka | 100.00% | 52.02% | 19.86% | 73 | 100.00% | 43.71% | 18.77% | 0.00% | -8.31% | -1.09% | ||
| Agaar Dinka | Agaar Dinka | 48.81% | 10.14% | 3.88% | 18 | 54.55% | 10.78% | 4.63% | 5.74% | 0.64% | 0.75% | |
| Chiech Dinka | 10.29% | 2.14% | 0.82% | 6 | 18.18% | 3.59% | 1.54% | 7.89% | 1.45% | 0.72% | ||
| Atuot Dinka | 15.75% | 3.27% | 1.25% | 8 | 24.24% | 4.79% | 2.06% | 8.49% | 1.52% | 0.81% | ||
| Gok Dinka | 17.97% | 3.73% | 1.43% | 1 | 3.03% | 0.60% | 0.26% | -14.94% | -3.13% | -1.17% | ||
| Total Agaar Dinka | 100.00% | 20.76% | 7.93% | 33 | 100.00% | 19.76% | 8.48% | 0.00% | -1.00% | 0.55% | ||
| Padang Dinka | Abyei Dinka | 10.87% | 1.68% | 0.64% | 9 | 29.03% | 5.39% | 2.31% | 18.16% | 3.71% | 1.67% | |
| Panaruu Dinka | 16.95% | 2.61% | 0.99% | 10 | 32.26% | 5.99% | 2.57% | 15.31% | 3.38% | 1.58% | ||
| Paweny Dinka | 20.37% | 1.05% | 0.37% | 4 | 12.90% | 2.40% | 1.03% | -7.47% | 1.35% | 0.66% | ||
| Nyiel Dinka | 10.12% | 0.78% | 0.25% | 8 | 25.81% | 4.79% | 2.06% | 15.69% | 4.01% | 1.81% | ||
| Total Padang Dinka | 100.00% | 15.41% | 5.88% | 31 | 100.00% | 18.56% | 7.97% | 0.00% | 3.15% | 2.09% | ||
| Bor Dinka | Bor Dinka | 59.43% | 7.01% | 2.68% | 15 | 50.00% | 8.98% | 3.86% | -9.43% | 1.97% | 1.18% | |
| Twic Dinka | 22.94% | 2.71% | 1.03% | 14 | 46.67% | 8.38% | 3.60% | 23.73% | 5.67% | 2.57% | ||
| Nyarweng Dinka | 8.80% | 1.04% | 0.35% | 1 | 3.33% | 0.60% | 0.26% | -5.47% | -0.44% | -0.09% | ||
| Total Bor Dinka | 100.00% | 11.79% | 4.50% | 30 | 100.00% | 17.96% | 7.71% | 0.00% | 6.17% | 3.21% | ||
| Central Equatorian | Bari | 21.63% | 9.08% | 3.23% | 22 | 47.83% | 21.78% | 5.66% | 26.20% | 12.70% | 2.43% | |
| Pojullu | 14.16% | 5.95% | 1.89% | 14 | 30.43% | 13.86% | 3.60% | 16.27% | 7.91% | 1.71% | ||
| Kuku | 17.80% | 7.47% | 2.38% | 7 | 15.22% | 6.93% | 1.80% | -2.58% | -0.54% | -0.58% | ||
| Lokoya | 5.91% | 2.48% | 0.79% | 1 | 2.17% | 0.99% | 0.26% | -3.74% | -1.49% | -0.53% | ||
| Kakwa | 8.04% | 3.37% | 1.07% | 2 | 4.35% | 1.98% | 0.51% | -3.69% | -1.39% | -0.56% | ||
| Total Central Equatorian | 100.00% | 41.98% | 13.36% | 46 | 100.00% | 45.54% | 11.83% | 0.00% | 3.56% | -1.53% | ||
| Eastern Equatorian | Lotuho | 11.01% | 3.79% | 1.21% | 11 | 45.83% | 10.89% | 2.83% | 34.82% | 7.10% | 1.62% | |
| Madi | 9.37% | 3.23% | 1.03% | 2 | 8.33% | 1.98% | 0.51% | -1.04% | -1.25% | -0.52% | ||
| Taposa | 29.26% | 10.09% | 3.21% | 4 | 16.67% | 3.96% | 1.03% | -12.59% | -6.13% | -2.18% | ||
| Didinga | 5.74% | 1.98% | 0.63% | 1 | 4.17% | 0.99% | 0.26% | -1.57% | -0.99% | -0.37% | ||
| Buya | 5.21% | 1.80% | 0.57% | 2 | 8.33% | 1.98% | 0.51% | 3.12% | 0.18% | -0.06% | ||
| Acholi | 9.37% | 3.23% | 1.03% | 4 | 16.67% | 3.96% | 1.03% | 7.30% | 0.73% | 0.00% | ||
| Total Eastern Equatorian | 100.00% | 34.47% | 10.99% | 24 | 100.00% | 23.76% | 6.17% | 0.00% | -10.71% | -4.82% | ||
| Western Equatorian | Zande | 63.92% | 15.05% | 4.79% | 19 | 61.29% | 18.81% | 4.88% | -2.63% | 3.76% | 0.09% | |
| Moru | 20.55% | 4.84% | 1.54% | 8 | 25.81% | 7.92% | 2.06% | 5.26% | 3.08% | 0.52% | ||
| Baka | 3.33% | 0.78% | 0.33% | 4 | 12.90% | 3.96% | 1.03% | 9.57% | 3.18% | 0.70% | ||
| Total Western Equatorian | 100.00% | 23.54% | 7.48% | 31 | 100.00% | 30.69% | 7.97% | 0.00% | 7.15% | 0.49% | ||
| Liech Nuer | Dok Nuer | 10.90% | 3.32% | 0.64% | 8 | 40.00% | 12.31% | 2.06% | 29.10% | 8.99% | 1.42% | |
| Bul Nuer | 24.82% | 7.56% | 1.46% | 2 | 10.00% | 3.08% | 0.51% | -14.82% | -4.48% | -0.95% | ||
| Jagei Nuer | 15.39% | 4.69% | 0.91% | 3 | 15.00% | 4.62% | 0.77% | -0.39% | -0.07% | -0.14% | ||
| Nyuong Nuer | 10.43% | 3.18% | 0.61% | 4 | 20.00% | 6.15% | 1.03% | 9.57% | 2.97% | 0.42% | ||
| Western Jikany | 6.79% | 2.07% | 0.39% | 3 | 15.00% | 4.62% | 0.77% | 8.21% | 2.55% | 0.38% | ||
| Total Liech Nuer | 100.00% | 30.45% | 5.87% | 20 | 100.00% | 30.77% | 5.14% | 0.00% | 0.32% | -0.73% | ||
| Jikany Nuer | Gajaak Nuer | 32.59% | 8.93% | 1.72% | 2 | 16.67% | 3.08% | 0.51% | -15.92% | -5.85% | -1.21% | |
| Gajook Nuer | 67.41% | 18.48% | 3.57% | 10 | 83.33% | 15.38% | 2.57% | 15.92% | -3.10% | -1.00% | ||
| Total Jikany Nuer | 100.00% | 27.41% | 5.29% | 12 | 100.00% | 18.46% | 3.08% | 0.00% | -8.95% | -2.21% | ||
| Lou Nuer | Moor Nuer | 32.17% | 8.53% | 1.65% | 12 | 54.55% | 18.46% | 3.08% | 22.38% | 9.93% | 1.43% | |
| Gon Nuer | 67.83% | 17.99% | 3.48% | 10 | 45.45% | 15.38% | 2.57% | -22.38% | -2.61% | -0.91% | ||
| Total Lou Nuer | 100.00% | 26.51% | 5.13% | 22 | 100.00% | 33.85% | 5.66% | 0.00% | 7.34% | 0.53% | ||
| Phow Nuer | Gawaar Nuer | 55.84% | 8.72% | 1.69% | 6 | 54.55% | 9.23% | 1.54% | -1.29% | 0.51% | -0.15% | |
| Laak Nuer | 22.52% | 3.52% | 0.68% | 4 | 36.36% | 6.15% | 1.03% | 13.84% | 2.63% | 0.35% | ||
| Thiang Nuer | 21.63% | 3.38% | 0.65% | 1 | 9.09% | 1.54% | 0.26% | -12.54% | -1.84% | -0.39% | ||
| Total Phow Nuer | 100.00% | 15.61% | 3.02% | 11 | 100.00% | 16.92% | 2.83% | 0.00% | 1.31% | -0.19% | ||
| Eastern Minorities | Shilluk | 48.67% | 27.99% | 2.98% | 23 | 74.19% | 41.07% | 5.91% | 25.52% | 13.08% | 2.93% | |
| Murle | 29.07% | 16.72% | 1.78% | 6 | 19.35% | 10.71% | 1.54% | -9.72% | -6.01% | -0.24% | ||
| Maban | 8.93% | 5.14% | 0.55% | 2 | 6.45% | 3.57% | 0.51% | -2.48% | -1.57% | -0.04% | ||
| Total Eastern Minorities | 100.00% | 57.52% | 6.12% | 31 | 100.00% | 55.36% | 7.97% | 0.00% | -2.16% | 1.85% | ||
| Western Minorities | Fertit | 54.99% | 23.36% | 2.49% | 14 | 56.00% | 25.00% | 3.60% | 1.01% | 1.64% | 1.11% | |
| Luo | 45.01% | 19.12% | 2.04% | 11 | 44.00% | 19.64% | 2.83% | -1.01% | 0.52% | 0.79% | ||
| Total Western Minorities | 100.00% | 42.48% | 4.53% | 25 | 100.00% | 44.64% | 6.43% | 0.00% | 2.16% | 1.90% | ||
| Overall Total | 100.00% | 99.99% | 99.96% | 389 | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 0.00% | 0.01% | 0.04% |
–
V. Conclusion
On the 23rd of July, 2011, just on the eve of the unveiling of the first cabinet of an independent South Sudan, I had written an article, “Tribocracy: The New Political Philosophy for the New Country,” in which I had argued that for South Sudan to avoid the pitfalls of her fellow, post-colonial African countries and be successful, the new nation must fully embrace and constitutionally legalize tribocracy as a system of political representation at all levels of governance–Boma, payam, county, state and national—in the country.
My article, much as it has been my long-harbored view about the preferred system of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, was partly triggered by President Kiir’s announcement that his first government would “be formed based on qualifications of candidates and not on tribal representation.” My advocacy for tribocracy is not so much the love for tribalism as it is the desire to take the bull by its horns. We should stop burying our heads in the sand of complacency.
Seminal national undertakings such as the formation of the national government should be based on the reality and understanding of the political caucuses, constituencies and sections because disgruntlement or contentment with any weighty decision made by the presidency is invariably rationalized to the extent with which the political, economic and security interests of these political caucuses, constituencies, and sections are taken care of according to their proportional share of the national population. This is the true meaning of justice, fairness and the essence of equality. Anything else is just a smokescreen—a dangerous recipe for national disaster.
Take for instance how pivotal national decisions, with wide-ranging and long-lasting impact, are made at the presidency. Have you ever pondered how the president makes seminal decisions such as the appointment of the cabinet before they are decreed on South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC)? I mean, what guides his political decisions and actions? And on what basis should his pronouncements be judged as to whether they are fair, just and equal? Merit and competence you may venture, but what determines merit and competence in a country like South Sudan? Corruption. If merit is about quality education and enviable resumes (CV), then it is all predetermined by filthy money and shady political connections. Who has the money and political connections? The 75 Mafia.
Our prized possessions—experience and education, merit and competence—are, more or less, therefore a function of nepotism and favoritism, another way to perpetuate, feed and nourish, the beast of corruption because if you are not corrupt like the 75 mafia, then it is highly unlikely you will gain merit and competence. You need money to procure good quality education; moreover, you need strong, deep political, security and economic connections to gain good experience and competence. Unfortunately, only the sons and daughters of the most corrupt are the ones going to the best schools because they have the money and would, therefore, be in the position to gain the necessary experiences and competence because of their daddy’s or mummy’s political, security and economic connections. While this may not be the rule, it is neither the exception in South Sudan.
The Constitution in its current form—and whatever form it might later metastasize into—is useless because it is not being followed and, worse still, is irrelevant to our political environment since it is based on an alien notion of power politics. There is, therefore, an exigency to invent and embrace a new way, a better stratagem, to manage the country, befitting analytical framework to make seminal political decisions such as cabinet selections; we need a yardstick not just to guide Benydit in his decision-making but also as a benchmark to reproach or praise his actions and pronouncements.
If fairness, justice, equality, peace and national harmony are to be the solid pillars of our national consciousness, then we must stop burying our heads in the sand of complacency in the name of making cabinet appointments and other national decisions on the purported rationale of “merit and competence”, which, sadly, in more cases than not, is not even remotely adhered to. It gives one person, in the form of the presidency, unwarranted powers and influence to satiate his whims. One effective, practical and relevant method to do this is to identify the reality of the political situation in South Sudan through the political forces that drive and influence political wave, direction, depth, and intensity.
Perusing through all the past governments of President Kiir, what intrigued most South Sudanese people about the 389 members of the past governments is neither their competence, the merit of their respective appointments nor their democratic credentials. Rather, it is the political caucuses, constituencies, and sections those 389 members hail from. Are they from the Dinka, Equatorian, Nuer or the Minority Group caucus? This is why the most controversial revelation of the tribocratic analysis of all President Kiir’s past governments is the domination by members of the Dinka and Minority Group political caucuses. Why is it a big deal? Aren’t they qualified? They are. Weren’t they picked on merit? Possibly all were. But still, something just reeks about the decision: their respective political caucus.
Put simply, let’s stop the destructive pretense of being a Democratic Republic of South Sudan where a democratically elected president has the mandate and confidence of the people to make decisions that put food on the table, send kids to school, fund economic infrastructure and social amenities, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, among others. It isn’t working and it will not work. And it has nothing to do with Salva Kiir as the current president or Dr. Riek Machar or James Wani or Pagan Amum or even Madam Rebecca Nyandeng as aspiring presidential candidates: it is systemic.
Our procedural democracy does not engender political stability, economic development, and social prosperity; our constitution is not worth the paper it is written on; our presidency has become a system where cabinet appointments are mere favors for Benydit to bestow whimsically without due regards to the reality of our political situation; our briefcase political parties make a mockery of democracy, and above all, our intellectuals parrot and ape undigested foreign ideas with no relevancy, practicality and usefulness to the reality of our socio-political and economic growth as a nation.
–
Table 6: Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Governments According to the New 32, and the Old 10, States of South Sudan
| S/No | State | 1st gov’t | 2nd gov’t | 3rd gov’t | 4th gov’t | 5th gov’t | 6th gov’t | 7th gov’t | 8th gov’t | Number in the gov’t | % of the gov’t | % of the national population | Dominating, Marginalized |
| The Greater Upper Nile Region (13 states) under 32 states | |||||||||||||
| 1 | Jonglei | 9 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 30 | 7.71% | 4.50% | 3.21% |
| 2 | Fangak state | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 3.02% | -0.19% |
| 3 | Bieh State | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 3.48% | -0.91% |
| 4 | Akobo State | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 3.08% | 1.65% | 1.43% |
| 5 | Maiwut State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.51% | 1.72% | -1.21% |
| 6 | Latjor State | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 3.57% | -1.00% |
| 7 | Boma State | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 2.59% | -1.05% |
| 8 | Central Upper Nile | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 5.14% | 2.32% | 2.82% |
| 9 | Northern Upper Nile | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 2.81% | -0.24% |
| 10 | Fashoda State | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.43% | -0.63% |
| 11 | Ruweng State | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 1.20% | 1.37% |
| 12 | Northern Liech State | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 1.80% | 3.97% | -2.17% |
| 13 | Southern Liech State | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 3.34% | 1.90% | 1.44% |
| Sub-total: The Greater Upper Nile Region | 24 | 16 | 23 | 23 | 15 | 12 | 17 | 18 | 148 | 38.05% | 35.16% | 2.89% | |
| The Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region (10 states) under 32 states | |||||||||||||
| 14 | Gogrial State | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 27 | 6.94% | 4.20% | 2.74% |
| 15 | Twic State | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 18 | 4.63% | 3.12% | 1.51% |
| 16 | Tonj State | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 4.37% | 4.46% | -0.09% |
| 17 | Gok State | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.43% | -1.17% |
| 18 | Western Lakes State | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 4.63% | 4% | 0.26% |
| 19 | Eastern Lakes State | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 2.56% | 1.04% |
| 20 | Aweil East State | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 3.75% | -2.21% |
| 21 | Lol State | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1.29% | 4.23% | -2.94% |
| 22 | Aweil State | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.31% | 1.40% | 0.91% |
| 23 | Wau State | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 6.43% | 3.38% | 3.05% |
| Sub-total: The Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region | 19 | 15 | 24 | 22 | 14 | 17 | 16 | 13 | 140 | 35.99% | 32.90% | 3.09% | |
| The Greater Equatoria Region (9 states) under 32 states | |||||||||||||
| 24 | Jubek State | 5 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 5.91% | 4.46% | 1.45% |
| 25 | Terekeka State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.75% | -1.75% |
| 26 | Yei River State | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 5.91% | 7.15% | -1.24% |
| 27 | Tambura State | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 4.37% | 0.79% | 3.58% |
| 28 | Gbudwe State | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 3.61% | -3.10% |
| 29 | Amadi State | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.58% | 0.48% |
| 30 | Maridi State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.50% | -0.47% |
| 31 | Imatong State | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 17 | 4.37% | 5.59% | -1.22% |
| 32 | Kapoeta State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 1.80% | 5.40% | -3.60% |
| Sub-total: The Greater Equatoria Region | 13 | 10 | 16 | 16 | 11 | 9 | 13 | 13 | 101 | 25.96% | 31.83% | -5.87% | |
| Overall Total: South Sudan | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100% | 100% | 0.11% | |
| The Old Ten States of the Republic of South Sudan (10 states) | |||||||||||||
| 1 | Jonglei | 16 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 73 | 18.77% | 16.45% | 2.32% |
| 2 | Upper Nile | 6 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 45 | 11.57% | 11.68% | -0.11% |
| 3 | Unity | 2 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 34 | 8.74% | 7.09% | 1.65% |
| 4 | Lakes | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 29 | 7.46% | 8.43% | -0.97% |
| 5 | Warrap | 9 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 64 | 16% | 12% | 4.67% |
| 6 | Northern Bahr el Ghazal | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 18 | 4.63% | 8.73% | -4.10% |
| 7 | Western Bahr el Ghazal | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 6% | 4.04% | 2.39% |
| 8 | Western Equatoria | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 31 | 7.97% | 10.97% | -3.00% |
| 9 | Central Equatoria | 9 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 46 | 12% | 13.36% | -1.53% |
| 10 | Eastern Equatoria | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 24 | 6.17% | 7.50% | -1.33% |
| SUB-TOTAL | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100.00% | 100.03% | -0.03% |
–
Table 7: Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Governments According to the (Old) 79 Counties of South Sudan
| S/No | COUNTY | 1st gov’t | 2nd gov’t | 3rd gov’t | 4th gov’t | 5th gov’t | 6th gov’t | 7th gov’t | 8th gov’t | Number in the gov’t | % of the gov’t | % of the national population | Dominating, Marginalized |
| 1 | Twic East | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.03% | 2.57% |
| 2 | Duk | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.79% | -0.53% |
| 3 | Bor | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 3.86% | 2.68% | 1.18% |
| 4 | Pigi | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.19% | -0.16% |
| 5 | Akobo | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 3.08% | 1.65% | 1.43% |
| 6 | Ayod | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.69% | -0.15% |
| 7 | Fangak | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.29% | 1.33% | -0.04% |
| 8 | Nyirol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.32% | -1.32% |
| 9 | Pibor | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.79% | -0.25% |
| 10 | Uror | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 2.16% | 0.41% |
| 11 | Pochalla | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.80% | -0.80% |
| 12 | Baliet | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.58% | -0.58% |
| 13 | Kodok/Fashoda | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.29% | 0.44% | 0.85% |
| 14 | Longochuk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.76% | -0.76% |
| 15 | Nasir/Luakpiny | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 2.54% | -1.00% |
| 16 | Maban | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.55% | -0.04% |
| 17 | Maiwut | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.96% | -0.45% |
| 18 | Malakal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.53% | -1.53% |
| 19 | Manyo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.46% | 0.05% |
| 20 | Melut | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.59% | 1.47% |
| 21 | Panyikang | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 16 | 4.11% | 0.55% | 3.56% |
| 22 | Renk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.67% | -1.67% |
| 23 | Ulang | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.03% | 0.00% |
| 24 | Abiemnhom | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.21% | -0.21% |
| 25 | Panriang | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 0.99% | 1.58% |
| 26 | Guit | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.39% | 0.38% |
| 27 | Koch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.91% | -0.14% |
| 28 | Leer | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.64% | 1.42% |
| 29 | Mayendit | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.65% | -0.39% |
| 30 | Mayom | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.46% | -1.20% |
| 31 | Panyijar | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.61% | 0.42% |
| 32 | Rubkona | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.21% | -1.21% |
| 33 | Awerial | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.57% | -0.57% |
| 34 | Cueibet | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.43% | -1.17% |
| 35 | Rumbek Center | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 1.86% | -0.06% |
| 36 | Rumbek East | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.49% | 1.34% |
| 37 | Rumbek North | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.53% | -0.53% |
| 38 | Yirol East | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.54% | 0.82% | 0.72% |
| 39 | Yirol West | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.25% | 0.81% |
| 40 | Wulu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.49% | -0.49% |
| 41 | Abyei | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.31% | 0.64% | 1.67% |
| 42 | Gogrial East | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.25% | 0.81% |
| 43 | Gogrial West | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 19 | 4.88% | 2.95% | 1.93% |
| 44 | Tonj East | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.41% | 0.13% |
| 45 | Tonj North | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.00% | -0.20% |
| 46 | Tonj South | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.05% | -0.02% |
| 47 | Twic | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 2.31% | 2.48% | -0.17% |
| 48 | Aweil Center | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.51% | 0.26% |
| 49 | Aweil East | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 3.75% | -2.21% |
| 50 | Aweil North | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1.29% | 1.56% | -0.27% |
| 51 | Aweil South | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 0.89% | 0.65% |
| 52 | Aweil West | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 2.01% | -2.01% |
| 53 | Jur River | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.55% | 1.28% |
| 54 | Raja | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.66% | -0.66% |
| 55 | Wau | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.83% | 1.77% |
| 56 | Ezo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.98% | -0.98% |
| 57 | Ibba | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.51% | -0.51% |
| 58 | Maridi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.99% | 0.04% |
| 59 | Mundri East | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.59% | 0.44% |
| 60 | Mundri West | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.41% | 0.62% |
| 61 | Mvolo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.58% | -0.58% |
| 62 | Nagero | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.12% | -0.12% |
| 63 | Nzara | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.79% | -0.79% |
| 64 | Tambura | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 4.37% | 0.67% | 3.70% |
| 65 | Yambio | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 1.84% | -1.33% |
| 66 | Juba | 5 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 5.91% | 4.46% | 1.45% |
| 67 | Kajo-Keji | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.38% | -0.58% |
| 68 | Lainya | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.08% | 2.52% |
| 69 | Morobo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.25% | -1.25% |
| 70 | Terekeka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.75% | -1.75% |
| 71 | Yei | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 2.44% | -1.93% |
| 72 | Budi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0.77% | 1.20% | -0.43% |
| 73 | Ikotos | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.03% | -1.03% |
| 74 | Kapoeta East | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.99% | -1.99% |
| 75 | Kapoeta North | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.25% | -0.22% |
| 76 | Kapoeta South | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.96% | -0.96% |
| 77 | Lopa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.29% | -1.29% |
| 78 | Magwi | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.54% | 2.06% | -0.52% |
| 79 | Torit | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.21% | 1.62% |
| TOTAL | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100.00% | 99.97% | 0.03% |
–
Table 8: Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Governments According to the (Old) 10 States of South Sudan
| S/No | COUNTY | 1st gov’t | 2nd gov’t | 3rd gov’t | 4th gov’t | 5th gov’t | 6th gov’t | 7th gov’t | 8th gov’t | Number in the gov’t | % of the gov’t | % of the national population | Dominating, Marginalized |
| 1 | Twic East | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.03% | 2.57% |
| 2 | Duk | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.79% | -0.53% |
| 3 | Bor | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 3.86% | 2.68% | 1.18% |
| 4 | Pigi | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.19% | -0.16% |
| 5 | Akobo | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 3.08% | 1.65% | 1.43% |
| 6 | Ayod | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.69% | -0.15% |
| 7 | Fangak | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.29% | 1.33% | -0.04% |
| 8 | Nyirol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.32% | -1.32% |
| 9 | Pibor | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.79% | -0.25% |
| 10 | Uror | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 2.16% | 0.41% |
| 11 | Pochalla | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.80% | -0.80% |
| Jonglei: Total | 16 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 73 | 18.77% | 16.43% | 2.34% | |
| 12 | Baliet | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.58% | -0.58% |
| 13 | Kodok/Fashoda | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.29% | 0.44% | 0.85% |
| 14 | Longochuk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.76% | -0.76% |
| 15 | Nasir/Luakpiny | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 2.54% | -1.00% |
| 16 | Maban | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.55% | -0.04% |
| 17 | Maiwut | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.96% | -0.45% |
| 18 | Malakal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 2% | -1.53% |
| 19 | Manyo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.46% | 0.05% |
| 20 | Melut | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.59% | 1.47% |
| 21 | Panyikang | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 16 | 4.11% | 0.55% | 3.56% |
| 22 | Renk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.67% | -1.67% |
| 23 | Ulang | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.03% | 0.00% |
| Upper Nile: Total | 6 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 45 | 12% | 12% | 0% | |
| 24 | Abiemnhom | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.21% | -0.21% |
| 25 | Panriang | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 0.99% | 1.58% |
| 26 | Guit | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.39% | 0.38% |
| 27 | Koch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.91% | -0.14% |
| 28 | Leer | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.64% | 1.42% |
| 29 | Mayendit | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.65% | -0.39% |
| 30 | Mayom | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.46% | -1.20% |
| 31 | Panyijar | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.61% | 0.42% |
| 32 | Rubkona | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.21% | -1.21% |
| Unity: Total | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 30 | 8% | 7% | 1% | |
| 33 | Awerial | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.57% | -0.57% |
| 34 | Cueibet | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.43% | -1.17% |
| 35 | Rumbek Center | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 1.86% | -0.06% |
| 36 | Rumbek East | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.49% | 1.34% |
| 37 | Rumbek North | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.53% | -0.53% |
| 38 | Yirol East | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.54% | 0.82% | 0.72% |
| 39 | Yirol West | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.25% | 0.81% |
| 40 | Wulu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.49% | -0.49% |
| Lakes: Total | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 33 | 8% | 8% | 0% | |
| 41 | Abyei | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.31% | 0.64% | 1.67% |
| 42 | Gogrial East | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.25% | 0.81% |
| 43 | Gogrial West | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 19 | 4.88% | 2.95% | 1.93% |
| 44 | Tonj East | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.41% | 0.13% |
| 45 | Tonj North | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.00% | -0.20% |
| 46 | Tonj South | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.05% | -0.02% |
| 47 | Twic | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 2.31% | 2.48% | -0.17% |
| Warrap: Total | 9 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 62 | 16% | 12% | 4% | |
| 48 | Aweil Center | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.51% | 0.26% |
| 49 | Aweil East | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 3.75% | -2.21% |
| 50 | Aweil North | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1.29% | 1.56% | -0.27% |
| 51 | Aweil South | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 0.89% | 0.65% |
| 52 | Aweil West | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 2.01% | -2.01% |
| NBEG: Total | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 20 | 5% | 9% | -4% | |
| 53 | Jur River | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.55% | 1.28% |
| 54 | Raja | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.66% | -0.66% |
| 55 | Wau | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.83% | 1.77% |
| WEB: Total | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 6% | 4% | 2% | |
| 56 | Ezo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.98% | -0.98% |
| 57 | Ibba | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.51% | -0.51% |
| 58 | Maridi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.99% | 0.04% |
| 59 | Mundri East | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.59% | 0.44% |
| 60 | Mundri West | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.41% | 0.62% |
| 61 | Mvolo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.58% | -0.58% |
| 62 | Nagero | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.12% | -0.12% |
| 63 | Nzara | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.79% | -0.79% |
| 64 | Tambura | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 4.37% | 0.67% | 3.70% |
| 65 | Yambio | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 1.84% | -1.33% |
| WES: Total | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 31 | 8% | 7% | 0% | |
| 66 | Juba | 5 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 5.91% | 4.46% | 1.45% |
| 67 | Kajo-Keji | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.38% | -0.58% |
| 68 | Lainya | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.08% | 2.52% |
| 69 | Morobo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.25% | -1.25% |
| 70 | Terekeka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.75% | -1.75% |
| 71 | Yei | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.51% | 2.44% | -1.93% |
| CES: Total | 9 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 46 | 12% | 13% | -2% | |
| 72 | Budi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0.77% | 1.20% | -0.43% |
| 73 | Ikotos | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.03% | -1.03% |
| 74 | Kapoeta East | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.99% | -1.99% |
| 75 | Kapoeta North | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.25% | -0.22% |
| 76 | Kapoeta South | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.96% | -0.96% |
| 77 | Lopa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.29% | -1.29% |
| 78 | Magwi | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.54% | 2.06% | -0.52% |
| 79 | Torit | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.21% | 1.62% |
| EES: Total | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 24 | 6% | 11% | -5% | |
| TOTAL | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100.00% | 99.97% | 0.03% |
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Table 9: Summary of Tribocratic Analysis of President Kiir’s Past Governments According to the New 32 States of South Sudan
| S/No | COUNTY | 1st gov’t | 2nd gov’t | 3rd gov’t | 4th gov’t | 5th gov’t | 6th gov’t | 7th gov’t | 8th gov’t | Number in the gov’t | % of the gov’t | % of the national population | Dominating, Marginalized |
| Twic East | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.03% | 2.57% | |
| Duk | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.79% | -0.53% | |
| Bor | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 3.86% | 2.68% | 1.18% | |
| 1 | Jonglei state | 9 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 30 | 7.71% | 4.50% | 3.21% |
| 2 | Akobo state | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 3.08% | 1.65% | 1.43% |
| Ayod | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.55% | 1.69% | -0.14% | |
| Fangak | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.29% | 1.33% | -0.04% | |
| 3 | Fangak state | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2.84% | 3.02% | -0.18% |
| Nyirol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.32% | -1.32% | |
| Uror | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 2.16% | 0.41% | |
| 4 | Bieh state | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 3.48% | -0.91% |
| Pibor | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.55% | 1.79% | -0.24% | |
| Pochalla | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.80% | -0.80% | |
| 5 | Boma state | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.55% | 2.59% | -1.04% |
| Baliet | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.58% | -0.58% | |
| Pigi | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.19% | -0.16% | |
| Panyikang | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 16 | 4.12% | 0.55% | 3.57% | |
| 6 | Central Upper Nile State | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 5.15% | 2.32% | 2.83% |
| Longochuk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.76% | -0.76% | |
| Maiwut | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.52% | 0.96% | -0.44% | |
| 7 | Maiwut State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.52% | 1.72% | -1.20% |
| Ulang | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.03% | 0.00% | |
| Nasir/Luakpiny | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 1.55% | 2.54% | -0.99% | |
| 8 | Latjor State | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2.58% | 3.57% | -0.99% |
| Malakal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.53% | -1.53% | |
| Manyo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0.51% | 0.46% | 0.05% | |
| Kodok/Fashoda | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.29% | 0.44% | 0.85% | |
| 9 | Fashoda State | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.43% | -0.63% |
| Melut | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.59% | 1.47% | |
| Maban | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.52% | 0.55% | -0.03% | |
| Renk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.67% | -1.67% | |
| 10 | Northern Upper Nile State | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 2.81% | -0.24% |
| Abiemnhom | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.21% | -0.21% | |
| Panriang | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 0.99% | 1.58% | |
| 11 | Ruweng State | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.57% | 1.20% | 1.37% |
| Guit | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.39% | 0.38% | |
| Koch | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.91% | -0.14% | |
| Mayom | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.46% | -1.20% | |
| Rubkona | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.21% | -1.21% | |
| 12 | Northern Liech State | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 1.80% | 3.97% | -2.17% |
| Panyijar | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.61% | 0.42% | |
| Leer | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 0.64% | 1.42% | |
| Mayendit | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 0.65% | -0.39% | |
| 13 | Southern Liech State | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 3.34% | 1.90% | 1.44% |
| 14 | Gok State | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.26% | 1.43% | -1.17% |
| Rumbek Center | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 1.86% | -0.06% | |
| Rumbek East | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.49% | 1.34% | |
| Rumbek North | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.53% | -0.53% | |
| Wulu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.49% | -0.49% | |
| 15 | Western Lakes State | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 4.63% | 4.37% | 0.26% |
| Yirol East | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.54% | 0.82% | 0.72% | |
| Yirol West | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.25% | 0.81% | |
| Awerial | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.49% | -0.49% | |
| 16 | Eastern Lakes State | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 2.56% | 1.04% |
| Gogrial East | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.25% | 0.81% | |
| Gogrial West | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 19 | 4.88% | 2.95% | 1.93% | |
| 17 | Gogrial State | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 27 | 6.94% | 4.20% | 2.74% |
| Tonj East | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 1.41% | 0.13% | |
| Tonj North | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.00% | -0.20% | |
| Tonj South | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.05% | -0.02% | |
| 18 | Tonj State | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 4.37% | 4.46% | -0.09% |
| Twic | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 2.31% | 2.48% | -0.17% | |
| Abyei | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.32% | 0.64% | 1.68% | |
| 19 | Twic State | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 18 | 4.63% | 3.12% | 1.51% |
| Aweil Center | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0.77% | 0.51% | 0.26% | |
| Aweil South | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.29% | 0.89% | 0.40% | |
| 20 | Aweil State | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.06% | 1.40% | 0.66% |
| 21 | Aweil East State | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1.54% | 3.75% | -2.21% |
| Aweil North | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1.29% | 1.56% | -0.27% | |
| Raja | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.66% | -0.66% | |
| Aweil West | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 2.01% | -2.01% | |
| 22 | Lol State | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1.29% | 4.23% | -2.94% |
| Jur River | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.55% | 1.28% | |
| Wau | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.83% | 1.77% | |
| 23 | Wau State | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 6.43% | 3.38% | 3.05% |
| Ibba | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.51% | -0.51% | |
| Maridi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.99% | 0.04% | |
| 24 | Maridi State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.50% | -0.47% |
| Mundri East | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.59% | 0.44% | |
| Mundri West | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1.03% | 0.41% | 0.62% | |
| Mvolo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.58% | -0.58% | |
| 25 | Amadi State | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2.06% | 1.58% | 0.48% |
| Yambio | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.52% | 1.84% | -1.32% | |
| Ezo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.98% | -0.98% | |
| Nzara | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.79% | -0.79% | |
| 26 | Gbudwe State | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.52% | 3.61% | -3.09% |
| Tambura | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 4.37% | 0.67% | 3.70% | |
| Nagero | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.12% | -0.12% | |
| 27 | Tambura State | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 4.37% | 0.79% | 3.58% |
| 28 | Jubek State | 5 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 5.91% | 4.46% | 1.45% |
| Kajo-Keji | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1.80% | 2.38% | -0.58% | |
| Lainya | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 3.60% | 1.08% | 2.52% | |
| Morobo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.25% | -1.25% | |
| Yei | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.52% | 2.44% | -1.92% | |
| 29 | Yei River State | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 5.91% | 7.15% | -1.24% |
| 30 | Terekeka State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.75% | -1.75% |
| Budi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0.77% | 1.20% | -0.43% | |
| Kapoeta East | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.99% | -1.99% | |
| Kapoeta North | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1.03% | 1.25% | -0.22% | |
| Kapoeta South | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 0.96% | -0.96% | |
| 31 | Kapoeta State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 1.80% | 5.40% | -3.60% |
| Ikotos | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.03% | -1.03% | |
| Lopa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00% | 1.29% | -1.29% | |
| Magwi | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.54% | 2.06% | -0.52% | |
| Torit | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 2.83% | 1.21% | 1.62% | |
| 32 | Imatong State | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 17 | 4.37% | 5.59% | -1.22% |
| TOTAL | 56 | 41 | 63 | 61 | 40 | 38 | 46 | 44 | 389 | 100% | 100% | 0% |
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